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Introduction 
 
This report presents a summary of the BC Post Disaster Building Damage Assessment (PDBA) project.   
The BC PDBA research project was an applied research project conducted through a partnership 
between BC Housing, Justice Institute of British Columbia (JIBC), the Professional Engineers and 
Geoscientists of BC, and the Architectural Institute of British Columbia (AIBC). This two year project was 
funded through the Canadian Safety and Security Program, a federal program of Defence Research and 
Development Canada’s Centre for Security Science, in partnership with Public Safety Canada.  
The PDBA project developed a building damage and safety assessment framework and 
recommendations, along with companion resources and references to support provincial and 
community-level PDBA planning. In addition, the project fostered the inauguration of a provincial PDBA 
Advisory Committee. The goal of PDBA is to enable communities in an emergency to more rapidly 
assess the safety of structures and allow people to remain in, or return to their homes and businesses 
as soon as possible. This will reduce the social impact of such events, allowing communities to recover 
more quickly, and reducing the impact on emergency and social service resources.  
Research outcomes included the tools, models, processes and approaches to empower community-
level professional and public engagement in emergency planning and safety assessment. Specifically, 
the research team developed 1) a provincial framework and recommendations for post-disaster 
building assessment (see the BC PDBA Framework and Recommendations and 2) a model that allows 
credentialed and trained non-credentialed personnel to perform safety assessment in an emergency 
situation (the BC PDBA Assessment Matrix; see the BC PDBA Framework and Recommendations, 
Appendix 2), and 3) establishment of a BC Post Disaster Building Assessment Advisory Committee.  
The research embraced a “system of systems” approach to guiding building damage safety assessment 
in a provincial context that can be applied at various scales across small and large, rural and urban 
communities throughout Canada. While the initial project focused on the BC context, processes and 
resources were developed to be adaptable and scalable for implementation across Canada and 
internationally. The second goal of this project was to develop a network of stakeholder organizations 
to implement, sustain, and enrich the resulting process over time. 
The objectives of the research program were to: 
(a) Develop a provincial framework for building damage and safety assessment through research, 
consultation and collaboration with stakeholders and practitioners.  
(b) Develop a community-level framework to empower professional (credentialed) and public (non-
credentialed) personnel to engage in emergency planning and building damage and safety 
assessment. 
(c) Establish a sustainable network of stakeholder organizations to guide, deliver, and sustain the 
resulting suite of processes, approaches, and resources. 
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Research Questions 
The research questions focus on two areas: gathering data on existing building damage safety 
assessment programs and exploring the experience of those who have used them.  
Part I: Building Damage Safety Assessment (PDBA) Framework 
How does Building Damage Safety Assessment fit within the overall Emergency Management planning 
and response structure? 
 Who has the overall (e.g., legislative) responsibility for PDBA? 
 Who are the stakeholders groups involving in developing, implementing and sustaining PDBA 
processes and infrastructure? 
 What are the roles and relationships between stakeholders in PDBA? 
 
Describe the elements/structure of existing PDBA programs. 
 What is the overall goal of PDBA? 
 What types of PDBA are performed, by whom, with what goals/outcomes, and following what 
procedures or processes? 
 How is PDBA information gathered, recorded, transferred, and employed?  
 What are the credentials, background, &/or experience required to perform each type of PDBA? 
 What training and/or education is available to support personnel performing PDBA? 
 Is there a performance standard identified for how PDBA is carried out and is there a different 
standard used for PDBA’s carried out by credentialed and non-credentialed individuals? 
 Are credentialed and non-credentialed individuals carrying out PDBA’s fully indemnified against 
any liability or from claims being made against them?  
 
Describe the administration and control of PDBA. 
 Who has operational control or administration of PDBA? 
 How are PDBA teams and personnel recruited, selected, operationalized, and supported? 
 
Describe the context for PDBA in your jurisdiction: history, evolution, and current state. 
 How have PDBA processes evolved to incorporate experience, best and emerging practices? 
 What are the key assumptions or principles upon which your PDBA program is based? 
 Why has it developed the way it has (e.g., political considerations, experience, etc)? 
 
Part II: Participants’ Experience in Building Damage Safety Assessment 
Please describe your recent experience in using PDBA. 
 Describe the event: location, timing, extent of damage, etc. 
 Describe the operational functioning of PDBA: who managed/administered the overall process, 
who identified indicator buildings (and what process was used to identify these buildings), who 
set operational priorities, what were the operational principles on which decisions were based? 
6.9.1e TECHNICAL REPORT 
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 Describe recruitment, deployment and use of PDBA teams. 
 Describe extent of PDBA: # of teams, composition, selection, logistics, timeline, # buildings 
assessed, and outcomes of assessment. 
 Were PDBA’s carried out in order to confirm that buildings actually met a certain performance 
level? 
 What types of information were collected, how was information recorded, where did 
information “go,” and what types of decisions did information influence? 
 Describe the actual performance of PDBA in comparison to your planned response: what 
worked, what didn’t, what would you change? 
 
The “Blue Sky” question: what would an ideal PDBA program “look like”? 
 Based on your experience, what would an ideal PDBA program “look like?” 
 What are the strengths and challenges with your current PDBA program? 
 What changes are you currently making in PDBA processes and infrastructure? 
 What changes would you like to make? What keeps you from making these changes? 
 What advice would you give us regarding development of a PDBA process for the British 
Columbia context? 
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Methods 
Design 
This pragmatic, applied research project employed concurrent mixed methods and an emergent design, 
bringing together an interdisciplinary group of researchers, emergency management, architectural, 
engineering, and education experts.  
The project consisted of three phases (see Figure 1. Research Design): 
 Phase I: Description and exploration of existing building assessment (BA) models and systems to 
identify leading practices and gaps in practice, employing several data collection streams: 
o Literature review 
o Key Informant Interviews 
o Visit to Exemplar Site 
o Stakeholder Workshop 
o Consultation with Expert Working Group members 
 Phase II: Analysis and synthesis to describe operational building assessment processes, explore 
current and best practices, and develop evidence-informed recommendations to support a BC-
based process. Development and dissemination of a draft framework describing selected 
aspects and considerations for national/provincial, regional, local authorities, and individual 
team members who are conducting post-disaster building assessment.  
 Phase III: Validation and development of production-versions of the BC PDBA Framework and 
Recommendations and Companion Manual of resources and references.  
 
 
Figure 1. Research Design. 
Data Collection 
Data sources included: 
 Relevant peer reviewed and professional/trade literature 
 Professional, operational, and educational documentation and processes 
 Documents describing relevant case studies and post-event debriefings 
 Transcripts and documentation from interactions with key informants  
 Artefacts from stakeholder engagement workshops and activities, including presentation 
material, handouts, worksheets, flip charts, wall notes, and discussion summaries 
6.9.1e TECHNICAL REPORT 
METHODS 
17 
 
 Researcher field notes, journals, and discussion summaries 
 
The project employed multiple strategies to gather and interpret data.  
An initial literature review used common academic search procedures of online databases and physical 
journals, supplemented by inspection of relevant literature identified by members of the research team, 
hand searches of relevant journals, and following citations and references within the literature. In 
addition, researchers surveyed websites and sought additional resources from personnel within key 
organizations and agencies involved in PBDA. While initially focusing on peer-reviewed literature, the 
researchers quickly shifted focus to professional and operational sources, supplemented with publically 
available reports from news and popular media.  
Five members of the research team conducted a seven-day site visit to New Zealand, meeting with 
individuals and groups from Auckland, Christchurch, the Kaikoura region, and Wellington. Team 
members gathered data through email correspondence (pre- and post-visit), semi-structured interviews 
and presentations with individuals and groups, field visits, a workshop, and informal discussions. In 
addition, team members met each morning to review and plan for upcoming sessions, and at the end of 
each day to summarize and document key take-aways and identify areas and opportunities for further 
exploration. 
Stakeholder Workshop. The research team conducted a one-day workshop with key stakeholders in 
British Columbia’s emergency management and building assessment community. The session consisted 
of presentations from national and international experts, followed by a series of structured activities 
designed to identify stakeholder expectations, needs, and capabilities related to the current and desired 
state of PDBA in BC.  
Expert Working Group Workshop. A sub-group of the Stakeholder workshop remained and participated 
in a second day of structured workshop activity aimed at consolidating, validating, and extending 
information gathered from the Stakeholder Workshop. The Expert Working Group consisted of the 
research team, several international experts, and selected BC stakeholders.  
Throughout Phase I, the research team met on a regular basis to review incoming data, conduct interim 
discussions and activities aimed at categorizing and developing an initial understanding of the data. The 
field notes, notes and minutes from team meetings and artefacts from these sessions became an 
additional source of data and, following an emergent design approach, allowed the team to focus and 
adapt subsequent data collection. In particular, the research team continually assessed the data and 
emerging areas of exploration for effective saturation (e.g., when little or no new information on a 
question was being obtained through subsequent data collection) and for gaps (e.g., areas where little 
or no data was being obtained). While the team continued to collect data on all questions when 
available, data collection was strategically focused to explore gaps and areas of specific interest.  
Following initial data gathering in Phase I, the research team engaged in a series of Structured 
Conversations to analyze and synthesize the findings-to-date. The research team conducted five 
sessions (the structured conversations) to explore, analyze, and synthesize the data with the goal of 
establishing guiding principles, exploring core concepts, developing a structure for the BC PDBA 
framework, and identifying requirements for key elements of the framework. 
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Analysis 
The researchers employed an inductive, thematic analysis approach, based on principles of grounded 
theory (Chamaz, 2014; Corbin & Strauss, 2014) with the goal of identifying effective processes to 
support an integrated approach to building damage and safety assessment. Data from Phase I was 
combined, then organized and coded both against the research questions and for emergent themes.  
This data was further analyzed across the coding categories to identify and/or develop: 
 Key points that would inform development of the BC PDBA framework (e.g., importance of data 
management, etc.) 
 Strategies, principles, guidelines, and concepts which participants used to make decisions within 
their own PDBA processes and experience (e.g., “don’t rush in; set up administrative structures 
before brining personnel into the area”) 
 Core concepts and emerging themes (e.g., the concept of “building status” in contrast to a 
building’s “placard,” etc.)  
 Elements, knowledge structures, and information that will be required to inform the BC 
framework (e.g., taxonomies of building types, etc.) 
 Recommendations for the BC framework (both explicit recommendations made by participants 
and recommendations developed by the research team), which formed the basis for the 
structured conversations. 
 
Finally, the research team analyzed the research questions, existing frameworks, and core concepts to 
develop a structure and approach for writing the BC PDBA framework. 
Project Outputs 
The project generated a substantial body of data and numerous outputs (see Figure 2. Overall Research 
Project Components and Deliverables): 
 6.1.1 Project Plan 
 6.1.2  BC Building Damage Safety Assessment  Research Protocol 
 6.1.3 Ethics Approval certificate 
 6.1.4 Workshop Participants and Travel List 
 6.2.1 Needs Analysis:  Literature Review  Report 
 6.3.1 Stakeholder Participant and Travel List  
 6.3.2 Workshop Agenda 
 6.3.3 Stakeholder Workshop Report 
 6.4 Needs Analysis Final Report 
 6.5.1 Analysis and Synthesis Report 
 6.6.1 and 6.6.2 Draft BC PDBA Framework and Recommendations  
 6.7.1 Validation Workshop Report  
 6.7.2 Draft Provincial and Community Level Framework & Resources 
 6.7.3 Final versions of BC PDBA Framework and Recommendations and Companion Document: 
Resources and References 
 6.8.1 TOR for PDBA Advisory Committee 
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 6.8.2 Inaugural Advisory Committee Report  
 6.8.3 White paper on DA Framework 
 6.8.4 Presentation(s) for peer-level conference (MATILDA, EPBC, and NCSEER) 
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Figure 2. Overall Research Project Components and Deliverables. 
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The following sections provide detailed information on the various phases and activities in the research 
project. Note that the sections are presented in chronological order and this differs from the numerical 
ordering of the Deliverables.  
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Deliverable 6.1: Project Initiation 
 
The first phase of the project involved establishing a detailed project plan, developing the research 
protocol, and obtaining ethical approval for the project.  
Please refer to the following project documents to review the project initiation deliverables: 
 6.1.1 Project Plan 
 6.1.2  BC Building Damage Safety Assessment  Research Protocol 
 6.1.3 Ethics Approval certificate 
 6.1.4 Workshop Participants and Travel List (for the Stakeholder Workshop and Expert Working 
Group) 
The key element of the project plan was a detailed task and timeline (Appendix 1: Project Gantt Chart). 
The research protocol is outlined in Appendix 2. 
The project received ethical approval and oversight from the Justice Institute of British Columbia 
Research Ethics Board (see Appendix 3: Ethics Certificate). 
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Deliverable 6.2.1: Needs Analysis:  Literature Review   
The Literature Review consisted of two components: a traditional academic literature review and a 
more focused review of post disaster building assessment in operation through the lens of several case 
studies.  
An initial literature review used common academic search procedures of online databases and physical 
journals, supplemented by inspection of relevant literature identified by members of the research team, 
hand searches of relevant journals, and following citations and references within the literature. In 
addition, researchers surveyed websites and sought additional resources from personnel within key 
organizations and agencies involved in PBDA. While initially focusing on peer-reviewed literature, the 
researchers quickly shifted focus to professional and operational sources, supplemented with publically 
available reports from news and popular media.  
Initial scoping surveys found limited academic and peer-reviewed literature on the subject of building 
damage safety assessment (PDBA). Much of this literature was situated in structural and earthquake 
engineering, often with descriptions of PDBA given as background on articles that then looked at a 
variety of topics such common damage patterns (such as Yamazaki, 2000). A second body of literature 
was found that discussed emergency management, response, and recovery associated with specific 
disasters and emergencies (see, for example CERC 0004.01, 2011). Again, this literature spoke about 
PDBA as an aspect of responding to the emergency, but did not often examine the processes 
themselves. A further set of educational and professional literature was found that forms the tools and 
resources that make up or support specific PDBA programs (see MBIE, 2014a).  
The key outputs of the literature review included: 
 Data extraction tables, identifying key information related to the research questions 
 Case Studies, with an annotated list of resources describing PDBA systems and operations 
following events in New Zealand, Italy, and Japan 
 A list of key gaps or areas requiring further investigation 
Objectives 
The overall research project sought to meet three objectives, one of which is pertinent to the literature 
review component: 
 Provide information on the overall context of building damage safety assessment and its 
relationship with the broader field of emergency management 
 
In addition, the research team examined literature related to specific PDBA programs and case studies 
showing PDBA in practice. The specific goals of literature review was to: 
 Provide an overall context for the development of PDBA processes for British Columbia 
 Identify data that would inform the research questions 
 Identify gaps in the data to be explored through ongoing literature review, key informant 
interviews, a site visit, and workshops with stakeholders in BC PDBA 
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Methods 
The literature review employed three strategies: 
 Traditional key word search using Academic Search Premier and EBSCO databases 
 Identification of key resources from research team members 
 Snowball strategy, including review of citations in key articles, searches on authors of exemplar 
articles, suggestions from journal sites, and hand searches of selected journals 
 
Titles, key words, and selected abstracts were reviewed for articles identified through all strategies.  
Results 
Overview 
An initial search strategy generated substantial numbers of hits, but only five articles that directly 
addressed building assessment processes. The researchers then searched for known events, such as 
recent earthquakes in Italy, Japan, and New Zealand. This strategy again generated large numbers of 
initial hits, but few that described building assessment procedures in any detail. Finally, the research 
team pooled articles and resources gathered from their personal and professional experience, 
supplemented by hand searches of references lists and non-obvious articles by known building 
assessment authors. In all, 36 articles were identified for in-depth analysis. A review of professional and 
educational literature from known PDBA programs, educational programs, and related professional 
associations (e.g., engineering, architecture) was more successful. In total, 194 articles were identified 
for initial review, and 43 articles were analysed in depth. Two sets of data emerged from the literature 
review – comparative descriptions of BA processes from several exemplar systems and a list of “gaps” 
that served to focus further data collection.  
Table 1. Literature Review Search Strategies. 
Sources Hits 
Academic Documents   
 UBC databases 6,211  
 JIBC “Search Me” aggregator 53,453  
 Limiters: English language, full text, peer reviewed/academic journals, 
published between 2002 and 2017 
3.446  
 Subjects areas: earthquake, natural disaster, hurricane, risk assessment  36 
 Selected for analysis 5 
Case study, professional and operational documents  
 Documents identified 189 
 Selected for analysis 38 
Total documents for analysis 43 
 
Search Strategies 
An initial search using “damage assessment” was conducted using all online databases from the 
University of British Columbia on March 1, 2017, resulting in 6,211 hits. A similar search using the Justice 
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Institute of British Columbia’s “Search Me” aggregator resulted in 53,453. The search was narrowed to 
English-language articles in peer-reviewed and academic journals, with full text availability within the 
last 15 years (2002 -2017), which reduced the total to 3,446 hits.  
This initial search on damage assessment not useful, as the range of topics was too broad. A subject 
search on the results had the following selected findings: ecological (biology) 478, environmental impact 
102), US 55, environmental monitoring 45, anthropogenic effects on nature 39, ecological survey 35, 
Biotic communities 32, ecology 32, etc. The following subjects were pulled out as most likely related to 
building damage assessment: earthquakes 7, natural disasters 6, hurricanes 9, risk assessment 14. After 
abstract review, only 5 of the resulting articles were related to building damage assessment.  
A second strategy involved searching for known events, such as the Great Eastern Earthquake (Japan), 
the 2011 earthquakes in Italy, and the 2010/2011 earthquakes in Canterbury, New Zealand. Combining 
these events with terms such as damage assessment, building damage assessment, and emergency 
management continued to generate a substantial number of related articles, but few that addressed 
building damage assessment directly. The majority of these articles discussed specific damage patterns, 
damage to specific types of structures (e.g., reinforced concrete, or historical buildings, or lifeline 
infrastructure), or performing large-scale damage assessment using various forms of monitoring 
technology, GIS, and satellite imagery, without substantial discussion on the process of assessment of 
individual buildings on the ground. However, some of these articles did include descriptions of PDBA 
processes, or elements of those processes in the introductions or context-setting sections. 
Approximately 46 articles were gathered for abstract and full review.  
A more productive line of research was found through exemplar articles identified by team members 
and through review of professional documentation related to specific incidents. Several team members 
submitted lists of articles and documents that they had encountered in their professional work. These 
were added to the pool of sources for abstract and full review. 
One particularly useful series of documents emerged from the Canterbury Earthquakes Royal 
Commission Document Library for Building Assessments, which contained 57 documents related to the 
Canterbury earthquakes. These included formal submissions from key stakeholders (e.g., Civil Defence 
and Emergency Management, New Zealand Society for Earthquake Engineers, etc), and from specific 
personnel involved in PDBA. Several key documents were identified from this list. It’s important to note 
that many of the documents are linked and self-referential – some are responses to initial reports, 
others use each other as reference points.  
Throughout the search and review process, individual articles were reviewed for citations and links to 
additional sources. Promising documents were located through online databases including UBC, JIBC, 
and Google Scholar. Documents that were related to building damage assessment were added for 
abstract and full review.  
By March 20, 2017, over 194 articles had been identified for further review. After title and abstract 
review, 43 articles were selected for more in-depth review. Throughout the review, the snowball 
strategy was employed to continue identifying potential sources. Note also, that not all documents were 
reviewed in-depth. As noted with the Canterbury articles, it was found that that many articles had very 
limited information on PDBA, or referred and relied upon related documents, or added no new 
information.  
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Findings 
The source articles were analyzed and categorized into three sections: building damage assessment 
(generally), case studies, and specific programs. Key concepts, quotes, and content were identified, then 
extracted into data tables based on the research questions. This data formed the basis of a series 
resources that were then thematically analyzed. In addition, these data tables became an important 
source of information used throughout the research project to explore specific concepts and themes.  
PDBA Program Summaries 
The research team developed an initial icon-based informatics-style graphic identifying the key elements 
of PDBA. This initial model was used to create similar graphic images for several of the PDBA programs 
analysed in the literature review. These summaries are integrated in the Data Tables and Case Studies in 
the following section. 
Data Tables 
The Literature Review generated a series of data tables and case studies, which are presented in this 
document in Appendices 4.1 to 4.9:  
New Zealand 
Appendix 4.1: New Zealand Article Review Data Extraction 
Appendix 4.2: New Zealand PDBA Processes (2010/11 and 2014) 
Appendix 4.2.1: New Zealand Building Damage Safety Assessment Process 2010 
Appendix 4.2.2: New Zealand Building Damage Safety Assessment Process 2014 
Appendix 4.3: New Zealand Case Study: Christchurch Canterbury New Zealand Earthquakes 2010, 2011 
Italy 
Appendix 4.4: Article Review Data Extraction, Italy 
Appendix 4.5: Italy Building Damage Safety Assessment Process 
Appendix 4.6: Italy 2009 – 2011 Case Studies 
Japan 
Appendix 4.7: Article Review Data Extraction: Japan 
Appendix 4.8: Japan Building Damage Safety Assessment Process 
ATC 
Appendix 4.9: ATC Building Damage Safety Assessment Process  
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General impressions 
Very few articles were found in the academic literature that directly addressed the research questions in 
this study.  
As noted above the majority of the found literature is situated in structural and earthquake engineering. 
These articles usually address types of damage that occurred to specific types of structures (e.g. 
reinforced concrete buildings or historical buildings), damage to infrastructure, or use of seismic 
monitoring and imagery technology to determine both overall damage patterns and damage to specific 
buildings.  
A series of articles and presentations were uncovered that compared various PDBA processes. These 
provide one of the more useful sets of resources for this project.  
The most promising documents are reports and professional documents that either describe the 
emergency management and damage assessment processes after specific incidents (in particular, the 
documents that describe the Canterbury earthquakes of 2010/2011) and field guides for specific PDBA 
programs, such as the New Zealand model and ATC-20. 
Surprisingly few articles were found that could support study of specific cases. The New Zealand case 
provided the most in-depth example and source of documents describing PDBA. Several articles were 
found on the Italian earthquakes of 2011. While many articles were found on Japan, 2011, very few 
provided any meaningful data for this study. 
Program description data was found for New Zealand, Italy, Japan (very limited), and ATC. Other 
documents include data on Greece and several other European models, but this has not been reviewed 
in-depth in this report. However, the documents are included as potential data for further analysis in the 
project.  
Very few articles were found within an architecture context, and the ones that did show up tended to 
discuss damage to types of buildings, rather than the use of architects in PDBA.  
Note that the majority of sources focused on earthquake, with a smaller set of articles and resources on 
flooding and/or tsunami. Individual articles were seen on other hazards such as tornado, hurricane, 
terrorist activity; however, these articles did not contain references to PDBA. The research team is 
encouraged to continue to look for resources that go beyond earthquake response.   
Key Themes and Topics 
The findings of the Needs Analysis Report are included as a series of tables in the Case Study and 
Program in the Deliverable 6.2.1 Needs Analysis: Literature Review Report. The tables are based on the 
project’s research questions. Data that will guide the research team in developing a PDBA process for 
British Columbia was found on the following topics: 
 Relationship of PDBA to overall emergency management 
 Legislative authority for PDBA and roles of stakeholders at various levels (e.g., senior government 
to local stakeholders) 
 Goals and elements of several PDBA programs 
 Types of PDBA assessments 
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 Use of placarding systems 
 Outcomes of PDBA assessments and placard categories 
 Types of buildings associated with specific types of PDBA assessment 
 Recording and reporting of information 
 Types of personnel involved in PDBA (somewhat limited) 
 Liability (limited) 
 Procedures for different types of PDBA assessments 
 
Three particularly useful sets of data in the tables are sections on “Principles and Guidelines” which 
outline how various types of decisions were made, elements that should be in a PDBA process, and 
recommendations for changes to PDBA based on cases. Specifically, several sources noted the 
importance of having examples of specific types of damage associated with key decisions/categories. 
The recommendations from the Canterbury earthquakes were identified as key data studied for 
adaptation to the BC context.  
Gaps  
However, there are substantial gaps in the literature that was reviewed. The following topics required 
additional data, much of which was obtained from ongoing literature and document review, key 
informant interviews, exemplar site visits, and stakeholder consultation: 
 Ownership and sustainability of PDBA processes, both specifically and within the overall context 
of emergency management  
 Building taxonomies (various descriptions of types of buildings exist, but not what types of 
personnel can conduct those assessments) 
 Procedures for assessment of specific types of buildings 
 Fit of PDBA with transition to recovery 
 Management of placards over time (e.g., who can modify/change/remove, etc.) 
 Overlap of PDBA with USAR and other rescue/response activities 
 Personnel 
o Types of personnel involved in PDBA 
o Desired credentials or certification 
o Use of non-credentialed personnel in PDBA 
o Recruitment of personnel for PDBA 
o Prior training  
o Just-in-time training and/or preparation for PDBA 
o Liability for personnel involved in PDBA 
 PDBA Operations: 
o Overall management of PDBA 
o Decision-making and priority determination 
o Logistics and dispatching of PDBA teams 
o Data collection 
o Data reporting 
o Data management 
o Use of data in subsequent decision-making 
o Use of technology in data management 
o Team size and composition 
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Authors’ conclusions 
This literature review uncovered multiple sources of data that can guide the development of the British 
Columbia PDBA program. In particular, the Canterbury earthquake case study and program documents 
are exceptionally relevant and useful.  
Please refer to Deliverable 6.2.1 Needs Analysis: Literature Review for additional information. 
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Deliverable 6.4: Needs Analysis: Site Visit 
Overview 
The project team conducted a site visit to New Zealand in May, 2017. The site visit consisted of 
interviews, focus group sessions, workshops, and field trips to Auckland, Christchurch, Kaikoura region, 
and Wellington. The team met with representatives from government, local governments, professional 
associations, agencies and individuals who participated in recent post-earthquake building assessment 
and those who developed and manage the New Zealand PDBA processes. 
The initial project plan conceived of a site visit as an opportunity to visit either an incident in progress or 
an exemplary system (based on the case study analysis conducted in the literature review). The 
Research Team determined that there were no appropriate incidents-in-progress during the initial 
phases of the project and that a visit to an exemplar site/program would generate higher quality and 
more useful data for the project.  
Data collection methods for the site visit included a series of formal and informal meetings and 
presentations from both the research team and participants, a focused “workshop” session employing 
interactive sessions to obtain specific information related to the research questions, one-on-one 
discussions, and question and answer sessions. This data was analyzed using content and thematic 
analysis strategies with a particular focus on identifying and development recommendations for 
development and implementation of PDBA procedures, best practices, and suggestions for adaptation.  
The site visit generated a substantial body of raw data, primarily in the form of text-based notes and 
files. The most important findings from the site visit were extracted in the form of recommendations 
and key points for consideration. These recommendations were consolidated, then coded against key 
research questions and topics. To review the full list of recommendations, please refer to Deliverable 6.4 
Needs Analysis: Site Visit, Appendix 5: Recommendations.  
Site Selection 
The team conducted initial investigations into the logistics and potential liability issues regarding visiting 
an incident-in-progress and determined that the most useful time to visit an incident would be several 
weeks to months after the initial phases of the incident. This would ensure that travel and 
accommodation would be available without impacting local residents, allow the team to see the building 
assessment process in a mature enough state to evaluate yet still be in progress, and offer the best 
opportunity to engage assessors and managers of the BA program.  
The team reviewed the project timelines and noted that the latest the team could visit such a site and 
be able to incorporate the data into analysis would be late summer, 2017. No appropriate incidents had 
been identified by May, 2017. The research team agreed that it would be beneficial to have the site visit 
data before the Expert Working Group and Stakeholder workshops were held (scheduled for June, 
2017). In addition, the team was uncomfortable with adding logistical complexity to communities in the 
midst of dealing with a disaster. 
Therefore, the team decided that a visit to an exemplar site would be a more beneficial approach. 
Several programs were considered, including Japan, California, Ecuador, Italy, and New Zealand. New 
Zealand was chosen for several reasons, including the: 
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 Nature of the New Zealand earthquake events since 2010, with several large earthquakes, 
allowing for comparison of a single BA processes in different communities,   
 Ability to assess adaptations of the New Zealand process across several instances, 
 Similarity of New Zealand’s culture, governance structures, and building codes with BC, 
 Abundance of professional documentation and governmental reports describing the New 
Zealand experience, and  
 Availability of personnel in New Zealand who were willing to work with the research team. 
 
The research team worked with personnel from Christchurch City Council, New Zealand Civil Defence 
and Emergency Management, the University of Canterbury, and the New Zealand Ministry of Business, 
Innovation, and Employment to establish a time frame and logistics for a visit from 9 – 19 June, 2017. 
Team members included a representative from each partner organization, the lead investigator, and a 
second researcher: 
 Dr. Ron Bowles, JIBC 
 Steven Bibby, BC Housing 
 Peter Learoyd, JIBC 
 Peter Mitchell, APEGBC 
 Robyn Fenton, AIBC 
 Dawn Ursuliak, JIBC 
 
New Zealand Case Description 
The site visit focused on two earthquake events: the Canterbury (aka Darfield) earthquake series that 
initiated in September 4, 2010 and the Kaikoura earthquake of November 14, 2016.  
Canterbury (Darfield) Earthquakes 
New Zealand has a fairly active history of earthquakes, with over 55 events of magnitude 6.5 or greater 
between 1840 and 2011 (Cooper et al., 2012). The initial incident involved a magnitude 7.1 earthquake 
at 0435, 4 September, 2010, with an epicentre 40 km west of central Christchurch. Chirstchurch City 
Countil (CCC), along with neighbouring communities, inspected nearly 8,000 buildings in the first week 
following the event. A second earthquake – a magnitude 4.1 aftershock – occurred at 1030 26 
December, 2011 with an epicentre 1.8 km from Christchurch Cathedral in central Christchurch. 177 
buildings were re-evaluated after this event (CERC, 2012). Over 7,000 aftershock occurred in the 
following calendar year (Gallagher, Lizundia, & Barnes, 2011). On February 22, 2011, central 
Christchurch was severely damaged with extensive loss of life by a magnitude 6.2 aftershock with an 
epicentre 6 km southwest of the central business district (CBD) (Gallagher et al., 2011). Two significant 
aftershocks occurred on June 13, 2011 (M 5.7 and 6.0). While moderate damage occurred in the initial 
event, the subsequent aftershocks resulted in substantial damage – in particular “catastrophic damage” 
in the CBD and liquefaction which affected large suburban areas of the city, as well as significant loss of 
life (Gallagher et al., 2011).   
Kaikoura Earthquake  
The Kaikoura earthquake refers to a magnitude 7.8 earthquake that occurred near the north-east region 
of the South Island at 1102 on 13 November, 2016. This event caused substantial damage, including 
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“extreme surface displacements, land deformations and surface ground motions … , as well as a regional 
tsunami and triggered major slow slip events” (Wotherspoon, Palermo, & Holden, 2017, p. i). Similar to 
the Christchurch events, over 8,000 aftershocks were recorded in the following five months 
(Wotherspoon et al., 2017). The event was felt across New Zealand, resulting in damage in the Kaikoura 
region, extending to Wellington on the North Island (Wotherspoon et al., 2017).  
New Zealand continues to experience seismic activity on an ongoing basis. In fact, the research team 
experienced a magnitude 4.8 event in Christchurch on their first evening in Christchurch.  
New Zealand’s approach to building damage assessment evolved across these events. A modified 
version of the ATC 20 guidelines were in use following the initial 2010 Darfield event. These procedures 
were modified based on experience and the Ministry of Business, Innovation, and Employment (MBIE) 
now maintains a set of field guides for earthquakes and floods that incorporate a richer, more nuanced 
set of procedures.  
The research team was thus able to meet with personnel who had been involved in building damage 
assessment in multiple events which occurred in different geographic settings, with different levels of 
building development and building structure. In addition, the team was able to interview personnel 
involved in the evolution of New Zealand’s building damage assessment processes, procedures, and 
resources. In addition, the team was able to access a considerable amount of written documentation, 
both academic and professional, that described and analyzed New Zealand’s response and provided 
direction for future development.   
Data Collection Methods and Procedures 
Data collection consisted of three strategies:  
 Pre-trip document review 
 Site visit, including small and large group presentations and interviews 
 Stakeholder workshop 
 
In preparation for the site visit, the team identified documentation from the literature review that was 
relevant to the New Zealand experience with building assessment. This included academic articles, 
professional documents (including the Ministry of Business, Innovation, and Employment [MBIE] 
processes, training, and documentation), and an extensive set of resources gathered by the Canterbury 
Earthquakes Royal Commission – Te Konihana Ruwhenua o Waitaha 
(http://canterbury.royalcommission.govt.nz/).  
The research team met to review overall project goals and identify specific research objectives that 
should be the focus on the site visit. Team members then consulted with their staffs and contacts to 
identify agencies and specific personnel in New Zealand who could help address those research 
questions. Team members were able to identify personal contacts in each of the agencies on this list, 
and initial contact was made by email by individual team members (See Deliverable 6.4 Needs Analysis: 
Site Visit Report, Appendix 1: Initial Contact Message for New Zealand Site Visit). The project manager 
worked with team members and their contacts to develop an overall agenda, series of specific meetings 
and presentations, and personnel to meet and interview while in New Zealand. The research team 
developed a series of focused questions, a subset of the overall research questions, which were 
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distributed to participating NZ agencies and organizations. Please see Deliverable 6.4 Needs Analysis: 
Site Visit Report, Appendices 1 – 4 for more detailed information.  
The site visit included meetings with personnel in Auckland, Christchurch, Kaikoura, and Wellington. In 
addition to meeting with individuals, groups, and agencies/organizations, team members toured the 
Christchurch Earthquake City exhibit, multiple building sites in Christchurch, residential areas impacted 
by liquefaction in and around Christchurch, rural sites in Kaikoura, and damaged buildings in Wellington.  
The third form of data collection was a workshop held in Wellington. The purpose of this stakeholder 
engagement workshop was to share information around the initial findings of the research team and to 
advance the research by collecting information from emergency management and building related 
personnel, around the development and implementation of post-disaster building safety assessment 
programs. Specifically, the workshop sought data on: 
 Matching types of buildings with capabilities of inspectors 
o Credentialed and non-credentialed 
 Fit of PDBA with overall emergency management  
 Personnel 
o Who, credentials, training, recruitment, prep, liability 
 PDBA Operations 
o Overall management, day-to-day decision-making 
o Logistics and team management 
o Data management and use of technology 
The workshop consisted of a set of presentations, followed by group activities. Participants worked in 
small groups to answer questions targeted on each of the workshop research questions. The first 
activity explored the experiences of damage assessment teams, both at the operational and at the 
management level.  
For the second set of activities a “carousel” method was employed, where five “stations” were set up, 
each focused on one of the following questions or topics: 
 The Ad Hoc phase – what happened before formal damage assessment processes were in 
place? 
 Credentials – where were credentialed and non-credentialed personnel used and why? 
 Training – what types of training is available to support personnel before and during an event? 
 Standards – what standards, processes, and guidelines support the PDBA process? 
 Information Management – how was information gathered and managed? 
Participants were divided into four groups, with one group assigned to explore each question. 
Responses were gathered by flip chart. After 20 minutes, the groups rotated to the next question. The 
new groups spent five minutes being briefed on the previous group’s responses, then had fifteen 
minutes to respond, comment, and add new ideas. The groups continued to rotate until all groups had 
had an opportunity to respond to each topic. Each question was then debriefed in a plenary session, 
with additional analysis and commentary added to the data. The final plenary session explored 
unresolved issues through a set of open ended questions: 
 What has not been written in a report that you would like to share? 
 What has not been resolved? 
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 Blue Sky: what would you want DA to look like if you could start all over? 
Data was collected through flip charts, photographs, and field notes taken by research team members. 
The team met at the end of each day to review and compare notes. These sessions were informal, but 
helped to consolidate experience from each day’s sessions and to help develop focus questions and 
strategies for the following days.  
Findings and Recommendations 
The site visit generated a substantial body of raw data, primarily in the form of text-based notes and 
files. Two members of the research team gathered running field notes on discussions and meetings. In 
addition, all team members kept personal notes. Team members collaborated in a summary review of 
the site visit (captured in additional field notes) and several submitted lists of comments and 
recommendations based on their notes and experiences. This data was consolidated and was used 
throughout the remainder of the project for analysis and to support development of the project 
deliverables.  
The most important findings from the site visit were extracted in the form of recommendations and key 
points for consideration. These recommendations were consolidated, then coded against key research 
questions and topics. The results are presented in Deliverable 6.4 Needs Analysis: Site Visit, Appendix 5: 
Recommendations. These recommendations and key points served as critical elements for analysis in 
the Synthesis Phase of the project. While most recommendations applied to several research questions, 
the following emerged as primary themes: 
 Guiding principles – key concepts, actions, and considerations for guiding development of the 
BC project 
 Damage assessment as a complex system 
 Implications from concept that earthquakes involve an ongoing series of events, not a single 
discrete event 
 Damage assessment is one of a series of overlapping emergency management assessments and 
functions 
 The concept of Building Status as a dynamic ongoing feature of buildings 
 Importance of developing situational awareness 
 Strategies for overall damage assessment 
 Implications of changing goals of various building assessment processes over time 
 Overall emergency management process 
 Damage assessment operations 
 Damage assessment process 
 Placards and assessment outcome options 
 Information flow 
 Personnel 
 Training 
 Legal aspects 
 Building and geohazard surveillance and intelligence (both pre- and post-event) 
 Psychosocial impact 
 Taxonomies and models to support a Damage Assessment process 
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Key findings from the site visit are available in Appendices 5: Site Visit Participating Organizations and 
Agencies, and Appendix 6: Recommendations based on Site Visit Analysis.  
Please refer to Deliverable 6.4 Needs Assessment: Site Visit Report for additional information and data. 
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Interim Analysis and Core Concepts 
Analysis was an ongoing and emergent process within this project. At all points, the team was 
concurrently collecting, considering, and making sense of data and findings with the goal of informing 
the development of the BC damage assessment process. The project took a “systems of systems” 
approach, and this is seen in the organization and presentation of data and analysis.  
One of the challenges in this project has been to make sense and manage the volume of disparate 
information that the team has encountered. A second challenge has been keeping the focus on building 
assessment, as we have found that the process is inextricably linked a large and shifting set of other 
emergency management, recovery, and business-as-usual practices and processes.  
In the earlier phases of the project, the team had developed a procedural framework that described the 
various processes and activities that are involved in damage assessment and in emergency management 
generally. This model was graphically represented using an “infomatic”/icon-based graphic style (Figure 
3). The organization of the elements on the graphic could be organized horizontally in time (from pre- to 
post-event and on towards recovery) and vertically in complexity of organization (elements “lower” in 
the graphic were at the level of individual buildings, with successive elements arranged to local, 
regional, national, and international “levels.” This approach allowed a graphic representation of 
significant “elements” in the system under study, including buildings, personnel, agencies, and processes 
and how these were related in organizational complexity across time.  
 
 
 
Figure 3. Elements of a Generic Damage Assessment Program. 
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The model was used in the Literature Review and Case Study phase to compare various building 
assessment processes (Figure 4. Infographic Style PDBA Program Summaries). The graphic also served as 
a conceptual model for organizing, conceptualizing and integrating data gathered during the site visit 
phase with that from previous phases in the project. However, the icon-based format was not useful for 
displaying processes, their elements, or the relationships between those elements. Thus, while the 
conceptual organization (horizontally in time, vertically in organizational complexity) was retained, the 
presentation and graphic style was changed to more of a process/flowchart presentation.  
 
Figure 4. Infographic Style PDBA Program Summaries.  
The core of the new conceptual model was a “flowchart” outlining a “generic” post-disaster building 
assessment process (see Figure 5. Generic Post-Disaster Building Assessment Process). 
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Figure 5. Generic Post-Disaster Building Assessment Process. 
 
As the team gathered and assessed data throughout the site visit, this model was amended to add 
additional elements and processes. The graphic continued to grow in complexity, with new elements 
representing additional systems and sub-systems embedded within or of which building assessment is a 
part of. The resulting image (Figure 6. Systems-view of Post-disaster Building Assessment) serves as both 
a visual representation and an organizing framework for analysis and interpretation of data in this 
project. Figure 7 presents a systems-level version.  
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Figure 6. Systems-view of Post-disaster Building Assessment. 
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Figure 7. Systems-level model of Post-disaster Building Assessment.  
The remainder of this section presents an initial analysis of data in the form of definitions of a selected 
set of systems involving overall post-disaster building assessment.  
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Basic Process 
 
 
Figure 8. Basic Damage Assessment Process. 
 
Damage assessment models vary, but in general there are three phases (Figure 8. Basic Damage 
Assessment Process): 
 Area assessment, which typically consists of a “windshield assessment” and other information 
received by the EOC in the initial phases of a response. This phase focuses on gaining an 
understanding of the extent (what areas within the region) and severity (degree of damage) of 
the incident. This information is used both to determine what types of resources will be needed 
for building damage assessment and to begin initial prioritization. 
 Rapid Assessment, which typically follows an algorithmic structure designed to triage buildings 
in terms of usability and requirement for further inspection. New Zealand distinguished 
between initial external assessment of simple residential and more complex buildings. Buildings 
with minor or no apparent damage (“white”) and those deemed unsafe or unusable (“red”) 
required no further immediate assessment. Those requiring further follow-up received a more 
detailed “Level 2” assessment involving structural engineers and/or internal inspection.  
 A Detailed assessment, typically involving structural and/or geotechnical engineers to determine 
requirements for repair or demolition.  
 
Note that the New Zealand model has evolved through several incidents. Participants described an 
initial process based closely on the ATC 20 guidelines that was subsequently modified and refined 
through use in Christchurch, Kaikoura, and Wellington. While each version has substantive changes in 
focus, goal, and procedure, the overall structure remains similar to the generic model described above.   
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Overall Administration 
 
Figure 9. Overall Damage Assessment Administration. 
The research team noted that much of the research literature, professional documentation, and 
manuals focus on the procedures of assessing individual buildings. Overall administration of damage 
assessment is an apparent gap in the literature and documentation. In general, DA is administered 
through the EOC (in the response phase) and devolves to local authorities’ building inspection processes 
over time (Figure 9. Overall Damage Assessment Administration). This is an area that requires more 
detailed analysis and discussion. 
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Damage Assessment Strategy 
 
 
Figure 10. Damage Assessment Strategy. 
 
The research team encountered a number of discussions on strategies involved in both the pre-event 
and post-event phases. Along with overall administration, this is a system or component of damage 
assessment that is underreported. A key element of discussions around strategy was the need for 
developing information and relationships with stakeholders prior to the event, and of the importance of 
information management and analysis to administration of the damage assessment process (Figure 10. 
Damage Assessment Strategy). 
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Overlapping Assessments 
 
Figure 11. Overlapping Emergency Management Functions and Assessments.  
 
One of the striking findings in this study is the degree to which building assessment is embedded within 
and related to other emergency management processes and assessments (Figure 11. Overlapping 
Emergency Management Functions and Assessments). The New Zealand context was intriguing in that 
participants were involved in damage assessment in three distinctly different events: the suburban and 
somewhat distributed urban landscape in Christchurch, the more rural experience in Kaikoura, and the 
dense, urban setting of Wellington. These experiences allowed the research team to hear how building 
assessment teams engaged with a variety of other groups and processes, including (but not limited to) 
initial search and rescue, USAR activities, geotechnical assessment, welfare/social services, critical 
infrastructure and building owner assessments. In different events, building assessment teams 
encountered buildings assessed by other groups (e.g., USAR and geotechnical engineers), were engaged 
as coordinated teams with other personnel (e.g., USAR personnel for short-term countermeasures such 
as pulling down chimneys or welfare personnel), and struggled to gain access to and incorporate results 
from building assessments done by private engineers.  
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Information Flow 
 
 
Figure 12. Information Flow.  
Information gathering, management, and use emerged as one of the critical features of building 
assessment and one of the greater challenges in an event. Paper-based systems generated vast 
quantities of data that had to be collated, entered, and managed. Technology-based systems faced 
challenges due to limited network and communication systems, availability of power and integration 
with paper-based data. Multiple participants commented on the overwhelming volume of data 
generated by the building assessment process and the difficulty of timely data entry and analysis. 
Multiple participants described challenges in being able to manage data in a way that allowed for 
informed decision-making; and, indeed, much of the data gathered was not distributed to other 
elements of the emergency response. Another theme was the importance of integrating information 
from multiple assessments (e.g., USAR, later owner-led engineering assessments) with the information 
generated by the building assessment process itself. Elements of the information system included data 
collection forms, data collection technology, gathering and transmission of data to the overall DA 
administration, data entry, analysis, distribution, and decision-making (Figure 12. Information Flow).  
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Personnel 
 
Figure 13. Personnel. 
New Zealand’s damage assessment program has evolved significantly since the initial 2010 Darfield 
(Christchurch) earthquake, with the development of a program for recruiting, training, and sustaining a 
cadre of experienced assessors and coordinators. The research team identified a number of elements to 
consider in developing the personnel aspects of PDBA (Figure 13. Personnel): 
 types of personnel involved in building assessment 
 matching background and experience to both building types and regional assessment strategies  
 recruitment and deployment of local, regional, national, and international assessors 
 team composition and deployment strategies 
 management of volunteers  
 rotation and support of assessors 
 liability and legal issues 
 establishment of a sustainable recruitment and training program 
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Events over Time 
Another key concept that emerged from the site visit was the realization that post-disaster response and 
recovery is an ongoing process over time, and that many disasters involve multiple events rather than a 
single event. This is most evident in relation to earthquakes, where planners in Chirstchurch had to deal 
with at least three substantial earthquakes and a still-ongoing series of smaller aftershocks, but must be 
considered in other forms of disaster such as wild fire and flooding. Thus, the overall emergency 
management and building assessment processes must prepare for the possibility of re-evaluating 
buildings and/or complete areas due to follow-on events. A second implication of adding time as a 
consideration to building assessment planning is that the goals and processes of building assessment 
change over time. The research team noted the emphasis of building assessment processes change from 
life-safety and building entry, through questions of continued use, towards eventual remediation and 
repair. The third implication was that the legal and operational framework from which building 
assessment worked also evolved from the initial emergency response through ongoing assessment, 
towards a return to business-as-usual. Participants noted an uneasy transition in the legal foundations 
of using placards through emergency powers towards permitting as processes return to “business as 
usual.”  
 
Summary 
These initial core concepts, along with the list of “gaps” and issues for further exploration formed the 
foundation for preparing for the BC Stakeholders Workshop and Expert Working Group meeting. These 
meetings, the final components of the Needs Assessment Phase, allowed the research team to 
consolidate their understanding of PDBA processes (in the form of the core concepts), to validate and 
extend their understanding through consultation with BC stakeholders and international experts, and, 
finally, to begin contextualizing these concepts to the BC perspective.  
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Deliverable 6.3.1: Stakeholder Workshop 
Overview 
The final activities in the Needs Analysis phase consisted of a two-day Stakeholder Input and Expert 
Working Group session held on June 26 and 27, 2017 in New Westminster, BC (For agenda, see 
Appendix 7: Stakeholder Input and Expert Working Group Participants’ Worksheet).   
In broad terms, the goal of the Stakeholder Input and Expert Working Group Workshop was to 
contextualize project outputs to date for analysis and use in British Columbia, to gather data on existing 
PDBA systems and their implementation in practice, to identify needs and expectations of BC PDBA 
stakeholders in relationship to a provincial PDBA program, and to establish relationships with both 
individuals and organizations in support of the development, implementation, and sustainability of the 
BC PDBA program. 
The Stakeholder Workshop included participants from the Expert Working Group and from Stakeholders 
in BC’s emergency management and PDBA environment. The workshop employed a series of 
experiential activities including scenarios, group discussion, focused question and answer sessions, 
presentations from experts, group activities, and debriefings. Members of the Expert Working Group 
provided expert presentation to the Stakeholder workshop, then participated in a half day debrief and 
discussion session focused on initial interpretation of the data from the workshop and uncovering 
additional data  
Analysis of the data from the Stakeholder and Expert Working Group workshop was used to further 
extend and develop an understanding of how PDBA procedures, tools, and processes can best be 
established within a BC context. 
Methods 
The Stakeholder workshop consisted of two segments – Learning from Others and Stakeholder Input. 
The morning sessions included introductions and an expectation survey, an overview of the research 
project, and presentations from international experts on post-disaster damage assessment. The 
afternoon sessions consisted of findings from the research project to date, a carousel exercise to gather 
data from stakeholders on specific aspects of damage assessment, and a reflective summary exercise.  
Participants were given a Participants’ Worksheet which included prompt questions and fields for note 
taking for each segment of the workshop (See Appendix 7: Stakeholder Input and Expert Working Group 
Participants’ Worksheet).  
The lead researcher took field notes for each expert presentation. Slides from the presentations were 
collected as additional data.  
The main form of data collection for the workshop consisted of a carousel activity. Members of the 
research team were each assigned a particular topic (Table 1. Carousel Activity Topics). Participants 
were broken into groups which then rotated through each station. The research team member would 
provide the topic of the station and a summary of previous comments. Each group would then add 
additional comments. Comments were captured on flip charts by another team member.  
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Table 2. Carousel Activity Topics. 
• Goals of Building Assessment and its various assessments: 
• Safety, occupancy, usability 
• Matching types of buildings with capabilities of inspectors 
• Credentialed and non-credentialed 
• Outcomes and Placards 
• What are the outcomes of assessment, and who should be able to place, modify, 
remove placards 
• Team Composition and Personnel 
• Who, credentials, training, recruitment, prep, liability 
• Information Flow 
• Data management and use of technology 
 
The final exercise of the day consisted of a reflective exercise where participants were invited to review 
all the flip charts and information provided through the day and identify three messages to pass along to 
the research team. This was documented in the Participant Worksheet. 
The Expert Working Group session employed a “Wall Walk” activity, with participants reviewing the 
output from the previous day’s activities through a series of reflective prompts/questions, followed by a 
plenary session allowing participants to summarize their experience and reflections on the over 
workshop experience. 
Participants 
The Stakeholder Workshop ran from 0900 to 1630, attended by 44 participants on site and 2 who joined 
by teleconference and web. Participants included both the Expert Working Group (who met on Day 2, as 
well) and stakeholders in BC’s damage assessment and emergency management communities.  
Appendix 8: Stakeholder Input and Expert Working Group Workshop Participants lists the participants’ 
organizational affiliations. 
Table 3. lists stakeholder affiliations (by category) for participants in the Expert Working Group, BC 
Stakeholders group, and Research Team.  
Table 3. Participant Affiliations (by category). 
 
 Total Academic 
Critical 
Infrastructure 
Local 
Authorities 
Prof. 
Bodies 
DA 
Programs Govern Military 
Private 
Sector 
EWG 11 3 0 2 1 2 1 1 1 
Stakeholders 24 0 2 7 5 0 9 0 1 
Team 14 5 0 0 4 0 4 0 1 
Total 49 8 2 9 10 2 14 1 3 
 
The Expert Working Group had three academic members, and one or two representatives each from 
Local Authorities, Indigenous communities, professional bodies, damage assessment programs, 
government, military and the private sector. The BC Stakeholder group had no academics and strong 
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representation from government agencies (9), local authorities (5), and local professional bodies (5), 
along with two critical infrastructure owners and one private sector participant.  
The Research Team itself consisted of five academics (JIBC), 4 from government (BC Housing), and four 
members from professional associations (Architectural Institute of BC and Association of Professional 
Engineers and Geoscientists of BC).  
The distribution of members in the EWG ensures that we have representation from researchers, 
providers, operational DA groups, military and government.  The Stakeholder group has stronger 
representation from organizations who will employ DA processes (local authorities and government 
agencies) and those who will be assessors (professional associations representing engineers, architects, 
engineering technologists, and building inspectors).  
Findings 
The data from the Stakeholder and Expert Working Group workshops was merged with data from other 
sources for comprehensive analysis, with the goal of informing the development of the BC Building 
Assessment process. The following section highlights several recurrent themes that emerged from the 
two days of the workshop. 
Building assessment as a complex process.  
This theme echoes data from research of the literature and particularly from the Site Visit. Several 
expert presenters emphasized that BA is a complex system that requires a solid foundation, but the 
ability to be flexible and adaptable. One presenter noted the need for national goals that can be 
modified to meet local needs and events. Others noted that a system that works in one country will not 
work for another – that damage assessment must adapt to meet local building practices, building stock, 
cultural, and social factors; the resulting process itself must then be adaptable to meet the unique 
requirements of specific events, personnel, resources, and experiences.  
Goal of the program: Damage, Safety, Usability 
 A continuing conversation emerged around the goal or intent of the program. One of the 
recommendations from the Site Visit was to avoid using the terms “building safety assessment” or 
“building damage assessment” as the process neither ensured building occupants’ safety nor provided a 
comprehensive list of the damage to a structure. This sparked additional conversation in both the 
stakeholder and expert working group components of the workshop, with the conversation following 
similar lines. An additional conversation involved the concept of “usability” and whether or not usability 
was a short or long term goal of the program. If so, then the term “usability” requires careful definition. 
A subsequent discussion noted that Italy distinguishes between “peacetime” usability (the ability to 
occupy and use a building during normal times) and the “emergency” usability of a structure in the 
aftermath of a disaster. In the Italian context, the goal of building assessment, particularly in the early 
phases, is not to establish the long term usability and return to function of a building, but rather to 
identify whether it is safe enough to be used in the aftermath of the event. Even buildings identified as 
“usable” post-event may require an engineering assessment, and other assessments, to return to long 
term or “peacetime” functioning.  
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The Area Assessment  
The Area Assessment was identified as an important part of the overall process that needs further 
consideration and development. Participants noted that the “ad hoc” phase is poorly understood, but 
that a key element of this phase is developing an initial sense of situational awareness that can then 
guide the establishment, implementation, and administration of an effective building assessment 
program. In addition to the archetypical windshield assessment, participants noted the potential use of 
drones, real time satellite images, aerial photography, “getting a couple people up in a helicopter right 
away), as well as novel concepts such as the aggregation of social media and pre-positioned building 
surveillance monitors.  
Situational Awareness and the “Strategic” Level of Building Assessment  
Participants noted the need for guidelines and, possibly tools/worksheets to help those who are setting 
up the building assessment process. Key decision may be required around what constitutes “usable” for 
this incident, what the community’s risk tolerance will be for assessment (and hence potential 
modification of placarding categories and/or criteria). Factors to consider in the set up or strategic phase 
include administration, set up, logistics, and data/tracking systems.  
Information 
Both expert presenters and stakeholders noted that integrity and validity of information are issues that 
need to be considered, particularly if non-credentialed personnel will be conducting assessments. The 
system must also include technology for data collection, processes for data entry, mechanisms for 
distribution of information and information sharing, and identification of how information informs 
decision-making.  
Team Composition 
Team composition included discussions on how many personnel should be on teams, who has the 
authority to issue placards (e.g., should team leader be building inspector who has the legal authority?), 
and what skill sets are required for different roles or teams. Participants identified a minimum team as 
3, particularly for teams doing any form of interior inspection (allowing one member to remain outside 
for safety reasons).  
Overlapping Assessments 
The discussion on Team Composition also lead to discussion on overlapping assessments, which in turn 
had two aspects: different types of building assessments and additional forms of assessment that 
overlapped with damage assessment. Participants noted that a variety of assessments are performed – 
some in the immediately post-event phase, some much later on, and that it makes sense, when 
appropriate to leverage the building assessment process. For example, the New Zealand example of 
including social welfare personnel in the building assessment teams was seen as a valuable addition, 
particularly in urban residential areas (less so in rural areas or commercial zones). Similarly, in Kaikoura, 
assessment teams included both building assessment and geotechnical assessment personnel.  Other 
forms of assessment that may overlap include Search and Rescue, Emergency Social Services, 
humanitarian relief, etc.  
6.9.1e TECHNICAL REPORT  
DELIVERABLE 6.3.1: STAKEHOLDER WORKSHOP 
52 
 
Varied Forms of Building Assessment 
One of the more intriguing discussions involved the overlap between Local Authorities, who have overall 
responsibility for building assessment, and the building assessment performed by building owners, 
particularly of large groups such as Critical Infrastructure organizations, provincial and federal 
government agencies, the military, and even private sector companies with multiple buildings. This lead 
to a discussion on who has the authority to issue placards, and how to reconcile/support assessment by 
different groups with the overall Local Authority efforts. In particular, the issue of information sharing 
was seen as critical, as was Local Authorities’ ability to validate and ensure the integrity of assessments 
done by building owners.  
Bias, Experience, and Conflict of Interest 
The discussion above, in turn, informed another discussion on team composition specifically focused on 
the use of personnel such as facility managers and engineers who design, manage, or operate buildings. 
One aspect of the discussion focused on the importance of leveraging the knowledge of building 
personnel who know and have experience with a building. This was contrasted with the potential for a 
conflict of interest, particularly for commercial building owners. The challenge is to leverage experience 
of those with intimate knowledge of these buildings while ensuring integrity of the assessments and 
sharing of “proprietary” information. 
Matching Building Types and Required Expertise 
One of the more interesting and potentially interesting discussions was around ways of classifying 
building types and identifying the skill sets required to effectively assess them. Initial information was 
gathered in the workshop and this is one of the key areas for further data collection and analysis. 
Additional Topics 
Additional topics were flagged for more depth review and analysis when the Stakeholder Input data was 
merged with other data: 
 Liability, volunteerism, and status of visiting personnel 
 Cordoning of areas 
 Importance of information on shoring and securing buildings 
 Use of technology to support building assessment processes and data 
 Training and credentialing of building assessment personnel 
 Evolution or changing goals of assessment 
 Legal aspects 
 Operational Guidelines  
 Integration of various assessments (e.g., geotechnical, roads/bridges, environment, etc.) 
 
Identification of best practices 
A key data gathering strategy throughout the two days of the workshop was the identification of best 
practice in post disaster building assessment through gathering “advice,” “recommendations,” or 
principles for developing and implementing PDBA programs. Several flip charts were set up to allow 
concepts that emerged during conversations to be collected. In addition, members of the research team 
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took both contemporaneous notes and created field notes after the workshop. Finally, researchers 
reviewed all the artefacts (e.g., presentation slides, flip charts, field notes and debriefing notes) to 
further identify statements of “best practice.” 
Recommendations 
The research team acquired a substantial body of data from multiple sources from the workshop. The 
next steps in the process was to code this data against the research questions and in relationship to 
emerging themes and categories. A number of areas emerged as important or interesting to consider as 
the team moved towards analysis and synthesis, such as: 
 Establishing the overall goal of the building assessment process 
 Articulating the web of links that building assessment has with other facets of emergency 
management, governance of building, recruitment and training of professionals to assist in 
building management, etc. 
 Identifying those aspects of the overall process which are in scope and addressable within this 
project 
 Identifying those aspects and data which are beyond the scope of this project, but which should 
be articulated and considered for further study and/or development 
 Choosing a conceptual model from which to design the BC Building Assessment provincial system 
and the community-level framework 
 Articulating a set of guiding principles to guide the remainder of the project 
 Determining the appropriate level of detail for development of processes, tools, and resources 
 
Initial Analysis of Expert Working Group Session 
Several themes emerged from the Expert Working Group’s analysis of the Stakeholder Input: 
Building Assessment is a Dynamic Process that Changes over the Duration of an Event 
Several discussions focused on the changing role and goal of BA in an event. At a strategic level, 
different countries have different political or overall goals for BA, as mirrored in the stakeholder 
discussions on damage, safety, and usability. The EWG noted that context is a critical factor in an event, 
and that the goals of building assessment in practice depend on the perceived role of government, the 
community’s risk tolerance (around safety of buildings that are damaged), and the extent and nature of 
damage. In addition, the goals of building assessment change throughout and after an event. Early 
efforts focus on rescue and life safety; initial rapid assessment focuses on identifying obviously unsafe 
and clearing obviously safe structures; as building assessment progresses the focus can change from 
short term usability towards identification of repairs required to ensure the safety of the building and/or 
return to “normal” use.  
Building Assessment is Embedded in a Series of other Emergency Management Processes 
One EWG member noted that ATC 20 is essentially an engineering assessment. However, overall PDBA 
overlaps and is influenced by a variety of factors and concerns (Figure 14. Factors Influencing PDBA 
Decision-making).  
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Figure 14. Factors Influencing PDBA Decision-making. 
Designation of what constitutes “safe” or “usable” may be influenced by social and operational factors 
(e.g., need to reduce impact of displaced people who could “camp” in damaged but structurally safe 
buildings). As noted above, initial emphases on short term “usability” increasingly move towards long 
term rehabilitation and reoccupation, and assessment processes return to “business as usual.” Political 
factors may influence strategic decisions on distribution of teams, availability of external resources 
(regional, national, international), and prioritization of areas or types of buildings. And the 
implementation of a PDBA process is dependent on a number of contextual factor related to the 
incident itself, including the type and extent of the incident, the types and number of buildings affected, 
personnel and resources who are dedicated to PDBA, etc. Finally, PDBA itself overlaps with a number of 
other emergency management functions, including, but not limited to search and rescue, social/welfare 
concerns, building assessment by owners and agencies, etc.  
The Need for Strong Recommendations on Personnel 
The EWG noted that actual team composition is dependent on a variety of factors, not least of which 
includes the contextual factors noted above (for example, the nature and size of event, type of building 
stock, extent of damage, etc). However, there was general agreement on the need for a strong set of 
recommendations around core aspects of personnel and team management, including team size 
(minimum 3), safety considerations, matching composition to requirements of the assessment, 
recruitment, training, and ongoing support of teams during the event. The EWG did initial work on 
creating a matrix matching types of buildings with required expertise for assessors. This is seen as a 
critical aspect of the project.  
Contextual Implementation 
Many of the issues discussed in this section emphasize the need for a strong, well structured, and well 
supported foundation to the building assessment process that can be adapted for implementation for 
specific contexts and situations. EWG members noted that the early phases of an event can be chaotic, 
and that it may take several days to establish and implement an effective BA process. One of the keys to 
success is in effectively developing an understanding of “this” particular situation and being flexible in 
putting the BA process into effect.  
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Simple Core Process, Nuanced Strategies 
 Several participants noted the need to keep the essential building assessment process simple, with well-
designed training, orientation, and support. It is important, particularly in the early, more chaotic phases 
of the event to keep the process simple enough to allow multiple teams to cover wide areas, yet 
effective and efficient enough to ensure consistent application and safe results. At the same time, the 
strategic level of the process must be nuanced and “open” enough to allow for contextual 
implementation and adaptation to changing conditions over time.  
Please refer to Deliverable 6.3.1 Stakeholder and Expert Working Group Workshop Synopsis for further 
information, including: 
 Workshop Agenda 
 Participant Worksheets 
 Stakeholder Workshop Participants 
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Deliverable 6.5.1: Analysis and Synthesis – Structured Conversations and 
Core Concepts 
The researcher team collected considerable data from a number of sources (see Figure 2. Overall 
Research Project Components and Deliverables earlier in this document). The initial analysis of this data 
included categorization against the project research questions and a series of “recommendations” 
derived both from the data itself and by from analysis of the data by members of the research team. 
This data (both the categorized findings and the recommendations) formed the data “pool” from which 
the analysis and synthesis was drawn.  
A second element of the initial analysis was creation of a Building Assessment “macro-map” (Figure 15. 
Post Disaster Building Assessment Process Macro-map) showing the various processes and strategies 
that the research team has identified. This map will serve as a conceptual framework for understanding 
the major elements, sub-systems, and relationships in a post-disaster building assessment (PDBA) 
process.   
 
Figure 15. Post Disaster Building Assessment Process Macro-map.  
(see Figure 6, earlier in this document for a full-size version and explanation). 
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Analytic Approach 
The major analytic process in the Analysis and Synthesis phase consisted of a series of structured 
conversations (Figure 16. Structured Conversations) with the research team, each consisting of: 
 Review of data, categorized against research questions relevant to the topic of the conversation 
 Review of any preliminary thematic or content analysis of the data 
 Facilitated discussion to develop working concepts 
 Write up, including core concepts, implications for development, and areas for further 
exploration 
 
Figure 16. Structured Conversations. 
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Five Structured Conversations were conducted, covering: 
 Goals and Principles 
 Scope and Approach 
 Needs and Requirements 
 Models and Core Concepts 
 Establish the Framework and Next Steps 
Emerging from this process were a series of concepts, frameworks, tables, and commentary. These 
findings will guide the development of the draft BC PDBA Framework in the next phase of the project.  
Structured Conversations 
This section outlines the intent and process for each conversation, a summary or presentation of its 
results, and reference to findings and discussion when appropriate.  
Structured Conversation 1: Goals and Principles 
The goal of the first structured conversation was to revisit the project’s goals, then reaffirm or revise 
these goals based on the unfolding of the project. The session also explored the team’s current 
understanding of what the outputs of the project would be (in terms of form and structure), guiding 
principles for decision-making, and criteria for success of the project (see Appendix 9: Research Team 
Members’ Goal Statements (Themed), Appendix 10: Research Team Members’ Hopes and Dreams 
Statements (Themed), Appendix 11: Themes from Key Points and Principles Data Related to Goals and 
Principles, Appendix 12: Discussion notes on Principles).  
Structured Conversation 2: Scope and approach 
The session started with a general discussion on the scope and approach of the overall project. Team 
members noted that the project continues to collect a considerable amount of valuable data. Initial 
examination of this data has led to development of an overall “concept map” based on the functional 
components of a building assessment process (see Figure 4, above). A key finding to date is that the 
possibilities and opportunities available from analysis of this data far exceed the scope and expectations 
of this project. In a previous session, the team noted that project deliverables will have to be completed 
with an awareness of their “fit” within a layered series of emergency management processes and 
activities. At the same time, the project team must ensure that it remains focused on the core 
requirements of the project and does not attempt to reach too far.  
The conversation reinforced the necessity of seeing Damage Assessment as part of a layered series of 
dynamic systems. Each element in the system both informs and is influenced by changes and activities 
within other systems and sub-systems. Thus, while remaining focused on the core requirements of the 
project, the team will identify overlaps with external systems, and make suggestions on future potential 
work within the broader context.  
Drawing on the principles outlined in the first structured conversation, it was proposed that the core 
presentation of the overall PDBA process be based on a three-level structure. The framework will 
identify and describe specific aspects of PDBA, outline considerations associated with that aspect, and 
then provide guidance on addressing those considerations.  
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Structured Conversation 3: Requirements 
This session focused on identifying the concepts, models, structures, and content that would be 
required to develop the BC PBDA process. The team started with the conceptual model, then identified 
four sets of “needs”: guidelines and decisions (that were required), concepts and models, processes and 
procedures, and documents or forms. Sixty-eight items were identified. The elements were analyzed 
and themed to identify, for example, those elements that were part of a project deliverable, those 
associated with the overall PDBA framework, principles or guidelines to inform development, and 
elements addressing specific components of the project, such as governance, situational awareness, 
assessment, and information management. These were next categorized according to relationships 
(elements that were related to or similar to each other), dependencies (which elements could not be 
addressed until other elements were in place), and priorities (which elements were most critical to the 
project, based on relationships and dependencies).   
Based on this analysis, three lists were developed: Prioritized requirements, Glossary Requirements, and 
Models/Matrices Requirements (see Appendix 13: Framework Needs and Requirements). 
Structured Conversation 4: Models and Core Concepts  
The fourth structured conversation used the priorities list from the previous session as a framework for 
further defining and describing key concepts and models emerging from the data. Several core concepts 
were extended or redeveloped and others were identified as requiring further analysis in the next phase 
of the project. The outputs from this session are presented in the Results sections of this report.  
Structured Conversation 5: Establishing the Framework and Next Steps 
In the final structured conversation, the team reviewed previous data and analysis, then developed the 
structure and approach to developing and populating the BC PDBA Framework (see Appendix 14: 
Framework Structure and Table of Contents). As noted above, the team developed a structure and 
approach based on that used by Engineers and Geoscientists of British Columbia to document its 
performance standards: aspects, considerations, and guidance. In addition, each section would include 
sections providing resources, tools, or artefacts (e.g. forms, job aids, etc.) as well as a section with 
examples (when appropriate). The “vertical” layout of the framework would be based on the “layers” 
model: buildings, assessment, assessors (individually and as teams), administration/operations (LA or 
EOC level), regional (PREOC in the BC context), and provincial. Information on national and international 
aspects may be included as well, either embedded within other sections or separately depending on 
volume and nature of the recommendations in these areas. Finally, each “layer” will address a common 
set of aspects: e.g., core concepts, definitions, guiding principles, and then sections related to the PDBA 
process. Not all aspects will be included in all levels.  
 Summary 
The results of the Structured Conversations informed the overall analysis and synthesis that was the 
focus of Phase II of the project. The following section presents a summary of Phase II.  
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Deliverable 6.5.1: Summary of Phase II Analysis and Synthesis 
 
The following sections summarize the findings from Phase II analysis and synthesis. These results formed 
the foundation for the development of the draft BC Post Disaster Building Assessment framework.  
Goals and Principles 
This section outlines the findings, analysis, and statement of the project goal and guiding principles for 
development. The intent of Phase II was to guide the further analysis of data and development of the 
project deliverables. 
The process for this activity included: 
 Inductive thematic analysis of existing data and identification of data elements and themes 
related to: 
o Key points describing the overall process of PDBA and its implementation 
o Goals of PDBA (overall and specific to particular types of assessment) 
o “Principle statements” – statements that implicitly or explicitly identified rationale, 
explanation, or principles for decisions related to overall PBDA and its processes 
o Strategies used in the implementation of PDBA 
o Recommendations related to overall PDBA 
 Data included in this analysis included: 
o Field notes from NZ Site Visit, Stakeholder Workshop (NZ and JIBC), and Expert Working 
Group sessions (SB, RB, RF, JF, DU) 
o Artifacts and data collected from activities at the Stakeholder Workshops (NZ and JIBC) 
and Expert Working Group sessions (“wall charts,” flip charts, and “stickies” from 
various data collection activities) 
o Summary notes and recommendations from team members (SB, RB, RF, DU) 
 Selected, relevant data elements were identified and coded against a predetermined coding 
structure (Key Points, Principles, Strategy, Recommendations, and Overall Goal) 
 Data elements within two categories (Key Points and Principles) were next analysed through 
open coding to identify themes and concepts. These themes formed the basis of the team 
discussion. This data is included in a separate document (PDBA Structured Conversation 1 Data)  
 The full research team conducted an analysis workshop, employing a “structured conversation” 
to further develop the project goals and principles for further analysis and development. 
Activities included: 
o Review of formal project goals from the Project Charter 
o Brainstorming session on project goals, hopes, and dreams – members individually 
identified goals and aspirations for the project onto stickies, which were then grouped 
for discussion 
o Presentation of Principles data and themes 
o Focused discussion on principles in relation to the project goals, deliverables, and 
requirements 
o Open discussion on implication of these concepts  
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Goal Statements 
Team members were asked to identify their goals for the project, explicitly considering their personal 
and professional backgrounds. These goals (Appendix 9: Research Members’ Goal Statements – 
Themed) were then reviewed and discussed. Several trends were noted in the discussion: 
 Framework/Strategy 
 Process 
 Characteristics 
 Components 
Implications for Development (Goals) 
The goal of this project is to develop an operational post-disaster building assessment 
framework/strategy that: 
 Harmonizes and supports local plans, programs, operations and community needs with regional, 
provincial, and national processes and resources 
 Includes legislation, communications (information), and operational strategies at multiple levels 
of operation and governance 
The process developed in this project must: 
 Establish multiple levels of authority and control 
 Extend from pre-disaster through differing levels of event (both declared and non-declared 
emergencies) to recovery and return to (the new) business as usual 
 Create typologies and strategies matching event characteristics, types of buildings that are 
damaged, types of damage to those buildings, personnel that have the background and 
experience to assess them, and processes that are adaptable to the situation-at-hand  
The framework must incorporate the following characteristics: 
 Meet contractual obligations and be aware of potential scope creep 
 Have core strategies, with principles that are simple, scalable, and adaptable to different levels 
of community, different types of event, and varied types and levels of resourcing 
 Be sustainable, with mechanisms and support for ongoing review, revision, and adaptation 
The components of the framework must include: 
 Clear strategies and processes, including practice guidelines, criteria, and examples 
 Models, tools, and resources that can be easily adapted and implemented by personnel on-the-
ground 
 Clear guidelines and processes for recruitment, education, just-in-time training, and ongoing 
training and preparation 
 Recommendations, samples and examples of resources ranging from legislation to bylaws, 
operational strategies, manuals, field guides, forms/documents/electronic data gathering to 
support both systems-level implementation and use in an event 
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Success Criteria 
Team members next identified “hopes and dreams” (success criteria) for the project – identifying 
potential success criteria to guide development. Again, the elements were themed and discussed 
(Appendix 10: Research Team Members’ Hopes and Dreams Statements (Themed)). Five themes 
emerged from this discussion: 
 Vision: an exemplar system that is scalable, adaptable and adopted in different jurisdictions and 
contexts 
 Awareness, utility, and acceptance by stakeholders 
 Implementation of a functional system at multiple levels 
 Resolution of issues around liability and education  
 Sustainability and enrichment 
Implications for Development (Success Criteria) 
The team identified the following as criteria by which the extended success of the project may be 
measured. Note that these criteria are NOT within scope of the currently funded project; rather they 
represent long term indicators for uptake of the project’s outputs.   
Three to Five Year Success Criteria 
The following criteria represent markers that this project will have had a positive impact beyond 
meeting its project deliverables.  
 Vision: an exemplar system that is scalable and adaptable in different jurisdictions/contexts 
o The project is trialed or piloted in two different communities, ideally within different 
jurisdictions 
 Awareness, Utility, and Acceptance by Stakeholders  
o Usable and seen as usable by BC Stakeholders 
o Stakeholder both internal and external to local authority i.e. – EMBC, professional 
organizations etc. 
o Empowering local abilities to own/run their own DA programme 
 Implementation of a Functional System at Multiple Levels 
o Pilot simulation 
o 3-5 year plan for implementation 
o That a local authority will adopt and validate that system / structure in practice 
o Community roll out 
o Emergency response incorporated into plans 
 Resolution of Issues around Liability and Education 
o Liability issues are resolved with clarity 
o Consistent documentation and training standards are developed for various types of 
assessors 
o Provincial registration is changed to indemnify professionals acting in emergency 
response 
o Emergency response and damage assess is incorporated / required in professional 
training university  
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o To embed the framework training within JIBC curriculum with appropriate responders  
 Sustainability and Enrichment 
o Long Term Vision for enrichment / further development 
o All stakeholders support the framework so it can be implemented and maintained 
Long-term Success Criteria 
Long-term success of the project includes: 
 Vision: an exemplar system that is scalable, adaptable and adopted in different 
jurisdictions/contexts 
o Provincial program expands to become a national standard.  Supported and initiated by 
every province. 
o Seen as resources / experts 
o Exemplar system that other countries, regions draw upon 
o Multiple countries harmonize their D.A programs with Canada to create an international 
standard for PDBA 
o Supported by UN (UNDAC – United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination), 
including funding 
 Implementation of a Functional System at Multiple Levels 
o Usable and seen as usable by BC Stakeholders 
o Stakeholder buy in / collaboration  
o Achieves buy-in from regional stakeholders to facilitate the implementation of a D.A. 
programme at local authority level 
 Implementation of a Functional System at Multiple Levels 
o That a local authority will adapt and validate that system / structure in practice 
o This program is adopted by municipalities, large and small, and helps them be more 
prepared/resilient 
o Leads to rolling out framework across Canada 
 Resolution of Issues around Liability and Education 
o Provincial registration is changed to indemnify professionals acting in emergency 
response 
o Emergency response and damage assess is incorporated / required in professional 
training university  
o To embed the framework training within JIBC and other institutions’ curriculum with 
appropriate responders 
 Sustainability and Enrichment 
o To explore further funding for important issues that arise that are outside of scope 
o Sustainability needs to be kept in mind 
o Connected to Phase II sustainability / continuation planning and funding 
 projects i.e.- building monitoring 
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Principles to Guide Development of the BC PDBA Framework 
The themes that emerged from the project data provided the structure for outlining key principles to 
guide development of the PDBA process (Appendix 11. Themes from Key Points and Principles Data 
Related to Goals and Principles).  
Discussion 
The research team conducted and analysis of the key points and principles (see Appendix 12: Discussion 
Notes on Principles). Through this discussion, three sets of ideas emerged to guide further development 
of the project – a set of key principles, a series of tensions that must be considered and a series of core 
concepts which must be considered as the project progresses. 
Key Principles 
The following are key elements and/or principles that must be embedded throughout the project and its 
outputs: 
 Layered – each element in the model has relationships and interactions with other elements and 
layers 
 Pragmatic – must be as simple as possible, but as complex as required 
 Scalable and adaptable – stated as strategies and principles that can be implemented within 
(varying) local (large or small) contexts 
 RACI – A RACI model should be used to clarify roles and responsibilities between stakeholders in 
any PDBA program 
 Information management is the foundational concept of the process 
 Must inform and support decision-making, often with incomplete information and inadequate 
resources 
Tensions 
There are a number of tensions, which require ongoing consideration, both in development of the 
project and its outcome, processes and resources: 
 Safety and usability – seen as ends of a continuum, occasionally at odds in terms of desired 
outcome, information required to determine, resources required to establish. 
 This is also seen in a transition or tension between mandated processes at the government level 
(e.g., focusing on life safety) and market-driven decisions and outcomes at the level of the 
individual building owner (e.g., restoration and remediation). 
 Local and global – processes should be stated as principles and guidelines at the global level 
which are scaled and adapted for use at the local level to meet the requirements of the current 
event, conditions, resources, etc. 
 Efficiency and comprehensiveness – there is a tension between creating simplified processes 
which allow quick assessments/decisions versus more comprehensive processes that explore 
more complex aspects, or which incorporate other forms of assessment/process. This again calls 
for scalability and adaptability – individual decision-makers must constantly be aware of and 
incorporate this tension in developing and implementing their strategies and processes.  
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 Prescriptive vs performance-based approaches – some PDBA processes may be best articulated 
as prescriptive with little room for interpretation (e.g., life safety issues); however, following 
upon the concepts of scalability and usability, whenever possible, strategies and processes 
should be performance or outcome-based. Again, these two concepts will exist in tension with 
each other, and the balance between them may vary depending on the elements of the system 
being considered and/or the context in which that element is implemented in practice.  
Structured Conversation Data and Analytic Themes 
The data from the Structured Conversations are in the following appendices: 
 Appendix 9: Research Team Members’ Goal Statements (Themed) 
 Appendix 10: Research Team Members’ Hopes and Dreams Statements (Themed)  
 Appendix 11: Themes from Key Points and Principles Data Related to Goals and Principles 
 Table 1: Themes in Key Points related to Overall Goals and Functioning of PDBA 
 Table 2: Themes in Principles related to Overall Goals and Functioning of PDBA 
 Appendix 12: Discussion notes on Principles 
 Appendix 13: Framework Needs and Requirements 
 Appendix 14: Framework Structure and Table of Contents
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Project Findings: Revised Core Concepts 
Throughout this project, the research team worked to develop a conceptual model of how post disaster 
building assessment is structured, functions, and fits within broader emergency management planning 
and operations. At the end of Phase II, the initial Core Concepts were further refined and formed the 
foundation for the draft BC Post Disaster Building Assessment Framework and Recommendations.  
The following Core Concepts are described within this section: 
 PDBA as a layered construct 
 Defining Characteristics of a PDBA System 
o Situational Awareness 
o Administrative Structure  
o Building Assessment Procedures 
o Outcomes 
o Information Management 
o Building Status 
o Strategies 
o Embedded in Multiple EM Processes and Assessments 
o Legal and Legislative Aspects 
o Multiple Levels of Organization 
o Goals of PDBA Change of Time 
o Contextual Factors 
o Critical Decisions for Communities 
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PDBA is a layered construct, best thought of as a dynamic system of interrelated sub-systems, which 
is itself part of larger emergency management, government, and private sector systems (Figure 17. 
PDBA as a complex, layered structure). 
 
Figure 17. PDBA as a complex, layered structure. 
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These systems are overlapping, but share information and resources, and decisions/actions within one 
sub-system and have both obvious and covert (or unrecognized) impacts/effects on other sub-systems. 
Thus, both when describing elements and establishing principles, it is important to consider information, 
resources, decisions, and relationships of the element with both sub- and larger-systems. 
The model in Figure 16 is “generic” – an abstraction of the various models that the team encountered. 
The model currently identifies a number of “systems”: 
 The core Building Assessment procedure(s) (Blue elements) 
 A series of outcomes (often identified through placards) (light brown box with red, yellow, and 
white elements) 
 A number of overlapping Emergency Management functions and assessments (green elements) 
 An information/data collection system (light brown elements) 
 A legislative framework including both Emergency Powers and return to Business-as-Usual 
(orange elements) 
 An administrative structure (including both logistics and strategy) (light beige elements) 
 Personnel recruitment and training (light red elements) 
 Building assessment and monitoring strategy (light purple elements) 
Figure 18 represents the “system of systems” conception of PDBA. 
 
Figure 18. System of Systems. 
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Defining Characteristics of a PDBA System 
Building assessment is a complex safety, scientific, and engineering process that overlaps with a number 
of emergency management processes. Different programs employ different terminology and have 
varied goals while sharing common overall frameworks and processes. One of the challenges in our 
research has been understanding how building assessment is integrated (or not) with other emergency 
management response and recovery functions such as search and rescue, managing the human aspects 
of a disaster, incorporating the science of buildings and earthquakes, and long-term repair and 
remediation of buildings in a community.  
The overall goal of PDBA is the development of situational awareness of a community’s buildings within 
a broader emergency management framework. A PDBA system consists of three essential functions: an 
administrative structure employing building assessment processes whose outcomes categorize the 
safety, usability, and/or damage to a community’s buildings. Two key concepts underlie the PDBA 
process: information management which is used to identify, monitor, and update the building status of 
the structures in a community. The overall PDBA process is guided by pre- and post-event strategies, 
many of which are currently undocumented. PDBA is embedded within, and overlaps with multiple 
other emergency management assessments and processes. The overall PDBA system exists within a 
formal legislative framework that transitions from business-as-usual through emergency powers and an 
eventual return to (the new) business-as-usual permitting and building inspection processes. 
Several core concepts inform the development of specific PDBA processes within different jurisdictions 
and contexts. Functionally, PDBA occurs at multiple levels of organization, ranging from the assessment 
of individual buildings to the overall response at the provincial and national/international levels. The 
goals of PDBA change over time from an initial focus on life safety to repair (or demolition) of buildings, 
and these changes have implications for PDBA practices and resources. A number of contextual factors 
influence the structure and functioning of specific PDBA systems, including legal frameworks, frequency 
of events, personnel and resources available and the experience of those personnel. And PDBA 
operations themselves are influenced by a number of critical decisions based on the nature of the event 
itself.  
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Situational Awareness 
Building assessment occurs as part of an overall emergency management response to a disaster. While 
much of the documentation and processes describing building assessment focuses on assessment of 
individual buildings, the overall process of PDBA is both strategic and linked – or overlapping – with 
other emergency management processes (see Figure 19. Systems and Information Informing Situational 
Awareness).  
 
 
Figure 19. Systems and Information Informing Situational Awareness. 
The larger goal of PDBA is to develop and maintain an overall awareness of the areas that are damaged, 
the types of buildings in those areas, the types of damage affecting different types of buildings, which 
buildings have been inspected and the results of those inspections. An effective PDBA process must 
consider the broader strategic functions of establishing and maintaining the overall PDBA process and 
how PDBA information informs and is impacted by other emergency management processes, such as 
search and rescue in the initial phases of an event and eventual recovery strategies.  
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Administrative Structure 
An effective PDBA process must include the administrative functions as well as building assessment 
procedures (See Figure 20. PDBA Administration and Procedures). Administration of PDBA generally 
occurs at the local authority level – typically either municipal or regional. PDBA often is established 
within the Emergency Operations Centre, although operations may be moved to a separate location. 
Most often, Building Assessment occurs within the Operations component of an overall Incident 
Command System (or similar) process. The research team noted at least three phases in the 
administrative aspect of PDBA. In the initial response, administrative priorities include establishing a 
building assessment group, setting up information management and communication systems, and 
developing a strategy for forming and deploying teams. The second phase involves setting up and 
maintaining ongoing building assessment operations. Finally, the administrative process must have a 
strategy for transition from response to recovery and eventual return to standard building inspection 
processes.  
 
Figure 20. PDBA Administration and Procedures. 
Building Assessment Procedures  
The core of PDBA is the actual assessment procedures themselves (see the lower portion of Figure 20. 
PDBA Administration and Procedures, above). The research team noted that, while there are variations, 
the BA process generally consist of three phases: an initial area assessment, a rapid assessment, and a 
longer term detailed engineering/return-to-function assessment. The goal of the area assessment is to 
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establish an initial estimate of what areas are damaged and what the level of damage is within those 
areas – key information that will guide initial response strategies. This typically includes windshield 
assessment by emergency responders and local authority personnel, supplemented by other forms of 
formal and informal reconnaissance. This process overlaps with initial search and rescue and emergency 
response activities. The rapid assessment phase involves of teams of assessors systematically conducting 
focused assessments (usually 20-30 minute visual inspections of the exterior) to categorize buildings. 
Several systems use a “triage” approach to categorize buildings as able to be used in the short term 
(sometimes with restrictions or conditions), those requiring more detailed assessment (including both 
interior and exterior inspection), or buildings which are unsafe (from internal or external hazards). The 
third level of assessment involves comprehensive structural and functional assessments of a building to 
identify requirements for demolition or repair and reoccupation of a building. Note that the goals of 
rapid assessment may vary from system to system or even over the duration of an event (see below).  
Outcomes 
Most PDBA systems employ three “levels” or categories of outcome. Most systems used a three-colour 
model: White or Green to indicate no restrictions; Yellow to indicate that parts of the building were 
usable or that the whole building is usable with restrictions (e.g. shoring or stabilization of debris); and, 
Red to indicate that buildings should not be used or entered (Figure 21. Varied Placard Systems).  
 
Figure 21. Varied Placard Systems. 
The language used by different PDBA models varies, with nuances related to the overall goal of the 
particular system. Green criteria included: “inspected,” “usable,” or “no restrictions on occupancy or 
use.” New Zealand recently changed from using Green to White for this level of placard to emphasize 
that the outcome states only that a building could be used, but that the building may still require a 
detailed engineering assessment. Many systems had multiple levels of Yellow which allowed “temporary 
use,” or “use after interventions or countermeasures” (e.g., shoring or tearing down unstable features 
such as chimneys), or allowed “restricted use” of only portions of a building. Red generally indicated 
that a building was unsafe, although some systems had multiple categories distinguishing when a 
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building was unsafe due to significant damage or from external hazards (e.g. unstable adjacent buildings 
or geohazards such as unstable slopes). 
Information Management 
One of the key findings of this research has been the importance of information management to 
building assessment. This theme emerged both as a critical challenge and as an opportunity for 
innovation. Various countries have employed trial versions of electronic data capture, supplemented by 
paper-based backups. The challenges to electronic systems are availability of power, storage and 
transmission of data, availability of networks to link assessors and central administration, and the need 
for training of assessors. The challenges to paper-based systems included timely capture and collection 
of data, along with the need to collate and enter the data before it can be assessed and used. In 
addition, data may be available from multiple sources, including search and rescue, private building 
inspections, sensor data, etc. (See Figure 7. PDBA Administration and Procedures, above). A robust PDBA 
system should include a central building registry that allows for multiple forms of data collection 
(electronic, paper-based, data from other emergency management processes, social media, etc.), a 
process for validating or categorizing incoming data, the ability to collate and analyze data – ideally in 
real-time – and a process for monitoring the change in status in a building over the duration of response 
and recovery.  
Building Status 
The concept of “building status” emerged as a concept identifying what is known about the damage, 
safety, usability, and functionality of a building based on the information available at any given time. As 
noted elsewhere, there are multiple sources of information about the status of a building, including 
sensor data, early USAR/search and rescue assessments, building assessment by local authority teams, 
geotechnical hazard assessment, private building assessments, or assessments by social services (see 
Figure 7. PDBA Administration and Procedures, above). Each of these groups may use placards or other 
markings to indicate the status of a building from their own perspectives, which may sometimes conflict 
with outcomes or status identified through other processes. In addition, the status of a building may 
change based on subsequent events (e.g., aftershocks) or more detailed or focused assessments (such 
as Wellington’s experience in identifying particular classes of building that were more likely to suffer 
damage, based on analysis of the event). As the event moves from response to recovery, owners may 
make repairs and the PDBA system must be able to note the change in status. We suggest that a PDBA 
system should employ the concept of building status as a way of recording, monitoring, and responding 
to these changes over time. In addition to the Outcomes and Placards noted earlier, two additional 
categories of building status were also reflected in the PDBA status of some jurisdictions that captured 
the changes over time. The first reflects those buildings which have “not yet been inspected”, which are 
known or suspected to have sustained damage from the event. The second reflects those buildings 
which have been inspected and are considered “destroyed” beyond a state that they are likely to be 
reconstructed (e.g. from an extensive fire). Although these latter two conditions are not placarded as 
such, the buildings status is represented as part of the PDBA. 
Strategies 
Overall damage assessment is a strategic process that overlaps with other emergency management 
processes. Consistency in the assessment, categorization, and documentation of building assessment is 
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important and requires well-designed processes and support resources, along with both initial and 
ongoing training.  
However, local authorities require a flexible set of guidelines to deal with the unique needs of each 
incident, involving recruitment, preparation, deployment, communications, and information flow. These 
processes must also be able to accommodate additional events (e.g., aftershock or additional flooding) 
and changing conditions over time.  
In addition, the strategic process should include both pre- and post-event strategies to better inform 
decision-making (See Figure 22. Pre- and Post-Event Strategies).  
 
Figure 22. Pre- and Post-Event Strategies. 
In the pre-event phase, local authorities should gather as much information as possible, including 
inventories of building stock, types of buildings in the area, identification of hazards and hazard zones 
(e.g., flood plains or soil maps), identify critical buildings requiring early assessment after an event, the 
use of “indicator buildings” to monitor the effect of the event on common types of buildings in the 
region and the use of technology and sensors to get real-time data during and after an event. Post-event 
strategies should include more than recording individual building status’, but also include ongoing 
monitoring and analysis of results within and across areas, noting the status across types of buildings, 
looking for common damage patterns, and the use of “indicator” buildings to guide assessment 
priorities. 
6.9.1e TECHNICAL REPORT  
PROJECT FINDINGS: REVISED CORE CONCEPTS 
75 
 
Embedded in Multiple EM Processes and Assessments 
PDBA is only one of a number of emergency management processes and assessments. These processes 
include assessments which can provide valuable information about the building status, or that would 
benefit from information gained from the PDBA assessments. In the early phases of an incident, 
windshield assessments and scene evaluations from first responders flag both individual buildings and 
general areas of damage. Several participants noted the value and importance of leveraging these 
processes whenever possible. Similarly, USAR assessments and documentation may provide critical 
information to guide both the assessment of individual buildings and to identify priority areas or 
buildings for assessment; examples include use of USAR personnel to provide short-term and ad hoc 
interventions that allowed partially damaged buildings to continue to be occupied, or including social 
services personnel with BA teams. At the systems level, PDBA information overlaps with, and can inform 
other assessments such as critical infrastructure, assessments of other aspects of the built environment, 
and overall emergency management functions. And the PDBA system must also be able to incorporate 
data from informal assessments and private assessments by building and critical infrastructure owners 
(Figure 23. Information Flow & Overlapping Processes). 
 
Figure 23. Information Flow & Overlapping Processes. 
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Legal and Legislative Aspects 
PDBA is generally enabled by emergency powers granted by provincial or national legislation. However, 
as noted above, the process of PDBA should precede events and extends into recovery and return to 
business-as-usual (Figure 24. Legislative Aspects).  
 
Figure 24. Legislative Aspects. 
Ideally, legislation should allow and support pre-event gathering of key data on the existing building 
stock such as floor plans, structural engineering, and modifications. Processes or legal avenues should 
be in place to allow the local authority to obtain the results of assessments performed by critical 
infrastructure and building owners. Several participants noted challenges in having PDBA authority only 
within emergency powers legislation; a local authority must still have powers to enable its PDBA even if 
a state of emergency is not declared (e.g., the event is manageable by a local authority without 
exceptional powers). Second, there must be legal mechanisms in place to allow for transition from using 
placards during the state of emergency to the normal (or revised) permitting processes in a “business-
as-usual” environment.  
Multiple levels of organization 
The research team noted that PDBA system operations function at multiple levels of organization. Much 
of the literature on PDBA focuses on the assessment of individual buildings by individual assessors (or 
teams of assessors). However, the framework will need to incorporate considerations and guidance 
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ranging from operational aspects (use of an assessment framework) through EOC/Regional operations 
(e.g., recruitment and training of assessors pre-event) to provincial/national (e.g., legislative 
considerations regarding liability, authority to placard, etc.). 
The team identified the need to structure the eventual framework as “layered” or “scalable” on several 
fronts, including the levels at which various building assessment processes occur (see Figure 25. Levels 
at which BA Processes Occur).  
 
Figure 25. Levels at which BA Processes Occur. 
Data elements spoke to assessment ranging from the equipment an individual assessor should carry 
through strategies for assigning assessors to an area, to how to manage the arrival of international 
teams. There are distinctive characteristics of the BA process that occur at each of these levels: 
 The individual assessor 
 Assessment teams 
 Assessment of individual buildings 
 Assessment of types of buildings  
 Assessments of neighbourhoods or small areas 
 Assessment across a municipality or Local Authority 
 Assessment at the regional or provincial level 
The following are suggested levels for the BC PDBA Framework: 
 General (aspects related to overall PDBA and Emergency Management) 
 System (aspects related to the PDBA process or system as a whole) 
 Provincial (may include national/international considerations) 
 Regional (may be combined with Provincial) 
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 Community (Local Authority or municipality, regional district or First Nations government) 
o NOTE: may consider Neighbourhood/Area if required 
 Team/Assessors 
 Building 
 
Goals of PDBA Change over Time 
The research team noted that various programs include assessment for immediate life safety and 
evacuation, determination of short-term use, long-term remediation and repair, identification of 
hazards internal to the building (risk of collapse, presence of hazardous materials) and external threats 
(potential collapse of neighbouring structures, geotechnical hazards, ongoing flooding or aftershocks, 
etc.).  The research team noted considerable variation in the goals and intent of building assessment 
programs from different countries. In addition, the team documented an evolution in the New Zealand 
program over several major events (see Figure 26. Changing Goals over Time). 
On analysis, the team noted that several goals were involved in building assessment: 
 Area assessment, often including windshield assessments, to determine the location and extent 
of damage within the overall community. At this point, assessment focuses on general areas or 
neighbourhoods, rather than specific buildings.  
 Initial life safety concerns, evaluation, and rescue – although generally handled by USAR and 
emergency response personnel, building assessors were occasionally involved in support roles 
during the initial and ad hoc phases of response. 
 Safety/Entry – some systems assess whether or not buildings are safe for entry (e.g., to remove 
personal items). Several participants argued that building assessors cannot adequately 
determine the safety of buildings (particularly those with moderate damage) and that this 
should not be part of the explicit assessment process. 
 Usability – Italy’s framework distinguishes between short term (emergency) usability and long-
term usability, with the goal of allowing occupants to stay in buildings even when damaged, 
reducing the number of displaced persons that must be accommodated.  
 Damage – the long-term goal of building assessment is to identify the extent of damage and 
repairs required. While this is usually conducted later in the response, there is considerable 
discussion on both the “goal posts” of this level of assessment (e.g., return to pre-event 
function, ability to sustain a subsequent similar event, update to current building codes and 
standards), and on whether this assessment should focus on structural assessment (all agree 
with this) or should include damage assessment of non-structural elements.  
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Figure 26. Changing Goals over Time. 
The research team mapped these goals and noted that the intent and focus of building assessment 
changes over time in several ways. Figure 26. Changing Goals over Time, arranges the goals of building 
assessment from simple (lower on the vertical axis) to most complex (detailed structural damage 
assessment). The team noted that the goals near the bottom are the major focus early in an event, and 
that the overall goal and complexity of assessment increases over time. An initial focus on area 
assessment and life safety generally evolves into safety and usability assessment as the PDBA process is 
established. Early rapid assessment processes tend to be exterior, relatively quick (e.g. 20 minutes per 
ATC-20), and often employ a “triage” model – quickly identifying those that are obviously “green” or 
“red” and flagging “yellow” and more complex buildings for a more thorough secondary 
interior/exterior assessment. Finally, detailed engineering and return-to-function assessments tend to 
occur farther in time, although these may be initiated early in the response for critical infrastructure and 
private owner buildings. The team also noted that the early, shorter assessments tended to be simpler, 
more prescriptive (e.g. with explicit criteria and processes for categorizing buildings) that were 
mandated and conducted or supported through the Local Authorities, while detailed damage 
assessments tended to occur through private sector assessors using more outcome-based or context-
specific assessment processes (the lack of criteria, consistency, and oversight of these assessments was 
noted by some participants as a potential area of concern).   
Contextual Factors 
Specific PDBA processes shared common elements, but varied across many facets. A number of 
contextual factors influence specific PDBA systems, including legal frameworks, frequency of events, 
personnel and resources available and the experience of those personnel (Figure 27. Contextual Factors 
Influencing PDBA). 
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Figure 27. Contextual Factors Influencing PDBA. 
 
Designation of what constitutes “safe” or “usable” may be influenced by social and operational factors 
(e.g., need to reduce impact of displaced people who could “camp” in damaged but structurally safe 
buildings). As noted above, initial emphases on short term “usability” increasingly move towards long 
term rehabilitation and reoccupation, and assessment processes return to “business as usual.” Political 
factors may influence strategic decisions on distribution of teams, availability of external resources 
(regional, national, international), and prioritization of areas or types of buildings. And the 
implementation of a PDBA process is dependent on a number of contextual factor related to the 
incident itself, including the type and extent of the incident, the types and number of buildings affected, 
personnel and resources who are dedicated to PDBA, etc. Finally, PDBA itself overlaps with a number of 
other emergency management functions, including, but not limited to search and rescue, social/welfare 
concerns, building assessment by owners and agencies, etc.  
Critical Decisions for Communities 
Communities responding to an event will have a series of critical decisions to make which will impact the 
implementation of PDBA processes. The project will present strategies to support communities in 
engaging in these decisions, which may include: 
 Terminology – the project will include a data/terminology dictionary which provides the initial 
key terms used in the process (which will likely be BC specific terms), definitions and 
descriptions, and, when known, alternative names.  
 Risk tolerance – communities will have to determine the extent to which life safety, building 
entry, short-term and long-term usability are to be considered in setting up and implementing 
the initial and ongoing PDBA processes. These decisions will be influenced by the nature of the 
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event, the extent and type of damage, local building stock and population characteristics, 
likelihood of further events, available (short- and long-term) resources, etc. 
 Decision-making roles – consider using ICS-similar structures which identify scalable roles, which 
may be assumed in practice by different personnel, based on the local event and available 
resources 
 One of the key missing elements, and potentially important value-added aspects of this project, 
is the articulation of processes and strategies to guide the overall PDBA process. Most 
systems and literature focus on individual assessment of specific types of buildings, and have 
only general discussion on establishing and maintaining the overall administration of PDBA.  
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Deliverable 6.6.1 and 6.6.2: Draft BC Post Disaster Building Assessment 
Framework 
Developing the Draft PDBA Framework 
Phase I and Phase II involved the gathering of data with the goal of identifying core concepts and 
recommendations to support development of BC post disaster building assessment framework. The 
research team gathered data from multiple sources, including academic and professional literature, 
descriptions and artefacts from operational PDBA systems, interviews and focus group sessions with key 
informants and stakeholders in PDBA, and observations and interviews obtained during a site visit to 
New Zealand. This data was used to develop an initial set of recommendations for development of a 
PDBA system for British Columbia.  
The Analysis and Synthesis phase consisted of organization and analysis of the data, along with a series 
of structured conversations in which the team reviewed and synthesized a substantial amount of varied 
data. The structured conversations led to the development of the goals, guiding principles, and core 
concepts that the team employed in developing a draft Post Disaster Building Assessment Framework 
for British Columbia.  
The central concept that emerged was that the BC PDBA Framework should consist of a series of 
recommendations (“guidance” and “considerations”) that would inform communities, organizations, 
and senior governments in developing PDBA programs. The framework would consists of a series of 
topics (or “aspects”) based on the research questions that guided this project. The considerations and 
guidance were to be derived primarily from analysis of the Recommendations (see Deliverable 6.4 Needs 
Analysis Report) which would be prioritized and developed through the lens of the Goals, Principles, and 
Core Concepts on this report (see Figure 28. Development of Framework Content). 
 
Figure 28. Development of Framework Content. 
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Synthesis and development of the draft framework consisted of a series of activities, including:  
 Analysis of the core concepts to establish an initial overall structure or the topic areas for the 
framework (see Table 4. Framework Table of Contents and Structure) 
o For example, topics would include Governance, Administration, Assessment Procedures, 
etc. 
 Identification of a series of “layers” or audiences to which specific content of the framework 
would speak 
o For example, each topic in the framework would have content or recommendations 
aimed at groups such as Provincial agencies or local government or to assessment teams 
 Sorting of recommendations and data into the topic structure 
 Within each topic, sorting of recommendations to form themes (the aspects or ideas to be 
presented for each topic)  
o For example, themes within the Operations topic included Logistics, Team Formation, 
Daily Deployment, etc.  
 Further categorization of recommendation within a theme to the “layers” or “audiences” to 
which specific recommendations would speak 
o For example, within Operations, the theme of Equipment and Resources included 
recommendations at the Provincial level (identify resources for long-term PDBA 
operations), EOC/Local Government Level (pre-establish equipment supply sites or 
caches) and Assessment Teams (develop checklists of personal safety and assessment 
equipment)  
 Restatement/development of the considerations (core concepts or content) and guidance 
(discussion and/or resources to support the readers) that would form the “content” or 
“recommendations” of the PDBA framework.  
Table 4. Framework Table of Contents and Structure. 
 
Draft Post Disaster Building Assessment Framework Document 
The resulting document, Draft PDBA Framework and Recommendations, included the deliverables 
described in the Project Charter for Milestone 6: Initial Damage Assessment Framework, incorporating 
both Deliverable 6.6.1 (provincial level DA framework) and Deliverable 6.6.2 (community-level DA 
framework for credentialed and non-credentialed personnel).  
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These deliverables were initially conceived as two separate documents. However, as the project 
progressed, it became apparent that the two concepts are intertwined and are better presented as a 
single, “layered” document. A core element of the Draft Framework is the recommendations which 
include both provincial and local/community level recommendations throughout the document. In 
addition, a key element of the draft framework was an initial matrix matching the requirements of 
specific building types with the type of assessment required for post-disaster building assessment and 
the types of credentialed and/or non-credentialed personnel who could perform those assessments.  
  
6.9.1e TECHNICAL REPORT  
DELIVERABLE 6.2.1 & 6.2.2: DRAFT BC PDBA FRAMEWORK 
85 
 
Components in Draft PDBA Framework 
Table 5 lists the structure and contents of the Draft PDBA Framework and Recommendations. 
Table 5. Framework Structure and Contents.  
Section/Topic Considerations and Guidance 
Core Concepts 
Core Concepts 
 
Defining Characteristics of a PDBA System 
PDBA is a layered construct 
Changing Goals over Time 
The Recommendations 
Governance 
 
Goal 
Elements of a Building Assessment program 
Legislation, Regulation, and Policy 
Authority for Post-Disaster Building Assessment Functions 
Leadership 
PDBA Processes and Field Guides 
Transition from Emergency Powers to Business-as-Usual 
Post-Event Legal Considerations 
Administration 
 
Operational Structure 
Relationship with Other Emergency Management Functions and 
Stakeholders (e.g. CI Owners) 
Administrative Structure 
Equipment and Resources 
Information Management 
Tracking and Monitoring PDBA 
Situational Awareness 
 
Developing an Overall Strategy 
Operational Decision-making and Interpretation of Information 
Leveraging other Emergency Management personnel and processes 
Establish Relationships in the Pre-event Phase 
Pre-Event Intelligence 
Indicator Buildings 
Pre-Planning 
Activation 
Logistics 
Equipment and Resources 
Team Formation and Personnel Management (General) 
Priority Setting 
Daily Briefings/Intelligence Reporting 
Daily Deployment 
Communications 
Linking with Other EM Functions 
Short Term Countermeasures 
End of Day Debriefs 
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Section/Topic Considerations and Guidance 
Staff Rotation 
Information Management 
 
Information Management Systems 
Pre-Event Data Collection 
Data Management 
Data Collection and Forms 
Use of Technology 
Sources of Data 
Data Validation 
Sharing and Integration of Data with other Stakeholders 
Assessment Teams 
 
Pre-event Preparation 
Personal and Team Equipment 
Housing, Transportation, and Support 
Fitness to Practice 
Safety on the Ground 
Coordination with Other Teams 
Daily Briefings and Debriefings 
Building Assessment 
Procedures 
 
Goal of Building Assessment Procedures 
Building Assessment Algorithms 
Descriptions of Assessment Procedures 
Specific Assessments for Particular Building Types/Taxonomies 
Building Status 
 
Components of Building Status 
Changing Building Status over Time 
Placards 
Considerations and Guidance 
Placard Systems 
 
Categories and Definitions 
Format and Content of Placards 
Authority to Use Placards 
Overlap of Placards with Other Emergency Management Assessments 
Assessment Personnel 
 
Roles and Expectations 
Recruitment, Education, Background, Experience 
Registries and Rosters 
Legal and Liability Issues 
Personnel Requirements for Sustained Operations or Large Scale Events 
Training 
 
Goals of Training 
Core Curriculum Principles 
Responsibility for PDBA training 
Standards, Guidelines, Ownership/Responsibility for Curriculum 
Pre-Event Training 
Ongoing and Refresher Training 
PDBA Processes and Field Guides 
Orientation Training 
Just-in-time Training 
Appendix 
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Section/Topic Considerations and Guidance 
The Community-level PDBA Assessment Matrix 
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Deliverable 6.7: Stakeholder Validation Workshop 
 
The goal of the Stakeholder Validation workshop was to provide key stakeholders and end-users of the 
PDBA framework an opportunity to review the emerging framework and recommendations for post-
disaster building assessment programs and to obtain their comments, input, and advice. 
Prior to the workshop, participants received a copy of the draft framework along with an introductory 
letter and worksheet. Participants were asked to: 
 Review the PDBA Draft Framework and Recommendations Document 
 Provide general comments on the document, based on questions in the participant worksheet.  
 Provide feedback, identify areas where participants did and did not agree with or support 
specific recommendations 
The Stakeholder Workshop included participants from several members of the Expert Working Group, 
along with end users and key Stakeholders in BC’s emergency management and PDBA communities. The 
workshop employed a series of experiential activities including scenarios, group discussion, focused 
question and answer sessions, group activities, and debriefings.  
Analysis of the data from these sessions will be analysed with the goal of further extending and 
enriching the projects PDBA procedures, tools, and processes. 
Workshop Overview 
The workshop consisted of two segments: presentations on the background and findings-to-date of the 
project and a series of interactive work sessions focusing on specific segments of the overall framework 
(See Appendix 15: Validation Workshop Agenda). 
The initial presentation included: 
 Project overview: 
o Background 
o Funding and partners 
o Research goal and objectives 
o Design and data collection 
o Analysis  
 Core Concepts: 
o PDBA as a complex system 
o PDBA as a system of systems 
o Changing goals of PDBA over time 
o Guiding Principles  
 
The interactive component consisted of three blocks of activity: 
 The PDBA Assessment Matrix: 
o Building taxonomy 
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o Types of building assessments 
o Characteristics of assessors 
 Operations: 
o Fit of findings with participants’ context 
o Positioning of PDBA – EOC or separate department 
o Resources for PDBA 
o Requirements for establishing PDBA operations 
 Documentation and Transitions: 
o Placards, forms, and documentation 
o Transitions from normal to emergency powers to return to business-as-usual 
 
Participants 
The Stakeholder Workshop ran from 0900 to 1600, attended by 33 participants on site and 2 who joined 
by teleconference and web. Participants included stakeholders and DA personnel from BC’s damage 
assessment and emergency management communities.  
Please refer to Appendix 16 for a list of participants’ affiliations. Note that participant names have been 
removed per the research project’s Informed Consent provisions. 
Table 6 presents a summary of the affiliations for participants in the BC Stakeholders group, and 
Research Team.  
 
 Total Academic 
Critical 
Infrastructure 
Local 
Authorities 
Prof. 
Bodies Govern Military 
Other DA 
Stakeholders 
DA 
Programs 
Private 
Sector 
Indigenous 
Stakeholders 23 2 1 7 3 8 1 1 9 2 2 
Team 10 3 0 0 3 4  0 1 0 0 
Total 33 5 1 7 6 12 1 1 10 2 2 
 
Table 6. Participant Affiliations. 
 
The Research Team itself consisted of three academics (JIBC), four from government (BC Housing), and 
three members from professional associations (Architectural Institute of BC and Engineers and 
Geoscientists BC).  
The Stakeholder group has strong representation from organizations who will employ DA processes 
(local authorities, Indigenous communities, government agencies, critical infrastructure owners, and 
private sector stakeholders) and those who will be assessors (professional associations representing 
engineers, architects, engineering technologists, and building inspectors).  
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Workshop Activities 
PDBA Assessment Matrix  
The PDBA Assessment Matrix was presented by Research Team members Peter Mitchell and Robyn 
Fenton (Appendix 17: Draft PDBA Assessment Matrix). The intent of the matrix is provide standardized 
definitions for building types and assessment types and a cross reference of these with the types of 
personnel who can perform the assessments. The table is intended as a starting point for local 
authorities or communities to adapt based on the types of building stock in their community and the 
availability and types of assessors who are available.  
The matrix includes a Building Taxonomy, types of Building Assessment, and types of Assessors. The 
Building Taxonomy is based on work from UBC, NRCan, and North Vancouver. Four types of building 
assessment were identified (based on the recommendations of this project): Area, Rapid Exterior Only, 
Rapid Exterior and Interior, and Detailed. An initial set of three of assessors was presented: 1). (Non-
credentialed) contractor, tradesperson, building manager; 2). Building official, architect, engineer or any 
kind; and 3). Structural engineer.  
The matrix further identifies who is responsible for conducting building assessments (e.g., local 
authority, owner, and/or combination), and who has the authority having jurisdiction for conducting 
assessments (AHJ).  
Participants worked in small groups to answer a series of questions: 
 What is missing? 
 Is this applicable to your organization? 
 Can you see yourself/your organization using this? 
 
Each group presented their responses and this formed the basis of a large group discussion. The findings 
for this activity are presented in Appendix 3: Findings. 
PDBA Organization and Operations 
This activity consisted of three sessions:  
1. EOC/Support Structure, Roles & Responsibilities 
2. Team Structures & Assignment Considerations 
3. Deployment Considerations 
 
Pete Learoyd presented key information on each topic, then groups were formed. Each group started at 
a station (based on the topics above) and answered a series of questions. A carousel technique was used 
to have each group rotate through three stations, review what other groups had contributed, then add 
their own comments. Finally, the groups reviewed their starting station to look at comments from all the 
other groups.  
The discussion questions were: 
 ROTATION #1 
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o What PDBA EOC/DOC organizational model (& communication/reporting lines) are you 
considering? 
o What PDBA management/ support roles & primary responsibilities is your 
community/organization considering?  
 ROTATION #2 
o What considerations are you using when determining the make-up of your individual 
teams?  
o What factors/considerations have you identified when determining initial & ongoing daily 
team assignments?  
 ROTATION #3 
o What type of structure/ content would you include in a daily briefing for teams? 
o What measures has your community/organization considered around the health & safety 
of personnel when deployed?  
 
The session concluded with a large group debrief and discussion. The findings from this activity are 
presented in Appendix 3: Findings.  
Placards, Forms, & Documentation 
Steven Bibby and Jim Forrest reviewed the draft framework recommendations and then lead a 
discussion exploring the use of placards, forms, & documentation. Questions considered were: 
1. Do we allow white and green simultaneous? How will placards allow transition from EM to BAU?  
2. Are the same placards sufficient for pre/post emergency? 
3. Authority to post/remove? 
4. Do we need a working group to manage these in future? 
  
The findings from this activity are presented in Appendix 16: Findings. 
Transitioning Between Pre-Event, Response, and Recovery 
Steven Bibby and Jim Forrest lead a session exploring the various phases of PDBA. The questions 
explored in this session included: 
1. Is there an existing or planned data management system?  
2. Does the pre-event data collection adequately address the LA needs? 
3. Does the framework work well with the way your organization functions?  
4. Does the framework sufficiently address liability protection during and after the emergency?  
 
The findings from this activity are presented in Appendix 16: Validation Workshop Data and Findings. 
Proposal for BC Post-Disaster Building Assessment Advisory Committee 
The final session of the workshop was an overview of the proposed BC PDBA Advisory Committee by 
Steven Bibby. Steven described the role and functions of the proposed committee. An initial meeting 
was scheduled for September, 2018. Participants were encouraged to consider membership and to 
contact Steven for further information.  
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Findings 
The findings and notes from the Validation Workshop are available in Appendix 18: Validation Workshop 
Data and Findings.  
Initial Analysis and Summary 
Following the workshop, all data was gathered, collated and analysed to identify additional 
recommendations for inclusion in the PDBA Framework. This analysis is included in Appendix 19: 
Additional Recommendations.  
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Deliverable 6.8: BC Post-Disaster Building Assessment Advisory 
Committee  
 
The formation of the BC Post-Disaster Building Assessment Advisory Committee meets the final 
objective of the BC PDBA project, namely to establish a network of stakeholder organizations to guide, 
deliver, and sustain the resulting suite of processes, approaches, and resources. 
The goal of the PDBA Advisory Committee will be to adopt and advise on the provincial framework for 
establishing post-disaster building assessments. The concept of the committee emerged from the efforts 
of BC Housing (Steven Bibby) and as a result of the BC PDBA Validation Workshop. At the Validation 
Workshop, stakeholders reviewed the draft BC PDBA Framework and Recommendations which will 
serve as a guideline for communities and agencies who develop the resources and tools required to 
perform assessments in a post-disaster setting. Participants at the Validation workshop identified a 
series of recommendations to be introduced at an inaugural Advisory Committee meeting. After the 
Validation workshop BC Housing received overwhelming interest and support from multiple 
stakeholders to participate in the ongoing development of the provincial program. 
Additional details were provided to participants in advance of the meeting, including the draft PBDA 
Framework and the draft Advisory Group Terms of Reference . It is anticipated that Advisory Group 
participants will commit to meeting two to three times per year. 
An inaugural meeting of the BC Post-Disaster Building Assessment Advisory Committee was held in 
Burnaby on September, 2018. The Workshop included several members of the Expert Working Group, 
along with end users and key Stakeholders in BC’s emergency management and PDBA communities. The 
workshop employed a series of group discussion, focused question and answer sessions, group 
activities, and debriefings.  
Workshop Overview 
The workshop consisted of introductions, a project debrief, review and discussion of the committee 
draft terms of reference, working session on the potential development Streams/working groups: 
governance and administration, placards, forms, and information management, curriculum and training 
and a presentation from the BC Assessment Authority/Geo BC Presentation on Rapid Damage 
Assessment Mobile App and Dashboard (Appendix 20: Inaugural Consortium Meeting Agenda).  
Participants 
The Workshop ran from 0900 to 1400, attended by 22 participants. Participants included stakeholders 
and DA personnel from BC’s damage assessment and emergency management communities (Appendix 
21: Inaugural Consortium Workshop Attendees’ Affiliations). Note that, per the research project 
Informed Consent provisions, names of individual participants have been removed.   
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Workshop Activities 
Overview of PDBA project and framework 
Ron Bowles presented and update and overview of the BC Post-Disaster Building Assessment (PDBA) 
project.   
Committee Draft Terms of Reference 
Steven Bibby walked through the purpose and mission of the BC Post-Disaster Building Assessment 
PDBA Inaugural Advisory Committee. There was discussion to rework the Terms of Reference to include 
the interests of the non-BC Housing, governmental groups. Committee members all agreed to the 
revised TOR, which was later distributed to all members with the revisions (Appendix 22: BC PDBA 
Advisory Committee Terms of Reference). 
PDBA Development Streams/Potential Working Groups 
Pete Learoyd presented the working group Development Streams. (See appendix 5 Development Stream 
Descriptions.) Participants were split into 3 groups and brainstormed focus areas for each stream.  
Focus Areas 
1. Governance and Administration 
2. Placards, Forms, and Information Management 
3. Curriculum and Training 
 
Outcomes 
Table 7 lists the areas identified  
Building Assessment Matrix – who does what for which building – ID assessment expertise, building 
taxonomy type of assessments, assessment expertise, building type and what type of assessment 
Liability of assessors – credentials, who owns it. Occupational health and safety,  
Some community training residents vs experts to do assessments.  
Teams: how many people/roles and responsibilities, 
Information  odul. for local authority – are hazardous materials being tracked  
Worker care 
Stakeholders – how do they fit in / insurance / role of stakeholders – associations 
Governance liability, legal – need clarity on lines of authority, how do different acts play into this, 
(tenants and residential tenancy act – onus on building owners. – not just about the BA process itself 
but how it overlaps with different users, legal and regulatory) 
Capacity and training and dealing with difference between volunteers – what are we tariing them on 
and what to do.  
Information gathering – building inventory 
Assessors and training – who what how  
FN – governance / jurisdictions – play out – provincial/local. 
Data – privacy, access, information. 
Priorities == Liability/who – stakeholders (credentialing)/data – information  odul., future funding  
Legislation – FN 
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Table 7. Discussion Outcomes from PDBA Development Activity. 
 
BC Emergency Management Common Operating Portal 
Gurdeep Singh from Geo BC (FLNRO) presented on the BC Emergency Management Common Operating 
Portal and the Building Damage Assessment mobile App. It provides local and provincial authorities real 
time information. Assessors in the field enter assessment information into an app which goes directly 
into the BC Emergency Management Common Operating Portal. Local Authorities can view real time 
information on buildings in their area. Photos can be added and data reported.  
Next Steps – Meeting frequency, location, dates 
1. Steven Bibby discussed next steps and confirmed everyone’s commitment to the TOR. 
2. Notes, revised Terms of Reference will be sent out for approval. 
3. Next Advisory Committee meeting will be held middle of March, 2019. 
4. Development Stream meetings to be held before the end of December. Doodle meeting options 
will be sent out to forward and accept.  
5. Revised framework will be sent out for review within the next 2 months. 
See Deliverable 6.8 Inaugural Advisory / Consortium Committee Report for further information, 
including the Draft Terms of Reference and copies of the presentation slides.  
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Deliverable 6.7.3: Production Versions of the BC Post Disaster Building 
Assessment Framework and Recommendations and the Companion 
Manual: Recommendations and References.  
 
The final activity in this project was development of the production versions of the Framework Manual 
and Companion Manual (Figure 29. BC Post-Disaster Building Assessment Framework and 
Recommendations: Manual and Companion Manual). These documents are available through both BC 
Housing and the Justice Institute of British Columbia websites. 
 
Figure 29. BC Post-Disaster Building Assessment Framework and Recommendations: Manual and 
Companion Manual. 
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Reach and Impact 
 
The project has already had a reach and impact beyond its intended scope.  
The project had three major goals: development of a provincial framework to support PDBA, a 
community-level framework for using credentialed and non-credential personnel to perform PDBA, and 
establishment of a provincial-level consortium or network of stakeholders who would help implement 
and sustain the PDBA framework. Thus, the k project outputs include a BC PDBA Framework and 
Recommendations, which support both the provincial- and community-level goals of the project, a PDBA 
Building Assessment Matrix which further supports communities in developing models for using 
credentialed and non-credential personnel, and the establishment of the BC PDBA Advisory Committee.  
However, the project has had a substantial reach and impact beyond these goals, including supporting 
multiple agencies, stakeholders, and government agencies participating in PDBA across British Columbia, 
consulting and informing PDBA programs and initiatives nationally and internationally, and developing 
an extended international network of PDBA stakeholders, practitioners, and experts.  
Reach 
The BC PDBA Research Project has had local, national, and international reach in terms of individuals 
and agencies who participated in the project, knowledge dissemination activities, and development of 
ongoing relationships.  
 
Figure 30. Reach and Impact. EWG: Expert Working Group Members; I: Interview Participants; P: 
Presentations. 
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The following are individuals, agencies, and organizations who have participated in, or benefited from 
the project: 
Research Team 
 Steven Bibby, BC Housing 
 Ron Bowles, Justice Institute of BC 
 Robyn Fenton, Architectural Institute of BC (AIBC) 
 Jim Forrest, BC Housing; City of Vancouver (from June, 2018) 
 Marguerite Laquinte Francis, Architectural Institute of BC (AIBC) 
 Pete Learoyd, Justice Institute of BC 
 Peter Mitchel, Association of Professional Engineers & Geoscientists of BC  
 Cindy Moran, BC Housing 
 Dawn Ursuliak, Justice Institute of BC 
Stakeholder Workshop 
 Applied Science Technologists & Technicians of BC 
 BC Housing 
 BC Hydro: Generation Civil Design 
 BC Liquor Distribution Branch 
 Municipality of Bowen Island 
 Building Officials Association of BC 
 Coastal Health Authority 
 Earthquake Engineering Research Institute  
British Columbia Chapter  
 Emergency Management BC (EMBC)  
 Hollyburn Properties 
 Integrated Partnership for Regional Emergency  
 City of Port Coquitlam 
 Shared Services BC 
 Structural Engineering Association of BC (SEABC) 
 City of Vancouver 
 Vancouver Airport Authority (YVR) 
  
 
Expert Working Group: 
British Columbia 
 Mike Andrews, North Shore Emergency Management Office 
 Dr. Carlos Estuardo Ventura, P.E., P.Eng., University of British Columbia 
 Arnie van Hattem, BCR Properties 
 Daniel Stevens, City of Vancouver 
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National 
 Glenn Cooper, CFB Esquimalt USAR Team, Department of National Defence 
International 
 Agostino Goretti, C. Eng., Ph.D., Italy, Italian Civil Protection Department 
 Ayse Hortacsu, California, Applied Technology Council 
 David Swanson, PE, SE, LEED AP, F. SEI, Washington State 
 Satoshi Tanaka, Japan, Fuji Tokoha University 
 Fred Turner, California, California Office of Emergency Services; Safety Assessment Program 
 
Figure 31. Expert Working Group Organizations and Agencies. 
 
New Zealand Participant Organizations and Agencies: 
 Auckland City Council 
 University of Auckland 
 Aurecon Group  
 Canterbury Civil Defence Emergency Management  
 Canterbury Earthquakes Royal Commission  
 Christchurch City Council Building Consenting Unit 
 Holmes Consulting 
 Hong Kong Engineering Institute conference 
 Housing New Zealand, Christchurch 
 Housing New Zealand Corporation, Crown Agency 
 Hurunui District Council 
 Institute of Professional Engineers 
 Kaikōura District Council 
 NZ Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment 
 School of Architecture and Planning, Auckland 
 Tonkin and Taylor 
 Wellington City Council – Building Damage assessment 
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Figure 32. New Zealand Site Visit Organizations and Agencies. 
MATILDA (MultinATIonal  odule on Damage Assessment and countermeasures) 
 Final Event (Ron Bowles invited to attend), September, 2017 
 Croatian National Protection and Rescue Directorate 
 Eucentre Foundation, Italy 
 Italian Civil Protection Department 
 Italian Fire and Rescue Service 
 Natural Disaster Rehabilitation Service, Greece 
 National Institute for Research and Development in Construction, Urban Planning and 
Sustainable Spatial Development, Romania 
 Administration of the Republic of Slovenia for Civil Protection and Disaster Relief 
Meetings in Europe with Steven Bibby October, 2017 
 Agostino Goretti, Civil Protection Department, Rome, Italy  
 Kostas Ioannides, Earthquake Planning and Protection Organization, Athens, Greece 
Validation Workshop Participating Organizations and Agencies 
 Applied Science Technologists & Technicians of BC 
 BC Housing 
 Bowen Island Municipality 
 Building Officials of BC 
 CFB Esquimalt USAR Team  
 Department of Civil Engineering, UBC 
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 Emergency Management BC (EMBC)  
 Health Emergency Management BC 
 Hollyburn Properties 
 Indigenous Services Canada (ISC) 
 Insurance Bureau of Canada  
 Building and Safety Standards Branch Office of Housing and Construction Standards Ministry of 
Municipal Affairs and Housing 
 North Shore Emergency Management Office 
 City of Port Coquitlam 
 Richmond School District No. 38 
 Municipality of Saanich  
 Soda Creek Band 
 Vancouver Airport Authority (YVR) 
 City of Vancouver  
 
Figure 32. Validation Workshop Organizations and Agencies. 
Inaugural Consortium/BC PDBA Advisory Committee Meetings 
 Applied Science Technologists & Technicians of BC 
 Architectural Institute of BC (AIBC) 
 BC Assessment Authority 
 BC Housing 
 BC Hydro 
 BC Safety Authority 
 Building Officials Association of BC 
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 Canadian Safety & Security Program, Department of National Defence 
 Earthquake Engineering and Research Institute (EERI) – BC Chapter 
 Emergency Management BC (EMBC)  
 Engineers & Geoscientists BC  
 Geo BC (FLNRO) 
 Health Emergency Management BC 
 Hollyburn Properties 
 Indigenous Services Canada (ISC) 
 Insurance Bureau of Canada  
 Justice Institute of British Columbia 
 Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, Building and Safety Standards Branch Office of 
Housing and Construction Standards 
 North Shore Emergency Management 
 Provincial Health Services Assocaition  
 Real Estate Services 
 Richmond School District #38 
 RJC 
 District of Saanich 
 Soda Creek Band 
 Structural Engineering Association of BC 
 BC Safety Authority, Technical Safety BC  
 University of British Columbia, Department of Civil Engineering 
 Vancouver Airport Authority (YVR) 
 City of Vancouver, Building Review Branch 
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Impact 
The BC PDBA Research Project had pragmatic and applied goals in developing tools and resources to 
support both community- and provincial/national-level post-disaster building assessment operations. 
These goals were met through publication of the BC PDBA Framework and Recommendations and 
Companion Manual, and through the inauguration on ongoing operations of the BC PDBA Advisory 
Committee. 
However, the project has had impact beyond these formal goals, with impact at multiple levels from 
supporting local governments in British Columbia who are in the process of establishing their own PDBA 
systems, through consultation with multiple agencies and organizations involved in PDBA, and the 
development of an extended network of stakeholders and personnel who remain in contact with 
members of the research team and their organizations.  
Operational 
The project outputs (e.g. framework and recommendations) are actively informing work of British 
Columbia groups developing and implementing PDBA programs – e.g. Vancouver, North Shore, Delta, BC 
Housing, and the BC PDBA Advisory Group. Several participants noted that the timing of this project was 
extremely fortunate, as they are in the process of establishing and/or enriching their damage 
assessment programs and are incorporating the outputs of the project. 
Knowledge Dissemination Activities 
Members of the project attended and were invited to a variety of knowledge dissemination 
conferences, workshops, and meetings.  
Activity Date Location Notes 
Site Visit  June, 
2017 
New Zealand See notes above for attendees 
and participating organizations. 
 Presentations  Auckland, NZ Robyn Fenton & Dawn Ursuliak 
 Presentations  Christchurch, NZ Research Team 
 Presentation  Canterbury University 
Christchurch, NZ 
Robyn Fenton 
 Presentations  Kaikoura, NZ Pete Learoyd & Dawn Ursuliak 
 Presentations  Wellington, NZ Research Team 
 New Zealand 
Stakeholder 
Engagement 
Workshop 
 Wellington, NZ Research Team 
New Zealand Housing June, 
2017 
Christchurch Steven Bibby 
New Zealand Housing June, 
2017 
Wellington Steven Bibby 
PDBA Stakeholder Input 
Workshop 
June 26, 
2017 
New Westminster, BC Research Team 
PDBA Expert Working 
Group 
June, 27 
2017 
New Westminster, BC Research Team 
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Activity Date Location Notes 
Architectural Institute of 
British Columbia 
July 6, 
2017 
Vancouver, BC Robyn Fenton – presentation on 
Site Visit 
MATILDA Final Event (Italy, 
Slovenia, Croatian 
consortium on an 
international rapid damage 
assessment response team) 
Sept., 
2017 
Rome, Italy Dr. Ron Bowles was invited to 
attend and present at the 
MATILDA international conference  
Meetings with 
international PDBA Experts 
Oct., 
2017 
Rome, Italy & Athens, 
Greece 
Steven Bibby 
Emergency Preparedness & 
Business Continuity 
Conference 
2017 Vancouver, BC Dr. Ron Bowles presented on BC 
PDBA project.  
World Congress on Disaster 
& Emergency Medicine 
May, 
2017 
Toronto, ON Dr. Ron Bowles presented on BC 
PDBA project. 
BuildEx: Tradeshow and 
Conference for Western 
Canadian property 
management, interior 
design, architecture, 
renovation, construction, & 
real estate. 
Feb 14, 
2018 
Vancouver, BC Peter Mitchell & Dr. Ron Bowles 
presentation: POST-EARTHQUAKE 
BC: HOW DO WE STAND UP? 
 
Regional Emergency 
Planning Committee (REPC) 
for the Lower Mainland 
April 19, 
2018 
Vancouver, BC Jim Forrest presented on the BC 
PDBA project.  
Asset Management 
Conference 
May, 
2018 
Victoria Peter Mitchell, invited 
presentation the work being done 
under the BDSA as well as on 
resilient buildings at a Asset 
Management Conference 
schooled for Victoria 
Emergency Preparedness 
for Industry and Commerce 
Council (EPICC) 
Sept, 
2018 
Victoria, BC Steven Bibby presented on the 
PDBA project.  
National Committee of 
Structural Engineering 
Associations AGM 
Oct. 2018 Chicago, IL Steven Bibby & Peter Mitchell 
presented on PDBA project. 
Emergency Preparedness & 
Business Continuity 
Conference 
Nov., 
2018 
Vancouver, BC Steven Bibby presented on the 
PDBA project.  
Canadian Risk Hazard 
Network & Canadian 
Roundtable  
Nov., 
2018 
Vancouver, BC Pete Learoyd presented on the 
PDBA project. 
Earthquake Engineering & 
Research Institute (EERI) 
Mar 
2019 
Vancouver Steven is one of 6 in a technical 
presentation describing the PDBA 
process in comparison to other  
international assessment 
protocols 
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Consultation 
The project has had international reach, with multiple stakeholders both informing and drawing on the 
expertise of our personnel through contact with various provincial and international groups.  
Activity Date Location Notes 
UBC’s Earthquake 
Engineering Research 
Facility 
January 
29, 2018 
Vancouver, BC Demonstration on the 
methodology and training 
developed to carry out post 
earthquake building assessments 
with the Minister of Education, 
DM EMBC and ADM EMBC in 
attendance. 
George Abbott, 
Government of BC 
  Consulted with Peter Mitchell, 
APEG BC to provide feedback on 
the government’s review of the 
2017 fire and flood seasons and 
input on the planning, prevention, 
response and recovery aspects 
and any comments the association 
had based on their involvement. 
City of Vancouver Seismic 
Policy Committee 
Feb. 2, 
2018 
Vancouver, BC Attended by two Research Team 
members.  
BC Post Disaster Building 
Assessment Advisory 
Group 
Sept. 13, 
2018 
Burnaby, BC Inaugural meeting 
National Council of 
Structural Engineering 
Associations (NCSEA) 
Oct 2018 Chicago Providing ongoing expertise and 
consultation to assist in the 
development of the BC PDBA 
Volunteer Registry 
Earthquake Engineering & 
Research Institute (EERI) 
Mar 
2019 
Vancouver Steven moderating a panel of 
international experts to discuss 
PDBA processes for possible 
change to EERI deployment 
protocols 
Applied Technology Council 
(ATC) and Federal 
Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) 
In 
progress 
through 
Oct 2019 
United States of 
America 
Steven received a request to help 
ATC & FEMA develop US guidance 
for building experts to assess 
structures. Will be part of a 
project review panel. 
BC Post Disaster Building 
Assessment Advisory 
Group – Working Groups 
Dec 7, 
17, 18, 
2018 
Burnaby, BC Working group meetings on 
governance, outcomes/placarding, 
and curriculum 
PDBA Volunteer 
Registry/Website 
In 
progress 
BC Housing BC Housing is working on a PDBA 
Volunteer Registry/Website, with 
completion anticipated for 
Mar./Apr., 2019. 
Emergency Management 
BC (EMBC) 
In 
progress 
British Columbia EMBC has agreed to make 
Building Assessment a primary 
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Activity Date Location Notes 
function to test during the 
provincial full scale operational 
exercise in 2021. 
 
BC Ministry of Education, 
City of Vancouver, City of 
North Vancouver 
In 
progress 
British Columbia Consulting with BC Housing to 
modify their PDBA processes to fit 
with the provincial PDBA 
framework 
Emergency Management 
BC 
In 
progress 
British Columbia Consulting with BC Housing on 
proposed changes to emergency 
legislation in BC to help facilitate 
the provincial PDBA framework 
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Appendix 1. Project Gantt Chart 
 
 
Milestone           FY 17/18 FY 18/19 
  JIBC BCH AIBC APEG   A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N 
6.1 Project Initiation                                                   
Project Plan x         x x                                     
Research Protocol x         x x                                     
Ethics x         x x                                     
                                                    
Deliverable:                                                   
6.1.1 Project plan x           x                                     
6.1.2 Research protocol/proposal  x           x                                     
6.1.3 Research Ethics Approval  x           x                                     
                                                    
6.2  Needs Analysis Literature, 
Case Studies, and Professional 
Documents Review 
                                                  
Needs Analysis x         x x                                     
                                                    
Deliverable                                                   
6.2.1.1  Needs Analysis Report x           x                                     
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Milestone           FY 17/18 FY 18/19 
  JIBC BCH AIBC APEG   A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N 
                                                    
6.3  Needs Analysis: Stakeholder 
Engagement Workshop 
                                                  
Determine EWG vs participant list  x x x x   x x                                     
Workshop booked June 26th and 27 x         x x                                     
Invitation list created x x x x   x x                                     
Invites created x x x x   x x                                     
Invites sent out x x x x   x x                                     
Workshop planning agenda and 
outline x         x x x                                   
Travel booked for invited guests x         x x x                                   
2 day workshop x x x x   x x x                                   
Workshop data analysis/synthesis x         x x x x                                 
                                                    
Deliverable                                                   
6.3.1.2 Workshop agenda, 
attendance list and the presentation 
material.  
x               x                                 
6.3.1.2 Expert Working Group 
(EWG) Workshop synopsis report x               x                                 
                                                    
6.4 Needs Analysis: Stakeholder 
Interviews and Site Visit 
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Milestone           FY 17/18 FY 18/19 
  JIBC BCH AIBC APEG   A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N 
 Interviews: revise interview 
questions x               x x                               
Interviews: Identify Key Informants & 
Stakeholders for interviews x x x x         x x                               
Interviews: set up interview times x               x x x                             
Interviews: transcribe and drop into 
analysis software  x                 x x                             
Interviews: Analysis and Outcomes x                 x x                             
Interviews: Create report x                   x                             
                                                    
Site Visit Criteria Developed x x x x   x                                       
Site Visit goals and outcomes x x x x   x                                       
Site Visit Options x x x x   x                                       
Site Visit Picked  x x x x   x                                       
Site visit preparations x         x x                                     
Site Visit Establish Contacts x x x x     x                                     
Site Visit Set Up Meetings and 
Schedule x x x x     x                                     
Site Visit Book Travel / Hotel x x x x     x                                     
Site Visit Create Canadian 
Presentation / Workshop x           x                                     
Site Visit Create Research 
Questions x           x                                     
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Milestone           FY 17/18 FY 18/19 
  JIBC BCH AIBC APEG   A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N 
Site Visit 5 day Visit x x x x       x                                   
Site Visit Analysis and Outcomes x               x x                               
Site Visit: Create Report x                 x x                             
Review x x x x           x x                             
Deliverable                                                   
6.4.1 Needs Analysis Report  x                   x                             
6.4.2 Site Visit Report (MS Word 
electronically )  x                   x                             
                                                    
                                                    
6.5 Draft Framework: Analysis & 
Synthesis 
                                                  
Analysis/Synthesis x                   x x x                         
Review x x x x               x x                         
Deliverable                                                   
6.5.1 Analysis and Synthesis Report  x                       x                         
                                                    
Milestone 6.6 Initial Damage 
Assessment Framework 
                                                  
Initial Frameworks x                       x x x x x                 
Review x x x x                     x x x                 
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Milestone           FY 17/18 FY 18/19 
  JIBC BCH AIBC APEG   A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N 
                                                    
Deliverable                                                   
6.6.1 Draft Provincial DA Framework  x                               x                 
6.6.2 Draft Community-level 
Framework  x                               x                 
                                                    
6.7 Stakeholder Validation                                                   
Determine Workshop Validation 
Date x x x x                 x x x                     
Invite attendees x x x x                 x x x                     
Create agenda / outcomes/agenda x                       x x x                     
Workshop x                             x                   
Workshop data analysis/synthesis x                             x x                 
Revisions to Frameworks x                                                 
                                                    
Deliverables                                                   
6.7.1 Workshop agenda, attendance 
list and the presentation material  x                                 x               
6.7.1.1 Draft Validation Review 
Report . x                                 x               
6.7.2 Draft of the Provincial and 
Community-level frameworks and 
resources  
x                                 x               
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Milestone           FY 17/18 FY 18/19 
  JIBC BCH AIBC APEG   A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N 
6.7.3 Final distribution versions of 
the Provincial and Community-level 
Damage Assessment Frameworks 
and Resources. 
x                                 x               
                                                    
6.8 Establish Consortium                                                   
Establish Consortium x x x x                               x x x x     
Knowledge Dissemination x x x x                               x x x x     
                                                    
Deliverables                                                   
6.8.1 foundational administrative 
document for the Consortium x x x x                                     x     
6.8.2 Final agenda and attendance 
list x                                           x     
6.8.3 Knowledge dissemination 
documents:  
(a) A white paper on the DA 
frameworks  
(b) A draft presentation for a EWG 
peer-level conference for the TA’s 
approval no later than two weeks 
prior to the conference and a final 
copy following the conference  
x                                         x x     
                                                    
                                                    
Milestone 6.9 Project Close Out                                                   
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Milestone           FY 17/18 FY 18/19 
  JIBC BCH AIBC APEG   A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N 
Project Reporting x x                                               
Ongoing Project Reporting (verbal 
and written CSSP Progress Reports, 
in the format provided by the TA) 
x x       x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Financial Reporting (YE Financial 
Reports) x x       x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
PRC meetings, reports, and Record 
of Decision (as per the CSSP project 
implementation guide) 
x x       x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
 Project Completion Report and 
Presentation  x x       x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Project Technical Report x x       x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
                          
 
 
Table A1. Project Gantt Chart.
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Appendix 2: Research Protocol 
Research Questions 
 
The research questions focus on two areas: gathering data on existing building damage safety 
assessment programs and exploring the experience of those who have used them.  
Part I: Building Damage Safety Assessment (BDSA) Framework 
How does Building Damage Safety Assessment fit within the overall Emergency Management planning 
and response structure? 
 Who has the overall (e.g., legislative) responsibility for BDSA? 
 Who are the stakeholders groups involving in developing, implementing and sustaining BDSA 
processes and infrastructure? 
 What are the roles and relationships between stakeholders in BDSA? 
 
Describe the elements/structure of your BDSA programs. 
 What is the overall goal of BDSA? 
 What types of BDSA are performed, by whom, with what goals/outcomes, and following what 
procedures or processes? 
 How is BDSA information gathered, recorded, transferred, and employed? How  
 What are the credentials, background, &/or experience required to perform each type of BDSA? 
 What training and/or education is available to support personnel performing BDSA? 
 Is there a performance standard identified for how BDSA is carried out and is there a different 
standard used for BDSA’s carried out by credentialed and non-credentialed  individuals? 
 Are credentialed and non-credentialed individuals carrying out BDSA’s fully indemnified against 
any liability or from claims being made against them  
 
Describe the administration and control of BDSA. 
 Who has operational control or administration of BDSA? 
 How are BDSA teams and personnel recruited, selected, operationalized, and supported? 
 
Describe the context for BDSA in your jurisdiction: history, evolution, and current state. 
 How have BDSA processes evolved to incorporate experience, best and emerging practices? 
 What are the key assumptions or principles upon which your BDSA program is based? 
 Why has it developed the way it has (e.g., political considerations, experience, etc)? 
 
Part II: Participants’ Experience in Building Damage Safety Assessment 
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Please describe your recent experience in using BDSA. 
 Describe the event: location, timing, extent of damage, etc. 
 Describe the operational functioning of BDSA: who managed/administered the overall process, 
who identified indicator buildings (and what process was used to identify these buildings), who 
set operational priorities, what were the operational principles on which decisions were based? 
 Describe recruitment, deployment and use of BDSA teams. 
 Describe extent of BDSA: # teams, composition, selection, logistics, timeline, # buildings 
assessed, outcomes of assessment. 
 Were BDSA’s carried out in order to confirm that buildings actually met a certain performance 
level? 
 What types of information were collected, how was information recorded, where did 
information “go,” and what types of decisions did information influence? 
 Describe the actual performance of BDSA in comparison to your planned response: what 
worked, what didn’t, what would you change? 
 
The “Blue Sky” question: what would an ideal BDSA program “look like”? 
 Based on your experience, what would an ideal BDSA program “look like?” 
 What are the strengths and challenges with your current BDSA program? 
 What changes are you currently making in BDSA processes and infrastructure? 
 What changes would you like to make? What keeps you from making these changes? 
 What advice would you give us regarding development of a BDSA process for the British 
Columbia context? 
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Research Personnel 
 
Principal Investigators  
 Dr. Ron Bowles, Associate Dean, Centre for Applied Research, JIBC (primary contact) 
 Pete Learoyd, Program Director, Emergency Management Division, JIBC 
 Steven Bibby, BC Housing 
 Peter Mitchell, Association of Professional Engineers and Geoscientists of BC 
 Paul Becker, Architectural Institute of BC 
 Robyn Fenton, Architectural Institute of BC 
 Marguerite Laquinte Francis, Architectural Institute of BC 
Researcher and Research Project Manager 
 Dawn Ursuliak, Justice Institute of BC 
 
Research Design and Methodology 
Approach and Methodology  
 
This mixed methods study consists of three phases over approximately 18 months. 
Phase 1: Needs Analysis, employing five concurrent data collection streams: 
 Literature review 
 Stakeholder Workshop 
 Key Informant Interviews 
 Visit to Exemplar Site 
 Consultation with Expert Working Group members 
 
Phase 2: Analysis and Synthesis using content analysis and thematic analysis to develop a draft 
framework, process, and tools 
Phase 3: Stakeholder Validation, through consultation and a stakeholder validation workshop 
Site 
 
The primary site for this research will be the Justice Institute of British Columbia. Additional team 
meetings may occur at partners’ corporate locations. In addition, data will be gathered through 
interviews (both face-to-face and via tele/video conference) and a site visit (currently scheduled for 
Christchurch, Wellington, and Auckland, New Zealand). 
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Participants 
 
Four sets of participants will be engaged in this study: 
Expert Working Group, consisting of approximately 12 national and international experts with insight 
and experience in the development, delivery, and/or research into building damage assessment. These 
participants will be purposively selected with the goal of engaging recognized experts with a history of 
publication, operational experts from exemplar systems, both locally and internationally, and key 
stakeholders in BC’s emergency management community who have insight and responsibility for 
conducting building damage safety assessment after an emergency. 
Broad Stakeholder Group, consisting of up to 20 participants recruited from BC local authorities, critical 
infrastructure organizations, provincial and federal government agencies. Participants will be 
purposively selected, using convenience and snowball strategies. An initial list of potential participants 
(both individuals and organizations) will be developed by the research team, seeking individuals known 
to background, expertise, and interest in emergency management and building damage safety 
assessment or who hold positions involving damage safety assessment in key organizations and 
stakeholder groups. In addition, the research team will engage personal and professional contacts 
within key stakeholder organizations to identify other potential participants (snowball strategy). 
Potential participants will be contacted via email and given information about the study and invited to 
participate (convenience strategy). In addition, these potential participants will be asked for names of 
additional potential members. The research team will continue to recruit until the Stakeholder Group 
membership covers key stakeholders in BC emergency management and damage safety assessment. 
Site Visit Group, consisting of an unknown number of personnel encountered when the research team 
visits an exemplar site. Participants will be recruited by key organizations involved in the exemplar 
program.  
The research team will recruit up to 12 key informants to engage in in-depth semi-structured interviews. 
The goal of these interviews will be to fill in gaps from the literature review, stakeholder workshop, and 
site visit, and the explore in greater depth initial findings from data collection. We anticipate that the 
key informants will be drawn from the Expert Working Group, Stakeholder group, or participants met on 
the Exemplar Site Visit, although some participants may be identified from outside these groups.  
Inclusion/Exclusion 
There are no a priori exclusion criteria for participants.  
Inclusion criteria include personnel who have interest, expertise, experience and/or insight into 
emergency management with a particular focus on building damage safety assessment.  
Recruitment 
Members of the Expert Working Group and Stakeholder Groups will be contacted informally by email. 
Those that express an interest in participation will receive an introductory information letter.  The 
research team will identify one or more lead organizations in the site visit to assist with recruitment of 
participants. An information letter will be sent to the assisting organizations which will be forwarded to 
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potential participants. All participants will receive an information letter and informed consent form at 
the beginning of their interactions with the research team.  
Data Collection 
The study will collect several forms of data: 
 Text and images from existing professional, academic, and grey literature 
 Audio recordings, and subsequent transcripts of interviews, workshops, presentations, and other 
interactions with the research team 
 Field notes, both handwritten and typed, gathered by researchers at interviews, workshops, 
presentations, and other interactions with the research team 
 Hard copy artifacts and photos of flip charts, whiteboard/blackboard notes and activities from 
interviews, workshops, presentations and other interactions with the research team 
 Physical artifacts including texts, manuals, placards from exemplar damage safety assessment 
programs 
 
Data Collection procedures 
Initial data on existing BDSA procedures and case examples will be gathered from a review of relevant 
academic, professional, and gray literature. This data will populate a template based on the research 
questions. The first table, developed using an emergent strategy, will develop key characteristics and 
elements of damage safety assessment processes. At least four existing BDSA programs will be analysed 
using this structure. The second table consolidates consistent data from at least 3 case studies of BDSA 
in practice. Analysis will identify common elements and procedures, as well as gaps in existing literature 
describing BDSA. Both content and thematic analysis will be employed with case study data to identify 
best practices, gaps, strengths, and challenges with existing systems.  
The Stakeholder Workshop will include participants from the Expert Working Group and from 
Stakeholders in BC’s emergency management and BDSA environment. The workshop will consist of a 
series of experiential activities including scenarios, group discussion, focused question and answer 
sessions, presentations from experts, group activities, and debriefings. Activities directed towards the 
Expert Working Group will focus on uncovering additional data to supplement findings from the 
literature review and solicitation of advice on adaptation of BDSA procedures to the BC context. 
Activities focused on the Stakeholder group will focus on development of common terminology, 
understandings of core concepts related to BDSA and emergency management more broadly, gaining an 
understanding of the operational context and BDSA needs and expectations of different user groups 
(e.g., Local Authorities, Critical Infrastructure organizations, responder agencies, professional 
associations). Analysis will focus on further extending and developing an understanding of how BDSA 
procedures, tools, and processes can best be established within a BC context. 
The site visit will consist of a series of formal and informal presentations from both the research team 
and the exemplar site, focused “workshop” sessions where the research team will employ interactive 
sessions to obtain specific information related to the research questions, one-on-one discussions, and 
question and answer sessions. This data will be analyzed using content and thematic analysis strategies 
with a particular focus on implementation of BDSA procedures, best practices, and suggestions for 
adaptation.  
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Semi-structured interviews with key informants will supplement and extend the data gathered through 
the literature review and Stakeholder Workshop. While the Research Questions will form the foundation 
of the interview, the interviews will employ an emergent strategy with the goal of filling specific gaps 
and extending findings.  
Confidentiality 
The researchers do not anticipate a need for anonymity of data. The research questions focus on 
organizational structures, procedures, tools, and resources, primarily through information sources that 
are publically available. While individual participants will be asked about their experiences in performing 
BDSA, the focus, again, is on characterizing and evaluating the effectiveness of BDSA processes, not on 
personal experiences or personal opinions.  
 
However, the researchers will employ strategies to ensure confidentiality, such as de-identifying data at 
collection. Participants will only be identified by pseudonym or code, and comments and quotes will not 
be identified with specific participants. In instances where quotes or data might be attributable to 
specific individuals (for example, quotes from a manager of a civil defence organization from the site 
visit), researchers will provide those individuals the opportunity to review, and if desired, ask that the 
quotes be removed from the report or publication. 
Disclosure 
The researchers do not anticipate the collection of any data that the researchers might be legally 
required to disclose.  
Participant Review 
Initial research reports will be posted online and available for participant review and comment prior to 
completion of the study. 
Data Linking and Secondary Use 
The researchers do not anticipate secondary use of data or data linking from this study.  
Risks and Benefits 
Individuals will not directly benefit from this research. However, the findings of the study may result in 
recommendations or suggestions for practice that may inform participants’ professional practice.  
The findings in this study will directly benefit those in British Columbia who are impacted by disaster. 
The findings will inform the development and implementation of building damage safety procedures 
that have the goal of effectively assessing buildings damaged in a disaster and allowing people and 
businesses to more quickly reoccupy their buildings.  
This research will inform BC practice directly and contribute to national and international dialogue and 
practice on building damage safety assessment and emergency management more broadly. 
6.9.1e TECHNICAL REPORT  
APPENDIX 2: RESEARCH PROTOCOL 
122 
 
Improving building damage safety assessment procedures may have social, psychosocial, economic, and 
life safety impact for communities suffering a disaster.  
The researchers do not anticipate social, behavioural, psychological, economic harm to participants. The 
researchers do not anticipate any potential injury to reputation or privacy nor potential breach of law.  
Analysis and Synthesis 
The research team will employ a concurrent and iterative process of data collection, analysis, and 
synthesis with the goal of developing and continuing to enrich its understanding of BDSA processes and 
drafting a framework, tools, and processes for BC Building Damage Safety Assessment.  
The research questions form a basis for analysing both existing BDSA programs and their use in practice. 
A process of content analysis and thematic analysis will be used to identify and extract relevant data. 
Data from the literature review, site visit, stakeholder workshop, and interviews will be used to populate 
a template based on the research questions. Thematic analysis will be used to identify best practices, 
strengths, challenges, factors to consider in adaptation to the BC context.  
Synthesis will involve multiple meetings of the research team to develop an overall concept of the 
elements in the framework and to determine the desired level of depth or detail for resources and tools. 
Development will be iterative, following a “rapid prototyping” approach, with initial specification of high 
level outputs, which are reviewed with stakeholders and users and refined towards final form.  
A draft set of deliverables will be presented and/or piloted with a stakeholder group in a workshop in 
2018, from which recommendations will guide refinement of the final project outputs.  
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Appendix 4: Literature Review Data 
 
The Literature Review generated a series of data tables and case studies:  
New Zealand 
Appendix 4.1: New Zealand Article Review Data Extraction 
Appendix 4.2: New Zealand BDSA Processes (2010/11 and 2014) 
Appendix 4.3: New Zealand Case Study 
Italy 
Appendix 4.4: Italy Article Review Data Extraction 
Appendix 4.5: Italy Zealand BDSA Processes (2010/11 and 2014) 
Appendix 4.6: Italy Zealand Case Study 
Japan 
Appendix 4.7: Japan Article Review Data Extraction 
Appendix 4.8: Japan BDSA Processes (2010/11 and 2014) 
ATC 
Appendix 4.9: ATC 20 and ATC 20-2 
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Appendix 4.1: New Zealand Article Review Data Extraction 
 
This appendix provides an annotated list of key and useful documents uncovered in the literature review. Many of these documents provide 
similar information, though sometimes from different perspectives. Due to saturation of themes, not all documents are fully reviewed. Note that 
many of the documents reference each other and there is substantial overlap, particularly in regards to case history, BDSA procedures, issues, 
and recommendations. The articles listed here as KEY or USEFUL should be further assessed as the project moves from data collection to analysis 
and synthesis.  
 
Readers are directed to the following KEY Documents as essential reading on the Canterbury Earthquakes: 
 
 Canterbury Earthquakes Royal Commission (2011). Discussion paper: Building management after earthquakes. CERC Christchurch, NZ. 
 New Zealand Society for Earthquake Engineering. (2012). Building Management After Earthquakes: Submission to Canterbury Earthquakes 
Royal Commission. Wellington, NZ: NZSEE. 
 Gallagher, R., Lizundia, B., & Barnes, J. C. (2011). Building Safety Evaluation after the February 22, 2011 Christchurch, New Zealand 
Earthquake: Observations by the ATC Reconnaissance Team. Redwood City, CA: Applied Technology Council.  
For Current Procedures: 
 Ministry of Business, Innovation, and Employment. (2014). Field Guide: Rapid Post Disaster Buildings Usability Assessment – Earthquakes. 
Wellington, NZ: MBIE.  
 Ministry of Business, Innovation, and Employment. (2014). Field Guide: Rapid Post Disaster Buildings Usability Assessment – Flooding. 
Wellington, NZ: MBIE. 
 
 
Citation Canterbury Earthquakes Royal Commission Document Library for Building Assessments 
 
http://canterbury.royalcommission.govt.nz/document-
library?SearchView&Query=(Field+Subjects=%22Building+assessments+after+earthquakes%2
2)&Subject=Building+assessments+after+earthquakes  
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Inline Ref CERC Document Library  
Description Documents from the Canterbury Earthquakes Royal Commission related to Building Damage 
Assessment. 
 
Informs All aspects  
Commentary Comprehensive set of documents that explores all facets of the Canterbury Earthquakes. 
Many of the documents listed in this review are taken from the site. Note that there are many 
documents that are not reviewed, even though there is relevance due to saturation – many of 
the reports reference each other, particularly in regards to case history, BDSA procedures, 
issues, and recommendations.  
 
Status KEY KEY 
USEFUL 
LIMITED 
NOT USEFUL 
  
 
Citation Canterbury Earthquakes Royal Commission (2011). Discussion paper: Building management 
after earthquakes. CERC Christchurch, NZ.  
 
Inline Ref CERC 0004.01  
Description Discussion paper exploring “implementation and effectiveness of the building management 
process used after the 4 September and 26 December 2010 earthquakes.” (p. 1). The intent of 
the paper was to generate discussion, identify lessons, and present some options for 
addressing issues raised in the paper.  
 
Informs BDSA processes generally 
NZ BDSA during CCC incidents 
Recommendations for changes to BDSA. 
 
Commentary This is a key document for understanding BDSA in the NZ context. The source has a 
substantial amount of core content, both on process, case, and recommendations. 
 
The recommendations are a KEY RESOURCE for the BC BDSA project.  
 
 
Status KEY KEY 
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USEFUL 
LIMITED 
NOT USEFUL 
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Citation New Zealand Society for Earthquake Engineering. (2012). Building Management After 
Earthquakes: Submission to Canterbury Earthquakes Royal Commission. Wellington, NZ: NZSEE. 
 
Inline Ref NZSEE 2012  
Description Submission of the NZSEE to the Royal Commission.  
 
p. 2:  
This submission is focussed largely on item b. above, i.e. the assessment of post earthquake 
building vulnerability:  
b. The vulnerability to damage of the buildings in the affected region may have been increased by 
earthquake effects,  
 
 
 
Informs Case 
Understanding decision-making 
rationale 
 
Commentary This is a key document. Many of the issues and recommendations are documented elsewhere. The 
discussion paper from p. 8 on discusses potential changes and rationale and is particularly useful 
for the next phases of this project.  
 
 
Status KEY KEY 
USEFUL 
LIMITED 
NOT USEFUL 
   
 
 
 
Citation Wilkinson, S., Grant, D., Williams, E., Paganoni, S., Fraser, S., Boon, D., Mason, A., & Free, M. 
(2013). Observations and implications of damage from the magnitude MW 6.3 Christchurch, 
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New Zealand earthquake of 22 February, 2011. Bulletin of Earthquake Engineering, 23(11). 
107-140. 
Inline Ref Wilkinson  
Description Report of a reconnaissance team from UK-based Earthquake Engineering Field Investigation 
Team over 5 days following the 22 February 2011 incident. Article provides limited 
information on the case itself or BDSA procedures. Good discussion on the types of damage 
associated with specific types of buildings. 
 
Informs Building types taxonomy 
Examples of damage associated with specific types of buildings.  
 
Commentary   
Status LIMITED 
Although good background for damage and types of buildings.  
KEY 
USEFUL 
LIMITED 
NOT USEFUL 
 Responses to the Independent Review to the response to the Canterbury earthquake, 4 
September, 2010.  
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Citation Gallagher, R., Lizundia, B., & Barnes, J. C. (2011). Building Safety Evaluation after the February 
22, 2011 Christchurch, New Zealand Earthquake: Observations by the ATC Reconnaissance 
Team. Redwood City, CA: Applied Technology Council.  
 
 
Inline Ref Gallagher et al. 2011  
Description The Applied Technology Council (ATC) sent a small reconnaissance team to Christchurch, New 
Zealand to observe the building safety evaluation process following the Magnitude 6.2 
February 22, 2011 earthquake.This report summarizes the reconnaissance team’s  
observations, findings, and recommendations regarding postearthquake building safety 
evaluation. P. 1 
 
Informs Background on case 
Comparison of programs 
BDSA processes 
Indicator buildings 
Examples of building damage 
Recommendations 
 
Commentary Excellent comparison of then NZ procedures in comparison with ATC 20. Good discussion on 
BDSA processes. Excellent discussion on use of indicator buildings.  
 
Status KEY 
Multiple fronts: 
Case 
BDSA 
Indicator buildings 
Recommendations 
KEY 
USEFUL 
LIMITED 
NOT USEFUL 
 
 
Citation Ministry of Business, Innovation, and Employment. (2014). Field Guide: Rapid Post Disaster 
Buildings Usability Assessment – Earthquakes. Wellington, NZ: MBIE. 
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Inline Ref MBIE, 2014a  
Description This guide replaces the document ‘Building Safety Evaluation During a State of 
Emergency’, published by the New Zealand Society for Earthquake Engineering (NZSEE) 
in August 2009. The experiences from the 2007 Gisborne earthquake, 2009 Padang 
earthquake, and 2010-2011 Canterbury earthquake sequence have also greatly assisted 
in updating this document. 
 
Informs BDSA 
Information Flow 
Specific assessments 
 
 
Commentary Key document. This is the revised version of NZ procedures based on the Canterbury 
experience. The level of detail is very useful and should be a good model for user-level 
stakeholders in the BC framework. 
 
Status KEY KEY 
USEFUL 
LIMITED 
NOT USEFUL 
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Citation Ministry of Business, Innovation, and Employment. (2014). Field Guide: Rapid Post Disaster 
Buildings Usability Assessment – Flooding. Wellington, NZ: MBIE. 
 
Inline Ref MBIE, 2014b  
Description This Field Guide has been produced to assist building control officials, engineers, architects, 
property managers and other building professionals to carry out Rapid Building Usability 
Assessments during a State of Emergency. At the discretion of a territorial authority (TA) the 
Field Guide may be used outside a State of Emergency.  
This Field Guide is one of a suite of documents developed to promote a nationally consistent 
approach to rapid building usability assessments after the recommendations of the 
Canterbury Earthquakes Royal Commission. 
 
Informs BDSA 
Information Flow 
Specific assessments 
 
 
Commentary Key document. Companion to Earthquake guide – analyze for adaptation to flooding context.    
Status KEY KEY 
USEFUL 
LIMITED 
NOT USEFUL 
 
 
Citation McLean, I., Oughton, D., Ellis, S., Wakelin, B., & Rubin, C. B. (2012). Review of the Civil Defence 
Emergency Management Response to the 22 February Canterbury Earthquake. Wellington, 
NZ: Civil Defence and Emergency Management.  
 
Inline Ref   
Description This review deals with the Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Response to the 22 
February 2011 Canterbury earthquake, from the date of the earthquake until 30 April 2011. 
On that date the response phase officially ended and recovery process was taken over by the 
Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA). 
The purpose of the review is: _ from an emergency management perspective identify the 
practices that should be reinforced and identify the processes and policies that warrant 
improvements. P. 1 
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Informs Narrative of the event from a political and organizational perspective. Good discussion on 
interplay between stakeholders. 
 
 
Commentary There is a lot of background in here. The recommendations are key, and there is lots of 
information on the decision-making and organizational processes involved in operationalizing 
BDSA.  
 
The list of documents on p. 133 requires follow up. 
The list on p. 134 is a succinct summary of challenges from the NZSSE.  
 
Status KEY 
 
p. 134, 
p. 136 – number of teams, personnel 
138 - recommendations 
KEY 
USEFUL 
LIMITED 
NOT USEFUL 
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Citation GEN.MCDEM.0004  
Inline Ref Each document referred to separately.   
Description Package of documents that appear to respond to the independent review.   
Informs   
Commentary   
Status  KEY 
USEFUL 
LIMITED 
NOT USEFUL 
   
Citation Middleton, D. & Westlake, R. (2011). Independent Review of the response to the Canterbury 
earthquake, 4 September, 2010. Wellington, NZ: Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency 
Management.  
 
Inline Ref GEN.MCDEM.0004.32 Middleton & Westlake (2011).  
Description Review of CDEM response to initial Sept earthquake. Note that report was not completed as 
review overtaken by subsequent aftershocks and events.  
 
Informs   
Commentary Review itself has useful information, but not a lot that is new. Good description of response 
from CDEM perspective.  
Recommendations may be useful. 
 
Status USEFUL KEY 
USEFUL 
LIMITED 
NOT USEFUL 
   
Citation Canterbury District Health Board (2011). Canterbury Health System response to the 
independent review of the response to the Canterbury Earthquake, 4 September, 2010. 
Wellington, NZ: Canterbury District Health Board.  
 
Inline Ref GEN.MCDEM.0004.11    CDHB 2011  
Description Report from BDHB in response to the independent report. Responds to particular elements of 
the initial report.  
 
Informs   
Commentary Some information from perspective of CI – in this case health. Some information on multiple 
EOCs. 
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Some information on information flow 
Some information on managing volunteers (need to). 
Recommendations are useful 
Section on information pp. 50 - is USEFUL 
Status LIMITED for general information 
Recommendations are USEFUL 
Information flow is USEFUL 
 
KEY 
USEFUL 
LIMITED 
NOT USEFUL 
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Citation Baird, A., Palermo, A., & Pampanin, S. (2011). Facade damage assessment of multi-storey 
buildings in the 2011 Christchurch earthquake. Bulletin of the New Zealand Society for 
earthquake engineering, 44(4), 368-376. 
 
Inline Ref Baird et al. 2011  
Description This paper presents the damage assessment of the façade systems of these RC buildings. 
A survey of 173 RC buildings in the Christchurch CBD is conducted here, focusing on the 
damage to the façade systems of the buildings. 
 
Informs Types of buildings 
Operational performance level 
 
Commentary Article deals with specific type of damage to specific structures in reinforced concrete 
buildings and is of limited value overall. However, there is some good general information on 
types of damage with reinforced concrete buildings.  
Section on operational performance level as a taxonomy of interest. 
 
Status USEFUL KEY 
USEFUL 
LIMITED 
NOT USEFUL 
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Citation Lochhead, I. (2011). Christchurch architecture and the earthquakes of 4 September 2010 and 
22 February 2011. Fabrications, 20(1), 120-127. 
 
Inline Ref Lochhead 2011  
Description   
Informs N/A  
Commentary Good description of types of buildings in Christchurch and damage to specific buildings. 
However, very little that is directly related to BDSA. Good narrative of the earthquake events. 
 
Status NOT USEFUL KEY 
USEFUL 
LIMITED 
NOT USEFUL 
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Citation Palermo, A., Wotherspoon, L., Hogan, L., Le Heux, M., & Camnasio, E. (2012). Seismic 
performance of concrete bridges during Canterbury earthquakes. Structural Concrete, 13(1), 
14-26. 
 
Inline Ref Palemo et al 2012  
Description The authors aim to give a detailed overview of the damage assessment and seismic 
performance of the Canterbury bridges during these two earthquakes, emphasizing 
unexpected issues that are still not properly detailed in New Zealand and overseas 
standards. 
 
Informs N/A  
Commentary Background information on events, but focused entirely on bridges. Very little of use to BDSA.  
Status NOT USEFUL KEY 
USEFUL 
LIMITED 
NOT USEFUL 
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Citation Kam, W. Y., Pampanin, S., & Elwood, K. (2011). Seismic performance of reinforced concrete 
buildings in the 22 February Christchurch (Lyttleton) earthquake. 
 
Inline Ref Kam et al 2011  
Description This paper describes observations of damage to reinforced concrete buildings from the  
September 2010 Darfield (Canterbury) earthquakes. Data was collated from first-hand  
earthquake reconnaissance observations by the authors, post-earthquake surveys, and 
communications and meetings with structural engineers in Christchurch. The paper discusses   
the general performance of several reinforced concrete building classes: pre-1976 low-rise, 
pre-1976 medium rise, modern low- and mid-rise, modern high-rise, industrial tilt-up  
buildings, advanced seismic systems and ground-failure induced damaged and retrofitted RC 
buildings. 
 
Informs Types of buildings 
damage to specific types of buildings 
 
 
Commentary May be useful for taxonomy of building types and examples of types of damage to specific 
buildings. 
 
Status NOT USEFUL for BDSA 
 
MAY BE USEFUL for analysis of building types, damage to specific types of buildings, etc.  
KEY 
USEFUL 
LIMITED 
NOT USEFUL 
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Citation Lizundia, B., Hortacsu, A., & Gallagher, R. (2017)  
 Improvements in Postearthquake Building Safety Evaluations: Lessons Learned From Recent 
Earthquakes 
 
Inline Ref Lizundia et al. 2017  
Description This paper will reflect on lessons learned during recent development exercises, such as the 
development of an adaptation of the ATC-20-1 methodology for Bhutan which considered the  
country’s vernacular buildings, made adjustments for its cultural and governmental context, and 
provided an extensive set of images of varying degrees and types of building damage with the 
recommended posting category. 
 
Informs Comparison of systems 
 
 
Commentary NOTE ANALYZED ONLY FOR NZ CONTENT  - will be listed again in comparison articles section. 
Very little information included and nothing new or different. 
 
 
Status LIMITED in this context – very little information included.  KEY 
USEFUL 
LIMITED 
NOT USEFUL 
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Appendix 4.2: New Zealand BDSA Processes  
 
This section contains key data extracted from documents describing both the 2014 NZ Rapid Post Disaster Building Usability Assessment process 
and the Building Damage Assessment process in place during the 2010/2011 Canterbury Earthquakes.   
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Appendix 4.2.1: New Zealand Building Damage Safety Assessment Process 2010 
 
Figure A1. New Zealand DSA Process, 2010. 
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DSA Overview 
 
RQ # Topic Comments References 
AB_001 Elements   
AF_001 Overall Goal The main aim of New Zealand’s building safety evaluation process is to ensure public safety 
following a disaster. 
CERC 0004.1, 
p. 6 
Af_007 Overall Authority  Authority of a Civil Defence Local Controller, under local or national state of emergency CERC 0004.1, 
p. 6 
AF_008 Legal Basis Civil Defence and Emergency Management Act, 2002 CERC 0004.1, 
p. 6 
AF_010 General Liability   
AF_003 Types of BDSA 
Assessment 
Overall Damage Survey 
Rapid Assessment, Level 1. 
Rapid Assessment, Level 2. 
Detailed Engineering  
CERN 0004.1 p. 
7 
AF_012 Building Taxonomies None Described 
 
 
AF_012b Specific Assessments for 
Building Types 
None Described  
AF_007a Relationship of various 
assessments 
  
AF_013 Type of Placard System   
AF_014 Placard Colours Green 
Yellow 
Red 
CERC 0004.1, 
p. 8 
AF_015 
 
Potential Outcomes Green – Inspected; apparently okay 
Yellow – Restricted Use; Safety concerns, parts may be off limits; entry for short periods of 
time only 
Red – Unsafe; Clearly unsafe; do not enter; Engineering Evaluation required before any use. 
 
CERC 0004.1, 
p. 8 
AF_016 Changing Placards During state of emergency, placards/status can only be changed by civil defence and 
emergency management. After the state of emergency, only local authorities can change 
placards. 
CERC 0004.1 p. 
10 
AF_016 Removing Placards Cannot be removed during State of Emergency; may be re-classified 
After State of Emergency, become Warning Notices, per Building Act 2004. Can only be 
removed by person authorised by Territorial Authority. 
CERC 0004.1 p. 
10 
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RQ # Topic Comments References 
AF_018 – 
AF_024 
Reporting and 
Information 
All assessment reports must be entered into a building register, which may be computer-based 
or paper-based (varies by TA). 
Completed forms are given to TA.  
CERC 0004.1 p. 
10 
AF_017 Other markings   
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Personnel 
 
RQ # Topic Comments References 
  Personnel  
AU_001 Types of Personnel Note Process above. Most comprehensive description of personnel found yet.  
 Emergency services and TA personnel involved in Overall Damage Survey. 
 Structural and civil engineers along with other personnel from building industry 
engage in Level 1 assessments as volunteers. 
 Structural and geotechnical engineers along with building services personnel 
engage in Level 2 assessments as volunteers. 
 Engineers, architects, and loss adjusters are engaged in Detailed Engineering 
Evaluation.  
CERN 0004.1 
p. 7 
    
    
 
RQ # Topic Comments References 
 Category Engineer  
AU_004 Professional Certification   
AU_007 Pre-Event Training   
AU_011 JIT/Event Preparation   
AU_012 Relationship   
AU_013 Liability    
AU_014 Capabilities   
AU_015 Types of Assessments 
performed 
  
    
 
 Category Building officials  
AU_004 Professional Certification   
AU_007 Pre-Event Training   
AU_011 JIT/Event Preparation   
AU_012 Relationship 1.   
AU_013 Liability    
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AU_014 Capabilities   
AU_015 Types of Assessments 
performed 
  
    
    
    
  
6.9.1e TECHNICAL REPORT  
APPENDIX 4.2.1: NEW ZEALAND BDSA PROCESSES 2010 
 
Building Damage Assessment 
RQ # Topic Comments References 
 BDSA Type: Area Assessment, Windshield Assessment  
 Local Name Overall Damage Survey  
AG_001 Goal Assess aggregate damage and identify affected areas. “…quick stocktake of the extent of the 
damage caused by the disaster.” P.8  
CERC 0004.1, 
p. 7 
AG_003 Description Emphasis on extent of damage, areas of high impact, identifying rescue tasks, identifying areas 
of priority for rapid assessment, estimating manpower and skills base needs, etc.  
CERC 0004.1, 
p. 7 
AG_015 Types of Buildings Teams 
Can Assess 
Area assessment CERC 0004.1, 
p. 7 
AG_037 Legal Authority Emergency service action plans, territorial authorities action plans CERC 0004.1, 
p. 7 
AG_005 Dispatched By Civil Defence staff CERC 0004.1, 
p. 7 
AG_038 Implementation Within hours after event CERC 0004.1, 
p. 7 
AG_006 Team Members Emergency services, Territorial Authority staff, Civil Defence volunteers CERC 0004.1, 
p. 7 
AG_009 Team Size   
AG_010 How Selected   
AG_016 Interior/Exterior Check? No entry to premises CERC 0004.1, 
p. 7 
AG_018 Assessment Outcomes See description CERC 0004.1, 
p. 7 
AG_020 Info Gathering Tools No formal records CERC 0004.1, 
p. 7 
AG_028 Assessment Time   
AG_030 Destination for Info 
Collected 
  
    
 
RQ # Topic Comments References 
 BDSA Type: Rapid Damage Assessment  
 Local Name Rapid Assessment, Level 1.  
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RQ # Topic Comments References 
AG_001 Goal Ascertain level of structural damage to individual buildings and note other hazards; assess 
building safety and decide appropriate level of occupancy; recommend security and shoring 
requirements. 
CERC 0004.1, 
p. 7 
AG_003 Description Building safety assessment CERC 0004.1, 
p. 7 
AG_015 Legal Authority During a period of a state of emergency declared under the Civil Defence Emergency 
Management Act.  
CERC 0004.1, 
p. 7 
AG_037 Types of Buildings Teams 
Can Assess 
Up to 3 or 4 stories high CERC 0004.1, 
p. 8 
AG_005 Dispatched By Controller, Building Safety Evaluation Leader CERC 0004.1, 
p. 7 
AG_038 Implementation   
AG_006 Team Members Structural and Civil Engineers, architects, other personnel from building industry; note 
volunteer status 
CERC 0004.1, 
p. 7 
AG_009 Team Size   
AG_010 How Selected   
AG_016 Interior/Exterior Check? Typically exterior only CERC 0004.1, 
p. 7 
AG_018 Assessment Outcomes Placards posted on buildings, note made of sites requiring further inspection, unsafe areas 
cordoned off 
CERC 0004.1, 
p. 7 
AG_020 Info Gathering Tools Formal system, not specified CERC 0004.1, 
p. 7 
AG_028 Type of Placard System   
AG_030 Assessment Time 10 – 20 minute CERC 0004.1, 
p. 8 
AG_030 Destination for Info 
Collected 
Central record maintained CERC 0004.1, 
p. 7 
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RQ # Topic Comments References 
 BDSA Type: Detailed Building Damage Assessment – Simple Buildings  
 Local Name Rapid Building Usability Assessment, Level 2.  
AG_001 Goal Ascertain level of structural damage to individual buildings and note other hazards; assess 
building safety and decide appropriate level of occupancy; recommend security and shoring 
requirements. 
 
CERC 0004.1, 
p. 7 
AG_003 Description Building safety assessment  
 
Typically for priority inspection of critical facilities (for situations where facilities operators do 
not have contract engineers) or where further information that raises concerns is received 
CERC 0004.1, 
p. 7 
AG_015 Types of Buildings Teams 
Can Assess 
Larger and more complex buildings (more than 3 or 4 stories), along with critical facilities CERC 0004.1, 
p. 7, 8 
AG_037 Legal Authority During a period of a state of emergency declared under the Civil Defence Emergency 
Management Act. 
 
AG_005 Dispatched By Controller, Building Safety Evaluation Leader CERC 0004.1, 
p. 7 
AG_038 Implementation   
AG_006 Team Members Structural Engineers, building services, and geotechnical engineers; note volunteer status CERC 0004.1, 
p. 7 
AG_009 Team Size   
AG_010 How Selected   
AG_016 Interior/Exterior Check? Interior and exterior inspection, plus reference to available drawings. Calculations may not be 
envisioned.  
CERC 0004.1, 
p. 7 
AG_018 Assessment Outcomes May result in revised placards, central records updated, unsafe areas cordoned off, urgent 
work recommendations 
CERC 0004.1, 
p. 7 
AG_020 Info Gathering Tools Formal system, not specified CERC 0004.1, 
p. 7 
AG_028 Assessment Time 1 – 4 hours CERC 0004.1, 
p. 8 
AG_030 Destination for Info 
Collected 
  
  Central record maintained CERC 0004.1, 
p. 7 
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RQ # Topic Comments References 
 BDSA Type: Engineering Assessment  
 Local Name Detailed Engineering Evaluation  CERC 0004.1, p. 
7 
AG_001 Goal To determine the full scope of repairs and rebuilds, and resource requirements. Provides 
confidence in the remaining building stock to assist the recovery. 
CERC 0004.1, p. 
7 
AG_003 Description Detailed review and specification of repairs and/or strengthening required. CERC 0004.1, p. 
7 
AG_015 Dispatched By Building owners, insurance companies, Territorial Authorities. CERC 0004.1, p. 
7 
AG_037 Implementation Typically longer term, but may be immediate for critical structures.  CERC 0004.1, p. 
7 
AG_005 Team Members Engineers, architects and loss adjusters. CERC 0004.1, p. 
7 
AG_038 Team Size   
AG_006 How Selected Contracted by building owners. CERC 0004.1, p. 
7 
AG_009 Types of Buildings Teams 
Can Assess 
  
AG_010 Interior/Exterior Check? • Detailed review of existing documentation 
• Evaluation of capacity 
• Identification of weaknesses 
• Observation of damage 
 
CERC 0004.1, p. 
7 
AG_016 Assessment Outcomes Ascertain extent of structural damage, establish losses for insurance purposes, and 
recommend remedial work to restore functionality and compliance with the Building Code.  
CERC 0004.1, p. 
7 
AG_018 Info Gathering Tools These evaluations are likely to involve review of construction documentation and the 
preparation of detailed engineering reports.  
CERC 0004.1, 
p. 7 
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Appendix 4.2.2: New Zealand Building Damage Safety Assessment Process 2014 
 
 
Figure A2. New Zealand DSA Process, 2014. 
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DSA Overview 
 
RQ # Topic Comments References 
AB_001 Elements   
AF_001 Overall Goal The objective of the rapid building assessment is to quickly establish the usability of buildings 
and associated infrastructure where functions may be compromised by a hazard event. Hazard 
events include earthquake, flood, landslide, rock-fall, volcanic eruption, storm surge, tsunami, 
explosion, or other event with life safety, residential or business consequences. 
 
The focus of the rapid building assessment process is on immediate public safety, not the 
provision of an engineering assessment service to building owners. Quantified assessment of 
building damage is necessary to determine reconstruction programmes and resource 
requirements for repair, and to assess how long recovery may take. 
Field Guide 
2014 
Af_007 Overall Authority  Led by Territorial Authority (TA, similar to Local Authority) under control of a Civil Defence 
Emergency Management Controller (Local or Group Controller).  
Field Guide 
2014 
AF_008 Legal Basis Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 (CDEM Act) and the associated regulation, the 
CDEM Plan, provide for TAs to issue and control the use of signs. 
 
In case no State of Emergency is declared, the Building Act 2004 allows authorised officers of a 
TA to enter premises to determine whether a building is dangerous, earthquake-prone, or 
insanitary. 
Field Guide 
2014 
AF_010 General Liability The CDEM Act provides protection from liability for any act or omission of the Crown, CDEM 
Groups (including officers, employees or members of those groups), or other persons, except 
in cases of bad faith or gross negligence. 
Field Guide 
2014 
AF_003 Types of BDSA 
Assessment 
Rapid Impact Assessment 
Residential Rapid Assessment 
Rapid Building Usability Assessment, Level 1. 
Rapid Building Usability Assessment, Level 2. 
Detailed Building Damage Assessment – Simple Buildings 
Detailed Building Damage Assessment – Complex Buildings 
Field Guide 
2014 
AF_012 Building Taxonomies Simple Residential 
Complex Residential 
Non-residential and complex residential buildings 
Essential Buildings 
Field Guide 
2014 
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RQ # Topic Comments References 
 
AF_012b Specific Assessments for 
Building Types 
Timber framed structures 
Reinforced concrete or masonry wall construction 
Reinforced concrete frame construction 
Precast concrete tilt-up structures 
Suspended concrete floors 
Steel frame structures 
Unreinforced masonry (URM) structures 
 
Field Guide 
2014 
AF_007a Relationship of various 
assessments 
Rapid Building Usability Assessments are undertaken by the territorial authorities to provide a 
rapid indication of the usability and safety of affected buildings and adjacent public spaces. 
Irrespective of the result and recommendations of the rapid building assessment, it is the 
building owner’s responsibility to ensure that their building is safe before it is reoccupied. It is 
also the owner’s responsibility to ensure that the building does not pose any danger to 
neighbouring buildings or public spaces. 
Field Guide 
2014 
AF_013 Type of Placard System   
AF_014 Placard Colours White 
Yellow 
Red 
Field Guide 
2014 
AF_015 
 
Potential Outcomes W Can be used (white) 
Restricted access (yellow) 
Y1 Restricted access to parts of the building only 
Y2 Restricted access – short term use only  
Entry Prohibited (red) 
R1 Entry Prohibited – Risk from External Factors, e.g. adjacent buildings or ground failure 
R2 Entry Prohibited – Significant Damage 
Field Guide 
2014 
AF_016 Changing Placards Only by building assessor authorized by the Controller Field Guide 
2014 
AF_016 Removing Placards Cannot be removed during State of Emergency; may be re-classified 
After State of Emergency, become Warning Notices, per Building Act 2004. Can only be 
removed by person authorised by Territorial Authority. 
Field Guide 
2014 
AF_018 – 
AF_024 
Reporting and 
Information 
All assessment reports must be entered into a building register, which may be computer-based 
or paper-based (varies by TA). 
Completed forms are given to TA.  
Field Guide 
2014 
AF_017 Other markings  Urban Search and Rescue Markings 
 
Field Guide 
2014, p. 13 
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RQ # Topic Comments References 
Collapsed or partly collapsed buildings may already have been marked by Urban 
Search and Rescue (USAR) teams. The marking would usually be located on the 
exterior of the collapsed structure near the point of entry that offers the best 
visibility. Consider these markings when deciding whether it is safe to enter a building. 
USAR markings are always orange spray paint. The marking consists of a 1 x 1 meter 
square box with the following details: 
 
Inside the box: 
 
 “Go” or “G” if deemed safe to enter; “No Go” or “NG” if it is deemed unsafe 
to enter 
 Team identification 
 Date and time start 
 Date and time finish. 
 
Outside the box: 
 
 Hazard information (top) 
 Missing persons (bottom) 
 Live victims rescued (left) 
 Dead victims extricated (right). 
 
When the USAR team has completed work on the structure to its capacity, a circle is 
drawn around the entire marking. After all work on the structure is completed and it 
is confirmed there are no more 
victims, a horizontal line is drawn through the entire marking. 
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RQ # Topic Comments References 
  
 
 
Field Guide 
2014. P. 14 
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Personnel 
RQ # Topic Comments References 
  Personnel  
AU_001 Types of Personnel Rapid Building Usability Assessments:  
 Professional Engineers 
 Building Officials 
Detailed (Engineering) Assessment: 
 Professional Engineers 
Field Guide 
2014 
 
RQ # Topic Comments References 
 Category Engineer  
AU_004 Professional Certification   
AU_007 Pre-Event Training   
AU_011 JIT/Event Preparation   
AU_012 Relationship 1. Each event has a Memorandum of Understanding for engineers such as the 
IPENZ “Memorandum of Understanding for Engineers Volunteering to Assist 
territorial authorities in a State of Emergency” 
2. Professional Volunteer (Rapid Damage Assessment) 
3. Hired by building owner or occupant (Detailed/Engineering Assessment) 
Field Guide 
2014 
AU_013 Liability  Professional volunteers sign in on a list of assessors, to ensure that they are authorised to 
undertake Rapid Building Usability Assessments for a particular event. This protects their 
liability exposure. 
Field Guide 
2014 
AU_014 Capabilities  Field Guide 
2014 
AU_015 Types of Assessments 
performed 
 Field Guide 
2014 
    
 
RQ # Topic Comments References 
 Category Building officials  
AU_004 Professional Certification   
AU_007 Pre-Event Training   
AU_011 JIT/Event Preparation   
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RQ # Topic Comments References 
AU_012 Relationship 2. Employed by TA (local authority) 
3. Seconded to TA for a particular event 
Field Guide 
2014 
AU_013 Liability  Professional volunteers sign in on a list of assessors, to ensure that they are authorised to 
undertake Rapid Building Assessments for a particular event. This protects their liability 
exposure. 
Field Guide 
2014 
AU_014 Capabilities  Field Guide 
2014 
AU_015 Types of Assessments 
performed 
 Field Guide 
2014 
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Building Damage Assessments 
RQ # Topic Comments References 
 BDSA Type: Area Assessment, Windshield Assessment  
 Local Name Rapid Impact Assessment Field Guide 
2014 
AG_001 Goal To understand the overall impact and extent of affected areas.  Field Guide 
2014 
AG_003 Description Brief drive-by or aerial assessment of overall damage to areas. Emphasis on identifying extent  
of damage, priorities for rescue, areas of high impact and resources required.  
Field Guide 
2014 
AG_015 Types of Buildings Teams 
Can Assess 
Area assessment, not of specific buildings.  
AG_037 Legal Authority Leads to a decision on whether to declare a State of Emergency. Field Guide 
2014 
AG_005 Dispatched By   
AG_038 Implementation Undertaken within hours of the event by emergency services and the territorial authority. Field Guide 
2014 
AG_006 Team Members   
AG_009 Team Size   
AG_010 How Selected   
AG_016 Interior/Exterior Check?   
AG_018 Assessment Outcomes   
AG_020 Info Gathering Tools No formal records kept. Field Guide 
2014 
AG_028 Assessment Time   
AG_030 Destination for Info 
Collected 
  
    
 
 BDSA Type: Rapid Damage Assessment  
 Local Name Residential Rapid Assessment. Field Guide 
2014 
AG_001 Goal To quickly assess the impact of damage observed on the continued use of a building or 
adjacent property. The emphasis is on public safety. 
 
Field Guide 
2014 
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The objective of a rapid assessment is to assess the impact of damage observed on the 
continued use of a building or adjacent property. 
AG_003 Description Brief visual assessments of damage to individual buildings. Field Guide 
2014 
AG_015 Types of Buildings Teams 
Can Assess 
Simple residential buildings. Field Guide 
2014 
AG_037 Legal Authority Carried out during a declared State of Emergency acting under the authority of the Civil 
Defence Controller. 
Field Guide 
2014 
AG_005 Dispatched By Building Assessment Manager (EOC) Field Guide 
2014 
AG_038 Implementation   
AG_006 Team Members Volunteer engineers and building officials Field Guide 
2014 
AG_009 Team Size   
AG_010 How Selected   
AG_016 Interior/Exterior Check? external inspection only; internal inspection (if required) may consist of looking through 
windows for internal damage. 
Field Guide 
2014 
AG_018 Assessment Outcomes See overview  
AG_020 Info Gathering Tools formal records. 
 
Information Sheet (to occupant) 
Residential Assessment Report (to Territorial Authority) (p. 44) 
Photos 
Field Guide 
2014 
AG_028 Assessment Time Around 20 minutes each. Field Guide 
2014 
AG_030 Destination for Info 
Collected 
Discussion with building owner/occupant 
Provide Information Sheet 
 
Field Guide 
2014 
 
 
RQ # Topic Comments References 
 BDSA Type: Rapid Damage Assessment  
 Local Name Rapid Building Usability Assessment, Level 1. Field Guide 
2014 
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RQ # Topic Comments References 
AG_001 Goal To quickly assess the impact of damage observed on the continued use of a building or 
adjacent property. The emphasis is on public safety. 
 
The objective of a rapid assessment is to assess the impact of damage observed on the 
continued use of a building or adjacent property. 
Field Guide 
2014 
AG_003 Description Brief visual assessments of damage to individual buildings. Field Guide 
2014 
AG_015 Legal Authority Carried out during a declared State of Emergency acting under the authority of the Civil 
Defence Controller. 
 
AG_037 Types of Buildings Teams 
Can Assess 
Non-residential and complex residential buildings; buildings constructed using typical 
residential construction types. 
 
AG_005 Dispatched By Building Assessment Manager (EOC)  
AG_038 Implementation   
AG_006 Team Members Volunteer engineers and building officials 
building control officers, structural and civil engineers, architects, experienced 
building contractors and other suitable experienced building professionals. 
Field Guide 
2014 
AG_009 Team Size   
AG_010 How Selected   
AG_016 Interior/Exterior Check? external inspection only Field Guide 
2014 
AG_018 Assessment Outcomes See overview  
AG_020 Info Gathering Tools formal records. 
 
Information Sheet (to occupant) 
Level 1 Assessment Report (to Territorial Authority)  (p. 52) 
Photos 
Field Guide 
2014 
AG_028 Type of Placard System See overview  
AG_030 Assessment Time Around 20 minutes each. Field Guide 
2014 
AG_030 Destination for Info 
Collected 
Discussion with building owner/occupant 
Provide Information Sheet 
 
Field Guide 
2014 
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 BDSA Type: Detailed Building Damage Assessment – Simple Buildings  
 Local Name Rapid Building Usability Assessment, Level 2. Field Guide 
2014 
AG_001 Goal To quickly assess the impact of damage observed on the continued use of a building or 
adjacent property. The emphasis is on public safety. 
Field Guide 
2014 
AG_003 Description Brief visual assessments of damage to individual buildings. Field Guide 
2014 
AG_015 Types of Buildings Teams 
Can Assess 
Non-residential and complex residential buildings; buildings with typical commercial 
construction details (unreinforced masonry walls, tilt-up panels, multi-storey buildings, and 
others) 
All essential facilities (hospitals, schools, police and fire stations) 
All buildings of 2 or more storeys and containing 3 or more household units 
Any other buildings where the Level 1 Rapid Assessment identifies the need for further 
and more specific inspection. 
 
Field Guide 
2014 
AG_037 Legal Authority Carried out during a declared State of Emergency by mostly volunteer engineers and building 
officials acting under the authority of the Civil Defence Controller. 
Field Guide 
2014 
AG_005 Dispatched By Building Assessment Manager (EOC) Field Guide 
2014 
AG_038 Implementation   
AG_006 Team Members Volunteer engineers and building officials (intro) 
 
At least one structural engineer, with input from geotechnical engineers where necessary. 
Field Guide 
2014 
AG_009 Team Size   
AG_010 How Selected   
AG_016 Interior/Exterior Check? Both external and internal inspection. Field Guide 
2014 
AG_018 Assessment Outcomes See overview  
AG_020 Info Gathering Tools formal records. 
 
Information Sheet (to occupant) 
Level 2 Assessment Report (to Territorial Authority) (p. 58)  
Photos 
Field Guide 
2014 
AG_028 Assessment Time 30 min to 2 hours each  
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AG_030 Destination for Info 
Collected 
  
    
 
RQ # Topic Comments References 
 BDSA Type: Detailed Building Damage Assessment – Complex Buildings?  
 Local Name Interim Use Evaluation (IUE) Field Guide 
2014 
AG_001 Goal To quickly assess the impact of damage observed on the continued use of a building or 
adjacent property. The emphasis is on public safety. 
Field Guide 
2014 
AG_003 Description Conducted either during or after a declared State of Emergency by engineers contracted by 
building owners or tenants.  
Field Guide 
2014 
AG_015 Legal Authority Unlike the Rapid Building Usability Assessment the IUE outcome does not have a legal status. Field Guide 
2014 
AG_037 Dispatched By Contracted by building owners or tenants. Field Guide 
2014 
AG_005 Implementation   
AG_038 Team Members Structural engineers, preferably Chartered 
Professional Engineers 
 
Field Guide 
2014 
AG_006 Team Size one or more  
AG_009 How Selected Selected by building owner  
AG_010 Types of Buildings Teams 
Can Assess 
Non-residential and multiunit residential buildings in greater Christchurch Field Guide 
2014 
AG_016 Interior/Exterior Check? Essentially similar to a Level 2 Assessment (both external and internal inspection), but the 
evaluator identifies and observes the vertical and lateral load-resisting systems. 
Field Guide 
2014 
AG_018 Assessment Outcomes See overview  
AG_020 Info Gathering Tools formal records. 
 
Information Sheet (to occupant) 
Assessment Report (to Territorial Authority) (form not specified) 
Photos 
 
AG_028 Assessment Time   
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AG_030 Destination for Info 
Collected 
Territorial Authority  
    
 
 
 
RQ # Topic Comments References 
 BDSA Type: Engineering Assessment  
 Local Name Detailed Damage Evaluation (DDE) Field Guide 
2014 
AG_001 Goal To determine the full scope of repairs and rebuilds, and resource requirements. Provides 
confidence in the remaining building stock to assist the recovery. 
Field Guide 
2014 
AG_003 Description Detailed review and specification of repairs and/or strengthening required. Field Guide 
2014 
AG_015 Dispatched By Contracted by building owners. Field Guide 
2014 
AG_037 Implementation Conducted as part of the recovery phase. Field Guide 
2014 
AG_005 Team Members Engineers Field Guide 
2014 
AG_038 Team Size   
AG_006 How Selected Contracted by building owners. Field Guide 
2014 
AG_009 Types of Buildings Teams 
Can Assess 
  
AG_010 Interior/Exterior Check? • Detailed review of existing documentation 
• Evaluation of capacity 
• Identification of weaknesses 
• Observation of damage 
 
Field Guide 
2014 
AG_016 Assessment Outcomes Specification of repairs and/or strengthening required. Field Guide 
2014 
AG_018 Info Gathering Tools   
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Appendix 4.3: New Zealand Case Study: Christchurch Canterbury New Zealand Earthquakes 2010, 2011 
 
 
Figure A3. Case Study: Christchurch, 2010, 2011. 
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Case Background 
RQ # Topic Comments References 
 Case Title New Zealand 2010, 2011 Earthquakes  
  Introduction  
 Case Background In 2010 and 2011, the area in and around Christchurch Canterbury New Zealand experienced a 
series of earthquakes and aftershocks, the most significant of which occurred on 4 September, 
2010, 26 December 2010, and 22 February, 2011.  
 
 
 Location Christchurch located on east coast of New Zealand’s South Island 
Canterbury region 
At time, 390,000 population 
 
Gallagher, p. 2 
 Event Initial earthquake:  
0435 4 September, 2010 
7.1 magnitude 
Epicentre 40 km West of Christchurch  
Aftershocks: 
1030 26 December, 2010 
4.7 magnitude 
Epicentre 1.8 km from Christchurch Cathedral 
 
22 February, 2011 
6.2 magnitude 
Epicentre 6km southwest of the Christchurch CBD 
 
13 June, 2011 
6.0 magnitude 
Near Sumner, southeast of the CBD 
 
CERC 0004.1 
 
Gallagher, p. 2 
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 Extent & Type of 
Damage 
Christchurch suffered significant damage to a large number of its buildings. The most 
damaging of the earthquakes was the 22 February event which seriously damaged most of the 
buildings in the Central Business District and resulted in 189 deaths (Gallahger) 
 
  Catastrophic damage was experienced in the Central Business District. Most older brick 
buildings there were severely damaged. A five-story and a six-story building collapsed with loss 
of life. More than 40 significant buildings were so badly damaged as to require demolition, 
including many high-rises. Large areas of the city experienced liquefaction, and over 5,000 
homes in the liquefaction areas have been permanently abandoned, with the possibility of this 
number growing substantially. 
Gallagher, p. 3 
  The most damaging, and therefore most significant, of these was the Mw 6.3 event which 
occurred on the 22nd February 2011 at 12:51 (local time) and is the main topic of this paper. 
The close proximity of the epicentre to Christchurch and its shallow focus resulted in 
widespread structural damage, collapse of buildings, disruption to services and the loss of 182 
lives and a further 164 serious injuries. 
Wilkinson, p. 2. 
  The team was told that of the approximately 4,000 buildings there, some 1,000 may be 
demolished. 
Gallagher, p. 
10 
  At least 30 percent, and probably more, of the high-rise buildings in the CBD were seriously 
damaged. Two buildings collapsed outright during the February event. 
Gallagher, p. 
21 
  The Christchurch earthquake of 22 February 2011 caused tragic deaths and injuries, severe 
damage to tens of thousands of homes and the devastation of the city central business district 
(CBD). It was an unprecedented challenge for civil defence emergency management in New 
Zealand. 
McLean p.10 
  Feb 22 event: 
The devastation of the CBD was extensive, with only about a quarter of buildings undamaged 
enough to be repairable. 
McLean p. 13 
 DSA Process Initial Building Safety Assessments generally followed New Zealand Society for Earthquake 
Engineers guidelines. Each local authority expected to adapt to meet local circumstances. 
Building Safety Process, with three types of assessment: 
 Overall Damage Survey; area assessment; conducted by emergency services, 
Territorial Authority staff, Civil Defence volunteers. 
 Rapid Assessment Level 1; Level of damage and occupancy; conducted by 
structural and civil engineers, other personnel from building industry – note 
volunteer status; formal system exterior inspection, placards, central record, 
sites needing further investigation, unsafe areas cordoned off 
 Rapid Assessment Level 2: Level of damage and occupancy; conducted by 
structural engineers, building services, geotechnical engineers, - note 
Adapted from 
CERC 0004.1 p. 
7 
6.9.1e TECHNICAL REPORT  
APPENDIX 4.3: NEW ZEALAND CASE STUDY: CHRISTCHURCH CANTERBURY NEW ZEALAND EARTHQUAKES 2010,2011 
168 
 
RQ # Topic Comments References 
volunteer status; formal system with exterior and interior inspection as well 
as reference drawings, revised placards, central records, cordon off unsafe 
areas, urgent work recommendations 
 Detailed Engineering Evaluation and Remedial Work: ascertain extent of 
structural damage, establish losses for insurance, recommend remedial work; 
engineers, architects, loss adjusters; meets insurance and restoration 
requirements under Building Act 2004.  
  The inspection of damaged buildings to determine their safety was a substantial task and was 
carried out well technically. Some improvements are required in organisation and in 
communications with owners and tenants. Better communications are also needed regarding 
demolition of buildings and for systems for access to the cordoned area.  
McLean, p. 13 
  Guidelines from NZSEE, adapted from ATC 20.  Wilkinson, p. 
137 
  The procedures used to evaluate building safety in Christchurch drew upon a document 
developed by the New Zealand Society for Earthquake Engineering (NZSEE, 2009). The original 
ATC-20 procedures (ATC, 1989a) were used as a basis for this document, but significant 
changes were made. 
Gallagher, p. 3 
  The basis of this building safety evaluation system is to visually identify damage that could 
compromise the pre-earthquake resistant capacity of the building structure. The building 
evaluation process is founded on the premise that if a building has not been severely damaged 
in the initial earthquake, it should be capable of surviving an aftershock or aftershocks without 
serious damage or collapse. 
NZSEE, p. 3 
 Goal Focus on prioritizing buildings as unsafe and requiring further evaluation. Less emphasis on 
whether or not building can be reoccupied. 
CERN 0004.1 p.  
  Were buildings safe to enter? Wilkinson, p. 
137 
  It is the Society’s opinion that the process of managing the risk to buildings following an 
earthquake should be treated as a special case of the general and ongoing requirements for 
managing the earthquake risk to buildings. The risk assessment principles are the same, and 
the same options are available for treating the risk. The major difference is that the level of 
risk is higher than normal, and rapid decisions must be made to addresses these risks. 
NZSEE, p. 2 
 Placard System   
 Results Results used to “make decisions on controlling traffic, cordons, safe traffic corridors, and to 
indicate the economic impact of the earthquake.” P. 137 
Wilkinson, p. 
137 
 Use of Personnel Note Process above. Most comprehensive description of personnel found yet.  
 Emergency services and TA personnel involved in Overall Damage Survey. 
CERN 0004.1 p. 
7 
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 Structural and civil engineers along with other personnel from building industry 
engage in Level 1 assessments as volunteers. 
 Structural and geotechnical engineers along with building services personnel 
engage in Level 2 assessments as volunteers. 
 Engineers, architects, and loss adjusters are engaged in Detailed Engineering 
Evaluation.  
 Commentary Analysis of the earthquakes that impacted Christchurch and area through 2010 and 2011 
generated a substantial amount of documentary discussion on building assessment. The 
Canterbury Earthquakes Royal Commission’s Discussion Paper (CERC 0004.1) lists seven 
documents it requested, another seven submissions directly related to building assessment, 
five private submissions, and eight further documents that mention building assessment.  
 
  Part I BDSA Framework  
 EM  Overview   
 Legislative Authority   
 EM framework   
 Stakeholders & 
Relationships 
  
 <image>   
 Ownership & 
Sustainability 
Three groups are mentioned throughout the documents: early procedures drafted by the New 
Zealand Society of Earthquake Engineers, Civil Defence, and Local/Territorial Authorities. The 
latest documents describing New Zealand building damage assessment are published in 2014 
by the Ministry of Business, Innovation, and Employment.  
 
Note discussion on p. 21 on mandate and accountability for the overall framework. 
 
QUESTION: Who “owns” the overall BDSA process, and what are the formal and informal 
mechanisms for its maintenance?  
 
CERC 0004.1 
  The building safety evaluation system is designed to rapidly assess the safety of buildings 
during an emergency and to inform owners, tenants and the public of their safety status by, 
among other methods, a building placard system. 
The New Zealand building safety evaluation system is based on California practice with further 
developments reflecting European practice and the experience of New Zealand building 
evaluation teams in Gisborne, Indonesia and elsewhere. The guidelines had been developed 
over 20 years by the New Zealand Society for Earthquake Engineering and in 2009 National 
McLean, p. 134 
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Procedures134 were published with the support of the Department of Building and 
Housing.135 A revised draft of the guidelines had been prepared in July 2010 together with a 
draft Field Guide which included an induction module for _on the day_ operational briefing. 
These drafts had not been reviewed and signed off by the time of the 4 September 2010 
earthquake. 
  Part II BDSA in Operation  
 Case   
 Operational 
Functioning: 
  
  Who managed / 
administered 
process 
Sept 2010 
“Within an hour of the earthquake, Chirstchurch City Council, Waimakariri District Council and 
Selwyn District Council declared a local state of emergency for their area” (CERC 0004.1, p. 6).  
Local Authorities established their own EOCs, each run by a Local Controller.  
Local Controller was in charge of the response to the earthquake, including BSA.  
 
  
CERC 0004.1 
  26 Dec 2010 Aftershock 
Following the aftershock in Dec 2010, CCC chose not to declare a state of emergency as the 
event was manageable by emergency services, few residential buildings were impacted, and 
damage was localized. CCC adapted their process (as no formal state of emergency). 
CERC 0004.1 
  The Terms of Reference for this Review require examination of the management of building 
safety evaluations and the management of building demolitions and cordoned areas.130 Some 
of these matters were however dealt with in submissions to the Royal Commission and 
information from them is used in the preparation of this Review. Particular references include: 
ENG.NZSEE.0001: Building Safety Evaluation Following the Canterbury Earthquakes. New  
Zealand Society for Earthquake Engineering, September 2011131 
EBG.CCC.0001: CCC Building Evaluation Team _ Processes used and lessons learned following 
the Darfield Earthquake of 4 September 2010. Sisirc/McNulty January 2011132 
ENG.BRU.0001: Integrating Professional Engineering Within Emergency Management Planning 
and Response in New Zealand. Dave Brunsdon, January 2012133 
Mc:Lean, p. 
133 
  How were priorities 
established? 
3.6 High Priority Evaluation of Shopping Centers and Drug Stores 
ATC-20 offers the advice to conduct safety evaluations of essential facilities  first. Hospitals, 
police and fire stations, and emergency headquarters must be among the first buildings 
inspected. Officials in Christchurch added shopping centers and drug stores to the list of high 
priority inspections. It was felt that the public need for items such as food, diapers and 
Gallagher, p. 
23 
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medicines was important and that the best way to ensure supply was to inspect the buildings 
of these  businesses and identify those that could be left open. 
   3.8 Targeted Safety and Evaluation Teams 
Another innovation was the creation of specialized task forces that were set up to address 
sections of the city or issues of the community. The task forces targeted the suburbs, shopping 
malls (to make food and necessities available to the public), the Central Business District, 
critical buildings (six or more stories), cordoning and access, and demolition. The teams were 
named after the community element that they targeted for safety assessment and clearance, 
as follows. 
• Operation Suburb 
• Operation Critical Buildings 
• Operation Shop 
• Operation Cordon and Access 
• Operation Demolition 
By focusing selected resources to pursue the building safety evaluation of these targeted 
community elements, the Christchurch authorities were able to move more rapidly to open 
up, or deem unsafe, entire segments of the community. This approach has certain advantages 
over the block-by-block method used in California and other places 
Gallagher p. 24 
  What principles 
guided operational 
decisions 
“There is a direct trade off between: 
Taking the time to ensure that buildings are safe before allowing public access; and 
Getting the community and local businesses recovering from the disaster as soon as possible.”  
CERC 0004.1, 
p. 6 
  The placarding (i.e., posting) systems of the ATC and NZSEE procedures are the same, but 
placarding procedure is done somewhat differently. The Christchurch City Council used 
UNSAFE, RESTRICTED USE, and INSPECTED placards only on commercial buildings. For 
residential buildings, if a building was not posted UNSAFE, the occupant was given a small flyer 
that advised them that part of the building might be unsafe and that they should contact an 
engineer. 
Gallagher, p. 4 
  A Critical Buildings Team was established to review major buildings in the CBD and establish 
evaluation of indicator buildings post aftershocks was used to inform the evaluation teams of 
potential changes of building status and hence the need for further inspection.141 The 
information was also used to inform the establishment and extent of the cordon. Significant 
leadership and advice was provided through engineers associated with DBH. 
McLean, p. 136 
 Teams:   
  Recruitment Members made available from Institution of Professional Engineers of New Zealand and 
Building Officials Institute of New Zealand.  
CERC 0004.1 p. 
22 
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   3.9 Use of Private Engineers for Safety Evaluation 
Private engineers were permitted to inspect and post buildings under the authority of the 
Christchurch City Council. The arrangement used required the engineer to sign the form shown 
in Appendix B.  
Gallagher, p. 
24 
   repared to undertake rapid 
building safety evaluations. This is partly due to a lack of legal mandate which inhibits the 
development and maintenance of an effective organisational structure and appropriate 
systems. 
McLean, p. 134 
  Deployment Only CPEng used in CBD due to safety and assumption that CPEng more capable than non-
chartered engineers 
CERC 0004.1 p. 
22 
   A limited pool of engineers provided for evaluation of suburban residential dwellings 
(Operation Suburb) and suburban commercial dwellings (Operation Shop). 
McLean, p. 136 
  Use of teams Only experienced Chartered Professional Engineers were used for evaluations in the CBD due 
to the requirement for higher level expertise and the significantly heightened risk 
McLean, p. 136 
  Liability Liability waiver in effect during state of emergency that “provides protection from liability for 
damages or loss for engineers and other civil defence workers during a state of emergency, 
unless they acted in bad faith or were grossly negligent.” P. 22 
Means that liability is issue if no state of emergency declared.  
CERC 0004.1 p. 
19 
   Immunity from liability for volunteer engineers was granted by means of a contract between 
the individual and the emergency operations center manager (termed the “Controller”). No 
mention of worker’s compensation in the event of injury was mentioned in the contract.  
Gallagher, p. 
40 
  Preparation This was done with virtually no preparations for the scale of damage that occurred. There was 
little time to train safety evaluators.  Consequently, there 
was a considerable need to improvise on an urgent basis, and in this regard  officials did an 
outstanding job. 
Gallagher, p. 3 
 BDSA:   
  # teams Approximately 250 volunteers between 4 -1 5 September CERC 0004.1 p. 
22 
   In a massive effort by local officials, with considerable outside assistance Gallagher, p. 3 
KEY   The number of the building evaluations required a planned team of up to 100 engineers and 
50 building control officials. In fact a total of 352 professional engineers were involved in the 
rapid building evaluation process.142As a result of the linkages developed through the 
September 2010 earthquake many of the engineers were sourced through IPENZ143 and the 
building officials through the Building Officials Institute of New Zealand. 
McLean, p. 136 
  Composition Approximately 75 engineers with 25 Urban Search and Rescue Engineers.  
Building Officials are referred to but numbers and backgrounds are not given.  
CERC 0004.1 p. 
22 
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CPEng seen as more experienced than non-chartered engineers 
   5.8 Welfare Personnel Added to Safety Evaluation Teams 
In discussions with Christchurch officials, it was learned that a typical safety evaluation “team” 
for houses and residential buildings might consist of four people: one safety evaluator, two 
“welfare” staff (e.g., members of a non-governmental organization such as the Red Cross), and 
a driver. The consensus of those individuals interviewed was that the addition of the two 
welfare staff, while of aid to the occupants, significantly slowed the building safety evaluation 
process and is generally not desirable. 
Gallagher, p. 
43 
KEY  Whilst normally an evaluation team consisted of an engineer and a warranted building official, 
limitations in the supply of building officials because of the high demand for building officials 
for Operation Suburb meant there were not sufficient of these available for all teams and 
experienced engineers acting as  building safety evaluation team leaders were temporarily 
warranted. 
McLean, pp. 
136-7 
  Data gathering a  multidisciplinary 
teams consisting of an engineer, building control official and 1 or 2 social workers were used to 
visit homes in affected areas to assess dwellings and gather information on the needs of the 
people. However the times required for these different tasks were often radically different. 
 assessment often took 
longer. It was reported that the forms on which the information was recorded were not 
entirely appropriate and the quality of the information entered problematic. Data processing 
lagged behind and resulted in _weeks of work post event to fix inaccurately entered records_. 
 
McLean, p. 138 
  Selection Manpower was obtained from a number of sources, including Christchurch building 
department staff, volunteer engineers, private engineers, and building  inspectors (e.g, 
building control officers), engineers and others from other New Zealand cities. 
Gallagher, p. 
11 
  Logistics The management of large volumes of assessments (9,300 over 21 days in September 2010 
compared to 130,000144 over a corresponding period in February 2011) would not have been 
possible without the experience and process improvement as the result of the September 
2010 earthquake. 
McLean, p. 137 
   There were reportedly issues with mobilisation and management including: 
o Difficulties in communication with the EOC and uncertainty as to who to contact (a 
common theme) Too many engineers arriving at the wrong time instead of being programmed 
so as to allow for graduated relief 
o The lack of prequalification/warranting meant some additional confusion as engineers 
sought confirmation of their CPEng. Status  
o Training/safety briefing was repeated every day even for those who had been through it 
before thus wasting some time 
McLean, p. 138 
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o Transfer from unpaid volunteer to paid status was not clear although the general assumption 
was that volunteers would give up to three days on an unpaid basis. 
  Timeline   
  # buildings 
assessed 
In a massive effort by local officials, with considerable outside assistance, over 72,000 
buildings in Christchurch were inspected in the 10 days immediately after the February 
earthquake. 
CERC 0004.1 
??? 
   local officials, despite being initially caught off guard and unprepared for the scope and 
severity of the damage, made over 72,000 building inspections in 10 days.  
Lizundia et al., 
2017, p. 1 
   Over 130,000 buildings were inspected in the first 21 days (NZSEE, 2011). In Gallagher, p. 
3 
Key   Following the September earthquake an Indicator Building procedure had been developed 
 
valuations were required. 
This proved invaluable in the safe and efficient use of resources 
McLean, p. 137 
  outcomes After the 22 February earthquake, all buildings were inspected and given either a green, 
yellow or red placard to indicate the safety of the building. A green placard meant that a 
building had been assessed and no apparent structural or other safety hazards were found. A 
yellow placard meant that a building had restricted access and a red placard meant a building 
must not be entered because it was deemed unsafe [6]. Some 79 % of the buildings in the 
survey were given either a yellow or red placard. 
 
Baird, Palermo, 
& Pampanin, 
2012, p.6 
 Information:   
  Types of info 
collected 
  
  How recorded Excel sheet CERC 0004.1 
p.  
   Data management in the EOC did not seem to keep pace with the incoming data and data in 
respect of particular buildings was difficult to access and relate to earthquake prone  buildings 
 produce 
useful intelligence. 
McLean, p. 138 
  Where did info go Building inspection databases were maintained by Christchurch City Council for reporting and 
analysis.  
Wilkinson, p. 
138 
   The data base used in September was further developed with the data inputting management 
and mapping outputs resourced by CCC. 
McLean, p. 137 
  Types of dx made   
 Commentary   
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  Overall   
  Strengths One innovation in Christchurch was the use of “indicator buildings.” Indicator buildings 
represented the unreinforced masonry, reinforced masonry, reinforced concrete, and precast 
concrete structures typical of Christchurch. One such building is shown in Figures 3-1 and 3- 2. 
If an indicator building showed damage after an aftershock, similar buildings could then be re-
examined for safety. This is better than the rather intuitive methods currently used in 
California. 
Gallagher, p. 
21 
   The generally successful implementation of the building safety evaluation process (triage) after 
the earthquakes of 4 September 2010 and 22 February 2011, was a result of the preplanning 
that had occurred by members of NZSEE, supported by member’s employers, EQC, the (then) 
Department of Building and Housing, and by the Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency 
Management. The pre-planning included: adaptation of rapid response building triage 
procedures developed for the New Zealand environment; drafting guidelines that were tested 
following the Gisborne earthquake of 2007; amendment and publication by NZSEE of the first 
New Zealand Guideline in 20091; testing of that Guideline in Padang, Indonesia; gathering 
further experience from Samoa and L’Aquila, Italy; delivery of introductory training, including 
to senior Christchurch City Building Managers and others from Wellington and Dunedin, 
NZSEE, p. 3 
   A Critical Buildings Team was established to review major buildings in the CBD and establish 
stabilisation measures as well as to assess the effects of aftershocks on 
evaluation of indicator buildings post aftershocks was used to inform the evaluation teams of 
potential changes of building status and hence the need for further inspection.141 The 
information was also used to inform the establishment and extent of the cordon. Significant 
leadership and advice was provided through engineers associated with DBH. 
McLean, p. 136 
   The Review considers that the following features of the immediate response worked well: 
 Early inclusion and warranting of consulting engineers who had worked on building 
evaluation following September 2010. 
 Specific evaluation plans developed for evaluation of the CBD, key shops and critical 
community services (pharmacies, supermarkets, medical centres, hardware stores, etc.) and 
the arterial routes into and out of the central city. 
 The establishment of a Critical Buildings Team using experienced Chartered Professional 
Engineers. 
 Following the September earthquake an _Indicator Building_ procedure had been 
developed 
wh  
 
This proved invaluable in the safe and efficient use of resources. 
McLean, p. 
139-140 
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 Over 130,000 assessments were done over 21 days compared with 9,300 over 21 days a 
corresponding period in September 2010.151 
  Challenges CERN 0004.1, p. 6 
Consistency: 
 Multiple processes – building owners were completing own assessments with 
contracted engineers alongside formal process, resulting in inconsistent 
evaluation processes being used. . These evaluations were similar to, but not 
the same as the Level 1, 2, and Detailed Engineering evaluations.  
 A similar challenge to consistency is that some of the contract engineers had 
participated in Rapid Assessment teams and others had not; thus the engineers 
conducting the assessments for building owners had variable experience.  
   
CERC 004.01 p. 
8 
   Multiple Placard Systems 
 Some engineers developed or modified placards so that up to four different 
types of placard/notice systems were in use (p. 9). 
 
CERC 004.01 p. 
9 
   Information Flow 
 Local Authorities did not have access to building owners reports. There was no 
legal requirement to share results of the assessment, thus LAs did not have a 
complete picture of building status. 
 
CERC 0004.01 
p. 8 
   Status of Buildings 
 Building owners did not know, or just assumed, that their evaluations would 
change the status of the buildings in LA records. CERC 0004.1 notes instances 
of inconsistencies between placards and official records. 
CERC 0004.01 
p. 8 
   Changing Placards 
 During state of emergency, placards/status could only be changed by civil 
defence and emergency management. After the state of emergency, only local 
authorities could change placards. However, unauthorized personnel did 
change placards. As noted above, sometimes building owners and engineers 
changed the placard after the detailed engineering evaluation without 
consultation with the technical authority. 
CERC 0004.1 p. 
10 
   CPEng Forms 
 CCC developed a process and form for Chartered Professional Engineers to 
CERC 0004.1 p. 
10 
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submit following Detailed Engineering Review. This ensured consistent 
information and that the reviews were carried out by properly credentialed 
personnel. 
   Transition from Civil Defence to Local Authority 
 Gaps were found in the legal status of placards and status when the state of 
emergency ended. Placards were only in effect during the emergency, and yet 
many of these buildings had not been repaired or demolished before the 
emergency ended. Christchurch City Council (CCC) developed processes and a 
recommendation was made to develop formal transition processes. 
CERC 0004.1 p. 
12 
   Transition from Local Authority to building owners 
 The process for transition of responsibility to building owners was not clear. 
Some waited, expecting the local authority to conduct detailed engineering 
evaluations.  
CERC 0004.1 p. 
12 
   Maintaining Cordoned Areas 
 Again, while setting up fencing is typically the responsibility of the building 
owner, in the emergency local authorities determined where and when 
cordons were put in place. The report notes several issues around establishing, 
maintaining, and removing cordons. 
CERC 0004.1 p. 
13 
   Barriers for building owners 
 Building owners faced challenges to repair due to insurance issues, contractor 
shortages, and other issues.  
CERC 0004.1 p. 
13 
   Overlapping legislative and legal requirements 
 Noted that overlapping legislative requirements created challenges for owners. 
A particular challenge was noted as consenting (guessing that this is equivalent 
to BC building inspection). The varied acts that were applicable were not 
designed with recovery from an earthquake as a possibility. 
CERC 0004.1 p. 
13 
   Insurance requirements 
 Two concerns were  noted – owners had little control over the time and process 
for getting insurance approval to proceed/pay; relationship between how 
buildings were categorized and what insurers would pay for. 
CERC 0004.1 p. 
13 
   Placard system issues: 
 Designed for commercial buildings. 
 Uncertainty in public about what the actual meaning of placard colours and 
terminology meant 
CERC 0004.1 p. 
13 - 14 
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 Guidelines for Rapid Assessment were at a greater level of detail than those for 
Detailed Engineering Assessments, leading to inconsistency in their 
performance. Also, language on placards were inconsistent, calling for a 
“detailed structural engineering assessment” rather than a detailed 
engineering assessment.  
 Uncertainty on how implications of placard levels for indicating level of 
damage/need for further evaluation and for indicating long term safety and 
reoccupation. 
 Green placards could have different meanings. System designed to prioritize 
buildings for further assessment. Not clear how to handle buildings that were 
safe to use, but required further work and subsequent assessment.  
  
   Detailed Engineering Evaluations 
 Need for detailed engineering evaluations was uncertain. While guidelines 
indicate it is the owners’ responsibility, the local authority did not have the 
authority to demand these assessments. It’s not known how many building 
owners chose not to complete evaluations or did not follow all 
recommendations. 
 Inconsistency in experience and capability of engineers (not: phrased as 
quality of assessments by individual engineers) – found that many lower 
quality assessments tended to be overly conservative in their assessments. 
 Variability in skill and training of engineers in performing DDE – process and 
judgment are different than in design and determining earthquake readiness.  
 Different models are required for determining outcome based on different 
building stock, age, size, construction, and condition.  
 Use of damage – based assessment may be problematic. Suggest that 
additional factors should be considered such as damage to non-structural 
components, possible hazard to neighbouring buildings, utility lines, asbestos, 
hazardous materials.  
 Consideration should be given to extending past damage assessment to using 
seismic vulnerability assessment. 
 Assessments assumed that subsequent aftershocks would be less than main 
shock. This was not the case with the 11 Feb incident where the aftershock in 
CERC 0004.1 p. 
17 - 19 
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Christchurch CBD was stronger than the initial event.  
 Discussion on what types of training engineers require to be adequately 
prepared.  
  KEY follow up Issues with Framework 
Uncertainty on mandate and accountability for developing and maintaining system. 
  
 
 
   A document prepared by the New Zealand Society for Earthquake Engineering was used 
(NZSEE, 2009). While based somewhat on the original ATC-20 document, the New Zealand 
document covered primarily Rapid Evaluations and provided limited safety evaluation 
guidance, possibly because it was under on-going development. It did not contain basic 
instructions on how to inspect a building, examples of posting and barricading, guidance on 
how to inspect various types of buildings, guidance on filling out safety assessment forms and 
placards, and advice for dealing with occupants and owners of damaged buildings. It also 
introduced two levels of Rapid Evaluation (ATC-20 has only one). 
Gallagher, p. 
33 
   Management of logistics was fragmented between the CRC, NCMC and government 
departments. Less division and better involvement of government agencies in emergency 
management would be helpful. 
McLean, p. 14 
  KEY Of significance was the failure to convert the large inflow of raw information into intelligence 
and a common situational awareness. Internal information sharing was problematic for the 
CRC and there did not appear to be one area within the CRC which was considered the most 
reliable source of information. Information was not generally well displayed. Many CRC staff 
did not understand the distinction between information and intelligence. 
McLean, p. 14 
  KEY The New Zealand Society for Earthquake Engineering (NZSEE) in a report to the Royal 
Commission included the following issues: 
 Difficulty in communicating the meaning of the placards to the public. 
 Inconsistent skill sets, knowledge and confidence of evaluation team members. 
 Lack of integration of owner appointed engineers with the Council led process. 
 A clear approach to the managing of changing of placards was not established in the early 
stages. 
 The register of building placards was not publically available. 
 The transition to normal building regulatory processes on the lifting of the state of 
emergency required legislation139 to address the extra time required to process the large 
number of buildings to be transferred from status under the declared emergency to the 
normal CCC building processes. The CCC also set up a Building Evaluation Transition team to 
manage this transition. This operated until 30 Nov 2010. 
McLean, p. 135 
6.9.1e TECHNICAL REPORT  
APPENDIX 4.3: NEW ZEALAND CASE STUDY: CHRISTCHURCH CANTERBURY NEW ZEALAND EARTHQUAKES 2010,2011 
180 
 
RQ # Topic Comments References 
 After the 26 December 2010 aftershocks, although a state of local emergency was not 
declared, a form of rapid evaluation and placard system was used for the first two days but 
this was replaced by the normal process under the Building Act, e.g. the issuing of s124 notices 
for dangerous buildings.140 
   Inconsistent results of assessment by evaluation teams. Many engineers turned up voluntarily 
to assist with building evaluations. Most had not been trained in the evaluation protocols and 
required training, briefing and safety induction on site prior to being tasked. Notwithstanding 
the pool of engineers who had participated after the September 2010 earthquakes and those 
variation in understanding. This led to inconsistent evaluations with some judgements being 
unduly conservative but with others more liberal. The result was that the status of some 
confusion. 
McLean, p-. 
137 
   There was reportedly widespread confusion among the public, tenants and building owners as 
to the meaning of the placards 
McLean, p-. 
137 
   Clearly the wording and colour of the placards needs to be revisited to reinforce not only the 
building status but also the obligations on owners for further inspections. 
McLean, p-. 
138 
   This is also linked with the need for defined processes for further detailed engineering 
evaluation of placarded buildings which is not defined in the 2009 NZSEE Guidelines. 
Although information is available it is not in an easily available form.146 Detailed Engineering 
Evaluation Guidelines are required together with consideration of which buildings must be or 
should be further evaluated after placarding, particularly bearing in mind the possibly 
significant further deterioration due to aftershocks.147 
McLean, p-. 
138 
    Green and yellow placards were not posted by residential building evaluation teams. This 
was because the focus of residential evaluations was to determine which houses could not be 
occupied. A decision was made to use only the red placard where it was required on 
residential buildings. A black and white leaflet was used to inform residents that their 
building was safe to enter. Although yellow/green assessments were done and entered into  
the CCC data base they were not 
McLean, p-. 
138 
   Identification of buildings and  difficulties 
in consistently identifying buildings correctly 
McLean, p-. 
138 
    
buildings to be evaluated suitably qualified engineers were sourced and mobilised from 
around New Zealand, mostly by IPENZ. There were reportedly issues with mobilisation and 
management including:  
McLean, p-. 
138 
   The number of chartered engineers required to be available in New Zealand for rapid building McLean, p-. 
138 
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assessment has been estimated at over 600.149 There are suggestions that greater efforts be 
made to link normal engineering operations with emergency management response, inclu 
exposure to emergency management issues, during education and professional development 
   It was clear how important it was for both the Local Controller and 
later the National Controller to have access within their respective  OCs to high level 
engineering expertise with respect to building evaluation and engineering. The ability to 
clearly communicate technical issues to the public is also important.  
McLean, p-. 
138 
   Data management in the EOC did not seem to keep pace with the incoming data and data in 
respect of particular buildings was difficult to access and relate to earthquake prone buildings. 
McLean, p-. 
139 
   18 Given the experience following the earthquakes of 4 September 2010 and 22 February 2011 
in the Canterbury area, it is evident that the procedures can be improved, by:  
a. Amending and extending the two phased (Level 1, Level 2) “Red”, “Yellow”, “Green” of the 
building triaging process to cater for significant damaging aftershocks, and support all 
stakeholders;  
b. Improving communications among building owners, occupiers, businesses, territorial 
authorities, building officials, engineers, architects, building officials, the building sector, CDEM 
sector, the insurance sector, the media, Central Government and the public ;  
c. Requiring the improvement of the information management system, including having a fully 
functional secure computer database of property, building, and address information operating 
as part of normal Territorial Authority/Building Consenting Authority day-to-day processes and 
accessible securely from the internet;  
d. Requiring pre-event understanding and knowledge of critical buildings (Building Importance 
Level 4, and those critical to emergency functions including functions of lifeline utilities); and 
also  
e. understanding and knowing of vulnerable buildings such as those assessed as “Earthquake 
Prone” and/or “Dangerous”, with priority given to reducing risks, particularly those from 
critical weaknesses (parapets, gable ends, chimneys, foundation systems), non-structural 
elements (ceiling tiles, light fittings, air conditioning), and storage rack systems. Buildings that 
could adversely affect lifelines should also be identified and be included on a priority list for 
assessment following a damaging event;  
f. Providing National standard operating procedures for the effective management of 
cordoning of dangerous buildings;  
g. Training and exercising of building management officials, including staff of Territorial 
Authorities/Building Consenting Authorities, engineering and architecture consultancies, and 
property managers and CDEM staff;  
h. Amending the Building Statutes to enable procedures for the “normal” management of 
dangerous buildings to be utilised seamlessly between  “normal” business, of one or two 
NZSEE, pp. 4 – 
5 
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dangerous buildings a year, and civil defence emergencies involving upwards of thousands of 
dangerous buildings.  
i. The current model focus on buildings does not adequately consider the hazards associated 
with the environment – ground failure, slope stability etc. The triage system was extended in 
Canterbury to include such hazards for example, rock fall and slope failure. There are reported 
instances where placards placed for reasons of such geotechnical hazards being removed and 
replaced during subsequent inspections where the inspectors did not consider the hazards 
from the surroundings. It would be important to explicitly include consideration of such 
hazards in the guidelines and training for future post-earthquake building inspections.  
 
   The resources required for rapid emergency building evaluations exceeded a thousand 
volunteer engineers, Building Consenting Officials, and support staff. While a few had been on 
introductory training courses prior to the Canterbury earthquakes, the majority were only 
inducted on their first day. There is a need for formalised training in rapid emergency building 
evaluations and for a register that holds contact details and information on the currency of 
engineers, building control officials, architects, property managers, and CDEM staff who have 
been trained.  
 
NZSEE, p. 7 
  Recommendations Field guide with examples of different types of damage to promote consistency of evaluations CERC 0004.1 p. 
18 
   Engineers performing detailed engineering evaluation need more training as process for  
dealing with damaged buildings substantially different than determining earthquake readiness 
of building designs 
CERC 0004.1 p. 
18 
   Recommend that DEE be performed by CPEngineers with experience in earthquake  
assessment.  
CERC 0004.1 p. 
18 
KEY  Consider different assessment models for different building stock: age, size, construction, and 
condition. 
CERC 0004.1 p. 
19 
  Use of damage – based assessment may be problematic. Suggest that additional factors should 
be considered such as damage to non-structural components, possible hazard to neighbouring 
buildings, utility lines, asbestos, hazardous materials. 
CERC 0004.1 p. 
19 
  Consideration should be given to extending past damage assessment to using seismic 
vulnerability assessment.  See Cavli et al.  
CERC 0004.1 p. 
19 
  Give consideration to whether or not aftershocks may be greater than initial event in 
determining building safety. 
CERC 0004.1 p. 
19 
  Need to do more comprehensive review on what the requirements are for engineers to be 
adequately trained and prepared for doing building assessments.  
CERC 0004.1 p. 
19 
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 KEY Review discussion on p. 23 on building assessment models. Check Vidal reference.   
 KEY Information management: review discussion on p. 25 for recommendations.   
  This was done with virtually no preparations for the scale of damage that occurred. There was 
little time to train safety evaluators. Consequently,  there was a considerable need to 
improvise on an urgent basis, and in this regard officials did an outstanding job. 
Gallagher, p. 3 
  4.2 Little or No Training of Safety Evaluation Personnel 
It was reported by a number of individuals interviewed that safety evaluation personnel 
received little or no training before the earthquake and only a relatively modest amount of 
training immediately after the earthquake and before going into the field. 
Gallagher, p. 
33 
  4.3 No Prior Credentialing of Safety Evaluation Personnel 
There was no prior certification of the Christchurch safety evaluation personnel. This contrasts 
with California where the California Emergency Management Agency (Cal EMA) has trained 
and certified over 7,000 individuals. Cal EMA requires all students to provide their credentials 
at the time of the class. Credentials include a professional architect or civil engineering license 
(structural and geotechnical engineers in California are also civil engineers), or one of a 
number of building inspector certifications that require understanding of structural load path. 
These are checked against licensing board websites, and only those with current credentials 
are allowed into the active database for deployment. Those without these credentials are 
placed into an archive database, in the event they obtain their credentials later. 
Not having a pre-qualified cadre of personnel to draw from put New Zealand officials in the 
difficult situation of trying to qualify personnel on the spot. Understandably, there was little 
choice in the matter at the time.  
Gallagher, p. 
34 
  Both building safety evaluations and demolition would be improved by:  
the development of a high level national resource to manage the evaluations of buildings 
a national system for the selection, training, warranting and mobilisation of building 
professionals in an emergency 
revision of the Guidelines for Building Evaluation in light of Christchurch  experience, in 
particular revision of the placarding system and education of the  public in its meaning 
development of protocols for consultation prior to demolition and for the establishment, 
management and access through cordons. 
McLean, pp. 13 
- 14 
  Early restoration of business, including preservation of jobs should be an objective of the 
Response; and a senior business liaison person should be part of the organisation of the EOCs 
for any emergency or disaster that significantly affects economic activity and the business 
community. 
McLean, p. 14 
  The Guide to the National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan should include a section 
on logistics. A more formal adoption of a CIMS structure at all levels would have helped. 
McLean, p. 14 
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  Of significance was the failure to convert the large inflow of raw information into intelligence 
and a common situational awareness. Internal information sharing was problematic for the 
CRC and there did not appear to be one area within the CRC which was considered the most 
reliable source of information. Information was not generally well displayed. Many CRC staff 
did not understand the distinction between information and intelligence. A strategic plan for 
information collection and intelligence analysis was lacking and there was little development 
of a _common operating picture_. An operations _knowledge board_ or an electronic 
intelligence summary was needed in the CRC. 
McLean, p. 14 
  The Review considers that the duplication of control and EOCs between Christchurch city and 
the regional CDEM group was not only inefficient but put people and property at risk. Under 
existing legislation the same situation could arise in a number of different parts of New 
Zealand. The Review considers that for efficiency and clarity only one level of emergency 
management should exist below the national level. The Review therefore recommends that 
while territorial local authorities should continue to be able to declare a state of emergency 
the responsibility for leading and controlling the response should rest solely with CDEM 
Groups. 
McLean, p. 16 
  The Review recommends that a small cadre of personnel be established to lead in senior 
emergency management positions during natural disasters, that they be highly trained in 
catastrophic event management (including staff and command training from NZDF and Police) 
and that they be drawn from CDEM groups and public and private sector organisations. They 
would carry on with their regular job for much of their time; but would be well trained and 
maintain their emergency management skills through education, training, and regular 
exercises. 
McLean, p. 16 
  A national system be developed for the selection, training, warranting and mobilisation of 
building professionals for building safety evaluation in an emergency. The logical focal point 
for engineers would be IPENZ, which already maintains data bases of capability as  the 
registration authority under the Chartered Professional Engineers Act. Because this would be a 
national resource this activity should be properly funded by government rather than by the 
members of such an organisation. 
Mclean, p. 142 
  That building evaluation during an emergency be given a legal mandate and that this address 
the issues of: 
o authorisation and mechanisms for implementation of building evaluation both inside and 
outside declared states of emergency 
o appropriate liability protection for those undertaking assessments in both circumstances 
o clear legal status of posting, maintaining and removing placards 
o practical transition to normal building control arrangements 
Mclean, p. 142 
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  Territorial Authorities or their Building Consenting Authority have a responsibility for 
maintaining property and building information records (Resouce Management Act, Building 
Act, Local Govt & Meetings Act). Property and building information management is an evolving 
domain with developments occurring to address the shortcomings that are known nationally. 
For efficient emergency management of buildings, electronic records should be accessible via 
the internet from secure and backed-up computer databases  
 
 
  it is recommended that the expression “Building Safety Evaluation” be replaced by “Rapid 
Evaluation of Buildings in an Emergency”, because the evaluations judged necessary 
immediately following a damaging hazard event, such as earthquake, are rapid, and are under 
emergency conditions, and may be in high risk situations. The outcomes are thereby 
compromised, hence the need, as stated in the NZSEE Guidelines, for a subsequent “Detailed 
Engineering Evaluation” as has now been implemented in the Greater Christchurch area under 
the Department of Building and Housing Engineering advisory Group6  
 
NZSEE, p.7 
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Appendix 4.4: Article Review Data Extraction, Italy 
 
This appendix provides an annotated list of key and useful documents uncovered in the literature review. Many of these documents provide 
similar information, though sometimes from different perspectives. Due to saturation of themes, not all documents are fully reviewed. Note that 
many of the documents reference each other and there is substantial overlap, particularly in regards to case history, BDSA procedures, issues, 
and recommendations. The articles listed here as KEY or USEFUL should be further assessed as the project moves from data collection to analysis 
and synthesis.  
 
Readers are directed to the following KEY readings: 
 
Dolce, M., & Goretti, A. (2015). Building damage assessment after the 2009 Abruzzi earthquake. Bulletin of Earthquake Engineering, 13(8), 2241-
2264. 
Goretti, A., & Di Pasquale, G. (2002, September). An overview of post-earthquake damage assessment in Italy. In EERI invitational workshop. An 
action plan to develop earthquake damage and loss data protocols, California. 
 
Citation Dolce, M., & Goretti, A. (2015). Building damage assessment after the 2009 Abruzzi 
earthquake. Bulletin of Earthquake Engineering, 13(8), 2241-2264. 
 
Inline Ref Dolce & Goretti 2015  
Description The paper, after describing the procedures and the form that were used for the assessment, 
discusses the time evolution of the inspections and analyses the data on building type and 
seismic damage. The empirical damage distribution conditional upon seismic intensity and 
building type is provided and the role of several vulnerability factors, such as the quality of 
masonry, the construction year, the number of stories, and the pre-existing damage, is 
highlighted. Lastly the damage consequences, such as the immediate occupancy conditional 
upon building damage and building type, are reported. P.241 
 
Informs Case background 
Composition of teams 
Rationale for decision-making 
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Use of process and forms – rationale and examples 
Commentary This is an excellent article and provides a comprehensive overview of a BDSA process in 
progress. Excellent description of the AeDES form and its criteria. Significant information on # 
teams, time per building, distribution of damage.  
 
NOT CODED, but excellent discussion on distribution of different types of damage (e.g., # A, # 
B, etc) 
  
 
Status KEY  
 
  
 
 
Citation Goretti, A., & Di Pasquale, G. (2002, September). An overview of post-earthquake damage 
assessment in Italy. In EERI invitational workshop. An action plan to develop earthquake 
damage and loss data protocols, California. 
 
Inline Ref Goretti et al 2002  
Description The paper describes old and recent Italian experiences in the field of damage assessment, 
highlighting resolved, but also not yet resolved problems, that have been encountered in 
assessing procedures, forms, tools, computerisation, validation, maintenance, and data 
dissemination. 
 
Informs Historical aspects of damage assessment; damage assessment in relationship to larger/other 
assessment activities; comparison of BDSA processes, albeit older.  
 
Commentary Excellent for overall discussion on BDSA and for historical development of BDSA in Italy. Nice 
comparison of systems, but all data is dated and several of the systems described have 
changed since this article was written. However, its structure and the elements it discusses 
are very useful. Not included in Italy Case or Program data extraction – will be covered in 
detail in the Comparison section 
 
Status NOT USEFUL for Italian Cases 
KEY for comparisons. 
KEY 
USEFUL 
LIMITED 
NOT USEFUL 
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Citation Goretti, A., Di Pasquale, G., & Rota, M. (2007). Analysis and reporting on state-of-the-art on 
post-earthquake safety and damage assessment.  Lessloss Risk Mitigation for Earthquakes and 
Landslides Integrated Project. European Commission.  
 
Inline Ref Goretti et al 2007.   
Description This report contains a state-of-the-art on post-earthquake safety and damage assessment 
procedures adopted in different European countries.  
 
Informs Overall procedures of BDSA 
Team composition 
Training 
Time on task 
Forms and information  
 
Commentary Brief, but relatively comprehensive overview of BDSA in Italy. Very useful document and 
probably has the most detailed description to date on Italian procedures. 
 
 
Status KEY KEY 
USEFUL 
LIMITED 
NOT USEFUL 
 
 
Citation Masi, A., Santarsiero, G., Digrisolo, A., Chiauzzi, L., & Manfredi, V. (2016). Procedures and 
experiences in the post-earthquake usability evaluation of ordinary buildings. Bollettino di 
Geofisica Teorica ed Applicata, 57(2). 
 
Inline Ref Masi et al. 2016  
Description In this study, after an overview of the survey forms adopted in several countries throughout 
the world, the form currently used in Italy for usability surveys (called the AeDES form) is 
described, especially focusing on those points that highlight the role of vulnerability in the 
final usability evaluation. An analysis of the extensive database of the L’Aquila 2009 
earthquake usability surveys is presented, particularly discussing those buildings that were 
judged unusable despite having no or light damage. Finally, a case study analysed during the 
Emilia 2012 earthquake is reported. Masi, p. 200 
 
Informs Case background 
Use of non-credentialed personnel 
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Building taxonomies 
Commentary Good discussion on history of damage assessment and development of current model.  
Discussion comparing BDSA models for Italy, Greece, US, NZ, Japan 
Break down of damage patterns for types of buildings (private, public, heritage) 
Building types (p. 207) – NOT CODED 
 
Status KEY KEY 
USEFUL 
LIMITED 
NOT USEFUL 
 
 
Citation Molinari, D., Menoni, S., Aronica, G. T., Ballio, F., Berni, N., Pandolfo, C., ... & Minucci, G. 
(2014). Ex post damage assessment: an Italian experience. Natural Hazards and Earth System 
Sciences, 14(4), 901. 
 
Inline Ref Molinari et al 2014.  
Description This paper studies this context, and describes ongoing activities in the Umbria and Sicily 
regions of Italy intended to identifying new tools and procedures for flood damage data 
surveys and storage in the aftermath of floods. In the first part of the paper, the current 
procedures for data gathering in Italy are analysed. The analysis shows that the available  
knowledge does not enable the definition or validation of damage curves, as information is 
poor, fragmented, and inconsistent. 
 
Informs Flood damage assessment 
Higher order data management 
 
Commentary Consider doing a case study on flooding based on this article. The process and procedure 
should be compared to the earthquake procedures and also to the NZ earthquake and flood 
field guides. While not much information is taken from this article into the case or BDSA data 
extraction templates for Italy, there is a lot of really useful information in this article. The lack 
of data extraction is related to the earthquake-centric cases and programs, not to the quality 
of data in the article. 
 
Status USEFUL – generally 
KEY to contract flood with earthquake processes. 
KEY 
USEFUL 
LIMITED 
NOT USEFUL 
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Citation Baggio, C., Bernardini, A., Colozza, R., Corazza, L., Della Bella, M., Di Pasquale, G., ... & 
Papa, F. (2007). Field manual for post-earthquake damage and safety assessment and short 
term countermeasures (AeDES). European Commission—Joint Research Centre—Institute for 
the Protection and Security of the Citizen, EUR, 22868. 
 
Inline Ref Baggio et al 2007.  
Description This manual extends the Instructions reported on page 4 of the form, with the aim of 
providing a tool for a correct training of the surveyors and for a full awareness of the 
principles of the form, as well as for the necessary homogeneity of judgment. 
In Chapter 2, some information and guidelines on issues concerning the organisation of the 
damage and usability survey and the procedures for preparing and carrying out the building 
survey are given. 
Chapter 3 provides a detailed description of each structural component, correlating it to the 
building component behaviour (thrusting or non thrusting roofs, masonry of good or bad 
quality, rigid or flexible floors, etc.). 
Baggio, p. 5 
Informs Definitions and discussion of usability 
Elements of a BDSA system p. 4 
Building taxonomy p. 10. 
 
Commentary Detailed field guide for use of the AeDES form. Much of the information if structured in the 
context of completing the forms, making it difficult to extract for overall description of the 
BDSA process. The Manual does not describe the overall BDSA process.  
 
Status USEFUL KEY 
USEFUL 
LIMITED 
NOT USEFUL 
 
 
Citation Dolce, M., & Di Bucci, D. (2014). National Civil Protection Organization and technical activities 
in the 2012 Emilia earthquakes (Italy). Bulletin of earthquake engineering, 12(5), 2231-2253. 
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Inline Ref Dolce 2014.  
Description Description of NCPO response to Emilia earthquake in 2012  
Informs Some information decision making.  
Commentary Good overall description of broader earthquake assessment, with minimal information on 
actual BDSA procedures.  
 
Status LIMITED KEY 
USEFUL 
LIMITED 
NOT USEFUL 
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Appendix 4.5: Italy Building Damage Safety Assessment Process 
This section contains key data extracted from documents describing both the Building Damage Assessment process in place during the 2011 
Earthquakes in Italy.   
 
Figure A4. Italy DSA Process. 
6.9.1e TECHNICAL REPORT  
APPENDIX 4.5: ITALY BUILDING DAMAGE SAFETY ASSESSMENT PROCESS 
194 
 
DSA Overview 
 
RQ # Topic Comments References 
AB_001 Elements 1.3 Emergency management and surveyor’s responsibility In order to optimise the emergency 
management and the treatment of the collected data, the procedures should be unified on a 
national basis. They include for example: 
− the definition of the reference event, 
− the procedure for calling for an inspection, 
− the recruitment and the management of the surveyors teams for what concerns a territorial 
limitation of the area of action, 
− the compilation of the usability form, 
− the computerization of the data included in the form, 
− the procedures for the order of evacuation, 
− the procedures for repeating some usability inspections in order to obtain a more detailed 
investigation and/or to evaluate variations of the building conditions. 
Baggio, p. 4 
  The organisation in short requires that: the assessment of buildings begins after a request 
addressed by the citizens to the mayor. A first organisational work of these requests is carried  
out within the municipality, in order to associate all the requests, generally referred to building 
units, that refers to the same structural unit. The mayor will then forward these survey 
requests to the Mixed Operative Centre (COM) or to another similar structure, from where 
surveyors teams, registered and organized, are sent to carry out the inspection. The surveyors 
then go to the municipality to indicate the survey activity to be carried out, they check the 
relative data, they collect useful information with the help of the local structure, they 
complete their task and then inform the mayor about the result. The municipality must be 
organized for the collection of the results (registers and cartography) and for the openings of 
the provisions of its competence, including obviously the incidental ordinance of evacuation 
issued by the mayor. The surveyors go back to the COM, where they deliver the completed 
form. The data collected are then computerized and used both for the activities of the COM 
and for possible future elaborations of scenarios. 
Baggio, p. 7 
AF_001 Overall Goal Despite the fact that, at least in Italy, a definition of usability has never been codified, usability 
may be related to the need of using the building during the seismic emergency, being 
reasonably safe from the risk of significant damage to people. For this reason, the usability 
assessment does not aim at safeguarding the construction from further damages, but only at 
preserving the life of occupants. 
Baggio p. 2 
  As a matter of fact, this assessment allows: 
1. the population to safely stay in or re-enter their homes; 
Dolce 2014 
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2. the shelter and temporary housing needs to be properly scaled, both in the emergency (tent 
camps, hotels, self-lodging financial support) and in the post-emergency (temporary housing); 
3. activities to be rapidly restarted; 
4. cost analyses to be carried out, in order to define the funds needed for the reconstruction; 
5. priority and funding criteria to be identified for the interventions on each building. 
  The safety assessment has some implications on the reconstruction process: indeed, building 
usability is one of the parameters used to have access to public funds and to define priorities. 
On the other hand, the damage assessment does not have any implication on the 
reconstruction. In case an evaluation of damage is used to establish financial contribution 
given by the State or the Region for reconstruction, the damage is assessed again, in more 
detail by an engineer remunerated by the owner.  
 
Goretti, p. 9 
  In Italy, damage and safety assessment are jointly performed. The safety assessment aims 
mainly at distinguishing safe and unsafe buildings and evaluating the short term 
countermeasures necessary to make buildings safe. On the other hand, the damage 
assessment aims at establishing the overall cost of repair, upgrading or retrofitting in the 
affected area. Aims of short term countermeasures are to reduce private and public risk in 
case of aftershock and preserve monumental buildings from further damage.  
Goretti, p. 9 
 
Af_007 Overall Authority  Either the National or Local Civil Protection is in charge of the assessment, depending on the 
scale of the impact. Local authority may also be responsible for the safety assessment (Region, 
Province and Municipality). Even when buildings with different use have to be inspected all the 
inspections are managed by the same authority. Only the assessment of monumental buildings 
is usually managed by the Ministry of Cultural Assets.  
 
Goretti, p. 9 
 
  Inspections are managed at a local level, while resources are managed at the provincial or 
intermediate level.  
Goretti, p. 10 
AF_008 Legal Basis In general terms, the definition of the juridical responsibilities of the surveyor -  who is going 
to undertake, usually as a volunteer, the difficult task of deciding about the usability and hence 
about the normal use of a building, which can potentially be subjected to seismic shaking in 
the short period - is one of the crucial factors for the success of a good post-event 
management. It is evident that, first of all, the responsibility of the surveyor should not go 
behind his technical competences, which are those typical of people working in the technical 
field (engineers, architects, draughtsmen). 
Baggio, p. 5 
  It is likewise evident that the assumption of responsibility by voluntary workers can only be 
limited to the correct execution of the survey and to the release of the consequent usability 
judgment, based on their professionalism. It is also evident that the responsibility of the 
surveyor should be limited in time, since it is related to an emergency condition, which ends at 
Baggio, p. 5 
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the moment of the following reconstruction. Finally, the responsibility will be smaller, since 
the judgment is less certain, in case the surveyor is asked, based on the level of damage and 
on the vulnerability of the building, to give his opinion on the behaviour of the building in 
relation to possible seismic events of much larger intensity than the one already experienced. 
From what said above, the authors of this text derive the opinion that the responsibility of the 
surveyor can only include what is related to his bad faith or to his negligence in the fulfilment 
of his task. 
AF_010 General Liability The situation in Italy is somewhat different: the law concerning usability inspections in post 
seismic emergency is totally deficient and the jurisdiction is particularly penalizing the 
surveyor. 
Baggio, p. 5 
AF_003 Types of BDSA 
Assessment 
An approach similar to the two-step Japanese and Greek approaches has also recently been 
used in Italy, during the 2012 Emilia (Italy) earthquake, where early inspections were made 
very quickly by firefighters who performed more than 63,000 surveys in the very first days of 
the seismic sequence. Based on the results of these preliminary surveys, only damaged or 
“suspect” buildings (about 38,000) were subjected to later more accurate and time-consuming 
evaluations made by trained technicians using the AeDES form. Therefore, it can be computed 
that around 25,000 buildings with no or clearly negligible damage were considered usable just 
on the basis of the first fast survey, thus remarkably speeding up the reduction of the 
homeless number. 
Masi, p. 203 
AF_012 Building Taxonomies Several kinds of structures are considered in the assessment: residential buildings, 
monuments, special buildings such as schools or hospitals, commercial buildings and 
infrastructures such as bridges or dams.  
 
Goretti, p. 9 
AF_012b Specific Assessments for 
Building Types 
  
AF_007a Relationship of various 
assessments 
  
AF_013 Type of Placard System The procedure also includes a posting system, this however, is not standard.  Goretti, p. 10 
AF_014 Placard Colours   
AF_015 
 
Potential Outcomes Concerning the immediate occupancy classification, the form includes the following alternative 
options: 
A- Usable; 
B- Usable only after short term countermeasures; 
C- Partially usable; 
D- To be re-inspected; 
E- Unusable; 
Dolce, p. 2244 
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F- Unusable for external risk only. 
  According to the AeDES form, buildings are classified into the following usability categories:  
A. Usable building. The building, albeit slightly damaged, can keep on housing the functions to 
which it was dedicated, keeping the human life reasonably protected in case of an aftershock 
as strong as the earthquake that motivated the inspection. 
B. Building usable only after short term countermeasures. It is the case of a building with 
limited or no structural damage, but with severe non-structural damage. Once 
countermeasures are taken, however, the building can be re-used. 
C. Partially usable building. It is the case of a building with limited or no structural damage, but 
with severe non-structural damage located in a part of the building. The possible partial or 
total collapse of the damaged part must not imply a risk for the usable part.  
D. Building to be re-inspected. It is the case of unusual damage scenario, or of geological, 
geotechnical or other situations that require a specific, still visual, investigation. 
E. Unusable building, as a consequence of at least one of the following conditions: high 
structural risk, high non-structural risk or high geotechnical risk. 
F. Unusable building for external risk only, like in the case of landslides or adjacent  near 
collapsed constructions threatening the inspected building.  
Dolce 2014, p. 
2251 
  
 
Goretti, p. 10 
AF_016 Changing Placards   
AF_016 Removing Placards   
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AF_018 – 
AF_024 
Reporting and 
Information 
The assessment was carried out using the AeDES form (Baggio et al. 2007; Goretti and Di 
Pasquale 2002). The form and its field manual (Baggio et al. 2007) are based on the experience 
gained from several earthquakes (1997 Umbria and Marche, 1998 Pollino and 2002 Molise). 
The form, which consists of 9 sections and contains information on the building identification, 
dimension, age, use, constructional type and suffered damage, is specifically conceived to 
unambiguously define the collected data and to be self-explained. At the same time, the data 
to be collected are selected in order to be maximally informative of seismic performance, 
compatibly with the limits of a visual inspection. As an example, the classification of the 
vertical and horizontal building components is based on their seismic performance features 
rather than on their technology and materials. In addition a multiple choice-multiple answer 
option allows a rather detailed description of the building characteristics to be made using few 
categories. For instance, the R/C and steel building classification makes use of the following 
multiple choices-multiple answers: R/C shear walls, R/C frames and steel frames, thus allowing 
R/C frames, R/C walls and steel frames to be considered in the same building. In Figs. 1 and 2, 
the masonry, R/C and steel building classifications are reported. 
Dolce, p. 2243 
  At the regional level, information on flood damage is obtained from individual municipalities 
that collect such data in order to apply for reimbursement on the basis of the total 
extent of the damage incurred (it should be noted that in Italy no insurance policy covering 
natural hazards has to date been created for residential buildings (Maccaferri et al., 2012)), 
and as a consequence any form of compensation is a part of public expenditure). The damage 
data collected by municipalities are then organised and maintained by the Regional 
authorities, which receive compensation funds from central government and distribute them 
to affected communities on the basis of their own evaluation of what constitutes priorities 
and acceptable claims. Compensation can only be obtained if a state of emergency has been 
declared by the National Civil Protection Department. One problem deriving from the division 
of responsibilities among national and regional authorities is that survey methods and 
procedures differ from region to region, and sometimes even from municipality to 
municipality, which leads to inconsistencies among databases, and 
to poor levels of comparability. In addition, damage to different sectors, such as 
infrastructures, industries, and residential properties, are kept in separate archives and 
managed by different offices, which are responsible for compensation and 
reconstruction funds. Regional databases do not account for indirect damage, as it is not 
subject to compensation  
Molinari, p. 
903 
  A third limitation of the systematic use of these data for analysis purposes is that they are in 
paper form (i.e. the original survey forms). Few regions are provided with electronic 
structured databases such as the RasDa database in the Lombardy Region, which provides data 
going back to 1995. A distinction is made in the RasDa database between private 
Molinari, p. 
904 
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and public facilities. Damage data relating to the latter is then split into damage to 
infrastructures and damage to buildings. In the case of buildings, whether private or public, 
damage to structures and contents is reported separately. As with most 
regional databases, a very generic description of the physical triggering event is reported, with 
no reference to any relevant hazard parameters. The resulting information is therefore 
poorer than that contained in the AVI database mentioned above. As a consequence, even 
though digitalised regional databases such as RasDa are better organised where 
they need to be used to develop or validate damage functions, the poor geo-location of 
damage, and especially the absence of hazard data, represents a significant barrier. 
  A damage classification is included in the safety assessment form. Inspectors have to assess 
physical damage, for each building component, in terms of both damage grade and extension. 
Safety assessment inspections must be performed necessarily both from outside and inside 
the building, using expert judgment and based on data collected by visual inspection.  
 
Goretti, p. 10 
  Data entry for computerization is performed by dedicated personnel. The procedure includes a 
standard software  for data entry, query and reports, but no information technology is used 
for data entry. During inspection management, inspection results are spatially visualized on 
paper (e.g. cadastral maps). Data are then inserted in a GIS system when the emergency is 
ended.  
Goretti, p. 10 
AF_017 Other markings   
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  Personnel  
AU_001 Types of Personnel Each survey team is typically composed of 2 people, which may be engineers, architects or 
surveyors. The average number of daily inspections made in one day by one team, considering 
also transportation time is 7. The average ratio between the number of persons managing the 
inspections and the number of inspectors is approximately 5:200, while the average ratio 
between people in charge of the data entry and inspectors is 7:200.  
Goretti, p. 11 
 
 Training A standard training course has been set up for training inspectors in peacetime. This course is 
addressed to both public employees and professionals and lasts approximately 40 hours. 
Sometimes however safety assessment is part of a more general course (lasting 60-120 hours) 
that includes also other topics, such as building vulnerability, pre-event survey and so on. The 
training course consists mainly of lecture notes, papers, books, PowerPoint slides and Pdf files.  
Goretti, p. 12 
 
    
 
RQ # Topic Comments References 
 Category Engineer  
AU_004 Professional Certification   
AU_007 Pre-Event Training   
AU_011 JIT/Event Preparation   
AU_012 Relationship   
AU_013 Liability    
AU_014 Capabilities   
AU_015 Types of Assessments 
performed 
  
    
 
 Category Building officials  
AU_004 Professional Certification   
AU_007 Pre-Event Training   
AU_011 JIT/Event Preparation   
AU_012 Relationship 1.   
AU_013 Liability    
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AU_015 Types of Assessments 
performed 
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 BDSA Type: Area Assessment, Windshield Assessment  
 Local Name   
AG_001 Goal   
AG_003 Description As said above, soon after being notified of the May 20th main shock, teams of experts moved 
from Rome to the epicentral area to carry out a first survey of the real damage distribution 
and make an on-site evaluation of the macroseismic intensities (Galli et al. 2012). Their work 
was preliminarily aimed at identifying the localities with the highest level of damage, in order 
to correctly address the first activities of rescue and assistance to the population. 
Dolce 2014 
AG_015 Types of Buildings Teams 
Can Assess 
  
AG_037 Legal Authority   
AG_005 Dispatched By   
AG_038 Implementation   
AG_006 Team Members   
AG_009 Team Size   
AG_010 How Selected   
AG_016 Interior/Exterior Check?   
AG_018 Assessment Outcomes   
AG_020 Info Gathering Tools   
AG_028 Assessment Time   
AG_030 Destination for Info 
Collected 
  
    
 
RQ # Topic Comments References 
 BDSA Type: Rapid Damage Assessment  
 Local Name   
AG_001 Goal   
AG_003 Description   
AG_015 Legal Authority Buildings are inspected on citizen’s demand.  
 
Goretti, p. 10 
AG_037 Types of Buildings Teams 
Can Assess 
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AG_005 Dispatched By   
AG_038 Implementation   
AG_006 Team Members Firefighters Masi, p. 203 
AG_009 Team Size   
AG_010 How Selected   
AG_016 Interior/Exterior Check? A damage classification is included in the safety assessment form. Inspectors have to assess 
physical damage, for each building component, in terms of both damage grade and extension. 
Safety assessment inspections must be performed necessarily both from outside and inside 
the building, using expert judgment and based on data collected by visual inspection.  
 
Goretti, p. 10 
AG_018 Assessment Outcomes   
AG_020 Info Gathering Tools   
AG_028 Type of Placard System   
AG_030 Assessment Time   
AG_030 Destination for Info 
Collected 
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 BDSA Type: Detailed Building Damage Assessment – Simple Buildings  
 Local Name   
AG_001 Goal   
AG_003 Description   
AG_015 Types of Buildings Teams 
Can Assess 
  
AG_037 Legal Authority   
AG_005 Dispatched By   
AG_038 Implementation   
AG_006 Team Members Each survey team is typically composed of 2 people, which may be engineers, architects or 
surveyors. 
Goretti, p. 11 
AG_009 Team Size   
AG_010 How Selected   
AG_016 Interior/Exterior Check?   
AG_018 Assessment Outcomes   
AG_020 Info Gathering Tools AeDES form Masi, p. 205 
AG_028 Assessment Time   
AG_030 Destination for Info 
Collected 
  
    
 
 
RQ # Topic Comments References 
 BDSA Type: Engineering Assessment  
 Local Name   
AG_001 Goal In case an evaluation of damage is used to establish financial contribution given by the State or 
the Region for reconstruction, the damage is assessed again, in more detail by an engineer 
remunerated by the owner. 
Goretti, p. 9 
AG_003 Description   
AG_015 Dispatched By   
AG_037 Implementation   
AG_005 Team Members   
AG_038 Team Size   
AG_006 How Selected   
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AG_009 Types of Buildings Teams 
Can Assess 
  
AG_010 Interior/Exterior Check?   
AG_016 Assessment Outcomes   
AG_018 Info Gathering Tools   
 
 
 
 206 
 
Appendix 4.6: Italy 2009 - 2011 Case Studies 
 
 
Figure A5. Case Study: Italy 2009 – 2011. 
Note that there are several articles in this section that address differing earthquakes occurring between 2009 and 2011. 
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 Case Title   
  Introduction  
 Case Background   
 Location The 6th of April 2009, at 3:32 a.m., an earthquake of magnitude 5.9 on the Richter scale 
(Mw6.3) hit the city of L’Aquila, where about 73,000 people were living. It also affected 
some tens of municipality towns.  
 
Dolce 2241 
 Event On April 6, 2009, at 03:32:39 a.m. local time, a magnitude MW=6.3 earthquake with shallow 
focal depth (10 km) occurred in the Abruzzo region (central Italy) very close to L’Aquila (the 
urban centre is less than 10 km away from the epicentre), the capital town of the region (Masi 
et al., 2011). This  vent was the third strongest earthquake recorded in Italy after the 1976 
Friuli 
(north-eastern Italy; MW=6.4) and the 1980 Irpinia (southern Italy; MW=6.9) earthquakes, and 
it is the strongest event providing recordings from accelerometric stations located very near to 
the epicentre. Specifically, four accelerometric stations (AQA, AQG, AQM, AQV) were located 
across the Aterno valley and recorded PGA values up to 0.66 g. Specifically, the station AQK, 
located in the urban centre, recorded a PGA value of about 0.35 g with a peak ground velocity 
around 35 cm/s. 
In the first two days after the main shock, four earthquakes with MW≥5.0 occurred. Among 
them, the first (MW=5.1, April 6) and the third event (MW=5.1, April 7) occurred nearby 
L’Aquila city. The second one (MW=5.1, April 6) was localized at about 15 km NW of L’Aquila 
(Campotosto area), while the fourth one (MW=5.5, April 7) was localized SE of L’Aquila, in an 
area where the 
main event practically destroyed the small village of Onna and caused extensive damage in 
other villages. 
Masi, p. 205 
 Extent & Type of 
Damage 
The April 6 main shock and the subsequent severe aftershocks caused heavy and extensive 
damage in the urban area of L’Aquila as well as in several surrounding villages, mainly located 
in the south-eastern part of L’Aquila province (central part of the Aterno valley), where MCS 
(Mercalli-Cancani-Sieberg) intensity values ranging from VI to IX degree were observed (Galli 
and Camassi, 2009). Conversely, intensity values generally did not exceed VI MCS in the area 
NW of L’Aquila town, as displayed in the map in Fig. 1. Five villages suffered intensities equal 
to, or greater than, IX-X MCS (i.e., Onna and Castelnuovo), four villages suffered intensities of 
IX (e.g., Sant’Eusanio Forconese), while two villages and the urban centre of L’Aquila town felt 
intensities of VIII-IX. 
Masi, p. 205 
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A total of 315 localities were classified with a MCS intensity equal to, or greater than, V, as 
displayed in Fig. 2, which reports the number of localities classified in terms of the assigned 
value 
of MCS intensity.  
  The most damaged ones were located SE of L’Aquila. The earthquake caused 309 victims, 
about 1,600 injured, more than 65,000 people needing assistance and about 30,000 long term 
homeless 
Dolce p. 2241 
 DSA Process In DPC (2000) and Baggio et al. (2007) usability is defined as follows: “The evaluation of 
usability in the post-earthquake emergency is a temporary and rough evaluation - i.e., based 
on an expert judgment and carried out in a short time, on the basis of a simple visual 
inspection and of data which can be easily collected - aiming at determining whether, in case 
of a seismic event, buildings affected by the earthquake can still be used with a reasonable 
level of life safety”. 
Masi, p. 200 
 
  Usability surveys are first and foremost focused on the short-term use of the buildings under 
examination (Goretti and Di Pasquale, 2002). However, together with the usability survey, a 
global damage assessment can be done to provide data and directions useful in establishing 
longterm strategies on the affected building stock. 
Masi, p. 200 
 
    
 Goal Just after the event a field survey, aimed at evaluating the building immediate occupancy 
and the structural and non-structural damage, was performed.  
 
Dolce p. 2241 
  The immediate occupancy assessment was aimed at evaluating the short term use of buildings. 
The buildings that can be safely used even in case of aftershocks, as well as the emergency 
countermeasures to be taken in order to reduce the risk for people, were identified (Goretti 
and Di Pasquale 2005). The damage to structural and non-structural components was also 
annotated. 
Dolce, p. 2242 
  After an earthquake, usability of buildings definitely plays a major role in the recovery of the 
essential social and economic activities of the affected communities. Yet, usability of a 
structure represents a delicate calculation, involving the safety of individuals because of  the 
possibility of significant aftershocks (Baggio et al., 2007). 
Masi, p. 199 
  On one hand, assessing usability determines if there is a significant risk to human life in using 
the affected and possibly damaged buildings, thus minimizing the risk which people could be 
subjected to when returning to their houses once the initial panic has ended. Considering this 
objective, being conservative in such an evaluation appears mandatory. 
On the other hand, timely usability inspections are essential in order to minimize the number 
of homeless hosted in provisional or temporary structures. Too conservative evaluations can 
be detrimental, causing unnecessary discomfort, and therefore they should be avoided. 
Masi, P. 199 
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The social impact of this activity can be better understood by comparing the number of 
homeless before and after usability campaigns that followed past earthquakes. 
 Placard System   
 Results   
 Use of Personnel    
 Commentary   
  Part I BDSA Framework  
 EM  Overview   
 Legislative Authority   
 EM framework   
 Stakeholders & 
Relationships 
  
 <image>   
 Ownership & 
Sustainability 
  
    
  Part II BDSA in Operation  
 Case   
 Operational 
Functioning: 
  
  Who managed / 
administered 
process 
As for other past recent earthquakes (Pollino 1998, Molise 2002), the damage and usability 
assessment was managed by the Italian Civil Protection Department, with a substantial 
support from Regions, Provinces, Municipalities, Firemen, ReLuis, Eucentre, National 
Chambers of Engineers, Architects and Surveyors and National Research Council. 
Dolce, p. 2242 
  The coordination of all inspectionswas carried out by the ItalianCivil ProtectionDepartment. Dolce, p. 2242 
    
  How were priorities 
established? 
Prior to building inspections, an aerial evaluation identified 27 non-accessible zones, the so 
called “red zones”. They were typically located in the historical centres of L’Aquila and of the 
surrounding villages. In order to rapidly detect the actually usable buildings, and to limit the 
risk for the inspectors due to strong aftershocks, the inspections were initially carried out in 
the less-damaged areas and only after a couple of months they were extended to the “red 
zones”. 
Dolce, p. 2242 
 
   Just after the earthquake, the macroseismic intensity was assigned to 316 municipalities and 
localities following a visual survey performed by experts (Galli et al. 2009). 
Dolce, p. 2242 
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     
  What principles 
guided operational 
decisions 
In order to speed up the recovery and to reduce the social hardship due to the halt in 
production, priority to public buildings was given, in particular to hospitals, schools and 
headquarter buildings, as well as to commercial buildings.  
Dolce, p. 2242 
  Prior to building inspections, an aerial evaluation identified 27 non-accessible zones, the so 
called “red zones”. They were typically located in the historical centres of L’Aquila and of the 
surrounding villages. In order to rapidly detect the actually usable buildings, and to limit the 
risk for the inspectors due to strong aftershocks, the inspections were initially carried out in 
the less-damaged areas and only after a couple of months they were extended to the “red 
zones”. 
Dolce, p. 2242 
 
  Public buildings, such as hospitals, schools and headquarters, as well as buildings entirely 
dedicated to industrial or commercial activities had been given higher priority with respect to 
residential buildings. The inspections to these buildings were performed by more specialized 
teams. 
Dolce, p. 2242 
  The survey of residential buildings was carried out building by building in all the municipalities 
where the felt macroseismic intensity in the Mercalli–Cancani–Sieberg (MCS) scale 
(Sieberg 1930) was higher than IMCS = VI, and only under request in all the other cases.  
Dolce, p. 2242 
 
  In conclusion, it should be stressed that having a clear and well-founded procedure to follow 
during the inspections is essential, although the use of expert judgement is crucial to 
effectively apply the official procedures when one works on such a sensitive matter as the 
usability judgement. In this regard, some remarks reported in the foreword of the current 
version of the AeDES manual are noteworthy: “The activities during an emergency phase 
always proceed along a narrow line, along a boundary where the rapidity of the expected 
answers and the capacity in providing effective assessments based on poor judgment factors 
sometimes have difficulty in finding the right balance. The surveyor stands in the middle of it: 
only guarantee strictly derives from his/her technical competence and ability to fully operate 
on the basis of professional ethics”. 
Masi, p. 218 
  Emilia 
In the 2012 Emilia earthquakes, instead, the assessment of a building was carried out only in 
case of specific request made by the owners or the tenants, and after a preliminary inspection 
aimed at providing a first quick survey aimed at identifying clearly usable buildings; in case of 
first positive assessment (i.e., no damage), the survey based on the AeDES form was no longer 
performed. Therefore, the AeDES inspections were carried out only on a selected sample of 
buildings having higher probabilities of being judged as not usable. This strategy was adopted 
in Emilia, as well as in other previous earthquakes, to speed up the survey, because of the high 
number of buildings in the epicentral area, a figure much higher than in Abruzzo, and, at the 
Dolce 2014, p. 
2246 
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same time, of the low number of damaged buildings. The outcome of the usability assessment 
is urgently needed by the citizens and the authorities in charge of the emergency 
management, as it can be easily understood. Therefore, the most efficient way to complete 
the survey of damaged buildings as soon as possible must be pursued in any case. 
 Teams:   
  Recruitment   
    
    
  Deployment The inspection process benefited from the implementation of a specific Geographical 
Information System (GIS), based on a digital regional technical land-usemap. The inspectors 
were given a paper map containing their weekly working area, where the buildings to be 
inspected were reported, together with a building identification number used to insert data in 
the GIS. The GIS was also updated according to the findings of the inspectors on the field (new 
buildings, demolished buildings, etc). Inspections in the “red zone” of L’Aquila city turned out 
to be extremely delicate for the widespread damage. 
Dolce, p.2243 
 
  Use of teams   
  Liability All the about 8,000 inspectors operated as voluntarily. Dolce, p;. 2242 
  Preparation The teams were trained throughout specific on-site short courses held in the morning of the 
first day of activities. 
Dolce, p;. 2242 
 BDSA:   
  # teams All the about 8,000 inspectors operated as voluntarily. Dolce, p;. 2242 
   About 28,029 inspector working days were required to complete the inspections. About 2,000 
working days were required for the inspection management and about 8,190 for data 
computerization. It corresponds to about 1 working day for every 2.0 inspected buildings. 
Dolce, pp. 
2261-2 
  Composition The inspector’s teams were made up of two or three experts from Italian Regions, Provincial 
and Municipal technical offices, Fire Brigades, Universities coordinated by the Network of 
University Earthquake Engineering Laboratories, the National Chambers of Engineers,  
Architects and Surveyors, European Centre for Training and Research in Earthquake 
Engineering and the National Research Council. 
Dolce, p. 2242 
  Public buildings, such as hospitals, schools and headquarters, as well as buildings entirely 
dedicated to industrial or commercial activities had been given higher priority with respect to 
residential buildings. The inspections to these buildings were performed by more specialized 
teams. 
Dolce, p. 2242 
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  Inspections in the “red zone” of L’Aquila city turned out to be extremely delicate for the 
widespread damage. A Fireman was added to the team with the aim to evaluate the safer way 
to reach the building and the possibility that citizens safely enter their buildings. 
Dolce, p.2243 
 
 
  An approach similar to the two-step Japanese and Greek approaches has also recently been 
used in Italy, during the 2012 Emilia (Italy) earthquake, where early inspections were made 
very quickly by firefighters who performed more than 63,000 surveys in the very first days of 
the seismic sequence. 
Masi, p. 203 
  The 2012 Emilia earthquake struck the northern part of the Emilia-Romagna region 
(centrenorth of Italy). …About 3,000 expert technicians were employed to carry out a total of 
more than 40,000 usability inspections 
Masi, p. 215 
  During the post-earthquake emergency, immediately after the second shock (May 29, 2012), 
the authors carried out many usability surveys on school buildings in the framework of a 
collaboration between the ReLUIS Consortium (the Italian Network of University Laboratories 
of Seismic Engineering, www.reluis.it) and the Emilia-Romagna Regional Authority. Most of the 
inspections were performed in towns located far away from the epicentre (i.e., around 20 km  
or more), and therefore the surveyed buildings generally showed little damage. 
Masi, p. 216 
  Emilia 
Also in the case of the 2012 Emilia earthquake, a huge effort was made to organize the 
damage and usability assessment survey. The assessment was actually performed by experts 
coming from different Regions and from the National Fire Brigades, by researchers of the DPC 
Centres of Competence (ReLUIS and EUCENTRE), and by engineers, architects and surveyors 
coordinated through the related national professional Councils (Fig. 5). 
Dolce 2014, p. 
2244 
  Selection   
  Logistics A minimum operational stay of one week was requested to the inspectors. Dolce, p. 2242 
  The inspection process benefited from the implementation of a specific Geographical 
Information System (GIS), based on a digital regional technical land-usemap. The inspectors 
were given a paper map containing their weekly working area, where the buildings to be 
inspected were reported, together with a building identification number used to insert data in 
the GIS. The GIS was also updated according to the findings of the inspectors on the field (new 
buildings, demolished buildings, etc). Inspections in the “red zone” of L’Aquila city turned out 
to be extremely delicate for the widespread damage. 
Dolce, p.2243 
 
 
  The inspection management required, on average, the daily presence of 11 officers and 4 
volunteers for team and archive management and form validation, 8 operators for the real-
time computerization, 65 operators for the S.E.T. computerization, 15 operators for data 
checking and GIS implementation, 3 operators for the coordination of the data processing. 
Dolce, p.2244 
 
 
  Timeline   
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  # buildings 
assessed 
Just after the event a field survey, aimed at evaluating the building immediate occupancy 
and the structural and non-structural damage, was performed. Two months after the  
earthquake, about 50,000 buildings had been inspected. This number increased up to more 
than 72,000 by the end of August 2009 (Dolce et al. 2009). The number of inspections is even 
greater, since strong aftershocks, as well as uncertain evaluations, required several buildings 
to be re-inspected. 
Dolce p. 2241 
  In the first 60 days after the event, about 50,000 surveys were made in order to check the  
safety of buildings and evaluate their usability (DPC, 2014b). Until March 2010, about 80,000 
surveys were performed on a total of 73,521 buildings. This means that up to about 6,500  
buildings were surveyed two times. This work was performed by more than 5,000 voluntary 
technicians from all over the country 
Masi, pp. 205-
206 
  The 2012 Emilia earthquake struck the northern part of the Emilia-Romagna region 
(centrenorth of Italy). Its epicentre was located in the Emilia region, about 30 km to the west 
of the town of Ferrara. 
About 3,000 expert technicians were employed to carry out a total of more than 40,000 
usability inspections on ordinary buildings using the AeDES inspection form. During the period 
of maximum activity, the damage and usability survey involved about 180 teams per day (with   
maximum of more than 200 teams). The maximum number of inspections per day ranged  
between 1,000 and 1,200 (Dolce and Di Bucci, 2014). As a result of the usability inspections, 
37% of the surveyed buildings were judged usable (outcome A) and almost the same 
percentage were judged unusable (36%, outcome E), while the remaining buildings were 
distributed among the other usability outcomes (B, C, D, and F) but mainly attributed to B 
(building usable after short-term countermeasures). 
Masi, p. 215 
   The analyzed data base, updated to 6 October 2009, contains 74,576 inspected buildings. The 
number of inspections is even greater (78,062) since sometimes repeated inspections were 
performed on the same building because of aftershocks, inaccurate inspections or errors in 
building identification. In any case, all the following analyses are based on inspected buildings, 
rather than on inspections. When repeated inspections on the same building were found, the 
data associated to the last inspection have been considered. After 2009, October the 6th, only 
repeated inspections were performed, resulting inminor changes to the collected data. 
 
The number of daily inspected buildings, DI(t), performed by all the teams working on day t, 
versus time t, is reported in Fig. 4. After 3 months from the event, more than 70,000 buildings 
were inspected. Additional 4,200 buildings were inspected in the followings 50 days. The daily 
distribution shows that the statistical mode of the daily inspected building distribution (1,716 
inspected buildings per day) occurred at day 17 from the event. Note that the distribution 
decreases with a long tail and that a 7 days periodic component can be added to the general 
Dolce, p. 2245 
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trend, due to decrease in inspections during the week-ends. Figure 4 also shows that some 
days were initially required for the activation of the inspection process, due to the need to 
wait the end of the Search and Rescue activities and to set up the management centre and the 
inspector recruitment. 
   In Fig. 5 the number of daily teams, DT(t), versus time is reported. It can be noticed that the 
time evolution of the inspected buildings (Fig. 4) reflects the time evolution of the teams 
involved in the inspections (Fig. 5), so that the decrease of the number of inspections during 
the week-ends is due to  he decrease of the number of involved teams. This is confirmed by 
the correlation between daily inspections and daily teams, equal to ρ = 0.985. The dashed line 
represents the time average of the daily teams up to a certain time after the event: 
 
Dolce, p.2246 
 
   The sum of the number of daily teams, _tDT(t), was 10,919 (team working days); the maximum 
number of daily teams, DTmax = maxt[DT(t)], was 222 at day t = 16 from the event; the 
average number of daily teams at the end of the survey, EDT(Tf in), was 63; the maximum 
average number of daily teams up to time t, maxt[EDT(t)], was 157 at t = 39 days from the 
event. In Fig. 6 the average (over the working teams) number of daily inspected buildings per 
team, DIT(t), versus time t is reported. It provides the average team productivity and is given 
by the total number of inspections performed during one day over the number of teams 
working on the same day: 
Dolce, p.2246 
 
   It can be seen that the average daily team productivity was higher during the third and fourth 
weeks from the event, with amaximum of 10 inspections per day per team. It decreased to 
about 4 at the end of the survey, due to the greater difficulties of making inspections of 
buildings located very far, or far from each other or in rural areas. 
Dolce, p. 2247 
   It is reported in Fig. 6 by a dashed line. The average (up to time t) daily productivity increased 
from 4.75 inspected buildings per day per team at the beginning of the survey to 7.84 at about 
1 month from the event. It decreased to 6.8 at the end of the survey. This again reflects the 
greater difficulty in performing the very last inspections. The lesser productivity in the tail of 
the survey is compensated by a reduced amount of inspected buildings, so that the average 
(over time) productivity does not substantially change. 
Dolce, p. 2247 
 
 
 
   The time needed to complete the inspections is similar in L’Aquila and Molise earthquakes 
even if the number of inspections in L’Aquila earthquake is 3.6 times more than in Molise 
earthquake. This is mainly due to the greater number of involved teams. The comparison of 
the average team productivity is reported in Table 2. The final productivities in the 2002 
Molise (Goretti and Di Pasquale 2004) and 2009 L’Aquila earthquakes are quite similar and 
greater than in the 2002 Etna earthquake (Goretti and Sortis 2003). The time when the peak 
average (up to time t and over the teams) productivity occurred, Tpeak , is quite different in 
the three earthquakes, due to the different number of inspections carried out. It still differs 
Dolce, p. 2247 
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when compared with the time needed to complete the inspections (Tf inal ), due to the long 
tails in the inspections that make Tf inal a very sensitive parameter. The above differences 
reduces when Tpeak is compared with the time needed to complete 75%of the inspections 
(T75%). It appears then that T75% is more stable than Tf inal . 
Key   The modal value of the number of inspections per team per day is 4, while 5 and 6 inspections 
per team per day are just slightly less frequent. The time evolution of the immediate 
occupancy for the whole 
Dolce, p. 2247 
 
   during the 2012 Emilia (Italy) earthquake, where early inspections were made very quickly by 
firefighters who performed more than 63,000 surveys in the very first days of the seismic 
sequence. Based on the results of these preliminary surveys, only damaged or “suspect” 
buildings (about 38,000) were subjected to later more accurate and time-consuming 
evaluations made by trained technicians using the AeDES form. 
Masi, p. 203 
   Emilia 
A total of more than 40,000 inspections have been carried out, each of them corresponding to 
one AeDES inspection form. During the period of maximum activity, the damage and usability 
assessment involved about 180 teams per day (with a maximum of more than 200 teams; Fig. 
6). The maximum number of inspections per day ranged between 1,000 and 1,200. About 
3,000 experts were employed. 
Dolce 2014, p. 
2245 
  outcomes The immediate occupancy assessment was aimed at evaluating the short term use of 
buildings. The buildings that can be safely used even in case of aftershocks, as well as the 
emergency countermeasures to be taken in order to reduce the risk for people, were 
identified (Goretti and Di Pasquale 2005). The damage to structural and non-structural 
components was also annotated. The outcome of the entire process had significant 
implications on  both the emergency management and the reconstruction phase. 
Furthermore, the analysis of the collected data contributes to the scientific improvement of 
the vulnerability assessment of existing buildings (Braga et al. 1982). 
Dolce, p. 2242 
   Concerning the immediate occupancy classification, the form includes the following alternative 
options: 
A- Usable; 
B- Usable only after short term countermeasures; 
C- Partially usable; 
D- To be re-inspected; 
E- Unusable; 
F- Unusable for external risk only. 
 
When a building is classified under category A, even if slightly damaged, its use can be 
continued. Categories B and C are the cases of buildings with limited or no structural damage, 
Dolce, p. 2244 
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but with severe non-structural damage. In case a building is classified under category B, 
inspectors have to report the short term countermeasures deemed necessary to enable the 
use of the building, such as the removal of false ceiling, the propping of a lintel, etc. In case of 
category C, the possible partial or total collapse of the damaged part must not imply a risk for 
the usable part. Only in special cases, buildings can be re-inspected and the form re-compiled. 
 
 Information:   
  Types of info 
collected 
In order to apply the above-mentioned definition of usability, three elements need to be 
identified, as widely discussed in Goretti and Di Pasquale (2002): 
• the structural and non-structural building damage; 
• the reference earthquake to which the building needs to resist (seismic scenario); 
• the building vulnerability 
Masi, p. 201 
   Assuming that these preliminary surveys were correct, the only drawback of this approach is 
represented by the lack of structural information on the buildings not inspected with the 
AeDES form. 
Masi, p.203 
  How recorded The assessment was carried out using the AeDES form (Baggio et al. 2007; Goretti and Di 
Pasquale 2002). The form and its field manual (Baggio et al. 2007) are based on the experience 
gained from several earthquakes (1997 Umbria and Marche, 1998 Pollino and 2002 Molise). 
The form, which consists of 9 sections and contains information on the building identification, 
dimension, age, use, constructional type and suffered damage, is specifically conceived to 
unambiguously define the collected data and to be self-explained. At the same time, the data 
to be collected are selected in order to be maximally informative of seismic performance, 
compatibly with the limits of a visual inspection. 
Dolce, p.2243 
   It is worth noting that specifically assessing and considering the role of building vulnerability in 
post-earthquake usability judgements is unique to the AeDES form, and therefore it can be 
considered unique to the Italian approach. In fact, in other countries such as Japan (Goretti 
and Inukai, 2002), Colombia (AIS, 2009), U.S. (ATC, 2005), New Zealand (NZSEE, 2009) and 
Greece (Dandoulaki et al., 1998), the usability judgement is dependent only on the observed 
damage. Another peculiarity of the AeDES form is the clear and unequivocal evaluation of 
usability, which is different from other countries such as Japan, whose form gives general 
indications like safety, caution, or danger. Also, in Italy the recommendation of the AeDES 
survey becomes compulsory once accepted by the mayor of the municipality where the 
inspected building is located-not a simple recommendation or suggestion to the owner. 
Masi, 202 
  Where did info go The data entry requested the daily preliminary partial computerization of 1,000–1,800 forms 
in the first five weeks (Dolce et al. 2009), needed to keep under control the survey operations 
and to obtain important data for the emergency management. The final complete 
computerization was carried out through the S.E.T. software (Coppari 2001). The inspection 
Dolce, p. 2244 
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management required, on average, the daily presence of 11 officers and 4 volunteers for team 
and archive management and form validation, 8 operators for the real-time computerization, 
65 operators for the S.E.T. computerization, 15 operators for data checking and GIS 
implementation, 3 operators for the coordination of the data processing. 
   Once the inspections were performed, the completed forms were taken to the DPC offices, 
where they were digitized. This operation allowed the building of a broad database that 
provides a clear picture of the surveyed building stock, from the structural typology, damage, 
and usability judgement points of view. 
Masi, p. 206 
  Types of dx made   
  Tracking Buildings The inspection process benefited from the implementation of a specific Geographical 
Information System (GIS), based on a digital regional technical land-usemap. The inspectors 
were given a paper map containing their weekly working area, where the buildings to be 
inspected were reported, together with a building identification number used to insert data in 
the GIS. The GIS was also updated according to the findings of the inspectors on the field (new 
buildings, demolished buildings, etc). Inspections in the “red zone” of L’Aquila city turned out 
to be extremely delicate for the widespread damage. 
Dolce, p.2243 
 Commentary   
  Overall   
  Strengths   
  Challenges Emilia 
After the May 29th earthquake, it was once more evident that the post-seismic damage and 
usability assessment of industrial buildings had to be conducted with a methodology different 
from that adopted for the typical multi storey ordinary buildings, that are characterized by 
masonry or R.C. continuous structures and limited window size. As a matter of fact, the 
use of the AeDES form is not appropriate for prefabricated one-storey large-span industrial 
buildings. 
Dolce 2014, p. 
2248 
  Recommendations   
 
 
 
 218 
 
Appendix 4.7: Article Review Data Extraction: Japan 
This appendix provides an annotated list of key and useful documents uncovered in the literature review. Many of these documents provide 
similar information, though sometimes from different perspectives. Due to saturation of themes, not all documents are fully reviewed. Note that 
many of the documents reference each other and there is substantial overlap, particularly in regards to case history, BDSA procedures, issues, 
and recommendations. The articles listed here as KEY or USEFUL should be further assessed as the project moves from data collection to analysis 
and synthesis.  
 
Citation Nakano, Y., Maeda, M., Kuramoto, H., & Murakami, M. (2004, August). Guideline for post-
earthquake damage evaluation and rehabilitation of RC buildings in Japan. In 13th World 
Conference on Earthquake Engineering (No. 124). 
 
Inline Ref Nakano et al 2004  
Description This paper describes the basic concept of the Guideline for Post-earthquake Damage 
Evaluation and Rehabilitation of RC Buildings in Japan. In this paper, (1) the damage rating 
procedure based on the residual seismic capacity index consistent with the Japanese Standard 
for Seismic Evaluation of Existing RC Buildings, (2) its validity through calibration with 
observed damage due to the 1995 Hyogoken- Nambu (Kobe) earthquake, and (3) the decision 
policy and criteria to determine necessary actions considering earthquake intensity and 
damage, are mainly focused. P. 1 
 
Informs BDSA for Reinforced Concrete buildings by “inspector engineer.”  
Commentary Limited description and flowchart within the context of Reinforced Concrete buildings. Unsure 
how generalizable process is to overall BDSA. 
 
Status LIMITED KEY 
USEFUL 
LIMITED 
NOT USEFUL 
  
  
6.9.1e TECHNICAL REPORT  
APPENDIX 4.7: ARTICLE REVIEW DATA EXTRACTION: JAPAN 
219 
 
 
Citation Seismic.ca.gov Table 1 – Comparison of Post-earthquake Building Evaluation Programs  
retrieved from: 
http://www.seismic.ca.gov/meeting_info/Item%20F3.2%20International%20Post-
eq%20Comparison.pdf June 8, 2017 
 
Inline Ref Comparison Table n.d.  
Description Comparison table from seismic.ca.gov site – unable to find link or source, although link is 
active. Comparison on BDSA programs from EU, Italy (AeDES), Japan, Greece, US (ATC 20), 
SEAOC (California) 
 
Informs Types of assessments 
Outcome categories 
Placard use 
Use of form 
Time per inspection 
# trained assessors 
Liability protection 
 
Commentary NOTE _ UNABLE TO VERIFY OR VALIDATE INFORMATION. 
Very useful document, but cannot verify. Do not know when table was compiled, or by whom, 
or from what document.  
 
Status KEY KEY 
USEFUL 
LIMITED 
NOT USEFUL 
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Citation Isoda, K. (1995). Issues to be Solved in the Establishment of Institution of Assessing the Safety  
of Damaged Buildings in Japan. 8th International Research and Training Seminar on Regional 
Development Planning for Disaster Prevention Emergency Assessment System of Damaged 
Buildings.  
 
Inline Ref Isoda, 1995  
Description Presentation given in 1995 as part of the Proceedings of the 8th International Research and 
Training Seminar on Regional Development Planning for Disaster Prevention 
16 January 1995 Osaka, Japan 
 
Informs Limited information on personnel and categories of outcome for BDSA in 1990s.  
Commentary Presentation gives some peripheral information. Dated – from 1995.   
Status LIMITED KEY 
USEFUL 
LIMITED 
NOT USEFUL 
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Citation Goretti, A., & Di Pasquale, G. (2002). An overview of post earthquake damage assessment in 
Italy. EERI Invitational workshop, An action plan to develop earthquake damage and loss data 
protocols. September, 2002.  
 
Inline Ref Goretti & Di Pasquale 2002.   
Description The paper describes old and recent Italian experiences in the field of damage assessment, 
highlighting resolved, but also not yet resolved problems, that have been encountered in 
assessing procedures, forms, tools, computerisation, validation, maintenance, and data 
dissemination. 
 
Informs Building selection 
Data collection 
Categorization 
 
Commentary Limited but useful  
Status LIMITED KEY 
USEFUL 
LIMITED 
NOT USEFUL 
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Appendix 4.8: Japan Building Damage Safety Assessment Process 
 
Figure A6. Japan DSA Process. 
There is very limited information available through searches of online databases of English-language articles describing Japanese BDSA processes.  
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DSA Overview 
 
RQ # Topic Comments References 
AB_001 Elements   
    
AF_001 Overall Goal RC Buildings:  
When an earthquake strikes a community and destructive damage to buildings occurs, 
immediate damage inspections are needed to identify which buildings are safe and  which are 
not to aftershocks following the main event. However, since such quick inspections are 
performed within a restricted short period of time, the results may be inevitably coarse. 
Furthermore, it is not generally easy to identify the residual seismic capacities quantitatively 
from quick inspections. In the next stage following the quick inspections, a damage assessment 
should be more precisely and quantitatively performed, and then technically and economically 
sound solutions should be applied to damaged buildings, if rehabilitation is needed. 
Nakano, p. 1 
  In Japan, the aim of the damage assessment is to evaluate the long term use of buildings. The 
result of the evaluation is a suggestion to the owner of the building concerning the repair, 
retrofit, or the demolition of the building.  
Goretti, 2002, 
p. 4 
  Emergency Assessment is to assess the risk of collapse of the whole or part of buildings by 
aftershocks or other forces and to judge risk of usage of buildings. The purpose of this  
assessment is to prevent a secondary disaster. Immediately after the earthquake, an 
emergency assessment will be done by Structural Engineers to observe the outline of 
buildings, sinking and leaning of buildings, damages of structural elements and risk of collapse. 
Isoda, p. 46. 
  In Japan, the aim of the damage assessment is to evaluate the long term use of the buildings. 
The result of the evaluation is a suggestion to the owner of the building concerning the repair, 
the retrofit or the demolition of the building.  
Goretti & Di 
Pasquale, p. 3 
Af_007 Overall Authority    
    
AF_008 Legal Basis   
    
AF_010 General Liability   
AF_003 Types of BDSA 
Assessment 
RC Buildings:  Nakano, p. 3. 
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  From Figure 1: 
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RQ # Topic Comments References 
Quick Inspection 
Damage Survey of Building: 
 Foundation Survey 
 Superstructure Survey 
 
 
  Quick Inspection Comparison 
table 
AF_012 Building Taxonomies damage evaluation basis and rehabilitation techniques for three typical structural systems in 
Japan, i.e., reinforced concrete, steel, and wooden buildings.   
Nakano, p. 2 
AF_012b Specific Assessments for 
Building Types 
Reinforced Concrete (RC) and Steel Encased RC (for EU’s Exercise) Comparison 
Table 
  In Japan, inspections are performed only on multi-owner buildings. Buildings to be inspected 
are selected after a rapid post-earthquake screening.  
Goretti & Di 
Pasquale, p. 4 
AF_007a Relationship of various 
assessments 
  
AF_013 Type of Placard System RC Buildings:  
Not Stated, but implied by Figure 1, p. 3 
Nakano, p. 3 
  Yes Comparison 
Table 
  A posting system, reflecting the building usability classification, is adopted.  Goretti & Di 
Pasquale, p. 4 
AF_014 Placard Colours    
AF_015 
 
Potential Outcomes RC Buildings:  
Green: Inspected 
Yellow: LTD Entry (limited entry) 
Red: Unsafe 
 
NOTE: appears that both Yellow and Red lead to:  
 Temporary Abatement or  
 LTD Entry or No Use 
Nakano, p. 3 
   Inspected (Green) 
 Limited Entry (Yellow) 
 Unsafe (Red) 
Comparison 
Table 
  Results of the assessment are categorized into: "Danger", "Caution" and "Safe". "Danger" 
persons from entering the building “Caution” asks persons to pay attention.prohibits 
Isoda, pp. 46 - 
47 
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  In Japan, the aim of the damage assessment is to evaluate the long term use of the buildings. 
The result of the evaluation is a suggestion to the owner of the building concerning the repair, 
the retrofit or the demolition of the building.  
Goretti & Di 
Pasquale, p. 3 
AF_016 Changing Placards   
AF_016 Removing Placards   
AF_018 – 
AF_024 
Reporting and 
Information 
RC Buildings:  
Damage evaluation form 
Nakano, p. 10 
   Steel Bldgs 
 Wood Bldgs 
 Building Land 
 Damage Classification Forms (for each structural system, 2 pages) 
Comparison 
Table 
  In Kobe damage assessment has been performed sending to each inspector team a plan of the 
city containing the buildings to be inspected. The inspectors, after completed the damage 
collections, delivered to Building Research Institute the 2 page forms, already computerised. 
After the damage classification, the repair, upgrade or demolishing of the damaged buildings is 
suggested to the owner. The suggestion, unless public safety is involved, [is] not compulsory 
for the building owners. 
Goeretti, p. 4 
    
    
AF_017 Other markings   
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Personnel 
 
RQ # Topic Comments References 
  Personnel  
AU_001 Types of Personnel inspection engineer Nakano, p. 4 
  Trained and Registered 1st or 2nd Class Authorized Architect  Comparison 
Table 
  Structural Engineers Isoda, p. 47 
 Training   
 Liability Liability Protection for Evaluators Yes 
Evaluator’s Injury Insurance Provided Yes 
Comparison 
Table 
 
 
Building Damage Assessment 
RQ # Topic Comments References 
 BDSA Type: Area Assessment, Windshield Assessment  
 Local Name   
AG_001 Goal   
AG_003 Description   
AG_015 Types of Buildings Teams 
Can Assess 
  
AG_037 Legal Authority   
AG_005 Dispatched By   
AG_038 Implementation   
AG_006 Team Members   
AG_009 Team Size   
AG_010 How Selected   
AG_016 Interior/Exterior Check?   
AG_018 Assessment Outcomes   
AG_020 Info Gathering Tools   
AG_028 Assessment Time   
AG_030 Destination for Info 
Collected 
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RQ # Topic Comments References 
 BDSA Type: Rapid Damage Assessment  
 Local Name Quick Inspection 
 
 
AG_001 Goal   
AG_003 Description   
AG_015 Legal Authority   
AG_037 Types of Buildings Teams 
Can Assess 
  
AG_005 Dispatched By   
AG_038 Implementation   
AG_006 Team Members Trained and Registered 1st or 2nd Class Authorized Architect  Comparison 
Table 
  Structural Engineers Isoda, p. 47 
AG_009 Team Size   
AG_010 How Selected   
AG_016 Interior/Exterior Check? Structural Engineers investigate the leaning of buildings and damages of structural elements 
from both inside and outside of buildings.  
Isoda, p. 47 
AG_018 Assessment Outcomes RC Buildings:  
Green: Inspected 
Yellow: LTD Entry (limited entry) 
Red: Unsafe 
 
Nakano, p. 3 
  Results of the assessment are categorized in to five levels "little damage", "slightly damaged", 
"half damaged", "seriously damaged" and "collapsed". The judgments of the necessity of 
restorations are divided into three categories, namely, "restoration", "restoration or 
reinforcement (detailed investigation needed)", "reinforcement or demolition (detailed 
investigation needed)" by damage extents and the intensity. 
Isoda, p. 47 
  In Japan, the aim of the damage assessment is to evaluate the long term use of the buildings. 
The result of the evaluation is a suggestion to the owner of the building concerning the repair, 
the retrofit or the demolition of the building.  
Goretti & Di 
Pasquale, p. 3 
AG_020 Info Gathering Tools   
AG_028 Type of Placard System yes Comparison 
Table 
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AG_030 Assessment Time 20 – 30 minutes Comparison 
Table 
AG_030 Destination for Info 
Collected 
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Appendix 4.9: ATC Building Damage Safety Assessment Process  
 
Figure A7. ATC DSA Process.  
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DSA Overview 
 
RQ # Topic Comments References 
AB_001 Elements   
AF_001 Overall Goal   
  Postearthquake safety evaluation and posting of buildings involves assigning an appropriate 
level of occupancy or entry to buildings with some degree of earthquake damage.  
ATC 20-2 p. 3 
Af_007 Overall Authority    
AF_008 Legal Basis   
AF_010 General Liability   
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RQ # Topic Comments References 
AF_003 Types of BDSA 
Assessment 
 
ATC p. 14 
AF_012 Building Taxonomies   
AF_012b Specific Assessments for 
Building Types 
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RQ # Topic Comments References 
AF_007a Relationship of various 
assessments 
  
AF_013 Type of Placard System 3 colour  
AF_014 Placard Colours INSPECTED  Green – no apparent hazard found, although repairs may be required. Original 
lateral load capacity not significantly decreased. No restriction on use of occupancy. 
LIMITED ENTY Yellow – Dangerous condition believed to be present. Entry by owner permitted 
only for emergency purposes and only at own risk. No usage on continuous basis. Entry by 
public not permitted. Possible major aftershock hazard.  
UNSAFE  Red – extreme hazard, may collapse. Imminent danger of collapse from an 
aftershock. Unsafe for occupancy or entry, except by authorities 
ATC p. 15 
AF_015 
 
Potential Outcomes INSPECTED, for buildings that have no restrictions on use or occupancy, because no apparent 
hazard has been found (repairs may be required) 
RESTRICTED USE, for buildings that can be entered only by owners on an emergency basis and 
only at their own risk (public entry not permitted), because a dangerous condition is believed 
to be present 
UNSAFE, for buildings that cannot be entered except by local regulatory authorities, because 
they have collapse, partially collapsed, or are in imminent danger of collapse from an 
aftershock.  
ATC 20-2 p. 1 
AF_016 Changing Placards By a representative of the local building department and that the posting will be enforced by 
local authorities.  
ATC, p. 17 
AF_016 Removing Placards By a representative of the local building department and that the posting will be enforced by 
local authorities.  
ATC, p. 17 
AF_018 – 
AF_024 
Reporting and 
Information 
ATC 20 Rapid Evaluation safety assessment form 
ATC Detailed Evaluation Safety assessment form 
ATC 20-2 p. 4 
  One of the most basic capabilities needed to adequately respond to an earthquake disaster is 
to have a computer database program available for immediate use. It is vitally important to 
begin recording observations made during the very early phases of emergency response (e.g., 
windshield surveys) to inform local, state, and federal officials of the extent of damage. Safety 
evaluation teams using the ATC Rapid and Detailed Evaluation forms will later collect 
considerable data each day that must be stored in an orderly manner and be available for 
quick access.   
ATC 20-2 p. 17 
  Laptop computers and networking capabilities are also useful in recovery database 
management.  
ATC 20-2 p. 19 
AF_017 Other markings   
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Personnel 
 
RQ # Topic Comments References 
  Personnel  
AU_001 Types of Personnel Engineers, architects, building inspectors ATC20-2 p. 1 
    
    
 
RQ # Topic Comments References 
 Category Engineer  
AU_004 Professional Certification   
AU_007 Pre-Event Training   
AU_011 JIT/Event Preparation   
AU_012 Relationship   
AU_013 Liability    
AU_014 Capabilities   
AU_015 Types of Assessments 
performed 
  
    
 
 Category Building officials  
AU_004 Professional Certification   
AU_007 Pre-Event Training   
AU_011 JIT/Event Preparation   
AU_012 Relationship 4.   
AU_013 Liability    
AU_014 Capabilities   
AU_015 Types of Assessments 
performed 
  
  Rapid Evaluation ATC 20-2 p. 3 
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Building Damage Assessment 
RQ # Topic Comments References 
 BDSA Type: Area Assessment, Windshield Assessment  
 Local Name Preliminary or “Windshield” Survey  
AG_001 Goal Determine the scope of safety risk and damage in the jurisdiction ATC 20-2 p. 4 
  A preliminary evaluation carried out within hours after the earthquake. The main function of 
this survey is to quickly provide preliminary information to the jurisdiction, such as: 
 The general extent of damage within the community, 
 The extent of areas with high-intensity damage,  
 An estimate of the number of obviously unsafe buildings, and 
 The extent of other obvious unsafe conditions.  
ATC 20-2 p. 20 
AG_003 Description The survey has been called a “windshield” survey because it is usally done by driving the 
streets and quickly observing and recording obvious damage, generally without stopping to 
post individual structures.  
ATC 20-2 p.4 
AG_015 Types of Buildings Teams 
Can Assess 
  
AG_037 Legal Authority   
AG_005 Dispatched By   
AG_038 Implementation Within hours of the earthquake ATC 20-2 p. 4 
AG_006 Team Members It is usually performed by police officers, firefighters, or building inspectors. ATC 20-2 p. 4 
  Safety evaluation volunteers may be requested to assist. ATC 20-2 p. 4 
  An “ideal” survey team might include a building official who knows the community thoroughly, 
and a structural engineer with practical experience in all kinds of construction. Under 
emergency circumstances, however, the survey might be done by firefighters or police officers 
observing building damage conditions as they respond to other specific emergencies.  
aTC, p. 15 
AG_009 Team Size   
AG_010 How Selected   
AG_016 Interior/Exterior Check?   
AG_018 Assessment Outcomes   
AG_020 Info Gathering Tools Detailed maps should be ready, and an agreed-upon colour and symbol system should be 
inplace. This system should indicate building type (commercial, industrial, etc) and observed 
level of damage. The classification of damage should be compatible with the INSPECTED, 
RESTRICTED USE< and UNSAFE placards used in the Rapid and Detailed Evaluations. 
ATC 20-2 p. 20 
AG_028 Assessment Time   
AG_030 Destination for Info 
Collected 
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RQ # Topic Comments References 
    
 
RQ # Topic Comments References 
 BDSA Type: Rapid Damage Assessment  
 Local Name Rapid Evaluation   
AG_001 Goal This … is designed to quickly designate the apparently safe and the obviously unsafe 
structures. Those not specifically designated, the so-called gray area structures, are then 
designated for a more detailed visual examination by a structural engineer.  
ATC p. 13 
  Rapid assessment of safety. Used to quickly post obviously unsafe and apparently safe 
structures, and to identify buildings requiring Detailed Evaluation.  
ATC, p. 15 
AG_003 Description The Rapid Evaluation Team, which usually has two members, first identifies both the 
apparently safe and the obviously unsafe structures and then continues on to evaluate more 
difficult damage conditions that may require the Restricted Use posting.  
ATC 20-2 p. 20 
    
AG_015 Legal Authority Performed under the direction of the local building department.  ATC, p. 16 
AG_037 Types of Buildings Teams 
Can Assess 
  
AG_005 Dispatched By Performed under the direction of the local building department.  ATC, p. 16 
AG_038 Implementation   
AG_006 Team Members Usually has two members ATC 20-2 p. 3 
  Ideally, two building inspectors or a building inspector and an engineer make up a team. Under 
more pressing circumstances, a building inspector and an unlicensed engineer might form an 
acceptable team. 
ATC 20-2 p. 20 
  Qualified building inspectors, Civil/structural engineers, architects, other individuals deemed 
qualified by local jurisdiction. 
ATC p. 15 
AG_009 Team Size Ideally, two  ATC 20-2 p. 20 
AG_010 How Selected Designed for use by individuals with at least 5 years experience in general building design, 
construction, or inspection. This includes building inspectors in particular, as well as volunteer 
civil/structural engineers, architects, building contractors, and others who have been involved 
in the building design and construction process. …. The damage inspectors need to have a 
basic familiarity with building construction so that structural damage or any unusual situations 
can be readily recognized.  
ATC, p. 17 
  Individuals with previous postearthquake building safety evaluation experience as well as 
those who have participated in special training programs will generally make excellent choices.  
ATC, p. 17 
AG_016 Interior/Exterior Check? Implied: external  
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RQ # Topic Comments References 
AG_018 Assessment Outcomes   
AG_020 Info Gathering Tools   
AG_028 Type of Placard System   
AG_030 Assessment Time 10 – 20 minutes  
AG_030 Destination for Info 
Collected 
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RQ # Topic Comments References 
 BDSA Type: Detailed Building Damage Assessment   
 Local Name Detailed Evaluation  
AG_001 Goal This inspection… is designed to result in the rating of all structures as either safe, potentially 
dangerous (i.e. limited entry), or unsafe.  
ATC p. 13 
  Careful visual evaluation of damaged buildings and questionable situations. Used to identify 
buildings requiring and Engineering Evaluation.   
ATC p. 15 
AG_003 Description Inspects buildings that are more difficult to assess.  ATC 20-2 p. 3 
AG_015 Types of Buildings Teams 
Can Assess 
  
AG_037 Legal Authority Performed under the direction of the local building department.  ATC, p. 16 
AG_005 Dispatched By Performed under the direction of the local building department.  ATC, p. 16 
AG_038 Implementation   
AG_006 Team Members Under the OES Plan, the Detailed Evaluation team will include a building inspector, a structural 
engineer, an architect, and other specialist as needed to address specific situations.  
ATC 20-2 p. 3 
  Structural engineers; Geotechnical specialists required for assessment of geotechnical hazards ATC p. 15 
AG_009 Team Size Preferably as a member of a team of at least two persons.  ATC, p. 16 
AG_010 How Selected Ideally Detailed Evaluation should be conducted by damage investigators with experience in 
structural design and insights into the earthquake behaviour of buildings.  
ATC, p. 25 
  …may have to make do with available resources… 
Normally, structural engineers, structural plan checkers, and other engineers with structural 
design expertise will be excellent choices for this task. Additional desirable qualifications 
include 5 to 10 years or  more of experience, previous postevent inspection experience, and 
knowledge of earthquake effects on buildings.  
ATC, p. 25 
AG_016 Interior/Exterior Check? They are to make a detailed visual examination of the questionable structure for purposes of 
assessing whether the building is (1) apparently safe and can be used, even though it may 
require repairs; (2) unsafe, and must not be entered by anyone, or (3) still questionable and 
must be subject to an Engineering Evaluation.   
ATC p. 16 
  A Detailed Evaluation is a thorough visual examination of a damaged building, inside and out.  ATC, p. 25 
AG_018 Assessment Outcomes   
AG_020 Info Gathering Tools   
AG_028 Assessment Time 1 – 4 hours ATC, p. 15 
AG_030 Destination for Info 
Collected 
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RQ # Topic Comments References 
 BDSA Type: Engineering Assessment  
 Local Name Engineering Evaluation ATC p. 15 
AG_001 Goal After this evaluation [Detailed], any further evaluation would normally be done by a structural 
engineering consultant retained by the owner to prepare an Engineering Evaluation of the 
structure.  
ATC p. 13 
  Detailed engineering investigation of damaged buildings, involving use of construction 
drawings, damage data, and new structural calculations.  
 
AG_003 Description Such a study will typically include detailed reconnaissance and mapping of the damage, 
preparation of structural calculations, and a quantitative assessment of the strength of the 
damaged structure. It may also involve preparation of plans for emergency repairs (e.g., 
shoring) to enable the structure to be placed back in service during the immediate postevent 
period.  
ATC p. 13  
AG_015 Dispatched By   
AG_037 Implementation   
AG_005 Team Members Structural engineering consultant; Geotechnical specialists required for assessment of 
geotechnical hazards 
ATC, p. 15 
AG_038 Team Size One or more ATC, p. 16 
AG_006 How Selected By owner ATC, p. 15 
  …require hiring a structural engineering consultant, who may need to remove portions of the 
building to complete the examination.   
ATC, p. 111 
AG_009 Types of Buildings Teams 
Can Assess 
  
AG_010 Interior/Exterior Check? Implied interior and exterior  
AG_016 Assessment Outcomes   
AG_018 Info Gathering Tools   
AG_028 Assessment Time 1 – 7 days or more ATC, p. 15 
AG_030 Destination for Info 
Collected 
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Appendix 5: Site Visit Participating Organizations and Agencies 
 
The research team met with participants from a number of organizations, agencies, and levels of 
government. While the participation of individuals is confidential and anonymous, the following are 
groups that the team met with: 
Auckland City Council 
University of Auckland 
Christchurch City Council Building Consenting Unit 
Holmes Consulting 
Royal Commission representatives 
Tonkin and Taylor 
Aurecon Group  
Dr Sjoerd Van Ballegooy 
Hong Kong Engineering Institute conference 
Housing New Zealand, Area Managers for Christchurch 
Canterbury Civil Defence Emergency Management  
Institute of Professional Engineers 
Wellington City Council - Building Damage assessment 
Architecture School  
NZ Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment 
Housing New Zealand 
Hurunui District Council 
Kaikōura District Council 
 
 242 
 
Appendix 6: Recommendations Based on Site Visit Analysis 
 
One of the key sources of data emerging from the Site Visit is a series of recommendations developed by 
members of the research team. These recommendations came directly from field notes (e.g., team 
members recorded key concepts, principles and recommendations while in meetings), and from 
subsequent review of their notes.  
The recommendations are provided in two parts. The first column in the table is a “recommendation” 
for the team to consider in developing the BC damage assessment framework. The second column 
provides a link to field notes or contextual notes that support the recommendation.  
All recommendations were consolidated into a single table. Each recommendation was then reviewed 
and coded, looking for themes related to the research questions. Each recommendation was coded 
against a “primary” theme, and also coded to additional, related themes. In this appendix, 
recommendations are grouped into their primary themes. Note that the recommendations have not 
been further organized or analyzed within these themes.  
These recommendations will serve as a primary source of data for analysis and synthesis by the research 
in conjunction with other data sources.  
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Guiding Principles 
Recommendation Context/Data Element 
Allow for changes in scope and governance as events 
unfold. must be able to accommodate transition from 
local to regional governance/operations if required. 
September – CDEM not that involved. Ensure 
assistance was going on, and that it was being done 
well. 
Didn’t have a lot to do with building assessment 
Feb 2011 
Regional and local got joined together in one large 
coordination centre 
Need graduated model for describing building status: 
USAR, RDA, 2nd level, engineering - markings, placard, 
Interim use, permits 
 
Consider having countermeasures capability to facilitate 
having people stay in homes 
KK pull down chimney, then patching tarp, then 
family could stay in house.  
Need to establish relationships between individuals and 
groups prior to events.  
*****Biggest thing I learned; where there are 
relationships in place before things go better; where 
communication went well, things worked; when 
went poorly, usually not listening to each other;  
KEY POINT - while our focus is on RDA, need to ensure 
we support transition and BA in broader context 
KEY: Great at responding, but not so hot at recovery.  
Need to articulate an overall process, not just BA 
procedures 
** – guidelines how to do assessments but not how 
to manage process 
Note that standards and thresholds change in an 
emergency setting. While this is to be expected, need to 
ensure there is good conversation and good 
understanding about this.  
To be frank, most buildings damaged after an event, 
when you flip to building act get notices to be 
dangerous buildings – threshold is quite high – many 
probably wouldn’t make the grade if challenged – 
however, practical, in an event, do what has to be 
done Chattam house rules on this 
Framework must balance local process with 
national/prov guidelines. Common foundation, and 
adapt, but not each LA having its own system. 
I think that comes in on the supporting systems. Last 
thing we wan tis local council to have own system; 
national process, so you can get engineers from 
around the country and they use same tools, 
processes, consistency (KEY – what’s standard, 
what’s local) 
system must be scalable and adaptable; Local 
responsibility, but varied ability and resources to 
support.  
Council can take ownership locally; build own 
resources; problem for lot small district councils; no 
budget or resources; rely on bigger councils 
Examine how process changes when scaling from local to 
regional 
If ours, we can do what we want; when you’re not in 
charge, and having to go through 4 agencies to get a 
helicopter, very frustrating 
Need to consider DA as ongoing process over probable 
multiple events. Building status over time. Associate 
damage with particular events. Note changes in damage 
from different events. 
Difficult to distinguish damage from which event, 
which is problem for insurance. 
1500 commercial buildings demolished 
Sample size of 1. Each event unique; strategies not 
necessarily generalizable 
KK – we’d been through it; put what we’d learned 
into practice. KK isolated; access cut off; only way in 
and out was air; 
Need process to access local wisdom and knowledge, 
but within process and framework. 
Driven by volunteers, particularly in the engineers.  
Wisdom and knowledge is in the community 
How do we get out of their head and into processes 
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Clearly mandated processes and not let legislation 
get in the way  
In initial response you want to get simple data quickly 
and accurately  
In initial response you want to get simple data 
quickly and accurately  
System is likely to be too conservative; experience 
changes how assessors evaluate buildings 
PL – one of our concerns – people without 
experience being overly cautious – impact on 
emergency services; concern that we might be too 
overprotective; where do you find that line. 
Don’t rush in: do recognizance [? Reconnaissance?], 
sending advance team, know what you are getting into 
(maybe expanded scope of windshield-type-level, 
depending on event?) 
 
Have to consider the social and economic considerations 
as well as building itself. ? Strategic  
Somewhere along the line, 27,000 where are you 
going to put all these people? Ongoing costs, lack of 
resources, talking a little bit of recovery;  
allow room for innovation and use of alternate groups of 
people 
CTV – immediate response – monitoring the building 
while the rescue team was in – monitoring to look 
for changes, moving, settling in real time.  
Need to plan for scale of event Operation suburb – 54000 houses on the east side 
216 teams, 1 BI, 1 engineer, 1 welfare staff; 17800 
houses per day 
Guidelines: do you want to do a lot quickly or some with 
quality. 
Day 1 everyone man and their dog hits the street to 
do assessment 
Some good, some not 
Do you want to do a lot quickly 
Or some with quality 
Keep requirements and processes lean to allow for 
simpler solutions. 
Kept things pretty simple – did it lean? Is it out of 
level?  
Processes must be flexible and adaptable enough to 
meet needs in different regions with different levels of 
support and resources. 
PL ? community volunteers? Varies across the 
country – registration process, but not well 
maintained – 17 teams across the country 
Build with support from top, but response from local.  Bottom up sustainability framework; district plans, 
etc. focus on things they want to keep; council 
administers both; they should talk, but not always 
like that – particularly after an earthquake 
Single biggest thing learned was to have the 
relationships (with geotech’s) in place in advance. Need 
the names and contracts in place before the emergency 
To facilitate the quick deployments of geotech 
personnel, a contact list is required in advance 
Best laid plans - ensure that model/framework allows for 
people coming from outside the formal system. 
Especially in the first couple days. 
Good to have that database, but if we have another 
event, they’ll just show up whether they have the 
training or not. 
Process must be able to be put into practice within 3 
days. 
Get underway with a process that will allow 
engineers, architects, others to get out in the field, 
day 3 on 
Framework must include guidelines on 
supporting/accommodating staff and assessors. 
Lack of accommodation. Look after your staff. 
There will be hearings. Document and sort from the 
start. 
There will be hearings or commission after that. 
Start storing rubble.  
Documented system on how things are taken down. 
Here so this doesn’t happen again. 
Need core group of expert personnel to maintain 
intellectual leadership over time. 
Summit group – broad representation of building 
and engineering and architecture people – lead 
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people in the engineering and geo and volcanologist 
and Civil Defence – Tier 1, but greater role as extra 
responsibility act as a clearing house for what we 
are doing in documentation. Last summit group, put 
through Tier 2 training and terms of reference. 
Getting guidance on the next step;  
As groups develop expertise, we need a way to 
recognize, tap into, and collect that expertise to improve 
the system and inform the "next time." 
We wound up having two types in ** 
 
Building inspection tribe in suburbs 
Engineering tribe – self-mobilized under different 
management structure 
By different focus, BI residential focus; engineers 
with the commercial 
 Mental smart allocation of resources; operationally, 
this was difficult to manage 
Create banks of guidelines, tips, stories tagged to 
different issues.  
Lot of stories came out of protecting each other 
from things that others hadn’t seen – holes in the 
floor, wires in the ceiling – hazards that weren’t 
obvious to people walking around 
Core goal of field guide: ensure consistency of process 
and documentation at individual level, but allow 
flexibility to meet unique needs of different situations. 
Set up field guide to ensure consistency of process 
and documentation at individual level, but flexibility 
to meet unique needs of different situations. In 
different communities, different needs – range from 
hold your hands to life safety;  
Keep requirements as specifications rather than 
solutions. Technology, situation at hand, etc. make "hard 
wired" processes difficult to implement.  
The technology has changed. We have the ability to 
access information. New can capture a whole face 
of a building.  
Need to examine BC building code and goal posts of 
assessment. 
** – building standards are around life safety – 
about staying intact. Built to survive earthquake. 
Sept was a design earthquake for the buildings in ** 
– they were through it, but that doesn’t mean they 
were intact; just that they had survived the first 
event. It stood up; but damaged and not able to 
stand second. 
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Damage Assessment as a Complex Process 
Recommendation Context/Data Element 
Note overlap of USAR/EM with damage assessment and 
changing goals/operations over time. Need to consider 
how to acknowledge, allow, support these transitions. 
All teams throughout NZ were pulled down here. 
Large part of the role of CDEM was managing teams. 
Brief teams each day; working with engineers – large 
part was searching and clearing buildings; dealing 
with rubble and crushed cars; 3 or 4 months. Key 
role was supporting engineers and entry into 
damaged buildings. 
Decision-making complex exercise - not just a 
matrix/rubric. 
Arguments could be really complex – placards 
DA is more than just the building inspections - NZ 
analyzing data and noted types of buildings more 
susceptible to damage - led to re-investigation and re-
placarding. 
Ran three sessions on how to perform targeted 
assessments of the 72 buildings in wellington 
Quickly recognized because of the dynamic 
characteristics of the earthquake that a set of mid-
rise buildings were likely to be damaged and with a 
particular type of damage.  
Process must have a variety of facets - structural 
damage, land issues, danger from surrounding 
buildings, geotechnical hazards, larger area-sized issues 
(e.g. liquefaction). 
Geotech community mobilized itself in ** – houses 
okay, but rocks and slides waiting to take them out. 
More than just LA assessment in place - need to 
consider other processes and how they interact with LA 
process. 
Some people in school district, etc., checking their 
own buildings, but not in position to placard for the 
council, but want to let their own people know 
what’s up. 
Need to consider "prior to level 1" - how to support and 
incorporate Ad Hoc phase 
PL: Prior to level 1 damage assessment: initial triage: 
where do we even start? Thoughts on how 
information was collected?  
More than just building assessment.  Other thing that happened in port hills, building 
inspectors go around with green; geotech sees big 
rock, then slaps red sticker on. Later on and engineer 
says building is fine; takes off the red.  Geo techs 
working to the side; info falling down through the 
gap, not making it on to the spreadsheet – people 
tearing stickers off, hard to know whether they had 
been red stickered, geo techs sent back to check to 
see that red stickers were still on while aftershocks 
going on. 
BA more than the building. Have to look at property and 
other potential hazards. 
Need to inspect the entire property – hanging over 
edge 
Need to have overall framework from act to plans on 
the ground - have to have - and be seen to have - links 
up and down the chain. 
CDEM framework 
• Own act, 2002 
• National cdem strategy – regulation 
• Into a plan national cdem plan – regulation 
• From plan make up plans for on the ground 
• Local risk reduction 
Allow for changes in scope and governance as events 
unfold. must be able to accommodate transition from 
local to regional governance/operations if required. 
September – CDEM not that involved. Ensure 
assistance was going on, and that it was being done 
well. 
Didn’t have a lot to do with building assessment 
Feb 2011 
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Regional and local got joined together in one large 
coordination centre 
Need graduated model for describing building status: 
USAR, RDA, 2nd level, engineering - markings, placard, 
Interim use, permits 
 
Consider having countermeasures capability to facilitate 
having people stay in homes 
KK pull down chimney, then patching tarp, then 
family could stay in house.  
Need to establish relationships between individuals and 
groups prior to events.  
*****Biggest thing I learned; where there are 
relationships in place before things go better; where 
communication went well, things worked; when 
went poorly, usually not listening to each other;  
KEY POINT - while our focus is on RDA, need to ensure 
we support transition and BA in broader context 
KEY: Great at responding, but not so hot at recovery.  
Need to articulate an overall process, not just BA 
procedures 
** – guidelines how to do assessments but not how 
to manage process 
Note that standards and thresholds change in an 
emergency setting. While this is to be expected, need to 
ensure there is good conversation and good 
understanding about this.  
To be frank, most buildings damaged after an event, 
when you flip to building act get notices to be 
dangerous buildings – threshold is quite high – many 
probably wouldn’t make the grade if challenged – 
however, practical, in an event, do what has to be 
done Chattam house rules on this 
Framework must balance local process with 
national/prov guidelines. Common foundation, and 
adapt, but not each LA having its own system. 
I think that comes in on the supporting systems. Last 
thing we wan tis local council to have own system; 
national process, so you can get engineers from 
around the country and they use same tools, 
processes, consistency (KEY – what’s standard, 
what’s local) 
system must be scalable and adaptable; Local 
responsibility, but varied ability and resources to 
support.  
Council can take ownership locally; build own 
resources; problem for lot small district councils; no 
budget or resources; rely on bigger councils 
Examine how process changes when scaling from local 
to regional 
If ours, we can do what we want; when you’re not in 
charge, and having to go through 4 agencies to get a 
helicopter, very frustrating 
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Ongoing and/or Multiple Events 
Recommendation Context/Data Element 
Need to consider DA as ongoing process over probable 
multiple events. Strategy for reassessment 
Difficult to distinguish damage from which event, 
which is problem for insurance. 
1500 commercial buildings demolished 
Need to consider multiple events. Not a static process. Tricky when you have multiple earthquakes. Limit to 
number of times you can inspect the same building. 
Have to make a call at some point. 
This building was inspected by our engineers before 
we reoccupied it.  
We put up fire signs, but we’ve had 1400 bloody 
earthquakes. What are we doing about that?  
Ongoing event; status changes as conditions change 
(e.g. additional shocks) 
Sept shook it up a bit, 22 feb came along and shook it 
down 
 we’ve had 1400 bloody earthquakes. What are we 
doing about that?  
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Overlapping Assessments 
Recommendation Context/Data Element 
FF, USAR, and RDA all different types of assessment. 
Goals in first days are different than in subsequent 
phases of response and recovery. 
First assessments critical in the firs couple days – ours 
took longer, two teams had to part ways.  
Relationship splits in second week – different focus 
with FF/USAR 
Emergency response, USAR and RDA different process 
that are hard to combine - but can overlap when 
appropriate. 
Fire act impact USAR, but not damage assessment 
Hard to combine two processes, but ability to share 
intel. 
Even Rapid building damage assessment asking if 
building might hurt someone.  
Hard to merge, but usefulness is different from how 
to repair. 
LA is not only group doing assessments. Need to 
acknowledge this and incorporate in pre-planning and 
in post-event processes. 
PL: were there other authorities or others doing own 
assessments (e.g. hospitals, schools); but may have 
training.  
Yes, building managers go through; schools, hosp; did 
cause some problems. Own engineer some of the 
engineers did own placards and reports – information 
didn’t get to the Centre. Some were green when they 
shouldn’t have been.  
Consider whether or not non-LA assessment and 
placarding is looking at different things? How do 
different models/assessment inform/interact with each 
other? 
** – schools, etc. impact triage with placards, 
owners’ responsibility to do more formal assessment; 
triage is about immediate access to the building; 
generally speaking, placarding done reasonably well;  
Need to consider whether to incorporate geotechnical 
assessment or suggest as separate but overlapping 
assessment. 
Geotech rapid response 
Leverage BA process with other types of assessment or 
EM functions.  
Building inspector; engineer; USAR; welfare – aim to 
get into house quickly, do the assessment, wellness 
check – save a lot of time in one inspection 
Need process to identify resources for short term 
countermeasures. Resources and processes will 
necessary vary between communities and incidents. 
? recommended practice to use USAR 
Not in **, not available 
But in small community Why? Did have teams do 
some of that stabilization work.  
Didn’t do the rescue team, engineer per se. 
Doing it pretty much on their own. 
More than just structure involved in building 
assessment. Need to educate owner/occupant as well. 
Having to explain to people; if the chimney going to 
fall, people get it; need to see that if there’s a rock 
that could fall, same thing;  
Need to understand different processes, standards, 
outcomes of private and non LA assessments. ? Tie to 
validation and use of knowledge? 
building owner employing an engineer, this is where 
you start to see differences; where you get CTV 
building collapse – different standards. Didn’t remove 
linings, didn’t pick up cracks in the building;  
More than structural damage. **: geo tech side; liquefaction. Comment again; liq 
not a life safety issue, so wasn’t a priority; could just 
send a geo tech out; but from a human perspective; 
thoughts on that? And Prioritizing 
Targeted assessment process = reinvestigation of a 
category of building based on emergent damage 
patterns. 
Quickly recognized because of the dynamic 
characteristics of the earthquake that a set of mid-
rise buildings were likely to be damaged and with a 
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particular type of damage.  
 
This is what you  should look for, if you see it, this is 
bad news. This is what you have to look for in this 
type of event. 
 
11 buildings were found with the targeted 
assessment in which there were significant problems 
and half a dozen were taken down. 
 
KEY: Not deficiencies, but once we got more 
information, assessments became more refined.  
Develop process or guidelines for temporary shoring 
and countermeasures 
SB did volunteer groups take down chimneys, etc. 
**; yes, spent a lot time with fire making chimneys 
safe – four pieces of wood and wrap it up to stabilize; 
not as big an issue in Feb as most taken care of in 
Sept.  
Did Volunteer Rescue Teams help to make homes safe 
to occupy similar to SAR? Yes, in September they 
worked with fire service to take down chimneys 
Other personnel can accompany the DA teams to 
perform one-stop services for occupants to keep 
them in their homes 
Overlap with USAR and other EM - how to deal with 
people in imminent danger. 
No firm way of dealing with people that are in 
imminent danger.  
Guidelines for initial phase where USAR and RDA 
overlap. 
Rescue teams involved in BDSA – escort engineers, 
particularly into commercial buildings – USAR 5 
minutes, 10 min, all day in this building: USAR 
engineer – tell people how long they could go in 
there. 
Rescue team held engineers to that. 
Need to consider geo-tech assessment  Yes, better if teams have geo technicians involved 
from the beginning.  
We got that going very quickly in KK, but was after 
the building inspections. 
Have of KK cut off from the south, different group 
doing this – didn’t do geo tech assessments. Took a 
while to figure out and had to send geotechs back in. 
Guidelines and principles for USAR engineers or 
engineers supporting USAR in early phase. 
Rescue teams involved in BDSA – escort engineers, 
particularly into commercial buildings – USAR 5 
minutes, 10 min, all day in this building: USAR 
engineer – tell people how long they could go in 
there. 
Rescue team held engineers to that. 
 
Core Concept: Building Status 
Recommendation Context/Data Element 
Concept of assessment should be around Building 
Status, which changes over time and from different 
assessment perspectives. 
** – sept, these assessments done; stickers; white 
doesn’t mean building is fine, just good for now and 
get an engineer to look at it. Green stickers at the 
time. 
Need system to monitor building status over time, 
from various assessments and also as status changes, 
3 bins: 
1. USAR approach –  
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and as event moves from response to recovery to 
repair. 
2. BA program – 
3rd bin – private consultants doing their won 
assessments  
need process to allow challenge to building status 
decisions. 
Were the categorizations challenged? Yes. 
Building status change process - LA does placarding, 
but up to owner to take responsibility for moving 
things forward after that. Intriguing comment. 
Let council run process for placarding, then owner 
take responsibility for moving forward & changing 
placards. Etc. contract engineer takes on another 
aspect 
DA is ongoing process. This is where we look at BDSA as something that 
happens over time. 
Status can change; need to be prepared for things to 
go wrong. 
CTV – building 115 people died 
Things go really wrong.  
Initially yellow, then to green.  
Need to track ongoing status of building as it 
undergoes multiple assessments. 
3rd bin – private consultants doing their won 
assessments. Start with existing placard and data then 
do their own assessment.  
Need to consider placards in larger framework - e.g. 
Building Status to allow for changes, follow up, 
remediation, etc. 
Placards worked well, but the follow up. Only thing we 
had was Detailed Evaluation; that could be quite and 
extensive and expensive process; Royal Commission 
considered using a sledgehammer to crack a nut – 
forcing owners to give information 
Like this definition - should be basis of defining 
building status: what we know about the damage 
observed in the context of the event that has occurred 
and the information that is available at this time. 
Usability based on the damage observed in the 
context of the event that as occurred 
Need to consider geotechnical and ground/land issues 
as well as structural issues during assessment. 
Timber frame can move a meter and twist, but main 
damage was from liquefaction 
Concrete slabs did worse – liquefaction  
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Overall Goal of DA: Development of Situational Awareness 
Recommendation Context/Data Element 
Information available from multiple sources. Need to 
incorporate into overall situational awareness and 
deployment.  
3 bins: 
1. USAR approach –  
2. BA program – 
3rd bin – private consultants doing their won 
assessments  
This is about interpreting information. Make use of 
visuals like maps. 
Very paper based; maps of area printed on the walls. 
Outside RDA, but use of technology for overall 
situational awareness.  
Have a better understanding of what’s happening 
through UAV or drones; redirect satellites for high 
resolution data; feed into GIS; where are significant 
collapse; where are bridges and roads out; could 
capture a lot more strategic data to help coordinate 
the response;  satellite says this area looks bad; send 
UAV to get more detailed; then send drone to look at 
that building in more detail. Large scale data pictures;  
beyond DSA, but photos and satellite useful for 
neighbourhood and regional situational awareness 
Getting pictures of changing landforms 
Series of pictures 
Understanding the hazards and risks 
If outside the knowledge base, struggled to make a call 
– need a way to say “this is outside my comfort zone” 
If outside the knowledge base, struggled to make a 
call – need a way to say “this is outside my comfort 
zone” 
Have someone going through USAR and other 
emergency response data to gather intel on buildings 
Need some form of record assessment – going 
through the forms and intel – use USAR for this 
Lesson learnt – get the right resources – know what 
you are going into before you deploy a lot of 
resources. 
Lesson learnt – get the right resources – know what 
you are going into before you deploy a lot of 
resources. 
take a  moment and evaluate before you send 
resources up there. Send an advance team to 
reconnaissance and then deploy the appropriate 
resources.  
take a  moment and evaluate before you send 
resources up there. Send an advance team to 
reconnaissance and then deploy the appropriate 
resources.  
Would have been better if the data had been 
organized into buildings of significance, those that we 
need to stay away from, etc. 
The priority of buildings to be assessed 
The ability to share the results of the DA quickly, to 
generate safety for DA personnel 
Situational awareness: need overall picture to 
effectively deploy teams. Need to be aware of 
geohazards at local and area level as well 
access – liquefaction a problem – teams are activated, 
but how do you get them to the places they need to 
go. 
Big lesson, when you have an event, have to step back, 
sept – whew – we’ve made it through – didn’t think 
about the next. Need to get in and REALLY look at 
things. 
Big lesson, when you have an event, have to step 
back, sept – whew – we’ve made it through – didn’t 
think about the next. Need to get in and REALLY look 
at things. 
Establish strategy  on broad scale; consider bigger 
picture when establishing priorities 
Needed to get supermarkets cleared so we could get 
food to the communities. 
Need mix of local knowledge and external expertise to 
be effective. Either without the other not as effective. 
**: Big city folks who think they know best; how do 
you best use the local people; Shane: employ them in 
your decision-making; we don’t know everything; 
don’t have a big city mentality; went a long way.  
Develop and maintain situational awareness through 
daily maps of the city. 
Daily maps of the city – good snap shot of what the 
city would look like after the level 1 survey; then 
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people conservative on first, lots of red; map started 
changing red to yellow, yellow to green 
Monitor status of areas and regions through daily 
maps with updated information. 
Daily maps of the city – good snap shot of what the 
city would look like after the level 1 survey; then 
people conservative on first, lots of red; map started 
changing red to yellow, yellow to green 
Need geotech risk map in advance of DA 
Geotech info is needed to determine whether or not 
it’s safe for the DA personnel to deploy into areas 
Daily briefing/debrief and also clearing house meetings  
Planning and intelligence are key elements of process. One of the most important  planning and intel. 
Definition of building assessment situational 
awareness. 
Understanding what BA means – the data coming out 
of it – the meaning of it and the learning coming from 
it.  
Develop initial situational awareness as quickly as 
possible - use helicopter or other means to get 
overview of situation 
Get them out- get them in a helicopter – what do we 
need to do; where do we need to be 
Create a model of what we’re dealing with  
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Strategies for Employing and Managing Damage Assessment  
Recommendation Context/Data Element 
Need to acknowledge that private assessments are 
being done. Need method to capture and use that data.  
3rd bin – private consultants doing their won 
assessments. Start with existing placard and data 
then do their own assessment.  
More than algorithm and procedures. Must include 
guidelines and support for EOC and political dimension. 
Need to include political decision-making in situational 
awareness and decision-making support. 
Naïve in not knowing how things work politically. 
Process needs to consider political processes – be 
able to steer politics when it tries to impose poor 
decisions. 
Consider risk tolerance in developing rubrics - note 
increasing sophistication/nuance in NZ placard 
categories with experience 
Categories are not hard to deal with at all. More for 
internal thing – distinctions are quite useful.  
Trick is trying to define the limits between categories. 
How much risk re you putting people at. No right 
answer to much of this – it’s up to the judgment of 
the person. Does your training teach them  - criteria?  
Have multiple DA types to maximize engineering 
resources 
Initial surveys don’t need to be engineers 
More than rubrics - decision-making complex. ? 
Layered decision-making process? Easy, so-so 
(technical), complex (multi-factor) 
Did you add the human element – yes, but more in 
how to not let that influence your decision. Judgment 
more around logic and evidence – lots of competing 
interests.  
Have multiple strategies for assessing large number of 
buildings; use insurance companies, private sector 
assessors 
Buster: how do we mobilize an adequate number of 
assessors 
Insurance companies rolled out program for homes 
of clients 
Damage will vary from one area to another in region. 
Need to take this into consideration in strategic 
deployment of personnel.  
Some disagreement in room – person needs some 
understanding of building – not necessarily 
engineers, but…. Even with the size of this event. Half 
the city didn’t know anything had happened… very 
little damage;  
Damage patterns in residential different - need to 
consider in developing assessment processes and 
guidelines.  
Timber frame can move a meter and twist, but main 
damage was from liquefaction 
Concrete slabs did worse – liquefaction  
Ensure that the first stage of DA is the reconnaissance, 
and stage the incoming DA assistance so that it’s 
staggered over time 
Most people want to assist in the immediate 
aftermath of the event, but that willingness runs out 
after a few weeks or months 
Think beyond immediate shock; be ready if there is 
another rattle 
Lessons learned – evaluation work in KK this front of 
mind – buildings that didn’t loose facades – needed 
to be proactive and barrier to be ready for if there is 
another rattle; 
Strategies - need to become more nuanced over time. How do we not do all 1200 at once; how do we 
become more nuanced as we go. 
Include layer of decision-making above the team - how 
do they resolve complex decisions? Who gathers 
experience/knowledge of overall situation? 
How would you pick who to do the plan and know 
that they have the background and expertise to even 
develop the plan. So much is exposure - time.  If you 
pull it back and make it too conservative, it causes 
problems.  
Need for teams with variable skills dependant on 
context, resources, availability 
** – do you need GEO on each team 
** – challenge in different times required by each 
group – consider putting diff #s – e.g. two or three 
welfare people with one team if they are going to 
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take longer than the structural engineers: 1 geo tech, 
1 building inspector, 3 welfare people – varies to 
meet needs of particular areas. 
Need guidelines matching teams to needs of the 
particular situation. 
What are the guidelines we should be giving – teams 
can’t be static – need to match the needs of the 
particular situation.  
Consider sending 2 or more welfare people with each 
DA team 
Welfare meetings with occupants often take longer 
than the DA and this allows some to stay with the 
occupants while others move with the DA team to 
the next site 
Include local welfare people on the DA team They know the local issues 
Consider cascading hazards that threaten buildings (e.g. 
dams on farms which provide water storage) 
Include this info in DA reports to advise of unknown 
hazards that also need to be assessed 
Would have been good to have geotech’s go out with 
the building assessors, and also a welfare person 
Geotech’s identified safety risks in the field which DA 
personnel did not 
Include a welfare check with the initial rapid DA.  
More than BA - need to consider geohazards Most deaths rock fall and structural collapse. Rocks 
on the hills turned into missiles – some would go 
right through a building 
Look for ways to leverage information from varied 
sources, but remember that data will be gathered by 
different personnel who have different procedures, 
terminology, and goals for assessment. Valuable, but 
must be contextualized. 
PL were their assessments that USAR or others could 
do that would provide information that would be 
useful? 
 
GIS “pin” locations, but system unreliable, so 
sometimes not giving accurate locations.  
Their assessment criteria very different – get people 
out of house; frustration between inspectors and 
USAR; to the point we had to go in and reevaluate – 
they would placard as white, but we’d come back and 
do yellow 
Incorporate varied sources of data for ad hoc phase. How that information could be gathered to build 
picture on where to start? 
**: Not in a structured way. Social media; ** doing 
workshop 
Initial impact done by police fire service, being in the 
community and seeing what was being done. Ad hoc, 
data coming in 
Incorporate varied sources of data for ad hoc phase. Other thing from EM, critical where phone calls 
coming from, or not coming from;. Not getting calls 
from this area, so they are okay, but actually were 
hard hit areas where they’d be evacuated. Need to 
consider impact of all data that is coming from you.  
Ask “why aren’t they communicating?”  
M: liq. National insurance lobby;  very quick drive 
arrive – knew where we were likely to get 
liquefaction; not public, but experts knew – walked 
every street, got the extent of it, really; fly overs, 
aerial photography to identify areas that probably 
were affected. Sept – there was standing water from 
rains; but still; first pass to identify liq.  
Feb; hills area, geotech community got together, self-
volunteered, split the hills into sectors; we’ll take this 
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one; mapped all the boulders, starting where the 
population was, then moving out; compared how 
they were mapping things; several iterations  
Risk involved in using non-engineers during rapid 
assessment 
When these rapid assessments are done, assessors 
are not necessarily engineers – that’s the risk;  
When assessing buildings beyond basic timber frame, 
you need to use people who are skilled in that type of 
construction 
Additional skills are needed to assess complex 
buildings. Non-complex buildings can be assessed by 
(certified) builders 
Note Blue category in mapping. Need to consider 
guidelines/methods for mapping and tracking status at 
neighbourhood, regional levels.  
Red area  - no rebuilding. Blue areas need 
geotechnical assessment, foundation specific to 
building. Focused geotechnical expertise into areas 
that they are needed.  
Over 7500 homes taken out.  
Develop a map layer of buildings by height that can be 
overlaid with other info 
Can help to prioritize DA based on ground motion 
and period, even if buildings are only rated as high, 
medium, and low heights 
Acceptable to use multiple people to gather 
information and provide opinion - but ensure 
responsibility and decisions rest with experienced 
structural engineers when possible. 
Engineers need to be the ones who make the 
decisions; we were care to not make judgments;  
Lists of buildings to assess, and details of those 
completed, are required each morning 
Staff worked overnight adding the results of DA from 
the day before, which was submitted on paper at the 
end of each day. Lists were often not up to date 
Don’t wait for calls to tell you that DA is needed 
Assumptions were made that areas were OK because 
they didn’t call to request assistance, which was not 
the case 
Use of technically-prepared and trained non-
credentialed personnel for simple residential, but not 
complex residential or commercial.  
Technical people doing the residential; not the 
complex residential or commercial 
Level 1 externals, perhaps –  technical people could 
do, but not complex buildings.  
Use building wardens (similar to floor wardens and fire 
safety directors) to perform an initial DA. Provide them 
with pictures of existing damage and a list, and training, 
of what to look for 
This is much quicker and more cost-effective than 
having engineers assess every building 
Composition of assessing team will vary, with type of 
building 
 
Residential rapid assessment effective with non-
credentialed, e.g. building inspectors. Beyond timber 
frame, need commercial construction experience. 
residential wise, assessors pretty good; beyond 
timber frame, you need people who are really 
familiar with commercial construction, 
BA - other buildings not so easy - take more expertise, 
and you have to look at bigger picture. 
Others need more consideration 
This building leaning onto the building next door 
If fence was around, you might not notice 
Use of surveyors to monitor buildings during 
assessment  
CTV – immediate response – monitoring the building 
while the rescue team was in – monitoring to look for 
changes, moving, settling in real time.  
Model how to employ non-engineers for specific types 
of buildings or assessments. 
Has to be the RIGHT engineer, not just an engineer – 
other hand where you have building officials and 
facilities personnel, but not engineer, they could be 
assessing some types of buildings satisfactorily.  
May have multiple types of teams for different 
strategies and/or regions (e.g. critical buildings, 
suburbs).  
We wound up having two types in ** 
 
Building inspection tribe in suburbs 
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Engineering tribe – self-mobilized under different 
management structure 
By different focus, BI residential focus; engineers with 
the commercial 
 Mental smart allocation of resources; operationally, 
this was difficult to manage 
Have multi-skilled teams perform the assessments 
Some areas felt “over visited” due to the different 
types of DA which was required, causing multiple 
visits to the same buildings 
Designate the non-technical people on the DA team as 
the “spotters” 
at least one of the DA would remain outside of the 
building in a safe area 
Need to have systems to ensure that teams are 
thoughtfully put together and make best use of 
expertise available.  
From BO tribe perspective, got sent out to, different 
types of buildings. Sent up on the hills; others in 
areas affected by liq but not damage to buildings; in 
early days teams put together, bull rush – line up two 
captains, I want them I want those; I wound up with a 
team a group from welfare, red cross, st johns, go get 
someone; morphed over a couple days that pre-
recon. Which was completely differently if the 
engineering evolved, we were required to take 
someone out – rapid group, do assessment, don’t 
have the expertise for full estimate, can you send 
them out.  We can get through more cause we know 
the risks of this are now. 
Identify buildings and assessment types for different 
levels of personnel. 
Building control officers very good at understand 
design, but limits based on their reference (Tier 1, 2, 
3)  
Don’t look at magnitude, look at peak ground 
acceleration 
Magnitude helps but PGA is more important for 
prioritizing the DA 
Peak Ground Acceleration is needed as an overlay map 
with the homes to help prioritize DA 
 
Residential didn't generally require structural 
engineering. 
Residential space – often overlooked or limited 
engineering involvement. Arch design, limited 
structural engineering. 50, 000 taken out by 
liquefaction – move that population about and 
rebuild. Will need engineering. 
Have strategies at larger level; don't overlook "lesser" 
priorities. 
Big challenge was first 8 months was to deal with the 
larger buildings 
12 engineers concentrated on significant buildings; 
greater than 4 stories; 270 buildings to look after; 
went through each one systematically; quantitative 
assessment of each 
Strategy and guidelines for neighbourhood assessment 
and response. 
Public safety was paramount – prioritize areas, 
focused engineering resource; need info from “here” 
to unlock that part of the city. 
Need for area strategy, guidelines, approaches. 
Consider using things like CCC,KK experience as 
examples of process. Broad guidelines (establish zones, 
determine priorities within zones, balance needs of 
various zones with available resources…) then use 
criteria and examples from our various interviewees as 
examples of what similar places did. 
Initial triage – level 1: eastern suburbs lots of damage 
liquefaction; western ok, level 1 focused on eastern;  
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Perform DA on all buildings/areas where the 
responders will be working 
Some locations were later found to be unsafe 
Ensure that facilities are available to support the health 
and safety of responders 
Some responders arrived back from a day of DA 
soaking wet, and unable to have a shower 
Have an auditing team - a small group of very skilled 
engineers reviewing some of the DA results coming in 
against the actual building assessments 
This helps with public trust, and ongoing training and 
information for the DA teams 
Surveyor’s can set up monitoring equipment on 
buildings to see if they were still moving, for example, 
while SAR is working in the building 
Survey equipment can confirm if a building is moving 
or out of plumb 
Send people to multiple sector areas to perform DA 
rather than focus the teams into one sector area. 
In the early stage of the disaster, you need to give 
assurances to the community. Must share resources 
across multiple sectors (e.g. housing, business, 
industrial sectors) 
If cordon needed, conduct assessments systematically 
to make cordon progressively smaller. 
 
Main arterial routes have to be safe – keep the main 
roads safe 
Main arterial routes have to be safe – keep the main 
roads safe 
need to balance priorities - life safety and future shocks 
should win  Become thick skinned to closing the business down -  
While focus is often on life safety in complex buildings, 
sheer number of residential units requires strategies for 
dealing with their assessment. 
Overlooked part, the humble little house, but taken 
together, they are what makes up the city. 
99% of building portfolio is lightweight timber frame 
houses with brick cladding. Shake at 1 g and not a lot 
happens, even if it’s wobbly. From a life safety 
perspective – other tan lighting, plumbing, structure 
itself not at risk of imminent collapse.  Not a life 
safety. 
Have strategies for neighbourhood, regional 
assessment 
Cordon – get the city back to the people – 18 months; 
clockwise frame, shrinking to the centre. Set up 
CERA;  
Process must allow identification and development of 
priorities for DA process - what areas or resources done 
first, etc. 
Staged, prioritizing area where hazard is highest, e.g. 
wellington 
One of the things that happens here. At least make 
them strengthen the parapets – that’s been added 
into the building act. Concentrate on the things that 
are real problems 
Focus on main arterial routes – prioritize  
Different ways of strategizing overall DA at regional 
level.  
In **, trying to get around – may hear how well they 
do as far as their Building dept goes – three or four 
days – scathing of us for not getting inspectors as 
quickly as they wanted. We put back, why did you 
want to do it that quick? Did it need to be done in 3 
days, could you have prioritized the buildings to do – 
e.g. commercial, then residential, etc. Rather than 
blanket across all levels at once.  
Put criticism on us on how slow – there’s a formal 
process, they tried the informal and got it done – 
caused grittiness and grumbling and got it done. In 
the end they got it done. 
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Goals of Damage Assessment Change over Time 
Recommendation Context/Data Element 
While LA responsibility, may need to have separate 
structure to manage overall assessment over time. 
CERA coordinated recovery and rebuild 
post RDA blends EOC, insurer goals and processes. Therefore an insurer-led response. 
100000 loss covered, and land damage, NZ govt 
effectively the first loss insurance for the residential 
portfolio. Damage assessment becomes the cost-of-
repair, rather than life safety. 
Changing priorities from first days to when system fully 
in place 
In first days in cordon, just doing rescue. Focus at the 
beginning on trained USAR, FF, about contamination 
in the basement, wires here, hazards, about to 
collapse; two days to stabilize the building.  Victims, 
found, when, etc. 
When the council placard teams come in, much 
different focus. 
Priorities change with different levels of RDA. NZ 
experience 
First assessment is health and safety – welfare and life 
safety 
 
Second splits – engineers for red/yellow?       Project 
managers and everyone to get at others – get in the 
roof, and walls, etc. – wall cracks. Change the 
nature/scope –  
 
Third is detailed engineering 
Examine relationship between ad hoc and managed 
phase. Look for ways to support early assessment, use 
info, but transition quickly to more formal process. 
Early assessment done by fire services – engineers 
with fire service, triage, recover bodies, USAR 
Once it gets to the point where that front has settled 
down, people get concerned about their own 
property.  
Process for post RDA - goals of engineering assessment 
different. 
That means that the engineering assessment has to be 
very different.  
Building owner has responsibility to get Engineering 
assessment; recovery manager can go to building 
owner and require you to do assessment – in process 
of figuring out how to do this. 
Process and goals and outcomes will change over time. Diverse from initial days to insurance wrap up 
Status changes over time - need to consider how 
various assessment processes interact with each other.  
Other ting that happened in port hills, building 
inspectors go around with green; geotech sees big 
rock, then slaps red sticker on. Later on and engineer 
says building is fine; takes off the red.  Geo techs 
working to the side; info falling down through the gap, 
not making it on to the spreadsheet – people tearing 
stickers off, hard to know whether they had been red 
stickered, geo techs sent back to check to see that red 
stickers were still on while aftershocks going on. 
goals change over time. Emergency work shifted over time to working with 
insurance companies to get their insurance 
goals of DA change over time.  Damage assessment takes on a different perspective. 
Insurance or long term perspective different. 
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Lasting legacy that needs to be considered 
95% had replacement insurance 
goals of DA change over time.  Early on, it’s about is it safe to stay in that building for 
a time – will it provide shelter in the short term 
Questions change over time 
Can we repair, should be we rebuild fi this is just going 
to happen again 
goals of DA change over time.  Over time; have to think about health and shelter – 
things change – e.g. weather.  
Liq concrete slab around the house, same inside – it 
just came up through the concrete floor 
Need to establish goals and goal posts for damage 
assessment - return to function; new codes; another 
shock? 
Requiring people to do seismic restraining – bring 
them up to code 
Brought in as a law, on council to do it 
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Overall Emergency Operations 
Recommendation Context/Data Element 
Require process for accepting and using international 
help. 
International office of help – managing that tis a  
nightmare – they come from everywhere – some you 
have to decline, some is good stuff; SAR was 
international – another thin you have to deal with – 
everyone wants to come help and how you deal with 
that. Probably two levels; operational level; gov wants 
advisors and how you make up making use; 2 guys 
sent by aus govt, they wound up being useful; they 
had experience in dealing with day 20 and 30 and 
temporary accommodation demands; they came 
unannounced – had to figure out what their 
experience was and how we could actually use that.  
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Damage Assessment Operations & Administration 
Recommendation Context/Data Element 
Build in ability of people to be creative and problem-
solve, while still remaining safe and useful. 
Pretty dynamic. Some of our structural engineers 
work with USAR, so they called  
we us up.  
Role emerged over time, not preplanned;  
Leverage USAR resources once initial life safety work is 
complete. E.g.. Countermeasures to allow temporary 
use of damaged structures, but still keep people in their 
homes. 
Multiagency approach allowed inspectors to do their 
thing while welfare dealt with family and person; 
army and USAR could deal with some of the damage 
(e.g., pull the chimney down).  
Deployment strategy at team levels: adaptable to use 
various personnel most effectively. 
USAR – limits on time to spend on quick repair, 
shoring, etc. team start together on a street, but may 
spread out a bit; get split up and meet again at the 
end of the street; Groups assigned to specific areas, 
so we’d know where they were if there were 
problems. 
More than an algorithm and a field manual. Need to 
consider processes behind these and also ways that 
they will be implemented on the ground. 
Having people well trained – how to deploy them – 
how robustly will you do it?  
Process from response to recovery 
Consider strategies for utilizing other non-credentialed 
(e.g., building practitioners - ? Property managers?) for 
specific types of situations - e.g. low risk, simple 
buildings, areas with minimal damage. 
**: Whole operation is a triage operation; most of 
the inspectors had been builders; some may have had 
emergency management training, but most was on 
building buildings. Training that would be given here, 
6 hours, broken down to be more palatable for those 
people. Licensed building practitioner scheme – build 
into that scheme – you must understand now 
assessment works, cause you  may be called up to do 
this in the future. 50,000 licensed building 
practitioners – bit group of people that could be 
trained and available in a bunch of different places.  
Leveraging assessments; criteria for when having social 
services works. 
Residential BI with engineering backup has more 
focus on welfare and may require more interaction 
with owners – take a welfare person with you 
Consider having social services and geo tech with 
assessors, when appropriate. 
Works very much better, especially in rural areas, 
have welfare with building assessors and geotechs, 
they can do their job much better if welfare along 
Use UAV’s for tall buildings and detailed DA  
Need to consider this - easy to say: "don't do this," but 
not realistic. It's going to happen, how can we make it 
as safe as possible. 
Teams helped residents to go back into the building 
to retrieve stuff – make sure they were safe 
Factors to consider in logistics and administration structural engineers tearing off stickers not knowing 
about the rocks and not looking for them.  
Less administrative nightmares; consultants not 
getting paid, etc. needs to be at regional level. 
Ensured that consultants that came in had sufficient 
insurance to cover liability. 
Have liability in place before them come in, 
Contracted expertise vs volunteer expertise 
Time briefings to maximize use of information that is 
coming in before sending new teams out.  
8 am briefings and only one manager – sometimes 
data not available because assessors already out. 
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Sometimes not back in time for 5 pm debriefing. 
Moved to shifts to help with this.  
Take into account that many of your local resources 
won't be available. 
What you need to factor in, a lot of the locals aren’t 
available themselves, dealing with their own issues as 
home; need to factor that in – let locals get own 
house in order before they can really help you out. 
Focus resource needs beyond just assessment: on 
admin side as well: data entry, processing, rostering, 
worker safety, coordination/admin roles behind scenes, 
food/shelter/wellness of assessors, etc. 
 
Residential teams required smaller team of structural 
engineers 
Engineers mobilized through IPENZ wound up in right 
place; had a small engineering group supporting the 
residential stuff, MBIE engineers, suspect at we might 
have used more,  
Need to anticipate workload and competing priorities. 
Have either predetermine processes/procedures to 
support workload, or have ongoing process to consider 
issues and support personnel over time. 
Workload issues – lots of request from different 
channels; people, politicians, business owners; 
putting unreasonable expectations; too chaotic, 
sometimes sending multiple people to same jobs; 
Get operations set up before bringing in operational 
staff 
Set up admin and then call up your operational staff; 
too difficult and frustrating – better to set up control, 
then add operations. Fools rush in… 
Although DA coordination is high level, the local 
authority should manage the personnel 
The Local authority needs to arrange the travel, 
accommodation, feeding, etc., and take ownership of 
the incoming data 
deploy 2 managers and two admin staff in advance to 
set up the DA 
an advance reconnaissance team is needed so that 
DA personnel can be immediately put to work on the 
ground 
Be weary – public falsified placards (red for demo or 
red cross $) or green to occupy; an “ambulance 
chasers” post-event (layers, consultants, etc. looking to 
cash in) 
 
Be prepared for volunteers, international and other 
unregistered – how to manage 
 
Have Engineers declare whether or not they know what 
the building system is 
To determine whether they’ve reviewed the design 
drawings and specifications 
Safety guidelines for teams; establish roles, have plan 
for entry, egress 
Have an exit plan – how you would get into and out 
of the building in cordoned off area.  
Don’t accept volunteers who are only available for a 
few days. Must be available for 7 days 
Some DA personnel only wanted to help for a few 
days and acted like tourists 
Bring people from outside of the disaster area to assist 
Those within the impacted areas are likely also 
impacted themselves 
If possible, have prepared kits with all disposable 
supplies needed to function effectively. 
Problem of photocopier fluid… lots of paper and 
communication required.  Battery life on cells; lack of 
internet access; 
LESSON: Now have a drop in box with technology for 
the first couple days. 
LESSON: Now have a drop in box with technology for 
the first couple days. 
Have a pre -deployment checklist for the DA team 
** EQ showed that several items need to be 
confirmed in advance of having DA personnel on the 
ground. Example: who was responsible to pay for 
what in relation to DA? Example, payment for the 
building that DA personnel slept in? 
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Have a container (drop box) containing all of the DA 
equipment and material 
Field equipment is not readily available at the DA 
location 
Provide DA teams with resources to deal with 
immediate needs during DA, or the means to 
communicate with those resources 
Many homes found with burst pipes could not have 
the water quickly turned off, as USAR resources were 
required to do so and time was spent finding them 
Ensure staff are sent with the appropriate safety gear 
Some personnel cannot access their PPE, or do not 
think to bring it along for DA 
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Basic Damage Assessment Process 
Recommendation Context/Data Element 
3 assessments past RDA, really: structural/damage 
assessment, loss assessment (insurer), and return to 
use/usability assessment (Robyn's comments) 
? loss assessment vs. damage assessment. Need 
damage assessment to do loss adjustment. 
Need to carefully think about what goals of engineering 
assessment are. 
** – similar design is to life safety; all it is; nothing 
on damage mitigation at all; using post-earthquake 
assessments to move to damage mitigation 
standards – what that criteria will be is a big 
standard. 
Consider triage-based system - anything with apparent 
structural damage referred to structural/geotechnical 
engineers. 
Impact of structural damage on a structure – by and 
large experienced practical structural engineers, 
geotechnical engineers,  
Layered response strategy, "triage" concept. Four phases: 
Initial damage survey - survey to see what the city 
looks like; no placarding; done within a few hours of 
the earthquake 
Rapid level 1 – redone for yellow and reds; 415 
engineers: 10000 building in a week or so; greens 
cleared; others get Rapid level 2; 
Rapid level 2 – when red buildings deemed 
dangerous, then yellows and owners required to do 
DDE 
Detailed engineering 
Need to establish what DDE goal posts are and what 
factors to consider. 
Normal service loading 
Wind loading 
Earthquakes of similar or less than main shock 
Have several engineers on call who can be asked to 
review specific non-complex buildings which are being 
assessed by non-credentialed personnel 
Operations East & Suburb were performed by many 
non-credentialed personnel, supported by engineers 
who reviewed some of the work 
Risk in single story wood frame different from 
commercial structure 
Risk in single story wood frame different from 
commercial structure 
Note goals: usefulness, repair Hard to merge, but usefulness is different from how 
to repair. 
Have 5 importance levels for buildings: 1 is regular 
houses, 2 is __ 3 is schools, 4 is emergency facilities 
Allows you to prioritize buildings 
Ensure that the second DA is extremely thorough and 
includes a drawing of the floor plans 
To avoid requiring third and possibly fourth 
assessments 
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Placards, Outcomes 
Recommendation Context/Data Element 
Like the Interim Use category - more than placard, less 
than permit.  
Rapid system, then Detailed Damage Assessment 
Interim Use Evaluation – all these buildings have had 
some damage – should do more than an external. 
Should pull the draw the  
Need to consider notes to accompany placards - 
describing in more detail what categories mean for 
owners/occupants.  
The reality is that you’re still trying to protect the 
safety of the person. If you can put it on the placard 
and they can make their own judgment.  
have category for partial use, or use with 
countermeasures 
What can be utilized? Is one part safe? Structurally 
the house is fine. But the sliding doors blown out. 
Take those doors out and building could be fine. In KK, 
quite cut off, so more acute – where do you put 
people if you take them our of their houses? 
Rate the condition of the home from 1-10 during the 
initial visit 
When several hundred buildings have been assessed 
and also require a re-assessment, a numbering system 
helps to prioritize the follow up 
One organization used 1-10 scale of damage at 
triage/rapid assessment 9then 7+ ranked building 
referred to engineer, others to trained personnel) 
 
Yellow sticker; can reoccupy, but needs to be seen by 
an engineer; but if that’s there, shouldn’t you go 
straight to engineering assessment.  
Yellow sticker; can reoccupy, but needs to be seen by 
an engineer; but if that’s there, shouldn’t you go 
straight to engineering assessment.  
take the approach that some parts of the residential 
building is safe (if it is) 
Accommodations are limited, so you don’t want to 
evacuate homes if you don’t need too 
BA - no/little damage easy, require little training or 
expertise 
Looking at buildings. Some easy. Untrained eye… 
Differences in residential damage and outcomes.  It’s not shaking for residential, it’s liquefaction – note 
this is damage in COST, not in life safety. 
Definitions of placard categories and meaning. 
Consider green/white  
Green does not mean it’s okay; still damage – you can 
use the building.   
Consider white placards - green has implications of 
safety and not needing any more work. 
Green to white to deal with false safety expectations.  
People would stop at the green and not do follow up, 
thinking that it meant they were okay 
Ensure the green/white placard includes a message 
that the building still needs to be checked in detail 
People assumed the green placard meant it was 
totally safe 
Use white placards instead of green 
The public sees a green placard and assumes that no 
further action is required with the building 
Changes to placards: green changed to white 
- Change in language – “no recommendations” 
 
 
  
6.9.1e TECHNICAL REPORT  
APPENDIX 6: RECOMMENDATIONS BASED ON SITE VISIT ANALYSIS 
268 
 
Information Flow 
Recommendation Context/Data Element 
Need to consider type, volume of information to be 
moved and ways of facilitating this according to 
conditions of specific event.  
No communication at that time between field and 
office, but now would have through cell phone etc., 
with battery backup, etc.  
Could make calls, but not send large volumes of 
data.  
Emergency response, USAR and RDA overlap, but should 
have ability to share intel. 
Fire act impact USAT, but not damage assessment 
Hard to combine two processes, but ability to share 
intel. 
Even Rapid building damage assessment asking if 
building might hurt someone.  
Hard to merge, but usefulness is different from how 
to repair. 
Info forms may need to be different for different types 
of events and/or situations 
Different form for flooding; different for geotech 
which is quite different 
Communication with owners/occupants **: geo tech side; liquefaction. Comment again; liq 
not a life safety issue, so wasn’t a priority; could just 
send a geo tech out; but from a human perspective; 
thoughts on that? And Prioritizing 
LESSON _ need to work with telecom providers to 
support 
Need to rethink how we set up – one of the first 
things we have to set up is a cell network; ? RF – 
emergency radio network. 
Radio repeaters on generators  and very unreliable – 
even handhelds not useful 
Have multiple options for communication and data 
collection. 
Need to rethink how we set up – one of the first 
things we have to set up is a cell network; ? RF – 
emergency radio network. 
Radio repeaters on generators  and very unreliable – 
even handhelds not useful 
Develop "national"/provincial strategy for data 
management but have flexibility to implement based on 
context on the ground. 
Someone at national policy level should develop 
systems; strategically better than individual CCC 
doing own systems. Most of that data was static 
Need process to ensure that USAR data is captured, 
collated, and passed along in meaningful way to DA 
teams. 
1. USAR approach – no idea if any data was 
captured. Focus on clearing building from people – 
was it strong on paperwork, more about getting 
people done. Justifying later quite frustrating.  
  
But that data never made it to the council 
Results from private assessments and detailed 
engineering assessments - how to incorporate into 
situational awareness and overall building status. 
What was damage, what would it cost, how to go 
about repairs. 
How does this information get shared with CC.  
Map different types of assessments and stakeholders 
(e.g. property managers, CI owners). 
**: were there other authorities or others doing 
own assessments (e.g. hospitals, schools); but may 
have training.  
Yes, building managers go through; schools, hosp; 
did cause some problems. Own engineer some of 
the engineers did own placards and reports – 
information didn’t get to the Centre. Some were 
green when they shouldn’t have been.  
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System to differentiate between assessments by 
different groups - ? Different types of placards? Paint, 
placards, notices?  
**: USAR – with an engineer on the team – some 
confusion on their carding buildings, then 
assessment team coming in with BI, E, W – did you 
have experience. 
Important to have way of 
validating/ranking/understanding quality of information 
coming in from different sources - ? Levels of Evidence 
model. 
Quality mixed; CERA’s role was to ensure quality – 
we had to be happy with it.  
System to reconcile/understand different markings - 
need different ways to note status, but also to tie status 
to the type of assessment that was done. 
Look at rescue marks, but might not know what 
they meant.  
How to validate information that comes from different 
assessments? 
building owner employing an engineer, this is where 
you start to see differences; where you get CTV 
building collapse – different standards. Didn’t 
remove linings, didn’t pick up cracks in the building;  
Need to find way to accommodate varied assessment 
and outcome information generated by different teams 
of assessors. Not about generating a single, best placard 
- rather about gathering and disseminating important 
information about a building's status at any given time.  
USAR was placarding – political pressure to show 
that assessment was done and “we were here.” 
People expect such a response now.  
Need to ensure that USAR data isn't lost, and is available 
to DA folks who come later. 
Teams were first into the buildings – do rapid 
assessment, put up markings, then building 
assessors come in days or weeks later. 
Usually the USAR markings – rather than placarding 
per se. 
how to "level" information from different 
engineers/processes 
others called by tenants, did lift and find cracks – 
you shouldn’t really be in there. Conflict between 
engineers that start to play a role in post disaster 
management.  
Need to track assessments taking place from private 
landlords as well, 
to avoid duplication and missed information 
Should collect and document with insurance/other 
concerns in mind, though not as priority 
Difficult to distinguish damage from which event, 
which is problem for insurance. 
1500 commercial buildings demolished 
Develop taxonomy/criteria for assessing quality of 
information and assessments. 
Day 1 everyone man and their dog hits the street to 
do assessment 
Some good, some not 
Do you want to do a lot quickly 
Or some with quality 
Information management is key. Need well-set up 
information flow that is adaptable to technology 
available.  
Paper based – repetitive information, dealing with 
all the paper 
Logistical issues, end of day – map not updated, so 
problematic 
Create a clearinghouse of documents to share amongst 
emergency groups 
DA coordination must be situated within easy access 
to this info. The IPENZ info was very helpful 
Need system to allow assessors to debrief and share 
experience/learning/guidelines on an ongoing basis. ? 
Wiki to post 
Lots of value in the discussion after – what your 
judgement and why- what was the logical reasoning. 
Talking about your reasoning was the important.  
Set up process for accepting information and developing 
situational awareness as quickly as possible 
That info important- get the staff you need to do 
what is needed; not enough, hence the national; 
people from all over new Zealand 
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Difficulty in managing incoming info – need to go 
through one channel to triage/prioritise 
 
need efficient and effective info management system 
that is scalable and adaptable.  
2. BA program – lots of paper forms, of which there 
were always behind. Forms done day before day 
after, huge issue on managing tremendous amount 
of prep and data.  
Have a central registry of the building types Same as above 
Need some form of documentation of meaning of 
incoming information 
Need some form of record assessment – going 
through the forms and intel – use USAR for this 
Critical to collect data whenever the opportunity arises Collection of information has been of huge value for 
the ongoing disaster recovery 
Highly valuable information that has many uses 
Critical to collect data whenever the opportunity 
arises 
Information plan has to extend past immediate or initial 
assessment to keep owners/occupants aware of 
changing conditions. 
Had to send notices to building owners to let them 
know that engineers were going to be doing more 
invasive work – lifting carpets, opening walls, etc. 
take the pressure off the individual engineer; need 
for formal conversation to facilitate assessments.  
 
As the science improves, how do we better get the 
information out. 
Ideally, way for on the ground assessors to access plans, 
drawings, particular for complex buildings 
Access to drawings at CC – wat that a problem? 
They had difficulty – hard copy, off site, 
disorganized. 
Have a GIS system publicly available to see DA results 
To find out about the condition of a building you 
had to walk right up to the door to see the placard 
Note that communications and data movement ability 
will change with time over an event. Methods for first 
days different than after a week. 
 
Now have a deployment form Now have a deployment form 
Need proper document tools and procedures. Have 
range to accommodate variable situation (e.g. lack of 
power or internet) 
Lesson: don’t give pieces of paper – have packages; 
with coverage, real time electronic very useful.  
LESSON – find a single funnel for requests and jobs to 
reduce chaos 
LESSON – find a single funnel for requests and jobs 
to reduce chaos  
Need adequate resourcing and processes to manage 
incoming information flow and provide useable intel. 
Paper based – repetitive information, dealing with 
all the paper 
Logistical issues, end of day – map not updated, so 
problematic 
Need to resource information management from the 
start 
2. BA program – lots of paper forms, of which there 
were always behind. Forms done day before day 
after, huge issue on managing tremendous amount 
of prep and data.  
Data management: store if can't transmit. Store information onboard equipment, then take it 
back to office, and upload to system. 
Need data entry processes and resourcing to keep up 
with information that is coming in. 
Engineers coming back with lots of reports, data 
entry couldn’t keep up, first week or so; working 
long shifts; next morning when map came out, some 
areas hadn’t been entered in the city; system wasn’t 
real time. 
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Be aware that data entry and analysis are 
overnight/early morning tasks.  
Engineers coming back with lots of reports, data 
entry couldn’t keep up, first week or so; working 
long shifts; next morning when map came out, some 
areas hadn’t been entered in the city; system wasn’t 
real time. 
strong recommendation for pads and tablets over paper, 
but have to problem solve power and 
download/connectivity issues 
Pads and tablets would help: challenge –no power;  
Need robust, scalable information management system - 
excel to GIS 
No thought to information systems 
Spreadsheet – 250 buildings very simple tabular 
spreadsheet...Problems due to number of 
assessments taking place – close to 1000 buildings 
in ** alone, day 3 we started doing arterial roads 
out of central ** – 7 or 8 of those...Number of 
assessments grew quickly 
10 or 20 people in the art gallery take the paper 
forms each night, enter into the spreadsheets 
Lose the spreadsheets every now and then, then 
amalgamate spreadsheets 
Information system is going to evolve with the event.  4th or 5th day, council GIS team up and running to 
produce map – no blame, no one had thought about 
time and money into this kind of problem and 
setting up a system  
How can we provide the supporting infrastructure 
and systems 
Ensure that the electronic database of DA results is 
widely accessible 
An in-house software product made it difficult for 
outside personnel to access 
Have an app that provides for the reporting needed 
Residents, and DA personnel, could report what’s 
needed more quickly if both had access to an app 
Consider the impact of publicly posting the results of DA 
One impact impaired business to buildings 
perceived as unsafe, a week before Christmas 
Communication systems critical: 
- Between teams; with key decision makers 
- With public, people knowing what their home is 
placarded, what that means, etc. (education pre-event, 
flyer/notice post), green/white doesn’t mean no 
damage, red doesn’t mean demolition  
 
Digital documentation idea., paper back up always 
needed – data entry issues with paper (need lost of ppl 
to keep up overnight) 
 
Technology can create problems: network availability, 
devices, user management. 
Challenges 
Internet and network availability 
Mobile devices- batteries, availability 
User management 
Information system should link business as usual with 
event - pre and post 
Worked great for business as usual, but not for 
these types of queries. 
Made it difficult to get info for third party agencies 
once it was in ** processes. 
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Recruitment and Types of Personnel 
Recommendation Context/Data Element 
Have a 3 tier group of DA personnel 
• Tier 1 – the control group of 40 people 
o The summit group is a subset of the control group, 
representing a cross section of each stakeholder 
group. Performs all the regular role plus have a 
separate TOR describing extra tasks (need copy of 
TOR).  
• Tier 2 – building officials, engineers, architects, 
geotech’s Only ones authorized to sign placards. 
• Tier 3 – building officials, engineers, architects (3 or 
4 in each team) Allows for focused expertise 
Volunteers: online registry, (not excel!) same for all 
volunteers (managed by ? ); have tiers, profession 
(somehow verified?), monitor education and renewal 
(Cont. Ed) 
 
Anticipate variation in background, expertise, ability. Getting lots of assessments of various quality of 
limited use 
Even in training – varied understanding of 
construction form 
Differing expertise 
need long term strategy to ensure engineering and 
other assessor resources are used effectively.  
All buildings had to have DDE – commercial; 
residential greater than 2 swellings townhouses and 
apartments; onus on the owner; had to submit those 
to the CERA; put massive strain on the engineering 
resources  
Have a pool of trained assessors throughout the 
country who will be activated for large events, but not 
local events 
Smaller communities don’t have the budget or 
resources to maintain a pool of personnel 
Need mechanism for bringing in professionals for 
extended responses 
Get 3 days voluntary by most communities; need 
memorandum of understanding that allows engineer 
to work for council; protected under their umbrella; 
signed by people and council or professional body; 
between non-council led staff – the person and civil 
defence.   
Recruited personnel must have adequate briefing 
before going into area. 
Not enough intel for staff; No briefing, poor 
communication; email, but no prep for what you were 
going into  
Personnel and personality management are critical in 
selecting and deploying teams. 
Some egos and personalities – everyone wants to be 
the hero 
Have an interview process to get the right people to 
be there – the right attributes to work in this. 
Process for recruitment of personnel should include 
formal and informal networks, pre-event planning and 
post-event problem-solving 
Every event has pulled BI and engineers – both ad hoc 
and formal way. 
BI often know each other – can you come help, and 
they come. When those networks get short, they go 
through us – we need 20 bI in three days time. Both ad 
hoc and formal 
Formal way can be quite slow at time – (KEY) ad hoc / 
relationship based 
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Haven’t heard of those coming from outside and 
parochial type issues 
Need to consider how trained personnel are recruited 
at the local/incident level.  
** – rapid building assessor designation – 400 
assessors accredited. They are the ones that would be 
the assessor with the various teams. If you have an 
earthquake, who contacts these 400? 
** – I don’t know.  
** what would your preference be? What agency best 
suited to maintain that list, contact people. 
** – best way through the councils’ engineers – they 
have the relationships, rather than emergency 
managers. Whatever they do for the council, needs to 
go back to the council – yes, it’s being managed, no it’s 
not being managed.  Don’t see us – as emergency 
managers – managing that process. The councils 
maintain their own database and should be ones 
doing it.  
have the MOU signed between the Engineering 
Association and Civil Defence, so that individual 
people didn’t have to sign their own 
An MOU is needed for personnel who will perform DA, 
and having an overarching agreement is easier to 
manage 
Have an interview process for selecting the engineers 
and DA team members 
Some people wanted to be the hero, or wanted to be 
the manager, instead of wanting to assist with the role 
they’ve been selected for or are needed for 
anticipate that people in the local community who 
would normally perform a role are not available 
They have likely been impacted and are having to deal 
with the impact to themselves and their family 
Have a list of staff which outlines their skill, AND, their 
willingness to go outside of their normal geographic 
area to assist 
Some people are willing to assist only within the 
immediate area of their home 
Anticipate that local engineering resources will be 
exhausted after a short time 
Engineers will be assisting their clients with repairs 
and other work after the initial response 
Have a dedicated volunteer management group Needed a place to direct the convergent volunteers to 
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Training 
Recommendation Context/Data Element 
Legal framework matched to event stages, goals of 
assessment, priorities in moving forward. Must ensure 
clear legal and liability considerations across event. 
Tension clear an emergency don’t want to infringe on 
property rights.  
No power to function outside the emergency. Can’t 
clear people unless you declare a state of emergency. 
Add a section to the Building Code to “Manage 
buildings damaged after an emergency event”, which 
ensures the authority/power needed up to the point 
that the building is repaired 
Legislation to inspect and require the repair of 
buildings is needed outside of the state of emergency 
Ensure the Residential Tenancy Act provides landlords 
with access in the event of an emergency 
Access to the suite without notice is needed in an 
emergency 
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Legal Issues 
Recommendation Context/Data Element 
Special power (re: BDSA) to recovery managers to 
manage placards/buildings after state of disaster ends 
or if one not declared (or if ended and aftershocks) 
 
Need to consider legal, liability issues of temporary 
countermeasures. 
Only done with building owners consent; if really 
unstable, might do it if no owner available 
Under emergency, no liability unless really negligent. 
Legal authority must include access, assessment, and 
outcomes. 
Full suite of powers –  
• Do rapid building assessments 
• Require further information 
• Require remediation 
 
• Specially provides for heritage  
• Includes a property rights framework 
Need overall clarity - pre-event - on what legal grounds 
are and what power are. 
1 – better planning, better response, consistency, 
clear set of powers people feel confident using 
Lack of legislative power meant that local authority 
can’t designate a building dangerous due to 
seismic/liquefaction risk. Being revised now in NZ. 
 
To address, CC formed CERA to handle recover and 
ongoing assessments 
 
need to understand legal, financial implications of 
placard categories 
Welfare  agencies put monetary value on placards – 
neighbour got red, so got 1000; I have a green, but 
want a red; 
Need some way to embed the placard into legislation 
If placards are tied to the emergency legislation, it 
must include authority which extends beyond the 
declaration of emergency 
Include legal permission to enter buildings - both in 
initial and ongoing phases 
Did you have the right to go inside buildings? 
Consider legal basis for status and placarding/permitting 
as moving from emergency to business as usual. 
Had to transition to the building act as the 
emergency receded 
Legal – had to have process to keep placards effect 
in place 
All of a sudden, we had to change to building notices 
Legal framework matched to event stages, goals of 
assessment, priorities in moving forward. Must ensure 
clear legal and liability considerations across event. 
Tension clear an emergency don’t want to infringe 
on property rights.  
No power to function outside the emergency. Can’t 
clear people unless you declare a state of 
emergency. 
Add a section to the Building Code to “Manage buildings 
damaged after an emergency event”, which ensures the 
authority/power needed up to the point that the 
building is repaired 
Legislation to inspect and require the repair of 
buildings is needed outside of the state of 
emergency 
Ensure the Residential Tenancy Act provides landlords 
with access in the event of an emergency 
Access to the suite without notice is needed in an 
emergency 
Psychosocial Aspects 
Recommendation Context/Data Element 
need to consider psychosocial impacts of event  Lots of social issues, still – blaming the truancy rate 
on kids who went through the earthquake – 
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Consider social and psychosocial impacts on team over 
time 
Energy that comes with an event like this. Everyone 
is in the same boat – lots of anxiety. Lasts a week or 
so, then people get tired; business is affected; kids 
are having issues; then dealing that would do 
anything to help; that that put barriers and 
roadblocks in front of you. Want to just give them a 
good shake;  
Train Coordinators/Managers to understand how staff 
react after an EQ, and how they may be reacting 
differently as a result of their experiences 
Some Managers or Supervisors did not manage the 
reactions of their staff very well, based on a lack of 
knowledge about PTSD 
Ensure that stress debriefing is performed after each 
deployment 
Some personnel encountered issues from their work 
(e.g. pets found starving after being left in cages; 
vermin and pests in homes with rotting food) 
Need to consider stress and CIS  ** – kiwis pretty good – but need to be put into 
consideration. Don’t do well is manage the stress 
related issues that follow on after deployment – 
checking that people are okay. Stress debriefing.  
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Models and Taxonomies 
Recommendation Context/Data Element 
Need to identify differences between building types for 
different assessments - for building taxonomy, may 
include height. 
DDE 
 
Difference if you have a two story and a 27 story. 
Come of them needed a lot more work than others – 
some needed analysis and modeling and others were 
simpler.  
Taxonomies - check Importance Level as part of 
strategic process for prioritizing BA 
Need some form of record assessment – going 
through the forms and intel – use USAR for this 
Building Taxonomies - include heritage buildings Heritage buildings bit sensitive – dangerous, they kill 
people; others – we need to preserve them; they are 
a important; symbol of the argument; can’t figure out 
the way forward; tricky buildings to restore; but how? 
Comes down to money –  
Use list for building taxonomy. All buildings had to have DDE – commercial; 
residential greater than 2 swellings townhouses and 
apartments; onus on the owner; had to submit those 
to the CERA; put massive strain on the engineering 
resources  
Have buildings categorized as Tier 1, 2 & 3 
This allows for easy direction of DA expertise to 
complex and non-complex buildings 
• Apply an importance level to all buildings:  
o level 1 is a garage or garden shed  
o level 2 is a house or an office 
o level 3 (can be damaged but must be repairable 
within a level of time) for EOC’s  
o level 4 (must be capable of continued operation) for 
hospitals  
o level 5 is a hydroelectric dam 
To assist with prioritization of DA and remedial action 
Terminology: Building assessment (no ‘damage’, no 
‘safety’), usability 
 
Ensure heritage building legislation is considered in DA 
Heritage buildings have different provincial and/or 
local legislation which may not be aligned with the 
needs in an emergency situation 
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Geotechnical and Building Surveillance and Intelligence 
Recommendation Context/Data Element 
Consider including concept of Indicator buildings, both 
for pre-event monitoring (with building surveillance) 
and post-event for monitoring for subsequent events. 
Defining indicator buildings – list.  
incorporate formal or informal indicator building 
process for post-event monitoring 
Couple of us would go out – we were familiar with the 
buildings. Yes especially with the aftershocks, and 
non-standard aftershock patterns;  
Use of indicator buildings to see what types of 
buildings are being impacted in an event and how; 
what buildings do we have to worry about? 
**: Indicator buildings – more from wellington – 
picking out buildings of certain variety, loading them 
up with sensors, get an idea of how they respond, 
what response should be required. 
** – buildings of different heights react differently; 
load them up and see what happens 
Geotech database – sharing info between companies 
during rebuild/insurance claim phase 
 
When selecting “Indicator” buildings, must select 
based on period, construction type, and features. 
Include both highly and less vulnerable land profiles. 
Select buildings within close proximity of teams to 
assess quickly. 
Indicator buildings help to reduce the reassessment 
process 
Incentive programs for insurers and building owners to 
participate in pre-event monitoring, etc. 
Get the insurance companies involved – monitoring 
the building, give a 10% rebate on my insurance…. 
Really good insurance incentives.  
Include knowledge of area and geo hazards in 
deployment and planning. 
Access was a real logistic challenge, particularly with 
slippage, road damage. Very rural area 
Need access to background information on buildings Who actually knows the structural systems of that 
building actually is. 
Need access to background information on buildings Having the electronic records of building information 
is really valuable 
Indicator building program/sensors  
Measurement of quake magnitude not relevant, use 
pga 9peak ground acceleration) = can be monitored by 
pre-installing sensors – link to indicator buildings 
project, and project map/ID buildings (types/risks) 
ahead of time 
 
Need db of building stock, with taxonomy of building 
types, and ability to develop/add to taxonomy during 
event. 
Problem with that made it difficult to pull out 
information in the response – wants to make response 
decisions about tasking engineers – we’ve heard this 
style of building has not done well, can you tell us 
what other buildings like this – difficult to do.  
Ideally, should have access to information on buildings 
over the years. 
Responsible for buildings and authority – managing 
that information, matching to their knowledge of the 
buildings across the years.  
Local authority to have database of contact for 
owners/tenants – once assessments complete, so they 
can all be contacted 
 
Target Building Inspectors to residential and simple 
buildings. Good use of their expertise. 
Did engineers get involved in residential buildings – 
mostly BI. That was a better use of BI expertise? Yes. 
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Pre-event planning to include geotechnical hazards Can identify pre-event neighbourhoods that may have 
geo tech hazards; do that for the whole region, then 
pull out the maps you need when the earthquake hits. 
Key characteristics of a pre-event monitoring program. • Need knowledge of your building inventory 
• Knowledge of modeling of your buildings 
• Instrumentation of the buildings 
• Allows targeted monitoring and assessment.  
• Decision-making processes 
Gather info in advance on who the engineer was who 
designed the building, and what other info can be 
prepared electronically 
This info is valuable for complex buildings and should 
be easily accessible during an emergency 
Pre-event assessment of building/soil types – ideally 
mapped in GIS (possible grant project; Wellington 
Smart Seismic city program) – have at risk blogs ready 
to ID based on quake type 
 
Ideal: possible to have province-wide GIS map based 
system to plug into? Or app? (i.e. smaller communities 
don’t have resources for their own) 
 
Use technology to integrate building surveillance into 
BA processes, including situational awareness 
80 accelerometers around the city now – once it hits 
the golden number, then will shut down structures; 
Use PGA to prioritize DA 
EQ magnitude and potential for damage are not 
correlated. Correlation between the higher level of 
shaking (magnitude) and the volume of liquefaction. 
An even greater correlation exists for PGA 
Develop indicator building process. Indicator buildings – we are in favour of that and will 
be putting something in place 
In wellington used successfully, narrowed down to 80 
buildings that were re-visited 
Likely to be a small guidance document – 4 pages, as a 
note rather than a publication, recommending to 
councils that they do pre scoping and look at 
categories of buildings in their area, talk to owners 
about pre-inspection and monitoring; 
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Appendix 7: Stakeholder Workshop Participants’ Worksheet 
 
Thanks for your interest and participation in this project. 
This worksheet is a Data Collection tool, as well as a resource for you during the day. We will be asking 
you, throughout the day, to complete activities and jot down notes using this worksheet.  
You will be asked to turn in the worksheet near the end of the day so we can collect your thoughts and 
input. Please let us know if you would like to keep a copy of your notes – we’ll be happy to make and 
return a copy to you.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please note that your comments will be anonymous – we will NOT be recording your name or any 
information that would allow us to identify you or associate you with your comments and input.  
Also, please note that each section has a checkbox that you can use to identify sections of notes that 
you DO NOT WISH TO BE PART OF THE PROJECT DATA. If you check off the box, we will not include the 
comments from that section in the research study. 
If you have any questions or comments, please check in with any of the project team: Ron Bowles, 
Steven Bibby, Peter Mitchell, Pete Learoyd, Robyn Fenton, Paul Becker, Marguerite Laquinte Francis, or 
Dawn Ursuliak, or send an email to rbowles@jibc.ca.  
Thank you!  
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Agenda 
Time Activity Comments/Notes 
15 min Introduction Formal opening; welcome from partners, etc. 
5 Minutes The Terminology Wall Overview of terms and definitions exercise.  
 
Part I: Learning From Others 
15 min Scenario Scenario with initial questions:  
 What would you do? 
 What would you need? 
 What do you not know? Or not have (resources)? 
 
45 min Debrief and 
Introductions 
Participants introduce self, role, interest and one point 
from scenario exercise 
 
30 min Project Overview Introduce Research Team, project overview, findings to 
date 
 
Rest of 
morning 
Expert Presentations 10 – 15 minute presentations from key national and 
international experts 
 
Lunch 
Part II: Stakeholder Input 
15 min The Survey Open discussion on the survey results and comments.  
 
20 min A Generalized Building 
Assessment Framework 
Overview of generic BDSA model, based primarily on the 
New Zealand 2014 model 
 
60 minutes Table/Wall exercise 
 
 
Carousel exercise. Groups rotate through tables that 
contain material on key concepts. Groups answer prompt 
questions, then rotate to the next table. They review 
what’s been written, then add new comments.  
 
30 min Table Exercise debrief Summary and discussion. 
 
15 min Gaps Things we don’t know we don’t know. 
 
20 min Parking Lot discussion Review Parking Lot issues and prioritize concepts for 
further investigation 
15 min Next Steps and Wrap Summary and Next Steps 
Wrap up 
 
The Words Wall 
We have placed a number of posters around the workshop rooms. These posters include descriptions of 
key terms, concepts, and programs that we have encountered in our research.  We’ve found that 
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various programs use different terms and phrases to refer to similar ideas, and sometimes use the same 
words to refer to very different concepts. The intent of this activity is to give you some familiarity with 
the core concepts and key ideas we are working with and to start to work towards a common set of 
terms and definitions for a BC Building Assessment program. 
How to use the Words Wall 
We invite you to browse the walls, read the posters, and give us your thoughts, comments, and ideas 
throughout the day. Each “idea” will generally include: 
 A Poster or display that presents a concept, idea, or BA program.  
 A set of Red/Orange and Green/Yellow post-it notes and some pens 
 A flip chart pad for general comments 
General Comments
Additions
Suggestions
Other things to 
add to the idea
Problems
Issues
Better Ways of 
Thinking About 
This
Use the Flip Chart to make 
general or longer comments
Use the Post-it 
Notes for 
corrections and 
suggestions
Participant
Worksheet
Use your worksheet for 
private or extended 
comments to the Research 
Team
 
Please read and think about the concept or program.  You can provide your thoughts in a couple ways: 
On the Wall: 
 Post your thoughts and comments using the post-it notes! Use Green/Yellow stickies for 
comments that extend, support, or enrich the ideas. Use Red/Orange stickies to indicate 
comments that challenge or address problems or issues you see with the concepts.  
 Use the Flip Chart pad to make general comments. 
 
Privately:  
 Use the following pages to make any comments or notes for the research team that you would 
rather not provide publically 
 Email us your comments and thoughts (both during the workshop and any time in the next week 
following the workshop) at our Damage Safety Assessment email account: DSA@jibc.ca.  
 Speak to any of the project team members 
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Workshop Opening 
 
 
Welcome to the BC Building Assessment 
project workshop. 
 
Our first activity is a chance for you to 
meet your “table”-mates and consider 
your personal context for participating in 
building damage assessment.  
 
We will open with a scenario involving a 
disaster set in a BC context. At your table, 
we want to consider the following 
questions. You can introduce yourself 
and discuss these with your colleagues, 
but we ask that you please use the area 
below to record your answers (as part of 
our data collection!). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Define your roles in a scenario such as. For example, would you be in the EOC (if so, which 
EOC & in what role), Critical Infrastructure Owner/Agency, potential Building Assessment 
assessor, etc.)? 
 
 
 
 
DO NOT 
Collect as 
data 
 
 
  
2 What would you, particularly in relationship to building assessment? 
 
 
 
 
Check the box if you DO NOT 
want your answer as part of 
the research data. 
Write your answers 
in this area. 
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DO NOT 
Collect as 
data 
 
  
3. What would you need in order to perform those functions (e.g., training, tools, practice, 
etc.)? 
 
 
 
 
DO NOT 
Collect as 
data 
 
 
  
4. What do NOT KNOW? Or what do you NOT HAVE (e.g., resources)? 
 
 
 
 
DO NOT 
Collect as 
data 
 
 
  
 
 
Project Overview 
Use this page to record any comments or questions you have for the research team about the overall 
project itself and the research we are conducting.  
 
1 Notes, Comments or Questions for the Research Team: 
 
 
 
 
DO NOT 
Collect as 
data 
 
 
Expert Presentations 
Use this page to record any comments or questions you have for the research team in regards to the 
expert presentations.  
  
Presenter: 
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DO NOT 
Collect as 
data 
 
 
Expert Presentations 
Use this page to record any comments or questions you have for the research team in regards to the 
expert presentations.  
  
Presenter: 
 
 
 
 
DO NOT 
Collect as 
data 
 
 
 
Expert Presentations 
Use this page to record any comments or questions you have for the research team in regards to the 
expert presentations.  
  
Presenter: 
 
 
 
 
DO NOT 
Collect as 
data 
 
 
 
Expert Presentations 
Use this page to record any comments or questions you have for the research team in regards to the 
expert presentations.  
  
Presenter: 
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DO NOT 
Collect as 
data 
 
 
Expert Presentations 
Use this page to record any comments or questions you have for the research team in regards to the 
expert presentations.  
  
Presenter: 
 
 
 
 
DO NOT 
Collect as 
data 
 
 
Expert Presentations 
Use this page to record any comments or questions you have for the research team in regards to the 
expert presentations.  
  
Presenter: 
 
 
 
 
DO NOT 
Collect as 
data 
 
 
The Survey 
We thank you for taking the time to complete the survey. This session is an opportunity for us to present 
some initial collation of the data and to have an open discussion about the questions in the survey. 
Please use the area below to list any questions, comments, or suggestions related to the survey and 
discussion to the Research Team. 
 
 
 
DO NOT 
Collect as 
data 
 
 
 
A Generic Building Assessment Framework 
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In this session, we will present a simplified, generic building damage safety assessment model, based 
primarily on the New Zealand 2014 model. Please use the area below to pass along your comments, 
notes, and suggestions to the Research Team. 
Expert Presentations 
Use this page to record any comments or questions you have for the research team in regards to the 
expert presentations.  
  
Role of Building Assessment in overall Emergency Management: 
 
 
 
 
DO NOT 
Collect as 
data 
 
 
  
  
The Current BC Model: 
 
 
 
 
DO NOT 
Collect as 
data 
 
 
  
  
Generic Model – a starting place to build upon: 
 
 
 
 
DO NOT 
Collect as 
data 
 
 
  
  
Personnel and Teams – Who should be involved, how should teams be formed? 
 
 
 
 
DO NOT 
Collect as 
data 
 
 
  
  
Training and Support: 
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DO NOT 
Collect as 
data 
 
 
  
  
Information Flow and Documentation: 
 
 
 
 
DO NOT 
Collect as 
data 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
Any other comments or thoughts! 
 
 
 
 
DO NOT 
Collect as 
data 
 
 
  
Stakeholder Input Session 
In this session, you will work in groups to review several aspects of building assessment. You will, as a 
group, record comments and provide input at each station. Please use the following pages to record any 
personal or private thoughts that you would like to pass along to the research team. Please note the 
name of each station that you provide notes on. 
  
Station 1: 
 
 
 
 
DO NOT 
Collect as 
data 
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Station 2: 
 
 
 
 
DO NOT 
Collect as 
data 
 
 
  
  
Station 3: 
 
 
 
 
DO NOT 
Collect as 
data 
 
 
  
  
Station 4: 
 
 
 
 
DO NOT 
Collect as 
data 
 
 
  
  
Any other comments related to the Stakeholder Input sessions: 
 
 
 
 
DO NOT 
Collect as 
data 
 
 
  
Stakeholder Debrief Discussion 
  
Please provide any personal comments or feedback on this session to the Research Team: 
 
 
 
 
DO NOT 
Collect as 
data 
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Gaps 
  
Please provide any personal comments or feedback on this session to the Research Team: 
 
 
 
 
DO NOT 
Collect as 
data 
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The Parking Lot Discussion 
  
Please provide any personal comments or feedback on this session to the Research Team: 
 
 
 
 
DO NOT 
Collect as 
data 
 
 
 
Last Thoughts 
  
Please use this page to provide any last thoughts or comment to the Research Team: 
 
 
 
 
DO NOT 
Collect as 
data 
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Thank you! 
Thank you for your interest and participation in this workshop. We truly value your contributions and 
appreciate the time and expertise you have brought to the day.  
 
 
 
 
 
Please check this box if you would like a copy of your notes. 
 
 Please provide an email address that we can send the copy to: 
 
 OPTIONAL SECTIONS 
 
You are under no obligation to agree to any of the following items. There will be no 
negative consequences to not participating in these sections. You retain the right to 
withdraw you and your data from the study at any time by notifying the Research Team. 
 
 Optional:  Your name.  
 
Please note that we will not include your name or any identifying information with your 
data. Your contributions and participation will be confidential unless you specifically agree 
to being identified. 
 
 Optional: 
 
Please check here if you would like the Research Team to contact you to discuss any aspects 
of the workshop or the research with you. We will do our best to get in touch with you in 
the next week. 
 
 Best contact method and details (e.g., email address, telephone number: 
 
 Optional:  
 
Please check here IF YOU ARE WILLING TO BE IDENTIFIED AS A PARTICIPANT IN THIS 
WORKSHOP. 
 
 Optional: 
 
Please check here if YOU ARE WILLING TO BE IDENTIFIED AS THE SOURCE OF SPECIFIC 
QUOTES FROM THIS DATA.  
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Appendix 8: Stakeholder Input and Expert Working Group Attendees 
 
Expert Working Group June 26 and 26, 2017 
Name Organization Contact Information 
Agostino Goretti, C. 
Eng., Ph.D. 
(Travel from Rome) 
Seismic and Volcanic Risk 
Office  
Civil Protection 
Department 
 
Via Vitorchiano 4 
00189, Rome, Italy  
Land. +39 06 68204226 
Mob. +39 320 4326130 (Whatsapp) 
skype name: agostino goretti 
agostino.goretti@protezionecivile.it 
agostino.goretti@tiscali.it 
 
Satoshi Tanaka 
(Travel from Tokyo) 
Graduate School of 
Environment and Disaster 
Research 
Tokoha University 
325 Obuchi 
Fuji, Shizuoka,417-0801 
Japan 
Tel:+81-545-37-2047 
tanaka_s@fj.tokoha-u.ac.jp 
 
Ayse Hortacsu 
(Travel from 
California) 
Director of Projects 
Applied Technology Council 
201 Redwood Shores Parkway, Suite 240 
Redwood City, CA 94065-1175  USA 
650/595-1542 
Fax 650/593-2320 
ayse@atcouncil.org 
Fred Turner  
(Travel from 
California) 
Alfred E. Alquist Seismic 
Safety Commission 
Aa public policy advisory 
agency of State 
Government 
 
1755 Creekside Oaks Drive #100  
Sacramento, CA 95833 USA 
Land Line 916-263-0583  *Note New Phone Number  
Fax 916-263-0594 
Turner@StateSeismic.com 
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David Swanson, PE, SE 
LEED AP, F. SEI  
(via Skype) 
 
Principal/Director, 
Structural Engineering 
Reid Middleton 
 
Washington Office 
728 134th Street SW Suite 200  
Everett, WA 98204 
425-741-5011 | Cell: 425-508-7971  
Office: 425-741-3800 | Fax: 425-741-3900 
dswanson@reidmiddleton.com 
 
Daniel Stevens 
Director of Emergency 
Management 
City of Vancouver 
453 West 12th Ave 
Vancouver, BC V5Y 1V4 
604-829-4370 
daniel.stevens@vancouver.ca 
 
Dr. Carlos Estuardo 
Ventura, P.E., P.Eng. 
Professor and Director of 
Earthquake  
Department of Civil 
Engineering 
The University of British 
Columbia 
6250 Applied Science Lane 
Vancouver, B.C, V6T 1Z4 
phone:  (604) 822-6946 
mobile: (604) 319-6946 
fax: (604) 822-6901 
ventura@civil.ubc.ca 
 
Mike Andrews 
Acting Director 
Emergency Planning Officer  
North Shore Emergency 
Management Office 
 
147 E 14 St 
North Vancouver, BC V7L 2N4 
Direct 778 338 6306 
mandrews@cnv.org 
 
Arnie van Hattem 
Ministry of Transportation 
and Infrastructure, South 
Coast Region 
Suite 310 – 1500 Woolridge Street 
Coquitlam, BC V3K 0B8 
604-678-4708 / 604-788-2515 
Arnie.vanHattem@gov.bc.ca 
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Glenn Cooper 
(travel from Victoria) 
Team Commander 
CFB Esquimalt USAR Team 
|BFC Esquimalt ELSARMU 
Canadian Forces Base 
Esquimalt | Base des forces 
canadiennes Esquimalt 
National Defence | Défense 
nationale 
 
PO Box 17000 Stn Forces 
Victoria, Canada V9A 7N2 
Telephone | Téléphone   250-363-2774 
Cellular | Cellulaire         250-213-8853 
Facsimile | Télécopieur 250-363-7935 
Glenn.Cooper@forces.gc.ca 
 
 
NOTE: Per Informed Consent requirements, names of individual participants are not included in this 
document. However, the participating organizations and agencies are identified.  
Stakeholder Group – June 26, 2017 only 
Name Organization Location 
 BC Liquor Distribution Branch Vancouver, BC 
 Emergency Management BC (EMBC)  Victoria, BC 
 Emergency Management BC (EMBC)  Victoria, BC 
 
Earthquake Engineering Research Institute  
British Columbia Chapter  
Vancouver, BC 
 Bowen Island Bowen Island, BC 
 BC Hydro: Generation Civil Design Vancouver, BC 
 Vancouver Airport Authority (YVR) Vancouver, BC 
 Chief Building Official City of Vancouver Vancouver, BC 
 
Regional Emergency Planner 
Integrated Partnership for Regional Emergency  
Vancouver, BC 
 
Regional Emergency Planner 
Integrated Partnership for Regional Emergency  
Vancouver, BC 
 Shared Services BC Vancouver, BC 
 Structural Engineering Association of BC (SEABC) Vancouver, BC 
 Applied Science Technologists & Technicians of BC Vancouver, BC 
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 Building Officials Association of BC Vancouver, BC 
 Hollyburn Properties North Vancouver 
 Health Authority Vancouver 
 Health Authority Vancouver 
 City of Delta  Delta 
 City of Port Coquitlam Port Coquitlam 
 City of Port Coquitlam Port Coquitlam 
 BC Housing Vancouver 
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Appendix 9: Research Team Members’ Goal Statements (Themed) 
Theme Statement(s) 
Framework and Scope  Articulate a BC process for PDBA 
 Provide the system structure to facilitate the implementation of a 
PDBA programme by authorities 
 Harmonized program between municipality and provincial and 
country 
 An operational damage assessment process in BC 
o All stakeholders buy-in and participate 
o Legislation put in place as needed 
o Communities develop own D.A. programs that harmonize 
with/provincial programs 
Process  Command and control processes are established 
 Have process in place for municipality to have authority over 
placards/assessments from declared emergency response to 
business as usual. (NZ model) 
 A process is developed which coordinates the input of credentialed / 
non-credentialed individuals so building damage assessments are 
carried out and documented in an appropriate, effective and timely 
fashion 
 A framework is provided giving clarity on the types of buildings the 
various categories of credentialed and non-credentialed people are 
to focus on so their effectiveness is maximized 
 Reduce professional liability 
Characteristics  Meet the contractual obligations, while staying within scope 
 Framework is sustainable, regularly reviewed / updated 
 Strong foundation 
 Adaptable to context  
 Framework is simple / scalable 
 Scalable and adaptable to both community level and other 
jurisdictions 
 Useful resources 
Components  Have a clear framework with definitions, roles, processes that can be 
implemented easily 
 Practice guidelines 
 Models, tools, resources to support (eg. Building taxonomy, 
personnel matrix) 
 Create an easy to use tool kit that facilitates emergency response by  
o Providing communication plan 
o Outlining plan of attack (and assist with how to prioritize) 
o Developing a plan that is easy to implement for various 
emergencies: fire, flood, earthquake etc. and include details 
related to each 
 PDBA manual / field guide framework / documents 
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 Have a clear process for development and  training 
 Plan for provincial implementation 
 Possible draft sample bylaw language 
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Appendix 10: Research Team Members’ Hopes and Dreams Statements 
(Themed) 
Theme Statement(s) 
Vision: an Exemplar 
System that is Scalable, 
Adaptable and Adopted in 
Different 
Jurisdictions/Contexts 
 Provincial program expands to become a national 
standard.  Supported and initiated by every province. 
 Seen as resources / experts 
 Exemplar system that other countries, regions draw upon 
 Multiple countries harmonize their D.A programs with Canada to 
create an international standard for D.A. 
o Supported by UN (UNDAC), including funding 
Awareness, Utility, and 
Acceptance by 
Stakeholders 
 Usable and seen as usable by BC Stakeholders 
 Stakeholder buy in / collaboration 
 Stakeholder both internal and external to local authority i.e. – 
EMBC, professional organizations etc. 
 To achieve buy-in from regional stakeholders to facilitate the 
implementation of a D.A. programme at local authority level 
 Empowering local abilities to own/run their own DA programme  
 Enhance disaster response capability in BC 
Implementation of a 
Functional System at 
Multiple Levels 
 
 Pilot simulation 
 3-5 year plan for implementation 
 That a local authority will adapt and validate that system / 
structure in practice 
 This program is adopted by municipalities, large and small, and 
helps them be more prepared/resilient 
 Community roll out 
 Leads to rolling out framework across Canada 
 Emergency response incorporated into plans 
Resolution of Issues 
around Liability and 
Education  
 Liability issues are resolved with clarity 
 Provincial legislation is changed to indemnify professionals acting 
in emergency response 
 Consistent documentation is developed for various types of 
assessors 
 Emergency response and damage assess is incorporated / required 
in professional training university required To embed the 
framework training within JIBC curriculum with appropriate 
responders 
Sustainability and 
Enrichment 
 Long Term Vision for enrichment / further development 
 All stakeholders support the framework so it can be implemented 
and maintained 
 To explore further funding for important issues that arise that are 
outside of scope 
 Sustainability needs to be kept in mind 
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 Connected Phase II sustainability / continuation planning and 
funding 
 projects i.e.- building monitoring 
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Appendix 11: Themes from Key Points and Principles Data Related to 
Goals and Principles 
 
Table 1: Themes in Key Points related to Overall Goals and Functioning of PDBA 
Themes 
 Adaptability 
 Aware and capable 
 Complex process 
 Decision-making rationale 
 Differing needs – e.g. buildings, assessments assessors, etc. 
 Goals: usability, safety, others 
 Information collection, organization, distribution 
 Information Validity 
 Intelligence – gathering and keeping current 
 Legal: can handle (no need for emergency powers), emergency powers, business as usual 
 Local vs external personnel and processes 
 Logistics 
 Overlap with other EM and Local Authority processes 
 Pre-planning 
 Process, guidelines and Interpretation 
 Situational Awareness 
Table 2: Themes in Principles related to Overall Goals and Functioning of PDBA 
Themes 
 This is about information management 
 This is about situational awareness 
 This is about adaptation to local need and context 
 Remember this is a formal process: legalities, evidence, documentation 
 PDBA is an ongoing process that changes over time 
 Fools rush in – take the time to set up procedures and infrastructure before sending people in 
 Assessments are complex and overlapping (BA and EM and LA) 
 Keep things as pragmatic, practical, and simple as possible 
 Building efficiencies with other processes and assessments 
 Plan for multiple events (both in framework and on the ground) 
 Need to adapt to BC context 
 More known and preplanned the better 
 Develop taxonomies of buildings, requirements, goals, assessments, assessors 
 Solid guidelines and frameworks, with adaptation and agility in implementation is critical 
 Allow emergence and adaptation of decision-making and thresholds 
 Assessments change over time 
 Be sensitive to time and efficient (as goal) 
 Stay focused on the goals of the project and the framework (compare with overlapping 
processes) 
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Appendix 12: Discussion notes on Principles  
 
Themes emerging as principles: 
 This is about information management 
o Need to stress that this is important both before, during and after. 
o In scope and out of scope – there will be information processes that we develop, but 
need to outline how that interacts with out of scope processes. Need to be aware what 
we include, what we exclude (but identify for the next project).  
o Always underestimating the resources required to process data in a timely way that 
allows meaningful decisions for the next day.  
o Is there a distinction between manual and digital – digital could be processed more 
quickly.  
o If we have processes, how will people be able to implement those – how do we tie those 
together – need to make sure what we create can be used across the board.  
o Scalability – need to support both small municipality and large scale organizations. 
o Need to be aware that information management will be both manual and digital 
depending on the context/municipality 
 This is about situational awareness 
o Resources important -= will never have enough resources, need to target – need to 
know the need, before you can target 
o How we fit with ICS and other EM processes 
o Knowing where buildings were, what the risk is what type of damage – some comments 
in there; matching personnel to type and amount of damage 
o ? where did you get the SA from? How do we share info to make purposeful choices 
o Recommendations for what you can do ahead of time. Identify critical buildings ahead 
of time 
o Have building managers and owners preplan/assess, allows resources to be allocated 
elsewhere 
o Challenge is applying the human element to this – is it really a strategy that we want to 
identify with heavy emphasis on elements of the framework. 
o Preassess, register all parts of what we are doing, but what is in scope and what’s out. 
What’s missing is the overall strategy. 
o Every community will be slightly different – but strategy can apply to all. E.g. FN on GIS 
might not show up in maps.  
o Consider reframing framework as a series of layered strategies, rather than as 
hardwired resources and processes 
 This is about adaptation to local need and context 
o Also about the resources that are available at the time and the relevant threat 
o Scalability, ability to meet needs of small and large communities 
o Tools need to be accessible 
o What comes out has to be adaptable – has to be able to be used in multiple contexts – 
or utility will be low. 
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o Take into consideration the training level as well – develop exercises that are targeted 
to the participants in each community 
o RACI model – way of implementing; are we responsible for this element or just 
informing it 
o Responsible, accountable, consulted, informed 
o Strategy is generalizable, framework is customized or customizable to specific types of 
communities or situations; this is what has to be done, this is what is expected of me,  
o Prescriptive with an example or make it performance based. Upper level strategy, way 
of how to implement it.  framework, implementation is customizable to situation or 
users.  
o Training could become each community building its own plan; course on overall strategy 
(same language); second focuses on framework – implementation at local level 
o Common definitions and starting points; but allow flexibility for implementation; need 
to brief and make aware each day;  
o Difference safety and usability; this puts this into context; safety is not interpretive – it 
is defined through the framework; usability may be a community based discussion and 
decision.  Prescriptive about safety; performance – discussion on other topics. Here’s an 
example of how you could do it, adapt to your situation.  
o Who makes those decisions? We specify what the role would be, and what would be 
expected.  
o Not about acceptable level of risk – guidelines need to be developed around level of risk 
you will use in this event.  
o Can’t be too open – need examples and prescription where needed. 
o Adjacent communities, including FN’s, need to be aware of the actions that each other 
will be taking  
o Is it role of government to tell you not to go back into your house?  
o Remember this is a formal process: legalities, evidence, documentation 
 
 PDBA is an ongoing process that changes over time 
o Community should have the ability to decide usability safety levels/overlap;  
o Need strategy to provide resources to help communities to make those decisions 
o Use examples to avoid going too far down the rabbit hole rather than recommending 
technical solutions 
o Safety – govt needs to look into; usability is more context dependent 
o Need to look at how changes over time 
o One thing you need to decide is how far out in time your process will go 
o Or tie to discussions with types of assessments 
o Can have flexibility in your local setting 
o How far out in assessments will your process go – through to rebuild, or just get them 
out of the rain 
o Give examples for each category – may have suggestions/examples for types of 
assessment; 
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o Steven’s map – origin is inside scope; retrofit/rebuild probably out of scope – 
mentioned/guidelines at outer side 
o Remember retrofit 
 Fools rush in – take the time to set up procedures and infrastructure before sending people in 
 Assessments are complex and overlapping (BA and EM and LA) 
o See wall map 
o Tensions between complexity and keep as simple as possible 
o Wall map – identify considerations in each segment – keeps simple and tight at that 
level, while overall diagram/model/strategies incorporate the complexity of the overall. 
o Not necessarily overlapping, more progressive and tied to time and resources 
o In terms of big picture, current levels of training – level 1, 2, 3 – at level one, just go do 
it; at level 2 focus on admin, 3rd level coordinates – use leveling to manage simplicity 
and complexity 
o What is in and out of scope at each level as key point 
o Added: govt regulated vs market driven – in terms of complexity 
o ICS – simple structure with complex tasks underneath it – layered presentation of 
information and content 
o Where the simplicity comes in is that I know my role, where I fit, what is expected of 
me.  
 Keep things as pragmatic, practical, and simple as possible 
o Tool kit to allow different communities to meet objectives of strategy 
o Identifying the aspects that form the framework; farthest we go down – what are the 
considerations you need in developing/implementing at your level, then some 
examples. 
o Slightly offset on some topics – some boxes more in scope, others less in scope – e.g. 
placards may be mostly in scope, while setting up teams might be at strategic level 
o More universal goes in the box 
o Will cut down a lot of the red tape – commonality of strategy but freedom to implement 
locally 
 Building efficiencies with other processes and assessments 
o BCH draft summary of other assessments performed post fire 
 Plan for multiple events (both in framework and on the ground) 
o Indicator building concept – define simply – include in your plan or not 
o Strategies or suggestions to consider at local level 
o Goals – will this withstand another similar shock? This date this time this building right 
now – not valid for another event; clear definition of what does this assessment mean 
(community defines or us) what is responsibility of owner after placarding; what is 
authority of ????/LA to enforce that. (e.g. Emergency to CERA to BAU) 
o On one side: earthquakes and aftershocks; on the other, large geographic area where 
you have multiple types of damage assessments; floods, fires, earthquakes 
o At earthquake level, include indicator buildings – need agreed upon typology – doesn’t 
exist, so strategy has guidelines for developing a typology, etc. may be as far as we can 
go at this time. 
o Could use examples of strategies from NZ 
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o In framework/strategy, scalable – eg. Use registry to identify who can go to different 
events or use for overall 
 Need to adapt to BC context 
o Keep strategies at the more generic level, but use examples from the BC context 
o Speak to how it is scalable to small community or national level in each section; BC 
needs to do this, this, this; in absence of provincial level, municipality must do bylaw for 
…. 
o Include BC terminology; for scalability, have to consider what other provinces or 
communities have to do 
o Identify where different levels of authority are already set that are different than BC 
o At front of document, statement and dictionary of terms; we are using …., you have to 
search for the similar authorities or organizations within your context 
o We can’t address all the variability in municipal context, but need to identify “needs” – 
what you have to do; from a Canadian context, deal with naming conventions;  
 More known and preplanned the better 
o id critical ahead of time 
o Have preplan assessments available at the time of event 
o What goes in is strategies – you should preplan as much as possible, then provide 
examples 
 Develop taxonomies of buildings, requirements, goals, assessments, assessors 
o Tools and resources –  
o Create BC typology, scalable outside BC by other groups 
o Suggestions/strategies for other jurisdictions to adapt to their own settings 
o When we say safety, we mean; when we say damage, we mean… people can harmonize 
or adapt to their own settings. 
o Provide rationale and background to development of typologies and tools; based on EM 
processes, etc. Safety most crucial, then usability, then damage… etc.  
o Important as professional groups looking at the highest standard – need to rationalize 
why non-credentialed may be performing some forms of assessment before others are 
available at the scene, etc. need to include these rationales. 
 Solid guidelines and frameworks, with adaptation and agility in implementation as critical 
o Strategy in scope – strict guidelines will depend on topic 
o Some may be minimum standards; others more open ended 
o Change to solid strategies, with adaptation and agility 
o Safety is less flexible; usability is more flexible 
o Issues of cost are addressed in BC by separate team (e.g. insurance, damage, repair 
costs – two different levels; BC different teams, in some jurisdictions may be part of 
original team) include in rationale 
 Allow emergence and adaptation of decision-making and thresholds 
 Assessments change over time 
 Be sensitive to time and efficient (as goal) 
o Use the wall model – efficiency vs depth is going to vary on the context of the situation, 
the time in the event, the scope and area of the damage 
o Safety easy – that’s efficiency  
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o Usability more about quality of information 
o Strategy must present this as one of the discussions to have at the local level, at the 
beginning 
 Stay focused on the goals of the project and the framework (compare with overlapping 
processes) 
Images from the workshop: 
 
 
Figure A8. Changing Goals and Resources. 
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Figure A9. In and Out of Scope. 
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Appendix 13: Framework Needs and Requirements 
 
 Note Context Colour Priority 
Depend-
ency 
Core 
Concept 
SC056 Goals map/matrix: 
safety, usability, damage, vs time 
 
orange 
1 1 1 
SC044 Taxonomy - buildings - delineate 
types of building stock 
 
orange 
1 1 1 
SC019 Levels 
Provincial 
Regional 
Municipal 
Neighbourhood  
Local 
Cherry pick from list of 
requirements to meet 
local need; "consider 
these types of things" 
red 
1 1 1 
SC009 Scalability is related to:  
level of risk tolerance 
complexity of event 
availability of resources 
time/events over time 
geography/local ->municipal-
>region 
x-factors: weather, etc. 
Model or taxonomy 
that supports 
scalability as a 
principle throughout 
framework 
 
1 1 1 
SC045 what is reasonable for different 
levels - e.g. neighbourhood 
response vs municipal 
look at aspect matrix - 
may have this. 
orange 
1 1 2 
SC051 Models and concepts 
Types of Assessment 
Term 
Goal(s) 
Outcomes 
Who (required capabilities) 
 
orange 
1 1 2 
SC058 Concept of Building Status as 
central concept 
changing status over time 
Process is not about "A" placard, 
but rather on the current status of 
a building based on what we know 
about it at a given point in time. 
 
orange 
1 1 2 
SC007 Overarching Concept: need 
guidelines on how to make things 
scalable for community - 
scalability factors 
Framework, Guiding 
Principles 
yellow 
1 1 2 
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 Note Context Colour Priority 
Depend-
ency 
Core 
Concept 
SC025 Terms/Definitions 
credentialed/non-cred 
define each, identify core 
capabilities for each 
in relationship to DA at high level 
 
yellow 
1 1 2 
SC052 Levels of assessment 
pre-event, area/windshield, 
safety, usability, damage, repair, 
building permitting 
Definition and considerations, 
examples, expertise required to 
perform that type of assessment 
 
yellow 
1 1 2 
SC049 DSA Algorithm 
 
green 1 1 3 
SC002 Develop a list of Aspects by 
"level"; not all levels will have all 
aspects, but use common 
framework 
Basic format for 
presenting framework 
as a matrix 
yellow 
1 1 3 
SC055 Need Common Engineering 
Approach 
address private with poor criteria - 
to get back into business - DA, 
private to retrofit - ? Tie in to 
Peter's project 
  yellow 
1 1 3 
SC047 Taxonomy 
building across horizontal 
assessment, type of people 
vertically 
 
green 
1 2 2 
SC010 Need Model of Stakeholders with 
roles, mandates, responsibilities: 
Prov 
Reg 
Local 
NGO 
Privates 
Professional bodies 
etc 
Model or taxonomy 
for identifying roles, 
responsibilities, etc of 
different stakeholder 
groups - NOTE 
different than the 
Event layers model 
(need name for this) 
 
regulators vs govt vs 
education 
yellow 
1 2 2 
SC059 Definitions for placards 
 
green 1 2 3 
SC042 Assessment process per building 
type 
identify types of buildings that 
require specific info on 
assessment - be cautious of scope 
creep 
 
orange 
1 2 3 
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 Note Context Colour Priority 
Depend-
ency 
Core 
Concept 
SC001 N,P,R, M, N: vs Aspect 
Considerations, 
Guidelines/evidence examples, 
and comments 
Basic format for 
presenting framework 
as a matrix 
yellow 
1 2 3 
SC053 Methods of identifying Building 
Status: 
placards - USAR, permits, markings 
use, importance, role, now 
recorded, how status is 
monitored, how these relate to 
each other 
 
yellow 
1 2 3 
SC015 Terminology: 
 
credentialed, non-credentialed 
who:  
architects 
engineers (what types) 
building officials/building 
inspectors 
other? 
Need glossary  red 
1 3 1 
SC054 Potential Tool or Requirements for 
Building Status record 
Like a medical Chart 
matrix: time across horizontal 
6 or 8 pieces of info that should be 
tracked over time 
highlight importance at different 
times 
 
green 
1 3 3 
SC005 How does event change all 
aspects? Do we do an All Hazards 
framework, or do earthquake and 
then adapt for floods, fires, etc. 
Decision required Red 
1 3 3 
SC036 Event to emerg to business as 
normal transition 
legal, administration, placarding 
and permitting 
issues exist 
 
yellow 
1 3 3 
SC024 Roles: considerations, functions 
and requirements for different 
roles, e.g. BA manager, team 
leader, assessor, info manager, 
trainer 
 
green 
2 2 2 
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 Note Context Colour Priority 
Depend-
ency 
Core 
Concept 
SC041 Roadmap - Matrix 
6 easy steps 
"quick easy" for newby 
to 
rich, nuanced system for manual 
for ?metro 
 
green 
2 2 3 
SC062 Timeline and perspective 
linkages between pre- and post  
monitoring, assessing, return to 
normal 
 
orange 
2 3 2 
SC032 BA Admin guidelines and process 
recommendations 
 
green 
2 3 3 
SC033 BA Teams - select, assign, get and 
give info 
 
green 
2 3 3 
SC034 Deployment 
concepts, guidelines for 
deployments 
areas 
types of buildings 
sequence or priority  
how to match to resources 
 
green 
2 3 3 
SC046 Assessment forms 
recommend content, 
considerations, examples 
?tweak vs?static 
 
green 
2 3 3 
SC050 Field Manuals  
recommendations - teams, models 
What's in: 
checklists, algorithms, contents 
do we produce? Probably not 
 
green 
2 3 3 
SC043 Manuals and Tools 
focus - nuance/contextual 
simplified 
or both 
credentialed, non-cred 
 
orange 
2 3 3 
SC063 Placards - customize in use, what 
can be customized vs what should 
"firm" 
 
orange 
2    
SC064 Placard definitions 
colours, levels, simplicity vs 
nuance - e.g. Nz experience 
 
orange 
2    
SC065 Other related assessments and 
their relationship to DSA - List, def, 
relationship - e.g. USAR, geotech 
 
orange 
2    
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 Note Context Colour Priority 
Depend-
ency 
Core 
Concept 
SC003 Check contract and SOW for level 
of detail required of framework 
Task Red 2 
   
SC004 Usig seismic for worst case 
scenario. Have to ensure that we 
incorporate other hazards and 
events as well. 
Decision required Red 
2    
SC021 Need to address 
local/neighbourhood 
teams/needs, but outside scope of 
this project: Principles and 
recommendations 
 
Red 
2    
SC011 Overall process at Provincial level 
is about how DA works, how 
different Das interact: 
who has leadership? 
What does leadership look like at 
different levels? 
Leadership over what things? 
What impact does this have on 
other aspects of framework? 
Governance questions Yellow 
2    
SC016 Critical Information Requirements 
 
what information is critical from 
an assessment? 
How to match info with who it 
should be shared with? 
List yellow 
2    
SC026 Tiers of People, Levels of training, 
tiered capabilities, level of 
expertise - similar to NZ Tier 1, 2, 3 
 
yellow 
2    
SC030 Linkages between BA & EOC 
 
yellow 2    
SC031 Model for validating level and 
quality of information 
type or level of assessor 
how long is info valid? 
Esp if outside formal LA process 
 
yellow 
2    
SC037 Non- Local Authority Info  
has assessment been done, if so 
by what level assessor and what 
was outcome 
 
yellow 
2    
SC039 Situational Awareness 
dealing with pieces of data from 
various places 
what data, where coming from,  
data in and out - e.g. $ for my 
house 
 
yellow 
2    
6.9.1e TECHNICAL REPORT  
APPENDIX 13: FRAMEWORK NEEDS & REQUIREMENTS 
313 
 
 Note Context Colour Priority 
Depend-
ency 
Core 
Concept 
SC040 Overlay of DSA with other L.A. 
Processes - e.g. CI, school, private, 
owner 
 
yellow 
2    
SC060 What are alternatives to placards 
for non-LA processes - e.g., private 
or owner assessments, informal 
assessments - how to distinguish 
"official" from other placards/info 
 
yellow 
2    
SC066 Consecrations for leveraging 
overlapping assessments 
e.g. S.S., geotech, USAR - 
guidelines for this should be 
developed - careful of scope creep 
 
yellow 
2    
SC067 Expand concept of building status 
and markings 
other, USAR, Geo to Placard to 
permitting 
process for transition of 
ownership & process over time 
 
yellow 
2    
SC017 Information Input and Output 
model 
Graphic with 
definitions. What 
information is coming 
into BA process. What 
should be done with 
that info? What info 
should be coming 
back out and where 
should it go? 
 
2    
SC020 Tool Kits performance 
standards by context 
(e.g., levels) and 
examples 
 
2    
SC018 What everybody needs:  
from EOC to Individual 
 
pre-prepared kits 
daily "top ups" - disposables 
basic supplies 
assessment equipment 
safety considerations 
contents of kits for 
various tasks and 
personnel - pre-built 
and ready to go, or 
with list of what's to 
be added. 
 
Refer to scalability 
matrix. 
green 
3    
SC023 Appendix: List of Stuff you Need 
by levels 
matrix - items down vertical, 
LAMRP across top 
 
green 
3    
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 Note Context Colour Priority 
Depend-
ency 
Core 
Concept 
SC006 For some aspects, only key points, 
but for others may have more 
specific examples, resources, 
descriptions 
Framework Red 
3    
SC027 Identify types of data that may 
come in, list type of info, what is 
available, what is required: 
DSA, USAR, Building Surveillance, 
owners' assessments 
 
yellow 
3    
SC035 Training procedures - BA 
coordinator 
 
yellow 
3    
SC048 Dynamic assessment 
scalable allocation of resources 
and impact on assessment types 
and strategies 
 
yellow 
3    
SC061 Guidelines for changing building 
status - changing placards 
 
Yellow 
3    
SC008 Stay high level - cannot get too 
detailed !!!!! 
Guiding Principles Red 
     
SC012 Situational Awareness: 
what data did you use  
what data did you want 
how did you use data to make dx 
how to develop  & maintain 
Situational Awareness: 
 
tied to each level from EOC to 
Prov/National 
Situational Awareness Red 
     
SC022 Overall process should be similar - 
don't go too far in providing 
criteria - need to find appropriate 
level of detail - specify "types" but 
not content 
scope creep Red 
     
SC028 Various stakeholders or groups 
to what degree do we incorporate 
and provide guidance for each? 
E.g. private owners, property 
managers, CI 
 
Red 
     
SC038 how elements of neighbourhood, 
school district, building owner 
assessments relate to Local 
Authority processes 
 
Red 
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 Note Context Colour Priority 
Depend-
ency 
Core 
Concept 
SC013 Future Data 
entries 
 - type f assessment 
 - outcome 
 
what were categories people used 
to allocate resources? 
What was important data? 
What were people recording? 
 
yellow 
     
SC014 Process:  
how formal? 
who owns? 
What can change at different 
levels? 
 
Yellow 
     
SC029 Need: Sources of info: Seismic 
sensors 
 
yellow 
     
SC057 Acceptable level of risk for a 
community may place different 
levels of emphasis on life safety, 
usability, damage, etc, and 
personnel required to assess that 
 
yellow 
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Appendix 14: Framework Structure and Table of Contents 
 
 Aspect Considerations Guidance         
TOC 
  
General System Provincial Regional Community 
Team/ 
Assessors Building Comments 
Resources/ 
Tools /Artefacts 
Core Concepts            
Definitions            
Guiding 
Principles 
           
Governance            
Administration            
Strategy            
Operations            
Information 
Management 
           
Assessors             
Assessment            
Building Status            
Placards            
Training            
Personnel            
 
Table A2. Framework Structure and Table of Contents. 
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Appendix 15: Validation Workshop Agenda 
 
May 15, 2018 – 9am to 4pm 
Registration and Coffee at 8:30am 
Justice Institute of BC, New Westminster – Room: NWCL304 
Time Item  
8:30-9:00 Registration, coffee and snacks  
9:00-9:30 Welcome and Introductions RON | STEVEN 
 
9:30-10:15 Overview of PDBA project and framework  
10:15-10:30 Coffee break  
10:30–11:30 PDBA Assessment Matrix  
 
Questions for consideration 
1. Building types, assessment types, assessor types? 
2. Did we miss anything? Are there any gaps? 
3. Is this applicable to your community/organisation? Can 
you see using this? 
PDBA Assessment Debrief 
 
ROBYN | PETER 
 
 
11:30 –11:45 
 
PDBA Organization and Operations – Overview 
Brief presentation on research projects findings related to:  
1. PDBA Support/EOC Structure  
2. Roles and Responsibilities 
3. Team Structures and Assignment Considerations 
4. Deployment Considerations 
PETE | RON 
 
11:45-2:00 
(3 rotations 
plus lunch) 
 
Rotation #1: EOC/Support Structure, Roles and 
Responsibilities 
Questions to consider: 
1. In what ways do the research findings align with your 
community/organizations requirements?  
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2. What PDBA EOC organizational model (and 
communication/reporting lines) are you considering for 
your community/organization? 
3. What PDBA management/support roles and primary 
responsibilities is your community/organization 
considering?  
12:15-1:00 Lunch  
 Rotation #2: Team Structures and Assignment Considerations 
Questions to consider:  
1. In what ways do the research findings align with your 
community/organizations requirements?  
2. What considerations are you using when determining the 
make-up of your individual PDBA teams? (i.e., size of 
team, knowledge/skills of members, local knowledge, 
organizational knowledge, third-party groups…) 
3. What factors or considerations have you identified when 
determining initial and ongoing daily PDBA team 
assignments? (i.e., who will go where and do what?)   
 
Tables: Peter | Robyn 
 Rotation #3: Deployment Considerations 
Questions to consider: 
1. In what ways do the research findings align with your 
community/organizations requirements? (View provided 
research documents prior to workshop) 
2. What type of structure/content would you include in a 
daily briefing for PDBA teams? 
3. What measures has your community/organization 
considered around the health and safety of personnel 
when deployed into an emergency/disaster zone?  
 
Tables: Ron | Jim 
2:00-2:15 Organization and Operations Debrief  
2:15-2:45 Placards, Forms and Documentation 
 
Questions to consider: 
1. Do we allow white and green simultaneous?  
2. Authority to post/remove?  
3. Are the same placards/forms sufficient for pre/post 
emergency? 
4. Do we need a working group to manage these in future? 
STEVEN | JIM 
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2:45-3:00 Coffee break  
3:00-3:30 Transitioning Between Pre-event, Response, & Recovery:  
 
Questions to consider: 
1. Is there an existing or planned data management 
system?  
2. How will assessment processes and authority transition 
from emergency powers to business-as-usual?  
3. Does the pre-event data collection adequately address 
the LA needs? 
4. Does the framework work well with the way your org. 
functions?  
5. Does the framework sufficiently address liability 
protection during and after the emergency? 
 
3:30-4:00 Summary,  Next Steps and Wrap Up 
1. Review 
2. Parking Lot 
3. Next Steps 
4. Wrap Up 
RON | STEVEN 
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Appendix 16: Validation Workshop Attendees’ Organizational Affiliations 
 
NOTE: Participant names removed per research project’s Informed Consent provisions.  
Stakeholders 
  ACADEMIC CI LOCAL 
AUTHORITIES 
PROFESSIONAL 
BODIES 
GOVT MILITARY OTHER DA 
STAKEHOLDERS 
DA 
PROGRAMS 
PRIVATE 
SECTOR 
Indigenous 
 Health Emergency Management BC     1   1   
 Department of Civil Engineering | 
UBC 
1          
  PhD | PE - CEng MICE (Works with 
Carlos Ventura at UBC) 
1          
 Emergency Management BC 
(EMBC)  
    1      
 Richmond School District No. 38     1   1   
 Applied Science Technologists & 
Technicians of BC 
   1       
 Bowen Island Municipality   1     1   
 Vancouver Airport Authority (YVR)  1      1   
 City of Vancouver    1     1   
 City of Vancouver     1      
 Indigenous Services Canada (ISC)     1     1 
 Saanich - few minutes late   1        
 North Shore Emergency 
Management Office 
  1     1   
 Soda Creek Band   1       1 
 Insurance Bureau of Canada     1     1  
 Hollyburn Properties       1 1 1  
 Emergency Management BC 
(EMBC)  
    1      
 City of Vancouver   1        
 City of Port Coquitlam   1     1   
 Building Officials of BC    1       
 "CFB Esquimalt USAR Team       1     
 BC Housing     1   1   
 Building and Safety Standards 
Branch Office of Housing and 
Construction Standards Ministry of 
Municipal Affairs and Housing 
    1      
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  2 1 7 3 8 1 1 9 2 2 
 
Team 
  ACADEMIC CI LOCAL 
AUTHORITIES 
PROFESSIONAL 
BODIES 
GOVT MILITARY OTHER DA 
STAKEHOLDERS 
DA 
PROGRAMS 
PRIVATE 
SECTOR 
Indigenous 
Ron Bowles Justice Institute of BC 1          
Cindy Moran BC Housing     1      
Dawn Ursuliak Justice Institute of BC 1          
Jim Forrest BC Housing     1      
Pete Learoyd Justice Institute of BC 1          
Peter Mitchel Association of Professional 
Engineers & Geoscientists of BC  
   1       
Robyn Fenton Architectural Institute of BC (AIBC)    1       
Steven Bibby BC Housing     1   1   
Joseph Huynh  BC Housing     1      
Marguerite Laquinte 
Francis 
Architectural Institute of BC (AIBC)    1       
Team Totals  3 0 0 3 4  0 1 0 0 
 
 
 
 
 
  ACADEMIC CI LOCAL 
AUTHORITIES 
PROFESSIONAL 
BODIES 
GOVT MILITARY OTHER DA 
STAKEHOLDERS 
DA 
PROGRAMS 
PRIVATE 
SECTOR 
Indigenous 
Totals 5 1 7 6 12 1 1 10 2 2 
 
Table A3. Validation Workshop Attendees Organizational Affiliation. 
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Appendix 17: Draft PDBA Assessment Matrix 
  
A key component of PDBA operations is the community-level formation of assessment teams, and – 
more directly – ensuring that assessment teams have the skills and capabilities required to function 
effectively. The PDBA Assessment Matrix provides an example of how communities can assemble teams 
of credentialed and non-credentialed personnel to effectively engage in post disaster building 
assessment.  
Communities consist of a number of types of building, ranging in complexity by location, size, 
construction material, construction type, and other factors. Similarly, communities have a variety of 
different credentialed or professional personnel who may be involved in PDBA assessment, including 
structural engineers, architects, and other engineers. In addition, communities may have non-
credentialed personnel who, with additional training, may participate in building assessment.  
The PDBA Assessment Matrix is an example of a tool that communities may use to better understand 
what types of building stock are in their community and who can assess those buildings after a disaster.  
NOTE: The following matrix is an example only – it is not intended to be a definitive tool, but rather a 
starting point which communities can adapt based on their own unique needs and capabilities. Please 
see the example provided after the generic matrix for how a small community might adapt the matrix to 
meet its own needs.   
Definitions and descriptions 
 
The Matrix relates three elements: building type, assessment type, and assessor type. 
Building Type: The matrix lists a variety of buildings types, based on a standardized building taxonomy 
from the University of British Columbia. Communities should edit and adapt this taxonomy (e.g., delete 
building types that are not in the community, or add/adapt for other/specialized types of buildings) to 
reflect their current and planned building types.  
Assessment Type: The assessment types in this matrix are based on the generic PDBA assessment 
algorithm in this PDBA Framework document. Communities are encouraged to adopt common PDBA 
processes to foster compatibility of processes and information between communities.  
 Area is a general assessment of a community to determine what areas are damaged and to what 
extent. This assessment is often performed by first responders or designated local government 
personnel (e.g., a windshield assessment) and do not require PDBA assessors. 
 Rapid Ext corresponds to a rapid (approximately 15 minute) exterior assessment.  
 Rapid Ext/Int involves a rapid (approximately 15 – 20 minute) exterior and interior assessment.  
 Detailed assessments are longer and more comprehensive (2 to 4 hour) structural assessments 
involving interior and exterior inspection.  
 Engineering assessments involve comprehensive structural and functional assessment of a 
building to identify requirements for demolition or repair and reoccupation of a building. 
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Options for this process could include developing an “all hazards” matrix, or matrices for 
different types of events. 
Assessor Type: Note that the examples given in this matrix are based on a seismic event. Communities 
are encouraged to consider the types of personnel that will be available to their community and also 
how the matrix would have to change to meet the impact of different types of events, such as flooding 
or wild fire. 
Responsibility refers to what stakeholder group has the responsibility for completing building 
assessments. Stakeholders identify in the example matrix include Local Government (LG), Local 
Government and/or Building Owner LG/OWNER, and building owner (OWNER). 
Authority refers to who has the authority to conduct PDBA assessments, usually the Authority Having 
Jurisdiction (AHJ).  
As noted above, the following example is based on the work of the PDBA research team. We would 
expect each of the elements in this matrix and process to be further developed by the newly formed 
British Columbia Post-Disaster Building Assessment (PDBA) Advisory Committee. 
Assessor Categories 
The following categories of personnel for performing specific assessments are proposed for this example 
matrix. Communities should revise as required based on their analysis of hazard and building types.  
Level 3: Non-credentialed personnel with relevant experience, such as contractors, construction 
tradespersons, or building managers. Level 3 assessors require formal PDBA assessor training, such as 
ATC 20/45 or equivalent. 
Level 2: Building officials, architects, or engineers of any background. Level 2 assessors require formal 
PDBA assessor training, such as ATC 20/45 or equivalent. 
Level 1: Structural engineers with formal PDBA assessor training, such as ATC 20/45 or equivalent. 
Team Composition Requirements 
Each community must develop its own team composition requirements, similar to the following: 
 Exterior teams may consist of a minimum of two personnel. 
 Interior assessment teams should have a minimum of three personnel, one of whom remains 
outside during the assessment. 
 The matrix identifies the minimum levels of personnel required for each type of assessment and 
type of building. Teams may have higher levels of expertise (e.g., an assessment listed as Level 3 
may be conducted by teams including credentialed personnel or structural engineers), but not 
lower.  
 Additional team members (e.g., fourth team members) may have any relevant background. 
 Teams may be augmented by specialty members (e.g., geotechnical engineers, USAR members, 
ESS personnel) as required. 
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Post Damage Building Assessment Matrix: Sample “Generic” Matrix 
 
Table A3. Draft PDBA Assessment Matrix 
  
6.9.1e TECHNICAL REPORT  
APPENDIX 17: DRAFT PDBA ASSESSMENT MATRIX 
326 
 
Post Damage Building Assessment Matrix – Sample Small Community  
 
The following is a sample created by a small community in British Columbia. It is provided as an example 
of how a smaller community might adapt the more comprehensive generic Matrix based on the 
community’s needs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A4. Sample Building Assessment Matrix for a Small Community 
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Appendix 18: Validation Workshop Data and Findings 
 
Data was gathered from notes and flip charts in the various activities and table groups. This data was 
sorted by activity and is presented below. Recommendations will be extracted from this data and used 
to inform revisions to the draft PDBA Framework and supporting resources.  
General Notes 
Roadmap for doing 
this planning 
Need a holistic roadmap for helping a community put together a DA plan. 
 
Need a parallel roadmap for agencies and private organizations 
 
Need a layered roadmap for everyone – what are the overlaps and linkages between 
planning at various levels/stakeholders 
  
Activity 1: The Assessment Matrix 
RF Notes Note: Use term ‘Local Government” instead of “Local Authority” as it is inclusive 
of first nation communities.   
AHJ = Authority having jurisdiction 
1.    Where to geo-
tech engineers fit in 
the matrix?  
a.    Coordinating their assessments 
2.    Detailed 
assessment: should 
be mostly 3 or have 
relevant expertise 
 
3.    BCsims.ca a.    Provincial Website available with seismic info  
b.    Ensure Local Gov’t know about it 
4.    Seismic sensors 
can give situational 
awareness 
a.    Who in EOC can analyse this info? 
b.    Can BCH/schools share this info? 
 
a.    Who in EOC can analyse this info?  
b.    Can BCH/schools share this info? 
5.    Inventory of 
protective assets 
(dykes, retaining 
walls, etc.) 
 
6.    Assessment 
Types 
a.    Good to have ext only separate from int/ext 
 
b.    Provide link to ‘engineered’ report criteria being developed by EGBC?  
c.    Provide more realistic guidance on time for assessments: 
 
                                          i.    ext only 15mins 
 
                                        ii.    ext/int single house 15mins 
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                                       iii.    ext/int on midrise building 30-45mins  
                                       iv.    ext/int on larger building 1hr+ 
7.    Guidance on 
coordination, to 
include in PDBA 
plan: 
a.    How do you allocate resources 
 
b.    What are triggers (magnitude?)  
c.    Is every building inspected, who decides this?  
d.    Include reference to examples that exist   
Assessment matrix Consider deeper/richer matrix: add % of building stock. Criticality.  
20 min, 24 situational awareness 29 ops 
 
Consider adding DSA training to initial programs for trades and professional  
Set criteria for retraining- BCH 3, 3-5 years; NZ annual? 
 
Establish own tables of assessors per category. Include local/specific types of people – 
e.g. facilities personnel – what other training will they need to be effective?  
Lot of work for LA to do – how to plan for all this. 
Roadmap for doing 
this planning 
Need a holistic roadmap for helping a community put together a DA plan. 
 
Need a parallel roadmap for agencies and private organizations 
 
Need a layered roadmap for everyone – what are the overlaps and linkages between 
planning at various levels/stakeholders 
Placard colours No. one or the other – not white AND green. White might be a little more coautionary. 
 
Colour is less important than what is on them.  
I kind of disagree. If I lost my cat, I’d put up a white sign. Walking down the street, 
might miss white placard. Prefer green. 
 
Sun will bleach out the colours anyway. Think about white. 
  
Placards Guidelines for placement of placards is needed – how many, where, etc. 
 
Important that the same language is in the documentation AND the placards.  
 
 Placards will fade/get lost – need to know what was on the placard. 
Can same forms be 
used for building 
Be careful of complacency – if it doesn’t stand out in the emergency, people might not 
pay attention 
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inspection and 
emergency 
  
Legal LA inform, not enforce. Not sure LA has authority to deny access? 
Who can remove? Can this be delegated? Need to explore more.   
  
 
Lots of platforms, but trick is to find systems that allow BA info to be shared/accessed 
by other systems.   
#2 Team Structure 
1)    Team 
composition 
 
 
a)    Capacity  
b)    Expertise  
c)    Hazard specific  
d)    Ideal to have type 3 in every team, but not realistic 
1)    Safety 
 
 
a)    3rd person as safety, stays outside when team inside, etc. incl. radio 
communications 
 
b)    NSEM has plan to have uniform presence in neighbourhoods, with public 
info 
2)    Composition will change as resources become available 
3)    Security concerns for staff/volunteers (looting/violence) 
4)    Support person with team to address public/home owner:  
 
a)    ESS if possible, Disaster Social Services  
b)    Possible insurance info  
c)    Flyer/door hanger  
d)    Daily briefing should include current ESS available 
5)    Guidance on minimum team composition, not ideal 
6)    Data – highly recommend GIS system 
7)    Worker support, OHS 
8)    Transport – work with what you have, carpooling, walking 
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9)     Issue ID card for assessors, to avoid confusion/distrust 
10)  ensure PPE for tram members 
11)  EOC: coordination, how to tackle areas, based on area assessment – preplan and reactive 
12)  Have a type 3 assessor in EOC as coordination/advisory role 
13)  Geographical: preplan  
a)    Identify hazards  
b)    Prioritise  
c)    Impact on transport/infrastructure 
14)  Assessor Training:  
a)    Basic training  
b)    Renewed at interval (1,2,3 years?) with refresher course 
 
c)    Exercise as part of training  
d)    Make training more current and relevant, realistic examples 
 
e)    Need more than 4hr ATC to feel confident as team lead 
 
f)     Tiered training: 1 day basic, ½ day refresh, more for team lead/coordinator 
roles  
g)    Include:  
i)     Media training, how to / not to speak to media in field 
 
ii)    safety in field (dogs in building, non-cooperative homeowner), clarify extent 
of authority and when to call in other resources 
 
iii)   radio?  
iv)   How to handle unofficial request fro the public/others that are outside 
scope  
v)    Expectation and extent of authority  
(1)  Not to enforce, but inform  
(2)  Not to break into locked buildings  
(3)  Not assessing fro code compliance  
(a)  A building may have been non-code compliant pre-event, and shouldn’t be 
placarded for that 
15)  Consider developing system/printed icons and symbols for common phrases 
 
a)    address language barriers  
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b)    look to ESS and Whistler for examples 
16) Resolve Liability issue with Credentialed assessors 
17)  Amount of time credentialed volunteers will volunteer,  
 
a)    3days? How many hours per day?   
b)    Transition to paid work?  
c)    Are they deputised as building officials?  
i)     How does this happen from Local Gov’t view? Bylaw? 
 
d)    Reciprocity with other provinces/US, precedents: (mutual aid agreement) 
 
i)     Wildfire   
ii)    PNEMA agreement 
18)  International and out-of-province teams 
 
a)    have local person on team  
b)    work under ICS  
c)    pre-plan managing them and logistics:  
i)     accommodation  
ii)    food  
iii)   technology  
iv)   PPE  
v)    Transport 
19) International teams:  
a)    Some will be here to help  
b)    Some to observe and gather data  
c)    Create guidelines for what they can/can’t do  
d)    And ensure local government knows  
20)  Training in small /remote communities 
 
a)    online available for remote communities  
b)    just-in-time training   
i)     can we empower local communities to train, post-event on as-need basis?  
 
ii)    Build capacity in real-time, situation specific  
iii)   Provide support/resources for expertise  
iv)   Can training include intro to geo-hazards  
21)  Just-in-time training modules: 
 
a)    team members  
b)    team lead  
c)    EOC coordinator 
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22)  Should Property owners assess themselves? Serious concerns with this 
23)  Public training module  
a)    what does placard mean  
b)    could they be aware of basic hazards  
c)    Port Coquitlam has a program in place  
24)  Manage emergent volunteers 
 
a)    how do we screen volunteers on arrival  
b)    how do we know they are prepared/trained – > BCH database 
25)  page 28 – indicator buildings – have this as a story / case study / lesson learned to more clearly 
explain – current is not clear 
26)  EOC roles 
 
 
a)    engineers and building officials as coordinators  
b)    support roles:  
i)     GIS  
ii)    Data entry  
iii)   Photos from devices  
iv)   Equipment and food prep  
v)    Charging technology  
vi)   Responding to home owner inquiries on placard status 
27)  Technology – for EOC, portable tablets/surfaces 
28)  legalities of data sharing? 
 
a)    Is any personal data gathered? Shared? That PIPA applies 
 
b)    Who owns the data?  
c)    How do home owners get the info on their home (ie. They have been 
evacuated)  
d)    Cross-link data 
29)  First Nations Communities 
 
a)    Cultural sensitivities  
b)    Cultural context  
c)    Respecting cultural rights (if told not to go in a building or place, to respect 
this)  
d)    Consideration for Hierarchy of decision making – will be different in all 
communities 
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i)     Some decisions are EOC, some are chief and council 
 
ii)    Recommend each community create a document within their emergency 
plan, outlining the hierarchy and decision making responsibility/authority 
 
(1)  Template could be created  
(2)  In-coming teams should know to ask for this document 
  
PDBA Assessment -  
 1.       Thresholds 
 2.       Local access of resources and shape maps 
 
3.       Front loading information – building knowledge upfront so it might allow lesser 
credentialed folks to assess 
 4.       Looking at threats outside 
 5.       Shortage of structural engineers 
 
6.       Good description of building – FEMA 151, Curriculum development / 
 7.       Practically – flow chart building types for assessors 
 8.       Non engineer/engineered / multiple building types 
 9.       Too much of a seismic lens vs all hazard 
 
10.   Assessor types – 123 – work that is involved between professional bodies, 
training they need to be able to do this. What do professional bodies need to define 
within their groups 
 
11.   Provide example in plain language, assessment types, types of buildings, 
 
12.   Local types of people to go out and do things—baseline list of assessors within 
communities 
 
13.   Real time information available – shaking, performance of building codes – make 
it available on real time basis – help to triage / prioritise … these buildings have 
suffered, this area has suffered 
 
14.   Challenge to credential non-staff – legal liability issues for city teams, 
 15.   Number 1 assessors on list - / most types of houses 
 16.   All hazards approach not just seismic 
 
17.   How does flooding and sewage affect vs just structural? 
 
18.   How do you manage duelling assessment processes? 
 19.   Non-credentials -- facilities, 
 
20.   Training for both trades/professional groups – 1 day 
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21.   Matrix – bigger – adding columns to show how much building stock in each 
category. To show % and criticality 
 22.   How do you ensure assessor qualification? 
OPERATIONS   
 
1.       EOC Support Structure Roles and responsibilities – page 20 (admin), 24 (sit 
awareness), 29 (ops) 
 2.       Team structures and assignment considerations 
 3.       Deployment considerations 
DEPLOYMENT   
 
1.       Initial deployment based on sensor, modelling, per-event situational awareness 
– ground composition, priorities, CI, 
 
2.       Set up a satellite site with cache supplies, intermediate level of information 
coming in 
 
3.       All damage information on common operating platform that shows up in EOC – 
includes damage assessment 
 
4.       Web-based common operating – Lightship creating common operating picture 
 
5.       Need information on areas you are deploying too | situational information, how 
to access, how to get there, 
 
6.       What resources you available to get there – bikes, helicopter, car 
 7.       Infrastructure to use technology 
 
8.       1 person to: security -- Information/communications/security person – bylaws, 
search and rescue, intro to DA but to provide security and communications 
 9.       Different teams for different areas 
 
10.   Collaboration of teams – team lead as reporting point, safety officer to make a 
call on moving forward, -- need specific roles per (by law officers) 
 
11.   Comprehensive assessments – many different teams – hydro, insurance, fortis, 
 12.   Insurance wants to be involved 
 
13.   Each group should have their own reporting piece and then keep it into the EOC. 
 
14.   Debriefing: structure, roles, other assessors, expectations of buildings per day. 
Cursory look the day before – so they can do that area quickly. Per-deployment safety 
briefing – immediate reporting demands, routes, potential hazards, what else to look 
for, perspective on other things going on, language / interpreter, information on 
resources available to help 
6.9.1e TECHNICAL REPORT  
APPENDIX 18: VALIDATION WORKSHOP DATA & FINDINGS 
335 
 
 
15.   Strategy for aftershock, do you continue, go back to reassess. || Indicator 
building 
 
16.   Data Analysis – person… || people to assess – phone, web, manage all the 
information, phone calls 
 
17.   SEMAC– structure of information – understanding information, 
 
18.   Dynamics – not in the training – what to do if… no address, house has already 
been assessed, 
 19.   Language 
 20.   Daylight 
 21.   Everyone has a role – one does placards, scribes, 
DEPLOYMENT – STEVEN NOTES 
 
1.       Team assignment briefing form (SAR) uses the SMEAC format 
 
a.       Situation, mission, execution, admin, communications. 
 2.       “reporting back” from field (delta has new form) 
 3.       DA needs to be part of mgmt. briefing in EOC 
 4.       Page 34 –daily briefings is really good 
 5.       Clearly describe DA in daylight / darkness 
 
6.       Initially based on models, sensors and know building/land compositions – 
known priorities – indicator buildings 
 
7.       Teams (size) would overwhelm EOC space, while use satellite spaces 
 
8.       Need software and training to ensue DA information can be shared remotely 
w/EOC (lightship software in NSEMO) 
 
9.       Know information of deployment area needed prior to deployment 
(environmental, chemical, other risk) 
 
10.   pre-deployment briefings – update daily, include prior day learnings 
 11.   Team composition 
 
a.       include a “safety officer” – security, communications, in uniform, 
 b.      psychosocial 
 c.       differs in industrial areas, specialists required 
 d.      local resident, speaks the language 
 
12.   coordinate members of team, comprehensive vs multiple assessments (e.g. 
Hydro, gas, environment, fire, etc.. insurance, utilities) 
 
13.   realistic expectations of team workload (e.g. - # buildings/hours/per day) 
 14.   information package for residents/occupants 
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15.   Instructions for team on aftershocks, continue? New priorities, OHS/Safety 
instructions 
 
16.   Record credibility of information sources (due to information inundation.) 
 
17.   Keep same teams together? Change members daily or less frequent? Resource 
availability may dictate 
 
18.   how to manage deployment to area within complex building and several non-
complex; one team for all 
 
19.   protocol for teams discovering existing placard on their building 
 
20.   LA’s may not be aware of which other buildings or agencies will initiate own DA 
in community; will complicate prioritization schedule 
 21.   Can we share data? Do we need to? 
 22.   Equipment checks and checklists 
 23.   Identification authority 
 24.   Maps 
 25.   Objective (e.g. Radio / safety)  
ORGNAIZATION MGMT 
 1.       EOC school district at each site – self-contained, 
2.       Property mgmt. group – zones, by bridges – assigned roles by credentialed, but 
then learned that they weren’t the best leaders so more free flowing 
 
3.       Port Coquitlam – amateur radio is main communication – can send email within 
community but not within levels 
 
4.       COV – 6 zones, pre-stocked containers, EOC coordinators for 2 zones, 
consolidate and then share uphill. DA teams play multiple roles 
 
5.       Overlap between groups – need to communicate more 
 
6.       Property mgmt.  – want to do more coordination between industry 
 
7.       Port Coquitlam – leaders, trained volunteers, groups of 2, 
 
8.       Do they want dedicated GIS on team?? (data analysis) 
 
9.       Community plan vs just the field guides – for NZ??? 
 
10.   Property Mgmt. stocked in the field / restocked bins (radios, safety, 
 
11.   Hard to have deployment out of EOC – need it out somewhere else. 
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12.   Common operating software- need GIS done in a simple way. GIS has role but 
want the practitioner to be able to be on map from beginning. 
 
13.   Moved damage assessment into operations – and then they put what needs to 
be on the EOC map (EOC doesn’t need to see all the green dots) operations only puts 
applicable colours/information up for EOC 
 
14.   Operations – building rep/DA rep  -- are an engineering and building rep 
(infrastructure facilities) 
 
15.   Use volunteers – not ESS but block watch, community volunteers, = they have all 
been trained – disaster support up. Each zone has 
 
16.   Insurance – Engaging stakeholders to overlap and coordinate information 
 
17.   Crisis communication plan – level authority – is there prescribed information that 
can be broadcasted to community on BA. BCH does has announcement. NS may have 
something. Are you able to disseminate emergency based communication to technical 
folks to mobilize them? 
 
18.   DA on waterfront may become lifeline as it is port jurisdiction, no regular 
relationship, port of Vancouver, -- can they aggregate DA on waterfront and distribute 
information out to different jurisdiction 
 
19.   Regional planning through IPRIM – regional disaster – make sure point/linkages 
 
20.   Indigenous communities – band ownership of land /building. Jurisdiction – when 
can they enter not enter. IRAP funding for engineers to look at DA. EMBC now 
responsible for EM for first nation’s community’s vs ISC. Band council resolutions not 
required. 
 
21.   Different embedment within structures depending on group/municipality 
 a.       Rally points / stations/ zones 
 
22.   Communications – how to deal with GIS – best way to deal with it in process 
 
a.       In process, external, one layer down – users are putting information in. don’t 
rely on external person not available 
 
23.   How do you distribute information (port example – access to port – coordinate 
work with other jurisdictions) 
 
24.   Lots done on buildings, local authorities – need more work done on the 
stakeholder side // coordination – big picture how all the players 
RB notes Organization 
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School District – have EOC in each school, which are set to run autonomously. In a 
larger event, each becomes a local centre under direction from central EOC. 
 
Property Management firm: areas by geography – specifically bridges – assume there 
will not be ability to move across bridge/water boundaries 
 
Initial training and roles based on credentials. With exercise/drill, found that it was 
better to be flexible in assigning leadership roles – best credentials not always the 
best leaders 
 
Port Coq: two areas, north/south because of rail.  
PoCo: using amateur radio for communications. Set up to send email between units 
within community. Issue in not having common format or forum to allow 
communication between communities and above. 
 
PoCO: pre established equipment stashes at Fire/Municipal Annex. 
 
PoCo: staff would respond to check pre-established CI for windshield assessment, 
then report for further deployment as required. 
 
Vancouver: 6 zones. BA unit in EOC, 3 coordinators – 2 zones each. Info flows to 
coordinators who consolidate then pass along data as appropriate. 
 
Vancouver: pre-established containers that have equipment and also serve as rally 
points and command/control points. 
 
Overlap between private organizations (e.g., property managers, provincial agencies) 
and LA. Are there communication/agreements in place? Not yet, PC and Vcr, though 
both in planning. 
 
Property management in discussions with several municipalities – suggest working 
through professional associations, e.g. Landlords BC to allow better coverage- avoid 
having multiple agreements between specific companies/owners and governments. 
 
Consider adding as stakeholder for provincial agency.  
Biggest challenge in agreements/collaboration between any group is the 
communications. Need mechanisms to share and protect information as required. 
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Question on accessing/embedding GIS. Three models: GIS person in BA unit – 
advantage that they can be “owned” rather than pulled away; in Planning, to 
centralize service and have access to more resources. Third option is to have GIS 
“under” what is done and have access to input and output with the users. That way, 
able to get info when and as and how needed rather than waiting to access specialized 
services. 
 
Importance of redundancy in roles – have org chart, but have left names off as we 
don’t know who will actually show up. Have multiple personnel who can assume roles. 
Have ways that people can assume roles “just in time.” 
 
Importance of finding someone like you who has been through this – e.g. property 
management firm talked with NZ property management firm of similar size. Invaluable 
information. 
 
Need to check with CCC, Kaikoura, Wellington on what their emergency and building 
assessment plans look like NOW. How did they change things? Why? 
 
North van – prepared positions, but equipment only. Vancouver has fairly well 
distributed population. North shore varies from deep cove to horseshoe bay – pockets 
of population/resources. 
 
When using app – amount of green dots overwhelmed. Needed way to limit or change 
what was displayed.  
Mapping needs to be in the hands of the practitioners, who have varying needs for 
different problems. Ideal is to have tools that allow users to adjust and adapt as 
required. 
 
Insurance and other stakeholders not directly involved in BA operations. However, 
play important roles. Insurance assessments overlap with BA. Need way to leverage 
and build on each other’s work. 
 
Consider pre-scripted crisis communications – e.g. social media; around safety of 
buildings. Develop pre-established messages that can be easily implemented. 
 
Need strategies for stakeholders and professional groups to connect with LA, then to 
communicate to their members for mobilization 
 
? self-registering database for volunteers with their capabilities and communications 
 
Waterfront for NV will be lifeline – yet authority rests with port of Vancouver and 
assessments done by industries themselves. Need way to coordinate, collaborate, 
access info 
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Need a better bigger picture of how things work at the provincial/federal levels. 
 
Need process map – turtle map  
Need to understand how professional and private organizations and agencies fit in 
and how to support and mobilize 
 
Need if, then that reach outside the framework If uninhabitable, then links to other 
social services, etc. if debris, then…. Tie to regional disaster planning. 
 
If band land, does that change authority and responsibility for entry evacuation, etc. 
Different levels even locally. Need to consider indigenous lens 
 
Health Authorities – have own staff to do internal assessment, then to HA, then to HA 
EOC. Challenge with difference HA even in same buildings. 
 
Goes to provincial health coordination Centre, then to PREOC if appropriate. 
 
Confidentiality and privacy – will not share information.  
Need mechanisms to share and ensure privacy and confidentiality. 
 
YVR – self contained – has robust system, including manuals for assessment of major 
buildings. Working towards manuals for ALL buildings. 
TEAM STRUCTURE   
 
1.       Logistical support – feed, clothe, transport, technology, accommodation, PPE, 
proper identification for volunteers 
 
2.       Time in field – 2-3 days / transition to being paid, how long in the day, 
 3.       Volunteer suitability / assessment for walk ins 
 
4.       Building/Facilities roles for DA – other roles – geo spatial, social media, filling in 
forms, data analysis 
 5.       Safety officer – key messaging, safety, RDA training 
 6.       Guidelines for media on the field 
 
7.       When to source other resources to take over – trouble houses/people/hard to 
deal with… 
 
8.       Technology logistics for at least EOC staff should be portable for maximum 
 
9.       Data sharing – Information FIPPA / PIPPA– cross linking data – legalities – 
permissions for sharing information, who owns data collecting – how does home 
owner get their information, 
 10.    Cross linked data – 
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11.   International support – (support from Seattle / Alberta) for DA and the group for 
data gathering. Guidelines on what they are allowed to do. AKA teams in the field may 
be requested to do more work than they – unofficial requests. (I know 
 
12.   Language of team – across language and disability – using pictures – (ESS model – 
whistler has done a  great job here) 
 13.   Parameters of authority – inform not inforce 
 
14.   Cultural sensitivity/competency – FN – respecting cultural rights. 
 
15.   Dealing with houses not to code pre-event – what happens when they are red-
tagged but nothing to do with event. 
 16.   How do duty to report not to code. 
 17.   FN – levels authorities – who can make the call. 
 18.   Relevant training – exercises 
 19.   Dealing guidelines for training 
 
20.   How long do they work for – transition into paid work 
 21.   Managing volunteers 
 22.   Logistics 
 23.   Support roles 
 24.   Legalities of data sharing 
 25.   Language skills – icons/symbols 
PDBA Documentation and Transitions 
  
Placards – GREEN AND WHJITE and YELLOW / transitions from EM to BAU 
 1.       White is better than Green – a little more 
 Colour vs information (more information) 
 2.       Green more distinctive 
 3.       Red vs green – go / safe / mixing with EMBC safety 
 4.       Sun vs water resistant 
 5.       Full back adhesive 
 
6.       Also hand out stickers on recovery centre information and put on corner of 
placard 
 
7.       Template to explain which will be left on door handle – FAQ – to share 
 8.       Bilingual 
 9.        Guidelines on placement of placards // 
 10.   Placard vs assessment forms must be the same 
 11.   Take a picture of the placard for reporting 
Placards good for pre-post emergency 
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1.       Keep for post disaster  
2.       Problem with complacency if they see them all the time 
 
3.       Need to different  
4.       Different goals / different processes  
5.       Post-earthquake  
6.       BAU – you put a date on it – so there is a limitation. 
 
7.       Reds in place until removed by municipal building person 
Who can take it down?  
1.       Whoever put it up?  
2.       Municipality responsibility – Chief building official  
3.       Anyone who can put it up should be able to take it down 
 
4.       Municipality can get a 3rd party / delegated contractor to advise on removal 
RB Notes 
Placard colours No. one or the other – not white AND green. White might be a little more cautionary. 
 
Colour is less important than what is on them.  
I kind of disagree. If I lost my cat, I’d put up a white sign. Walking down the street, 
might miss white placard. Prefer green. 
 
Sun will bleach out the colours anyway. Think about white. 
Placards Guidelines for placement of placards is needed – how many, where, etc. 
 
Important that the same language is in the documentation AND the placards. Placards 
will fade/get lost – need to know what was on the placard. 
Can same forms be 
used for building 
inspection and 
emergency 
Be careful of complacency – if it doesn’t stand out in the emergency, people might not 
pay attention 
Legal LA inform, not enforce. Not sure LA has authority to deny access? 
Who can remove? Can this be delegated? Need to explore more.   
Round Table 1 – Placards, Forms and Documentation 
  
 
Must be one or the other colour placard. Leaning towards white for same reason as 
NZ; whereas some people noted that a white placard might look like any other 
unrelated posting (e.g. missing cat notice) 
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Colour is less important that what the placard says (content over colour). Colour 
placards help to avoid complacency. 
 
Some communities have made the entire back of the placard a sticker 
 
Should there be pre-made stickers describing the recovery location, and it could be 
stuck on the placards. One community has a template that they can pre-populate with 
info of the day and print it on the placard 
 Bi-lingual placards are recommended 
 
Guidelines on the placard placement/location should be provided in the training (e.g. 
how many to post; the building locations 
 
Ensuring that whatever is written on a placard is written verbatim on the report 
 
Require DA personnel to take a picture of the placard when it’s posted 
 
Cannot use the same forms used by building inspectors (BAU) as a post disaster form 
 
DA is an “estimation” of how sensitive the building is to an earthquake, which is a 
different goal from a typical building assessment 
 
LA’s have plans in place to transition from EQ to BAU? One recommendation is that a 
deadline date be included on the placard for the building owner to perform their 
follow up action.  
 
Must ensure that owners/occupants have info on placards so that they know what 
action is required 
 
There should be a mechanism to identify in advance, who can remove the placards. It 
should likely be the municipal authority who removes them. Could have contractors 
who are pre-authorized to remove them 
 
Round Table 2 – Transitioning Between Pre-Event, Response and Recovery: 
  
 
NSEM is developing a common operating picture database. Challenge is how to make 
it communicate with existing municipal software systems 
 
NRCan is developing the EQ model, and it may serve as an appropriate 
database/clearing house for the building information. BC Assessment Authority is the 
source of data being fed into the NRCan system. It’s based on ArcGIS. This work could 
work alongside of the Disaster Debris Mgmt. processes. 
 
Shocking that there is no legislation now for professional liability protection.  
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Transitioning between pre-event, response and recovery 
  
 Is there an existing or planned data mgmt. system 
 
1.       Building registry to tack the BA information  
2.       Common EM software system – for municipal software to put into the municipal 
software –  
3.       Common terminologies between assessors  
Does the pre-event data collection adequately address the LA needs? 
 
1.       Building registries, building records,  
2.       Building information booklet for bigger buildings – online / physically printed? 
 
3.       NRCAN – blow out earthquake model – for scenarios, building, tracking, (37 
building..?? system)  
4.       BC Assessment – to catalogue buildings  (UBC is mapping to build of data ) 
Victoria did this combined with cataloguing information and scenario information 
 
5.       GIS tools – scenarios there, buildings identified …. Just need to add field data for 
event data 
Does the framework work well with the way your org. functions? 
Does the framework sufficiently address liability protection during and after the emergency? 
 
1.       Stressed to have in place before you send out folks  
2.       How do you protect – why get involved if not insured 
Two or three take-aways for them 
 
1.       Drafting bylaws  
2.       Connecting networks  
3.       Data collection  
4.       Transition to BAU  
5.       Exercises – designed for practice  
6.       Templates for sample policy/bylaws 
Two or three take-aways for us. 
 
1.       Liability  
2.       Volunteers  
3.       Legislation for placards – BAU post emergency  
4.       Scale to small community  
5.       Mostly rural no business building  
6.       Understanding of first nation community 
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7.       Build something to use to build DA Plan and then flex once in place 
 
8.       Close the box for now  
9.       Finalize the green vs white placards  
10.   Indigenous Lands – who owns what – complexity  
11.   Liability – current state in book  
12.   Training competency of assessors  
13.   Get the Recommendations out there – build the common framework and people 
can adapt.  
14.   Mindful of language around local authorities vs indigenous communities 
  
Parking Lot    
Overlap of private/other DA and local authority processes 
 
What role(s) =, opportunities are there for senior government 
 
Need a separate document to explore the “why”  
#NAME?  
More guidelines info organization, admin, data management, structures, 
 
Issues: data, bylaws more transition, exercises, placards, volunteers, liability 
 
Scale down for small and rural communities – more residential than other 
communities for example  
Understanding and inclusion of language supportive of first nations and indigenous 
communities  
Get it out so we can use it. Then do more.  
Green white placard issue needs more discussion  
Issues around indigenous land – e.g. ownership, authority 
 
Liability – what is current practice – can we have examples to build from 
 
More on training competencies for assessors  
Get it out then next steps 
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Appendix 19: Additional Recommendations 
 
The data in Appendix 18 was analyzed to identify the following recommendations for inclusion in the PDBA Framework document.  
System/Element Recommendations 
Global Replace Local Authority with Local Government  
- more inclusive term that acknowledges indigenous governments. 
Assessment Matrix add to Legend for matrix 
Assessment Matrix Consider development of new matrix or adaption to include geotech engineers in the assessment matrix. 
- RB: not sure about this one- seems more a strategic or integration issue, than one for the 
assessment matrix itself. 
Assessment Matrix Detailed assessments should probably be 3 or relevant expertise 
Situational Awareness RESOURCE: Bcsims.ca provincial website with seismic info 
Situational Awareness - pre-event 
Intelligence 
add to list in EOC 1. pre-event strategy for gathering and maintaining:  Inventory of protective assets (dykes, 
retaining walls, etc.) 
? Info management, assessment matrix RESOURCE: Provide link to ‘engineered’ report criteria being developed by EGBC? 
Assessment Matrix, Assessment 
Procedures 
modify time frames for assessments 
 i.    ext only 15mins 
ii.    ext/int single house 15mins 
iii.    ext/int on midrise building 30-45mins 
iv.    ext/int on larger building 1hr+ 
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System/Element Recommendations 
Operations 7.    Guidance on coordination, to include in PDBA plan: 
a.    How do you allocate resources 
b.    What are triggers (magnitude?) 
c.    Is every building inspected, who decides this? 
d.    Include reference to examples that exist 
Training Consider adding DSA training to initial programs for trades and professional 
Training Establish initial and retraining timeframes 
RESOURCE: Set criteria for retraining- BCH 3, 3-5 years; NZ annual? 
Resources - assessment matrix Establish own tables of assessors per category. Include local/specific types of people – e.g. facilities personnel 
– what other training will they need to be effective? 
 
Guideline or example for community on using matrix to develop local matrix 
Resources - assessment matrix Lot of work for LA to do – how to plan for all this.  
 
Guideline or example for community on using matrix to develop local matrix 
 
Overall  RESOURCE: Need a holistic roadmap for helping a community put together a DA plan. 
Overall  RESOURCE: Need a parallel roadmap for agencies and private organizations 
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System/Element Recommendations 
Overall  RESOURCE: Need a layered roadmap for everyone – what are the overlaps and linkages between planning at 
various levels/stakeholders 
Placards RESOURCE: Make firm recommendation  
Placards Guidelines for placement of placards is needed – how many, where, etc. 
Placards Important that the same language is in the documentation AND the placards.  
Placards  Placards will fade/get lost – need to know what was on the placard. 
Placards ? Recommendation or resource? consider 
Placards LA inform, not enforce. Not sure LA has authority to deny access? need to explore, determine if 
recommendation should be included 
Placards Can this be delegated? Need to explore more.  
need to explore, determine if recommendation should be included 
Information Systems Create list of potential information systems that PDBA could work with - what can be used? What can be 
shared/accessed by other systems? 
Assessment Teams Ideally, teams should have a minimum of 3 personnel. However, this may not always be necessary or possible 
in some situations. 
Assessment Teams Team Safety - at least one person must always remain outside and have radio/other communications to 
support the team. 
Assessment Teams Principles and guidelines are required to support making up team composition as resources and nature of 
assessment requirements change over time. 
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System/Element Recommendations 
Assessment Teams Processes and guidelines are required to ensure team safety in terms of potential violence and/or looting. 
Assessment Teams Supplement teams with ESS if possible 
Assessment Teams Teams should have standard information available to owners regarding insurance and LA concerns. 
Assessment Teams An information package should be designed, perhaps as a door hanger or flyer, to be left for owners. 
Assessment Teams Daily briefings should include current ESS availability 
Administration Worker safety processes and procedures, along with support for all workers involved in PDBA must be in 
place. 
Logistics Ensure that transportation is available for teams both to get to and from their areas, and for movement 
within their assigned areas. 
Logistics Develop ID system, including card/identification for assessors. 
Team Ensure that proper PPE is available for all team members 
Situational Awareness LA should develop deployment plans based on both pre-planned and reactive factors. 
Operations EOC PDBA coordinator should have training equivalent to NZ Tier 3 or have coordinator training. 
Situational awareness LA should develop a geographic preplan based on known/likely hazards, impact on transportation and 
infrastructure. 
Training Assessor training should be renewed or updated at regular intervals (e.g., annually refresher and re-training 
every 3 years?) 
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System/Element Recommendations 
Training Training should include exercising - both opportunity to conduct assessments and also to exercise as part of 
larger scenario. 
Training Team leaders should have additional training above basic assessor training. 
Training Suggest tiered training: e.g. 
1 day basic assessment 
additional for team leaders 
additional for PDBA coordinators 
annual refresher 
regular retraining  
Training Assessor training should include: 
i)     Media training, how to / not to speak to media in field 
ii)    safety in field (dogs in building, non-cooperative homeowner), clarify extent of authority and when to call 
in other resources 
iii)   radio? 
iv)   How to handle unofficial request fro the public/others that are outside scope 
v)    Expectation and extent of authority 
(1)  Not to enforce, but inform 
(2)  Not to break into locked buildings 
(3)  Not assessing fro code compliance 
(a)  A building may have been non-code compliant pre-event, and shouldn’t be placarded for that 
Placards; forms All placards, forms, documentation should include strategies for dealing with multiple languages that are 
common in an area/community - see ESS and Whistler for examples. 
Operations: Staff Rotation LA should establish guidelines for length of time that volunteers are expected to work: hours per day, number 
of days, etc.  
Assessment personnel: ? Sustained 
operations 
Guidelines should be in place to establish a transition from volunteer responses in the immediate aftermath 
to paid work on an ongoing basis.  
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System/Element Recommendations 
Assessment Personnel: legal and liability LA and provincial governments must consider how certification, indemnity, etc will be affected in large scale 
events - what is impact for mutual aid, reciprocity. 
Operations: Team Formation Teams must always have a local person. 
Assessment Teams: Housing, 
Transportation, & Support 
? Non-local resources? 
International and non-local team members will require transportation in/out of the site, accommodation, 
food, PPE, etc.  
Operations: Non-local Resources Local Authorities should have guidelines for working with non-local teams and personnel. Note that teams 
may be seeking to provide assistance; others may be seeking to gather data and observe operations.  
Operations: Non-local Resources Local Authorities should develop guidelines for assessing capabilities of non-local resources and have pre-
determined tasks/functions that these teams and personnel can assume. 
Operations: Non-local Resources Communication and documentation guidelines must be in place to ensure that all levels of government and 
related authorities are aware of the presence and activities of non-local resources and personnel. 
Training: NEW: Scalability Training programs must be scalable, and have multiple methods of delivery to ensure accessibility by 
personnel in remote, rural, and urban communities. 
Training: Responsibility Training programs should be developed with the goal of allowing local communities to provide adequate and 
effective training to personnel post-event on an as-needed basis. 
Training: Just in Time Consider training and/or communication mechanisms to allow the capacity to "learn in real time" regarding 
specific situations. 
Training: Core Curriculum Principles Training should include an introduction to geo-hazards. 
Training: Just in Time Just in time training should include modules and/or content for team members, team leaders, and PDBA 
coordinators. 
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System/Element Recommendations 
Governance: ???? Consider whether or not property owners should be allow to conduct their own assessments. 
 
Training should include a component for general public including topics such  
Assessment Personnel: registries and 
rosters 
Develop process for screening, supporting, tracking emergent volunteers 
Assessment personnel Recruitment, 
education, background, experience 
Identify training and experience of emergent volunteers; have way of tracking/identifying training 
Situational Awareness: Indicator Buildings Have case study and/or resources to support use of indicator buildings 
Administration: Operational structure Use engineers and/or building officials as coordinators 
Administration: Operational structure Consider EOC support roles: GIS, Data entry, photo/media management, equipment and food prep, charging 
technology, responding to home owner inquiries 
Information Management: Sharing and 
integration 
Relationship of PIPA, other legal constraints on collection and use of data 
Information Management: Sharing and 
integration 
System for owners/occupants to get info on buildings 
Information Management: Sharing and 
integration 
Look for opportunities to cross-link data 
NEW: Considerations and Special 
Situations: FN/Indigenous Communities 
Develop plans for identifying and honouring culturally sensitive areas/buildings/practices in area: respect 
cultural practices/rights (e.g. no entry);  
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System/Element Recommendations 
NEW: Considerations and Special 
Situations: FN/Indigenous Communities 
Identify and preplan integration of FN/Indig leadership with LA 
NEW: Considerations and Special 
Situations: FN/Indigenous Communities 
Create a document within their emergency plan, outlining the hierarchy and decision making 
responsibility/authority 
NEW: Considerations and Special 
Situations: FN/Indigenous Communities 
Ensure teams are aware of cultural sensitivities in areas they are dispatched to 
Operations: Pre-planning Predetermine needs for assessment - may allow lesser credentialed team to perform assessments. 
Building Assessment Procedures: Specific 
Assessments 
Develop graphics/flowcharts to support identifying types of buildings/assessor requirements 
Building Assessment Procedures: 
Descriptions of Assessment Procedures 
Ensure supporting documents use plain language, graphics 
Assessment Personnel: Registries and 
Rosters 
Identify local assessors, including sources of "just in time" personnel who may be trained on the job 
Information Management: Sharing and 
Integration of data 
Collect, organize, and make available information, including background info such as shaking, performance of 
building types, areas damaged, etc. available in real time to support area planning, team priorities and 
operational assessment of buildings 
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System/Element Recommendations 
? Ops preplanning? Or Assessment 
Personnel: Recruitment…, sustained 
operations 
Pre-develop ideal requirements for types/mix of assessors to meet needs within specific areas of a 
community. 
Situational Awareness: Leveraging other 
EM personnel and processes 
Consider overlap of resources and activities in "dueling assessments." 
Situational Awareness: Pre-event 
intelligence 
Expand building/assessor matrix to include #/type of building stock in each category - show # and criticality 
SA - Developing an Overall Strategy Factors to consider in initial deployment strategies: sensor, modelling pre-event SA, ground composition, 
priority buildings/areas, CI 
Administration: Equipment and Resources Consider pre-established satellite sites with cache supplies, communications, etc.  
Administration: Equipment and Resources If possible, use common operating system for all data and communications. 
 
Operations: Logistics Identify transportation options and availability for moving teams to/from and within operational areas. 
Assessment Teams: ? NEW: Roles Establish roles for team members: team lead, communication, safety/security officer, etc.  
 
Team collaboration - ensure key activities are established within specific personnel: e.g., reporting, 
communication, continue/withdraw from buildings, etc.  
Operations: Team formation Identify types of buildings that require specialized teams - e.g. Hydro, Fortis, other CI; pre-establish processes 
for working with CI owners 
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System/Element Recommendations 
Assessment Teams: Briefing and 
Debriefing 
RESOURCE for DEBRIEFING to include:  structure, roles, other assessors, expectations of buildings per day. 
Cursory look the day before – so they can do that area quickly. Per-deployment safety briefing – immediate 
reporting demands, routes, potential hazards, what else to look for, perspective on other things going on, 
language / interpreter, information on resources available to help 
Assessment Teams: Briefing RESOURCE: SMEAC briefing form: Situation, Mission, Admin, Communications 
Assessment Teams: Briefing RESOURCE: Delta has new form for "reporting back from the field." 
Operations: Logistics Consider size of space for DA operations and teams - use satellite locations if too much for EOC 
Operations: Pre-Event intelligence Information on areas such as environmental, chemical, other hazards should be known prior to event. 
Assessment Teams: Briefings Daily briefings should contain lessons and learnings from prior day. 
 
already captured above 
Operations: Team Formation Include psychosocial personnel on teams if available and appropriate. 
Operations: Logistics Establish realistic expectations of team workload: e.g., # buildings, hours/shift, days in a row, etc. 
Operations: Logistics Ensure procedures and instructions are developed for teams re safety issues such as aftershocks, building 
collapse, other OSH issues. 
Placards: Overlap with other EM 
assessments 
Have procedure for dealing with existing placards or documentation found on buildings by teams. 
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System/Element Recommendations 
Situational Awareness: Leveraging other 
EM pesonnel & processes 
Consider other DA processes in place by other building owners, agencies, CI, etc. and how these will affect 
prioritization of LA efforts 
Operations: Communications RESOUCES: PoCo amateur radio is main communication. 
Administration: Operational Structure RESOUCES: Case: COV – 6 zones, pre-stocked containers, EOC coordinators for 2 zones, consolidate and then 
share uphill. DA teams play multiple roles 
Operations: Team Formation and 
Personnel Management 
RESOURCE: POCO : leaders, trained volunteers, groups of 2 
Situational Awareness: Developing an 
Overall Strategy. 
Identify key locations and lifelines, such as waterfront/port 
Governance 
Special Considerations 
Collaboration is required between LA, provincial, national, and indigenous governments to ensure that 
responsibilities and practices for DA are integrated. 
Governance: Authority? Administration: 
relationship with other EM? 
Ensure that there is collaboration and integration between local authorities and other stakeholders - e.g. CI 
owners, building owners. 
Administration: relationship with other 
EM 
RESOURCES: Examples of other EM and DA systems 
Administration: relationship with other 
EM 
RESOURCES: Examples of other EM and DA systems 
Training: Pre-Event Training RESOURCES: Case examples  
Operations: Communications RESOURCES: Example communications 
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System/Element Recommendations 
Situational Awareness: Developing an 
Overall Strategy 
RESOURCES: Example of setting up zones 
Operations: ? Activation? SA: Developing 
an Overall Strategy? 
RESOUCES: case example of ad hoc phase 
Situational Awareness: Developing an 
Overall Strategy 
RESOURCES: Example of setting up zones 
Operations: Equipment and Resources RESOURCES: example of pre-situated equipment cache 
Administration: relationship with other 
EM 
Note that CI, Property management, etc. not based on LA boundaries.  
LA should connect with provincial associations to develop relationships with other DA stakeholders - e.g. 
property management, CI. 
Administration: Relationship with other 
EM, DA 
Ensure that agreements between partners include mechanisms for effective and ongoing communication. 
Information Management: Use of 
Technology 
RESOURCE: discussion on GIS. 
Administration: Administrative Structure RESOURCE: case study on org charts - need to identify LA 
???? RESOURCE: Case or example of setting up a program 
Operations: Equipment and Resources RESOURCES: example of pre-situated equipment cache 
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System/Element Recommendations 
Information Management: Use of 
Technology 
Ideally, tools should be adaptable and usable by practitioners closest to assessment. 
Administration: relationship with other 
EM 
Insurance and other stakeholders not directly involved in BA operations. However, play important roles. 
Insurance assessments overlap with BA. Need way to leverage and build on each other’s work. 
Assessment Personnel: Registries and 
Rosters? 
Operations: ? New on Personnel 
Management? 
Consider development of self-registration process and/or database for volunteers, which identifies their 
capabilities, training, experience, and methods to communicate with them. 
 
RESOURCE: need map/graphic for providing context in developing BA plans at LA level; ALSO need 
map/graphic for showing linkages between various elements of a functional system. 
Operations: Pre-planning Plan should include links to support occupants who's buildings are uninhabitable - e.g., social services; also tie 
to debris plan, regional disaster planning, etc.  
Administration: relationship with other 
EM 
RESOURCES: Examples of other EM and DA systems 
Administration: relationship with other 
EM 
RESOURCES: Examples of other EM and DA systems 
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Appendix 20: Inaugural Consortium Meeting Agenda 
 
Time Item 
8:30-9:00 Registration, coffee and snacks 
9:00-9:30 Welcome and Introductions (Steven & Ron) 
9:30-10:00 Overview of PDBA project and framework (Ron) 
10:00-10:30 Committee Draft Terms of Reference (Steven) 
10:30-10:45 Coffee break 
10:45–11:15 PDBA Development Streams/Potential Working Groups (Pete) 
11:15-11:45 BC Assessment Authority/Geo BC Presentation (Steven/Gurdeep) 
11:45 –12:00 Next Steps - Meeting frequency, location, dates (Steven) 
12:00 – 1:00  Lunch Provided 
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Appendix 21: Inaugural Consortium Workshop Attendees’ Affiliations 
 
NOTE: Participant names have been removed per the research project’s Informed Consent provisions. 
NAME: ORGANIZATION: 
Attended 
 Richmond School District #38 
1 
 Structural Engineering Association of BC 
1 
 Health Emergency Management BC 1 
 Technical Safety BC (BC Safety Authority) X 
 Department of Civil Engineering | UBC X 
 University of BC 1 
 Technical Safety BC (BC Safety Authority) 1 
 Building Officials Association of BC X 
 Justice Institute of BC 1 
 Emergency Management BC (EMBC)  1 
 Geo BC (FLNRO) 1 
 BC Assessment Authority 1 
 Applied Science Technologists & Technicians of BC 1 
 Earthquake Engineering and Research Institute (EERI) - BC Chapter 1 
 Vancouver Airport Authority (YVR) X 
 City of Vancouver; Mgr, Building Review Branch 1 
 Indigenous Services Canada (ISC) 1 
 District of Saanich X 
 North Shore Emergency Management 1 
 Soda Creek Band 1 
 Insurance Bureau of Canada  1 
 Hollyburn Properties 1 
 Justice Institute of BC 1 
 Engineers & Geoscientists BC  1 
 Architectural Institute of BC (AIBC) 1 
 Justice Institute of BC 1 
 BC Housing 1 
 BC Hydro 
X 
 BC Safety Authority X 
 BC Assessment Authority X 
 CSSP Project X 
 
Building and Safety Standards Branch Office of Housing and Construction 
Standards Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing 
X 
 Real Estate Services X 
 RJC X 
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 City of Vancouver X 
 PHSA X 
 Architectural Institute of BC (AIBC) 
X 
 
Table A5. Inaugural Consortium Workshop Attendees’ Affiliations.
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Appendix 22: BC PDBA Advisory Committee Terms of Reference 
 
British Columbia  
Post-Disaster Building Assessment (PDBA) Advisory Committee  
 
TERMS OF REFERENCE – Adopted 13 September 2018  
 
BACKGROUND  
 
In support of enhanced Post-Disaster Building Assessment (PDBA) in the province, BC Housing, Justice 
Institute of BC, Engineers and Geoscientists BC, and the Architectural Institute of BC partnered in a 
research project funded by the Department of National Defence to explore and develop a framework for 
post-disaster building assessment.  
 
One of the outputs of this project was recognition of the importance of a broad stakeholder group that 
would further support and advance development of a provincial system.  
 
The Province of British Columbia “BC Earthquake Immediate Response Plan” (July 2015) identifies that 
the role of BC Housing in a catastrophic earthquake will be to:  
 
• Establish and lead the Building Damage Assessment Branch at the PECC/PERRC  
• Provide rapid damage assessment teams, prioritize and coordinate rapid damage assessment of 
provincial and other key facilities  
• Provide rapid damage assessment training, assessment coordination, action plans, 
response/recovery priorities and authority to access and restrict access to government housing property  
 
MISSION  
 
The mission of the committee will be to recommend, develop, and enhance standards, processes and 
guidelines for the effective implementation and the sustainable management of a post-disaster building 
assessment system for the province of British Columbia. The PDBA Advisory Committee has been 
formed to facilitate the ongoing coordination, and for sharing of stakeholders’ collective knowledge and 
resources in this area and to make this information available to stakeholders.  
 
MANDATE  
 
In support of this mission, the committee will:  
 
• provide advice on all matters within the Advisory Committee areas of responsibility to 
coordinate post-disaster building assessments,  
• draw on the committee’s collective expertise to assist the Advisory Committee to identify new 
and emerging issues and opportunities in building assessment, and to strengthen the provincial PDBA 
framework.  
 
GOALS  
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• Develop and promote standards, processes and guidelines for a province-wide integrated PDBA 
system.  
• Advise on the development, maintenance, training and exercising of PDBA systems, plans and 
procedures.  
• Provide recommendations on cross government and cross organizational issues related to post-
disaster building assessments.  
• Promote integration and consistency between the Province’s PDBA system, including all levels of 
government and non-government organizations.  
 
MEMBERSHIP  
 
PDBA Advisory Committee membership will be comprised of representatives from the government of 
British Columbia and non-government stakeholder organizations involved in and with an interest in 
PDBA. Where possible, representation will include Associations such as the Architectural Institute of BC, 
Engineers and Geoscientists BC, Building Officials Association of BC, and others. When possible, 
participant organizations will include one representative from the parties identified within the BC 
Earthquake IRP as having a role in critical infrastructure and/or subject matter expertise, including all of 
the stakeholders identified in Appendix “A”.  
 
PDBA Advisory Committee membership may also include ad-hoc participation as required.  
 
ADMINISTRATION  
 
• A representative from BC Housing will chair the initial PDBA Advisory Committee, and will also 
provide basic administrative support and funding to support baseline activities. The committee will 
establish an ongoing process for determining the Chair  
• Additional expenditures (e.g. contract work in support of PDBA activities) will be subject to 
funding, in a manner agreed to by members.  
• As a voluntary committee, there will be no remuneration paid to members for the attendance of 
meetings or the time associated with the completion of projects.  
 
WORKING GROUPS:  
 
• Working groups (standing or temporary) struck to support PDBA, will each have an identified 
lead, and will report to the PDBA Advisory Committee through the Chair.  
• Working Groups will be asked to develop and adhere to work plans approved by the Advisory 
Committee, and to meet as and when required.  
• Organizations may choose to designate individuals other than their primary PDBA Advisory 
Committee representative to resource these working groups, in order to provide for the appropriate 
subject matter knowledge.  
 
MEETINGS AND AGENDAS  
 
• The PDBA Advisory Committee will meet at least two times per year or at the call of the Chair, 
either in person, or by teleconference.  
• Agendas shall be distributed in advance of meetings whenever possible, and minutes will be 
kept and distributed for each meeting.  
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• A record of decisions shall be prepared and maintained at all meetings.  
 
Appendix “A” – PDBA Advisory Committee Membership List Participating 
Organizations as at 13 September 2018  
 
REPRESENTATIVE:  
Applied Science Technologists & Technicians of BC   
Architectural Institute of BC (AIBC)   
BC Assessment Authority   
BC Housing   
City of Vancouver   
Earthquake Engineering and Research Institute (EERI) - BC Chapter   
Emergency Management BC (EMBC)   
Engineers & Geoscientists BC   
Geo BC (FLNRO)   
Health Emergency Management BC   
Hollyburn Properties   
Indigenous Services Canada (ISC)   
Insurance Bureau of Canada   
Justice Institute of BC   
Justice Institute of BC   
Justice Institute of BC   
North Shore Emergency Management   
Richmond School District #38   
Soda Creek Band   
Structural Engineering Association of BC   
Technical Safety BC (BC Safety Authority)   
University of BC   
 
Organizations Which Have Expressed Interest, or Have Been Identified as Potential Participants  
 
BC Ferries  
BC Hydro   
BC Transit  
Building and Safety Standards Branch Office of Housing and Construction 
Standards Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing  
 
Building Officials Association of BC   
District of Saanich   
Fortis BC  
Ministry of Advanced Education  
Ministry of Forest, Land and Natural Resource Operations  
Ministry of Justice· Liquor Distribution Branch  
Ministry of Transportation and Infrastructure  
PHSA   
Shared Services BC - Real Estate Services   
Translink  
Vancouver Airport Authority (YVR)   
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